Thai Deep South Rebels Strike Again During Ramadan

Don Pathan and Artef Sohko
Yala, Thailand

For the past 13 years, insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South have launched major attacks during Ramadan. They’ve done this to remind security forces of an alleged crime that occurred when the Islamic holy month, which follows a lunar cycle, fell in October 2004: the Tak Bai massacre.

File Photo: Roadside bombing in Narathiwat. CHAIWAT PUMPUANG

Army and police units allegedly opened fire on unarmed Patani Malay demonstrators in the Tak Bai district of Narathiwat province, killing seven. Another 78 protesters died from suffocation after they were stacked one on top another in military transport trucks.

This year Ramadan-time attacks started a little early, on May 20, when multiple ATMs were bombed simultaneously about half an hour after Muslims broke fast and the streets were empty.

The attacks were carried out in at least 14 locations in four southern provinces, Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songkhla. Most of the blasts took place meters from military checkpoints, thus adding to the humiliation of the troops.


Sending a message

Violence in Thailand’s Malay-speaking and predominantly Muslim Deep South is political in nature. It’s a form of communicative action.

In many places around the world, video cameras and social media are often used to send out a message behind an attack. Often, the intended audiences are policymakers and the general public, who may be halfway around the world.

On the other hand, the audience for the insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South is still pretty much confined to the security forces and the agency bosses. It’s a form of deadly messaging between two warring sides.

What goes into public space, including social media, doesn’t always reflect the reality on the ground.

Unlike other insurgent groups in Southeast Asia, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one longstanding group that controls virtually all of the rebels in the Thai Deep South, does not have an identifiable spokesman who can verify incidents on the ground.

This makes it much more difficult for academics and researchers to map the violence in this conflict.

Public statements come “once in a blue moon” and, usually, it is a one-way street, meaning reporters cannot ask thorough questions.

The narratives and explanations of incidents are provided by a government spokesman, but it doesn’t mean that the public living in this historically contested region believe them.

As residents of this region, where political violence comes in waves, Muslims and Buddhists have come to terms with things such as pro-government death squads who have no qualms about shooting indiscriminately into a tea shop full of villagers; or a gunman pumping two bullets at close range into the back of a person’s head because he or she was a government informant.

In one instance, a roadside bomb aimed at an incoming military patrol also claimed the lives of innocent bystanders who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Islamic leader gunned down

Many understand that this violence is political in nature. For those who’ve lost a loved one, no explanation could ever help overcome the personal tragedy.

Just days ago, the deputy chairman of the Islamic Committee of Pattani, Aduldej Chenae, was shot dead by a gunman at close range. Like the killings of top figures in the region, his murder generated all sorts of theories and motives.

Was he killed because of personal reasons? Or because he was too involved in the Safety Zone, a yet to be implemented ceasefire between the Thai government and a network of a longstanding separatist group called MARA Patani? Nobody seems to know the answer.

Nevertheless, Aduldej’s death raised the issue of the personal safety of individuals who are involved in conflict resolution. It is tempting to suggest that BRN, whose ruling council does not endorse the talks, had a motive to assassinate him.

Longtime observers of the conflict also pointed to the senseless killings of other high-profile figures. These included the fatal shooting of Waesumae Sudden in September 2014.

Like Aduldej, Ustaz Mae was also a resident of Saiburi district in Pattani province.

The Thai Army claimed it had been working closely with the two men to lay down the foundation for what would be official “Track 1” talks between the government and MARA Patani.

As expected, fingers were pointing back and forth. The BRN and Thai military accused each other of ordering the killings.

Ustaz Mae, as he was known to the locals, was said to be the acting secretary-general of the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP), the ruling council of the BRN.

Some said he was removed from his post for helping the Thai government with its peace initiative.

Three months prior to the launching of the peace talks with the government of then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in February 2013, a village imam, Abdullateh Todir, was killed in Yala’s Yaha district.

Abdullateh was a resident of Tambon Patae, an extremely “red” area.

