Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Funeral procession in the Patani, one of the few moments where Melayu can vent their anger towards the state. (File Photo: CHAROON THONGNUAL)

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Funeral procession for Thai soldiers in Pattani. (CHAIWAT PUPUANG)

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Not everybody agrees that Malaysia can play an honest broker to facilitate peace in southern Thailand. Credit: Mahendra Putra/Unpslash

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

A goodwill gesture brutally batted aside by insurgents

A history of mistrust has come back to haunt the latest peace efforts in the South

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

The recent release of a senior Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) member from prison was seen as a goodwill gesture by the Bangkok government, but the group that controls the vast majority of the insurgents in the deep South has demonstrated its campaign of violence in the region will continue unabated.

Last week a bomb attack in Pattani province's Sai Buri district killed a monk and a soldier and left eight people injured.

Members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) separatist umbrella organisation said they welcomed the release of Ma-ae Sa-a, better known to his peers as Sama-ae Thanam, or Ismail Gadaffi. But the move will have no effect on the ongoing peace talks with the separatists, or their struggle for a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the so-called Patani region.

Sama-ae was arrested by Malaysian authorities in 1998 and secretly handed over to the Thai police. Others captured in the same operation were Haji Abdul Rahman Bazo (aka Haji Beudo Betong), Abdul Rahman Haji Yala, and Haji Da'oud Thanam.

Bazo was released in November 2013 after he turned 70. Government sources said the release of Bazo and Sama-ae, as well as the pending release of Da'oud, was in line with Justice Ministry regulations on early parole for good conduct. But in this case the releases also had a political dimension, observers said.

Efforts to get these Pulo leaders released are nothing new. In the aftermath of the day-long stand-off between Thai security forces and Patani Malay insurgents at the Kru Se Mosque on April 28, 2004, exiled separatist leaders quietly suggested to the Thai side that the men should be released so they could serve as go-betweens with the new generation of insurgents, who had gone on the offensive a few months earlier following an arms heist in January.

The April 28, 2004 operation saw well over 100 young men, armed with little more than machetes and knives, charge into a hailstorm of machinegun bullets.

Thai officials and exiled leaders from longstanding separatist groups were shaken by the incident and its ramifications: if so many militants were willing to charge to almost certain death, what were the possibilities?

The old guard, once released from prison, might not be able to convince the new generation of fighters to lay down their arms. But it was suggested that they could broker an understanding, such as over rules of engagement, between the two sides.

But nobody on the Thai side was willing to act on these suggestions.

A closer look at the militant network behind the Kru Se incident, which was under the directive of charismatic religious teacher Ismail Yaralong (aka Ustaz Soh), revealed that the militants were influenced by what some called "folk Islam".

Those who took part in the simultaneous attack on 10 police outposts and one station in Pattani, Songkhla and Yala on April 28, 2004, said they had imbibed holy water, inscribed their machetes with "bismillah" - in the name of God - and gone into trance before launching their operation at the break of dawn.

Copies of a motivational pamphlet "Bir Jihad di Patani" (The Struggle of Patani) were found on some of the insurgents. Though it contained no theology, zealous Thai officials took it upon themselves to call it the "new Koran".

Though Ustaz Soh's network was short-lived for obvious reasons -machetes proved no match for Thai machineguns - their operation inspired great respect among locals. Not only did it instill real fear in the Thai security apparatus, but many locals said they were moved by the fact that these young men gave up their lives for the cause. During the stand-off, one militant used loudspeakers to call on local Muslims to rise up against the "Siamese invaders". General Pallop Pinmanee, the highest ranking military officer in Pattani at the time, ordered an all-out assault on the mosque for fear that the locals would actually rise up against state officials.

The idea of releasing the Pulo leaders has surfaced several times over the years, but no Bangkok government has acted on it for fear of political repercussions.

In fact, both Malaysian and Thai officials failed to see the consequences of arresting the Pulo leaders until then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra decided she wanted to talk peace.

Sama-ae said recently he never thought he would be arrested by the Thai authorities as he had been involved in facilitating secret talks between the two sides.

Sources in the BRN said they didn't want to end up like the Thanam brothers and added that they would never endorse any peace negotiation until properly prepared and that Bangkok would not deceive them the way they did these Pulo leaders.

The extradition of the prisoners reminded leaders of longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups that Kuala Lumpur will always place bilateral ties with Thailand over the wellbeing of their people.

The 1998 arrests of the Pulo leaders violated an unwritten agreement between Thailand and Malaysia that no such action would be taken as long as former combatants and operatives did not make trouble for their host country.

Members of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) have received Thai citizenship, while the Patani Malay exiled leaders were granted Malaysian citizenship or permitted to relocate to a third country.

The armed struggle of the CPM and the Patani Malays surfaced in the mid-1960s but went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The former was a communist insurgency and the latter ethno-nationalist in nature.

But Thai authorities didn't make the distinction between the two and were busy applauding themselves for a job well done. As for the current wave of separatist militants, the 1990s proved to be the lull before the storm - a period when a new generation of combatants were being groomed to take up where their predecessors had left off.

This time around, instead of relying on help from Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, they would become self-sufficient. And as long as the Patani Malay narrative remained alive, the moral and logistical support of local residents was more or less guaranteed.

Today, in spite of the rhetoric concerning peace and the peace process, insurgency violence in Thailand's Malay-speaking South continues unabated and with no end in sight.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and security analyst based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Bangkok lacks THE WILL to make peace in deep South

A LONG-STANDING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AMONG SECURITY FORCES IS PREVENTING THE LATEST PUSH FOR PEACE FROM GAINING TRACTION

DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION

More than a year after seizing power, our latest crop of junta officials have come face to face with separatist leaders in what are being billed as "pre-talks" - a stepping stone to formal peace negotiations in the far South.

Senior leaders from the self-styled MARA Patani umbrella organisation - which comprises several long-standing separatist groups, including the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP) plus a handful of people who claim to be members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - met with the Thai chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara Kherdphol and his team in Malaysia on June 8. The two sides had met previously for a "pre-talks" session in April.

A young cadre from the BRN, Sukri Hari, was present at the first meeting, but sources said his participation in no way constitutes BRN endorsement for the peace initiative with the Thais.

Sources in the movement said Sukri believes he can help locate common ground between MARA Patani and the BRN, which has so far ruled out any direct talks with the current government. The BRN controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, thus making their participation vital if any peace initiative is to win success.

As for Team Thailand, courting Sukri could pay off in the long run if he can succeed where MARA Patani failed - by convincing the genuine BRN leadership to join the peace process.

In other words, Sukri's participation could be much more important than the participation of self-proclaimed BRN leaders such as Awang Jabat and Tok Imam Haleng, both of whom are prominent members in the MARA Patani forum but were conspicuously absent from the June 8 meeting.

Sukri cannot be allowed to shine too brightly, however. The former teacher is a fugitive facing arrest warrants on charges of treason. He fled Thailand in 2007 along with seven of his colleagues from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala after they were granted bail under the then-government of Surayud Chulanont.

Unless the charges against him are dropped, putting Sukri on a pedestal could prove to be a legal and diplomatic disaster. And there is no guarantee that this young member can change the mindset of the BRN old guard.

Though the June 8 pre-talks were not formal negotiations, and not all of the MARA Patani groups were present, the Thai side did ask the separatist leaders at the meeting if they could get the combatants to curb their activities during the month of Ramadan.

The separatist leaders did not commit themselves, saying it was too early to be making deals, according to a Thai intelligence officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

However, a BRN operative said there would be no escalation of attacks or straying beyond the usual targets of security officials as long as the Thai side did not violate the rules of engagement - by, for example, targeting religious leaders.

The participants at the June 8 meeting couldn't accede to such a request even if they wanted to, because they don't control the combatants, the BRN source added.

Similar discrepancies also exist on the Thai side, between policymakers and the security agencies on the ground.

BRN operatives often point to the target killing of Imam Abdullateh Todir - a member of the Yala Islamic Committee and an imam in Yala's Yaha district - as a prime example of the disunity among the Thai security agencies.

Abdullateh was shot dead by a pro-government death squad in November 2012. An attempt on his life earlier that year failed but cost his daughter her life.

After the failed assassination, Thai Special Forces provided him with a security detail. The Army saw him as a potential go-between for the authorities and the insurgent fighters.

But another agency didn't see it that way, believing instead that he was too close to the insurgents. And when the Special Forces became complacent, a couple of gunmen pounced.

Abdullateh lived in Tambon Patae, an extremely "red" area in Yaha district. His killing triggered an unprecedented spike in violence that lasted six weeks.