Being an imam in Patae, one would have to be blind not to know the insurgents in the area, one security official reasoned. This made the imam a good candidate to act as a go-between, said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

But somebody felt he was too close to the insurgents and, therefore, he had to be “eliminated.” His death set off a series of vicious retaliation that lasted six weeks.

Abdullateh’s death also drove a wedge between security forces and the Islamic committees in the provinces of the Deep South. Abdullateh was a member of the Islamic Committee of Yala.

In the end, when the Yingluck peace talks were launched, none of these Islamic committees would endorse the initiative.

It is important to note that not all Thai security agencies sing to the same sheet music. Disagreement is rife on all sorts of issues, such as the official negotiation itself.

Indeed, there are many sectors in Thai society and state agencies that are turned off by the idea of top officials sitting and talking to Patani Malays, whom they consider to be criminals, more or less.

Targeted killings in this restive region are all too common. But they hardly ever solve the immediate problem. Often, these killings become part of the narratives promoted by the warring sides and stakeholders of the conflict.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. Artef Sohko is the chairman of The Patani, a civil society organization dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict in Thailand's Deep South. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and not of BenarNews.

This version revises an earlier headline that referred to the killing of Aduldej Chenae, the deputy chairman of the Islamic Committee of Pattani.

Why the Safety Zone concept has failed to secure peace in South

PART I

By Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 

Part one of a two-part series

Deep down inside, all sides knew that the “Safety Zone” pilot project in Thailand’s South wasn’t much to brag about.

But since neither side has nothing to show after talking to one another for nearly three years, the pilot project all of a sudden became important.

For the current junta, the Safety Zone would be their legacy, a shaky foundation for the next government to continue its work to resolve the conflict and insurgency in the Muslim-majority, 
Malay-speaking South. The two sides – MARA Patani and the Dialogue Panel – spent a great deal of time polishing and fine-tuning the Safety Zone idea, but forgot the big picture – one that talked about how the Malays of Patani can reconcile their differences with the predominantly Buddhist Thai state.

Soldier on foot patrol passing by school children in Pattani. Photo by Chaiwat Pumpuang

Political leaders were so eager to reduce or end insurgency violence in this historically contested region, they thought it best to focus their energy on reducing the attacks (and not much else). So far, the number of violent incidents has gone down dramatically. Naturally, the military has no qualms about taking credit for that.

Instead of examining the historical grievances of the Malays of Patani, Thai policymakers focus their energy on getting the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) to join MARA Patani at the negotiating table.

Many are pinning their hopes on Malaysia, the designated facilitator, to obtain BRN endorsement for the talks. But there is no indication that the BRN – the long-standing separatist movement that surfaced in the 1960s, will join the official track and sit with MARA Patani. Today, BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground.

Members said the leadership is not in a hurry to come to the negotiating table. BRN will only do so if their negotiators are properly trained and that the process is mediated by members of the international community, preferably countries with a strong record in conflict resolution.

Thailand and MARA Patani, meanwhile, are still bogged down with their own creation, Safety Zone, a pilot project where a ceasefire is supposed to be observed in a designated district.

Since MARA Patani doesn’t control the insurgents, the facilitator, Malaysia, had to ask BRN to observe the situation as well. After several rounds of discussions, technical officials on the two sides agreed on Joh I Rong district in Narathiwat.

MARA Patani was expecting to see a formal launch and signing ceremony of the “agreement” designating the zone. But the Thai technical officials said there was no need to ink anything because the process was still a “confidence-building measure”.

Work together

In a public statement dated May 23, MARA Patani’s spokesman insisted that signing the agreement was necessary because “it involves certain sensitive issues like legal, security and safety protection for its members who will participate in the SZ exercise”.

“Without signing the document there is no guarantee for them,” said Abu Hafez Al-Hakim.  

There was also the transfer of three prisoners to a holding centre in the vicinity of the Safe House, a co-working space where representatives from both sides will work together to observe the pilot project.

The refusal to ink the negotiated text was not the only reason that irked MARA Patani. Members of the umbrella organisation felt humiliated when Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan stole their thunder when they stated casually, without any fanfare, what was supposed to be a breakthrough in the dialogue process. It was not exactly what MARA Patani had in mind.