A few months later the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) failed to get the provincial Islamic committees to endorse peace negotiations launched on February 28, 2013. Clerics refused to endorse the initiative, having witnessed one of their own gunned down by what they said was a pro-government death squad.

The BRN says Thai security agencies' old attitudes and standard operating procedures haven't changed. The culture of impunity among the officials makes it difficult for them to take anything from Bangkok seriously, they say.

Nevertheless, the BRN has not ruled out talking to the Thai side, but will do so only on its own terms and when it is ready.

For the time being, it doesn't see any real commitment or seriousness from the current Bangkok government and believes that "peace process" is an empty phrase designed for domestic and international consumption.

The culture of impunity aside, the current structure of the Thai negotiating and policy team for the South is also problematic.

On the surface, many ministries and agencies are represented at the policy level and on the dialogue panel.

Top officials from the Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry, Internal Security Operation Command, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Army sit on the policy forum, and their subordinates are represented on the dialogue panel, which is headed by chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara.

But judging from the meeting in mid-May between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and top bureaucrats from these ministries and agencies, it appears that these representatives are more interested in protecting their constituencies than in exploring creative ideas to support peace and negotiations.

Prayut is averse to the idea of MARA Patani because, in the view of the Foreign Ministry, it could lead to an internationalising of the deep South conflict.

Thai officials are often reminded how the now-defunct separatist umbrella group Bersatu helped garner political and financial support from Muslim countries in the Middle East.

Besides the worry over "internationalising" the conflict, there are concerns that the draft constitution doesn't permit the Kingdom to be divided.

PM Prayut may not like the idea of MARA Patani, but the real issue is whether this separatist forum can evolve into something meaningful that attracts support and legitimacy from the Malays of Patani and the international community.

Moreover, no government wants to debate with a foreign entity on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays' historical homeland, much less the culture of impunity and the human rights violations committed against local Muslims over the past few decades.

When the previous wave of separatist militants went under in the 1990s, Bangkok governments stepped up their diplomacy to cut off their support from Arab and Muslim countries.

The Chuan Leekpai government even secured permanent observer status for Thailand at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in order to block these separatist movements from obtaining a seat in the forum and consequently diplomatic support.

Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - friendly Muslim countries in Southeast Asia - endorsed Thailand's quest, which Bangkok took as a stamp of approval for how Thailand treats its Muslim minority.

Today, a stamp of approval seems the last thing on Thai authorities' mind, with anti-Muslim sentiment in and around the country continuing unabated, especially in Nan province where residents are campaigning against a plan to build a local mosque. They claim that an Islamic place of worship could turn their community into another conflict zone like the Patani region.

But separatist movements, particularly the BRN, say it's a different kind of fight nowadays. Combatants on the ground no longer depend on foreign donors since local villagers now provide intelligence, logistical support and supplies to sustain militant cells.

Thai officials often pay lip service to the idea of winning hearts and minds in deep-South communities but seem to have little insight on how to achieve this task.

If anybody has sway over the combatants' rules of engagement, said one BRN operative, it is the local villagers.

He said the militants' decision to end the practice of mutilating Thai soldiers' corpses, as well as ceasing attacks on public schools, was influenced by the villagers.

For the time being, the immediate challenge for the self-proclaimed MARA Patani is convincing the BRN that there is merit in coming to the table to talk, Thai officials said.

But like everything else in this conflict, that's easier said than done, especially when Bangkok is not willing to make any concessions.

DON PATHAN is a security analyst and development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Split in Pulo could hurt peace process with Thai government

Don Pathan
The Nation

An ongoing secret peace talk may be facing more obstacles now that one of long standing Malay Muslim separatist groups that have been working the National Security Council (NSC) has split up resulting in more splinter groups.

The NSC has been secretly dealing with the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) since 2006 after the then Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont issued an executive order asking all relevant agencies to look for non-military solutions to the conflict in the deep South where nearly 5,000 people have been died since January 2004 due to insurgency-related violence.

The group was under the leadership of Noor Abdulrahman, also known as Abe Kamae, and vice president, Kasturi Mahkota, who doubled as the group's foreign affairs chief.

As of late October 2011, Abae Kamae and Kasturi went on their own separate way. No explanation was really given as to why the two parted.

In a statement sent to The Nation, Abae Kamae claimed he is still the president of the movement. He was elected at a Pulo Congress held in 2009 in Syria. He named a well-known figure in the exiled Patani Malay community, Lukman Bin Lima, as the deputy president.

Kasturi, on the other hand, accused Abae Kamae and his followers of abuse of power and trying to obstruct a work in progress. Kasturi, a key person behind the dealing with the NSC since 2006, maintained that his legitimacy came from the Pulo Congress, also known as the Majlis Kepimpinan Pulo, or MKP.

He argued that Abae Kamae had decided to abandon the Congress and therefore neither he nor Lukman has the right to the name of the movement. The two factions continue to use the same Pulo logo.

An informed Thai source with working relations with the secret process of the NSC said he was concerned that the split as a set back and could have an adversed affect on the NSC process.

But a source in the Thai Army who has been dealing with Patani Malay separatist movements for decades said the split at this stage should not matter much since the NSC secret process is still in confidence building mode and experimenting on a number of ideas.

Moreover, said the officer, there are other so-called Pulo factions and leaders that the NSC process had overlooked. They include Samsudine Khan, who is also known as Abu Yasir Fikri, who in July 2009 formed an alliance with another separatist group, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) of Jehku Mae Kuteh, also known as Doramae Puteh.

The officer also pointed to Europe-based Rushdie Yi-ngor, also a long-standing leader in the Pulo movement who appeared to have gained some traction after the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) re-entered the scene by organising a talk shop for the long-standing separatist groups in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in October 2010.

OIC urged the leaders to form the United Patani People Council (UPPC) to be an umbrella organisation that could serve as the separatist movement's political wing that would enter into some sort of formal dialogue or peace talks with the Thai state.

The problem with the Thai side, said another military officer, is that there is no unity among all the relevant government agencies on the very idea of talking to the enemies even though there is an understanding that they are willing to settle for something less than independence.

Thai military commanders said they rather deal directly with the insurgents on the ground who are behind the violence rather than the exiled leaders who have no real command and control on the ground.

Thai government continues to employ military approach, coupled with development, to win the hearts and minds of the local residents. The effort has been easy as the armed militants on the ground enjoy a great deal of tremendous support from the local Malay Muslim villagers, not to mention the fact that heavy-handed tactics and culture of impunity among the authorities continue to make it harder for the state to regain its legitimacy among the Malay Muslim residents.

Sources with working knowledge of the militants on the ground said the insurgents would not enter into any direct negotiation with the Thai officials for fear that such effort would be a trap to kill them.

They said the only exit strategy is through the exiled leaders who the armed insurgents said must first unite among themselves before they could enter into formal or informal talks with the Thai state.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Split-in-Pulo-could-hurt-peace-process-with-Thai-g-30170305.html

‘REFUGEE’ INCIDENT: Pulo denies role in Muslim exodus

Outlawed separatist group says flight of 131 Narathiwat asylum seekers into Malaysia was spurred by harassment 

Don Pathan
The Nation

The Pattani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) has dismissed allegations by the Thai government that it hatched a plot for 131 Thai Muslims to flee to Malaysia and to smear Thailand’s reputation by drawing international attention to the incident.

In a statement delivered to The Nation last weekend from the exiled outlawed Muslim militant organisation’s headquarters in Europe, Pulo said the 131 Thai nationals were ordinary villagers who fled their homes in southern Thailand because “they cannot live under Thai harassment.”

Pulo officials also dismissed accusations that the Pattani Malay Human Rights Organisation was their political “front” organisation. The Pulo statement said the Malay human rights organisation had been formed shortly after the Tak Bai demonstration last October when 78 Muslim demonstrators died in the custody of Thai security forces.

The organisation is an independent organisation with no link to Pulo, and that it helps “displaced people who need shelter and basic needs for survival”, according to Pulo. The 131 Thai Muslims seeking asylum in Malaysia are residents of Narathiwat’s border districts and appear to have crossed into Malaysia simultaneously before taking refuge in two mosques in the state of Kelantan.

They have since been relocated to a shelter and are being interviewed by officials working for a UN refugee agency. The incident took on a bitter diplomatic note when Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra accused some of the purported refugees of being insurgents. The Malaysian government responded by inviting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to interview the Thai Muslims to determine their status.

Outspoken former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad ratcheted up the controversy when he suggested the 131 Thai Muslims be given asylum once their status as refugees was established. Muslim residents in Narathiwat said they believed the asylum-seekers had fled because of a misunderstanding with security officials who ordered locals to report to provincial offices to undergo a week-long “re-education programme” aimed instilling a heightened sense of patriotism.