MARA Patani was hoping for a more formal announcement to reflect the importance of what it considered a breakthrough of sorts.

Already furious at the treatment from the Thai prime minister and his security tsar, MARA Patani came to the April 25 meeting determined to salvage its dignity by demanding that the Thai side sign the agreement. And when the Thai delegation refused, everything came to a halt.

“In my opinion, the much-awaited implementation of the Safety Zones will have to wait, at least for two reasons: First, until both parties can agree on the dispute over the document-signing issue, the implementation of the SZ will be put on hold. Secondly, the facilitator, Mr Zamzamin (Dato Ahmad Zamzamin bin Hashim), was exclusively appointed by (Prime Minister) Najib Razak on a contract basis that expires in February 2019,” Abu Hafez said.

PART II

Will electoral earthquakes free blocked peace in South?  

June 9, 2018
By Don Pathan

Special to The Nation

In a gesture to MARA Patani that all is not lost, Army Commander-in-chief General Chalermchai Sitthisart visited security checkpoints in Joh I Rong district on June 1. He was there to provide moral support to troops responsible for implementing the Safety Zone, Thai military officials said.

In spite of hiccups plaguing the pilot project, Thailand is still committed to this peace initiative – at least that was the message Chalermchai was sending out to MARA Patani and the world.

Thai officials at the policy level say they have been informed by the Malaysian facilitator that leaders of the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) have agreed to respect the Safety Zone ceasefire if and when the district is officially designated. No timeline was agreed upon, however.

Bangkok sees this as a gesture of goodwill from senior members of the BRN ruling council to the facilitator Dato Ahmad Zamzamin bin Hashim. The assurance is said to have been made last year at a meeting in which Zamzamin tried to convince BRN representatives to join the peace initiative being led by MARA Patani. Needless to say, the BRN declined the invitation.

Given the fluidity of the BRN chain-of-command, not to mention that their command-and-control from the very top to the cell level is untested, such an agreement will be difficult to manage, says a Thai military official working on the region.

The BRN is extremely bottom-heavy, with decisions to launch attacks made mainly at the local level.

For the combatants, it is a matter of grasping opportunity as it comes, usually employing roadside bombs to attack security units patrolling on foot or vehicles, followed by a brief gunfight. The strategic aim is for a “clean hit” without collateral damage. Government security officials are more or less sitting ducks, waiting to return fire.

As for the talks with MARA Patani, it is not clear how long Bangkok will continue on a course that some officials describe as a “vicious cycle”. So far, whenever Thai negotiators and MARA Patani have hailed “progress”, BRN operatives on the ground have carried out attacks to discredit the claims.

The BRN say the Safety Zone project will not change their strategy, which is to make the area ungovernable by attacking and discrediting government security apparatus.

The bombing blitz in the far South that hit more than 20 ATM machines on May 20 was a reminder to Thai authorities that the BRN is still a force to be reckoned with. The bombs were shrapnel-free devices detonated in almost deserted streets half an hour after people had broken their Ramadan fast. All the bombings were carried out in the heart of cities and, in most cases, just metres away from security checkpoints.

Local opinion was that the simultaneous attacks came in response to a dispute between teachers and a group of Muslim parents at the Anuban Pattani School over the banning of the Islamic headscarf for Muslim students.

But rebel sources deny this. They point out that traditionally at least one high-profile attack is conducted during the month of Ramadan, to remind the Thai government that the 2004 Tak Bai massacre of 78 unarmed Malay Muslim demonstrators – who suffocated after being stacked one atop the other in the back of military transport tracks – has not been forgotten. Seven were also shot dead at the protest site. 

Less than a week prior to the blitz, exactly one day before the start of Ramadan, separatist militants attacked four military outposts and a police station in Yala province’s Krong Pinang and Yaha districts. 

The overall number of attacks may have dropped over the past decade, but the militants continue to send a message that they are willing an able to carry on the fight with the same intensity as when this wave of insurgency surfaced 14 years ago.