 Residents said a recently passed controversial emergency decree, described by critics as “a license to kill”, may also have been a factor in further alarming local Muslims fearing abuse at the hands of security forces. Pulo surfaced in the 1970s at the height of the armed struggle by ethnic Malays seeking independence from Thailand.

Hostilities died down in the previous decade before they resurfaced again in January 2004 with a raid on an army arsenal. Since then nearly 900 people have been killed in the South. “As you may have notice, we are back,” the exiled organisation’s statement read. Pulo also accused the Thai government of misleading the Organisation of Islamic Conference in order to enhance relations with Muslim countries.

The statement by Pulo asserted that it was police and army “brutality” that had led to the renewed insurgency. The statement stated that Thai security forces had carried out extra-judicial killings of at least 17 Muslims prior to the assassination of Imam Stopa Yusoh in Lahar village in Narathiwat. It said these incidents had fostered resentment against the state, particularly after the killings were not properly investigated.

“We are engaged in defending and protecting local people who, as you know, are confronting Thai security men,” the statement said. In another statement issued by the organisation, exiled deputy president Abae Kamae dismissed recent news reports that Pulo was holding talks with government officials. He also dismissed a statement by an unnamed “spokesman” that the organisation was planning attacks in Phuket, Bangkok, and Pattaya. “It is not our policy” to stage such attacks, he said.

---------------

BURNING ISSUE: Malaysia row may backfire
Thaksin’s bitter ‘refugee’ pillis entirely self-administered

Don Pathan
The Nation

September 16, 2005

Thailand and Malaysia have once again found themselves at loggerheads in the
aftermath of a diplomatic tussle that involves the 131 Thai Muslims who fled their
villages for the Malaysian state of Kelantan, reportedly because they were scared by
an impending crackdown on their community by government security forces.
But this round of a political tussle could prove very costly for Bangkok now that the
stakes have been raised. An unwanted international spotlight is shining brightly on the
restive region, although the government insists that the incident is an internal affair.
Senior security officials on the ground said the issue could have been settled at a very
local level between the immigration officers of the two countries.
40
They said the Foreign Ministry had hit the right note when suggesting on the first day
that it was a case of simple misunderstanding and that the villagers would be treated
with dignity upon their return. But Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could not stay
quiet long enough for diplomacy to take its due course.
Thaksin put the ball in Kuala Lumpur’s court when he stated that some of the 131
were Muslim insurgents, whom authorities accuse of trying to carve out a separate
homeland for the ethnic Malays in Thailand’s deep South.
Malaysia responded by permitting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to get into the act – an unprecedented move on this sticky issue, which has
long been at the centre of dealings between the two countries.
Former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed turned up the heat even
further when he suggested that the 131 Narathiwat villagers should be given asylum if
they are deemed to be genuine refugees.
Defence Minister Thamarak Isarangura then shot back, suggesting that Kuala Lumpur
has turned a blind eye to supposed meetings among Thai Muslim insurgents on the
Malaysian island of Langkawi. But his move to implicate Malaysia could very well
pave the way for a completely new tone and context for future bilateral dialogues over
the border region, although not all stakeholders are convinced that this is best for the
two countries.
For one thing, the two governments have never really agreed between themselves
whether the violence in the South is criminal or political in nature.
The two sides cannot even agree on whether the extradition treaty dating from the
colonial period should be honoured.
Thailand has insisted all along that the violence in the deep South is a domestic matter
but overlooked the possibility that somehow along the way, Malaysia would be
brought into the picture.
So when the 131 local residents fled across the border, it was a question of too little
and too late to come up with an agreement about what is the appropriate terminology.
Diplomats and observers say that the Malaysian authorities have never really trusted
their Thai counterparts to treat the suspects whom they had previously handed over in
a proper manner – or at least in line with the country’s legal procedures.
If the UN deems the 131 to be genuine refugees, then any arrest warrants from the
Thai police would be almost meaningless as insurgent crimes in the unruly region
could be conveniently deemed political. And as refugees, they would have the right to
ask for resettlement in a third country.
At the recent Asean-UN summit in New York, Thaksin lashed out at an unnamed UN
agency for allowing itself to be “trapped into local political exploitation that could
lead to international misunderstanding”.
41
“Had the agency paid due respect to Thailand’s concern and had it tried to understand
the real cause of the incident, it would not have been so exploited,” Thaksin added.
But why hasn’t Thaksin asked Kuala Lumpur directly about this? Why couldn’t the
PM and his men stay quiet long enough to let officials handle the problem at the local
level?Some two years ago Thaksin said the UN was not his father – an angry remark
about the world body’s criticism of his government’s human rights record.
That may be true – the UN is not his father. But for the time being, Thaksin is
beginning to feel the might of an organisation often referred to as a “paper tiger”.
If the UNHCR grants the 131 “refugee” status, Thailand would know what a bitter pill
tastes like – the kind of pill that Burma and the Indochinese countries had been taking
for the most of the last half of the previous century when internal conflicts pushed
their own people across someone else’s border.
Don Pathan

How a policeman dodged bullets in broad daylight

Don Pathan
The Nation

SUNGAI PADI, Narathiwat

Staff Sergeant Marohsae Moohanan has no problem going to bed at night but admits the pictures in his head still haunt him every now and then.

"They were within my vision. I could see them take the bullets," said the 33-year-old Pattani native who spent 11 years on the force. "We couldn't make out where the bullets were coming from."

For five minutes, Marohsae's life hung by a thread, and he did not know whether he was going to make it or not. Two of his colleagues were knocked down in the blink of an eye when three men sprayed them with AK47 automatic rifles as they were carrying out a routine assignment.

It was a sunny afternoon when the four officers, doubling up on two motorbikes, were on their way to a nearby school to provide a security escort for a group of schoolteachers on their way to their quarters. The officers at Sungai Padi police station have been doing this for the past year since the discovery of the bullet-riddled body of a teacher from a nearby district.

It was supposed to be a routine assignment, but it turned out to be one of the most haunting experiences of his life, Marohsae admits. "I emptied half of the magazine in my automatic rifle. We were about 30 to 40 metres away from them," he said.

Outnumbered and outgunned, Marohsae yelled at his partner to retreat until reinforcements arrived. But by then, the gunmen were gone and about 80 empty metal jackets were scattered along the small dirt road in the midst of a highly wooded area.

"This is the first time I have ever experienced anything like this," the officer admitted. "It's too bad. They were good guys," Marohsae said of his dead colleagues.

The local community echoed the sentiments, saying the two young officers had no enemies and that they don't understand why anybody would want to kill them.

The death of Marohsae's fellow officers is part of a spate of violence that has not only rocked the predominantly Muslim community in the country's deep South but also made a mockery of the nation's leadership in Bangkok who appear at a loss about what to do.

Since December last year, 21 police officers have been shot dead by automatic rifle fire, and not a soul has been brought to justice. Police chief Pol General Sant Saruthanond thinks the killings are the work of some influential figures who are determined to create a situation of instability so that they can continue to demand protection money from developers and businessmen in the region.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, ruling out suggestions that Muslim separatists were behind the attacks, says the illicit activities may involve government officials as well. He also admits more work has to be done to bring the local community and government officials closer together.

Local residents and analysts say decades of heavy-handed tactics by the country's security apparatus, bent on weeding out separatists, still lingers in the minds of many Muslims.

During a recent visit to the region to meet with community and religious leaders, Sant boasted of a new government strategy that would guarantee all the security agencies - civilians, Army and police - pool their intelligence information. He admitted that in the past, intelligence tended to remain with the respective agencies but vowed that things would change from now on.

Still, the feeling on the ground does not reflect the optimism of political leaders, while morale is still low in spite of the 1,500 flak jackets passed out to officers by Sant himself. The jackets, locally made, are designed to stop .22 calibre and 44 magnum bullets - but all of the 21 dead policemen were shot with automatic rifles.

Officers manning checkpoints along the roads in remote areas opt for nearby bushes rather than stand behind their official sandbags, saying they were sitting ducks just waiting to be shot if they remain within the illuminated area.

Politicians dismissed suggestions the killing could be the work of Muslim separatists, calling the attackers "slapdash bandits". But a former leader of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, or Pulo, says the government is not in a position to count anything out.

Because nobody seems to have a convincing answer to the killings, coupled with the fact that no one has been arrested for the incidents, the government's credibility in the eyes of the local community has been dented tremendously, says Yusof Longpi, the former secretary-general and a co-founder of Pulo.

"The psychological impact is tremendous. If you can take out police officers, then where is public safety, where is the leadership, and where is the direction?" asked the former rebel leader who surrendered in 1991 in return for a blanket amnesty.