Stakeholders in this peace initiative are now waiting anxiously to see Kuala Lumpur’s next move. Many observers believe Malaysia’s Zamzamin, the designated facilitator, will be replaced as he is deemed too close to former prime minister Najib Razak.

For the BRN, it doesn’t matter whether Zamzamin stays or goes. They see themselves as the most important players because they control the course of insurgency violence and thus any peace negotiations will have to be with them. The unfortunate part for Thai authorities is that the BRN is not in a hurry to come to the negotiating table.

How long Thailand will ride this roller-coaster with MARA Patani remains unclear. But a growing number of Thai officials believe the upcoming election in Thailand, which could be as early as February, along with major changes in Malaysia’s political landscape, means serious soul-searching is in order for the peace initiative for the far South. Whether that means internationalising the process, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict in Thailand’s far South.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30347326

In Goodwill Move, BRN Rebels Halt Violence in Deep South District

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
June 4, 2018

Last Friday, Thai Army Commander-in-chief Gen. Chalermchai Sitthisart visited security checkpoints in Cho I-rong, a district in Narathiwat province designated as the site of a potential “Safety Zone,” or limited ceasefire, in the insurgency-stricken region known as the Deep South.

He reportedly was there to provide moral support to troops who would be on the ground during the implementation of the Safety Zone, a pilot project yet to be implemented but that was agreed upon by a so-called Dialogue Panel of government negotiators and MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of long-standing Patani Malay separatist organizations.

Armed separatist insurgency in Thailand’s far South surfaced in the 1960s and went under in the late 1980s. The conflict resurfaced again in mid-2001 but wasn’t officially acknowledged until Jan. 4, 2004, when scores of insurgents raided an army battalion in Narathiwat and made off with more than 300 weapons.

The one group that dominates the scene on the ground today is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the BRN or National Revolutionary Front, which controls virtually all of the insurgents in the Deep South.

BRN refuses to endorse the ongoing talks between Thailand and MARA Patani. Their members said any negotiation would have to be mediated by members of the international community and in line with international best practices.

But, as a gesture of goodwill to the stakeholders of this peace initiative, BRN said it would observe the ceasefire in Cho I-rong district and weeks have passed since its fighters stopped committing acts of violence as a manifestation of this gesture.

“We have been told to refrain from carrying out attacks in Cho I-rong district,” said a BRN source on the ground.

So far, BRN members have kept their word. But it doesn’t mean they have to end their campaign of violent attacks in other parts of this historically contested region. There are nearly 40 districts in the Deep South, where nearly 7,000 people have been killed from insurgency-related violence since January 2004.

Still committed to peace process

Chalermchai’s visit to Cho I-rong was symbolic. According to one senior military officer who monitors the conflict and the peace talks, it was a message to MARA Patani that Thailand was still committed to this peace initiative in spite of the absence of BRN’s endorsement and participation.

Bangkok understands full well that MARA Patani was upset at Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha for jumping the gun when he announced that Cho I-rong had been designated as the district to come under the Safety Zone.

The rebels were hoping for a more formal announcement to reflect the importance of what they considered a breakthrough of sorts.

It was not clear if Prayuth had breached the protocol on purpose or that he wasn’t thinking. Regardless, Bangkok never liked the idea of giving MARA Patani or any other separatist entity from the Malay-speaking South any kind of legitimacy or recognition if it didn’t have to. The fact that the government has sent a team of negotiators to meet with them is all the legitimacy they are going to get.

For the BRN, Safety Zone or not, it’s business as usual. Exactly one day before the start of Ramadan, separatist militants attacked four military outposts and one police station in Yala province’s Krong Pinang and Yaha districts.

Less than a week later, on May 20, BRN militants set off a string of simultaneous bombs at more than 20 ATM machines across the region. The bombs were small and shrapnel was not used. They were not powerful enough to blast the steel cover open. But cash or casualties didn’t seem to be their aim.

All the bombings were carried out in downtown areas and, in most cases, just meters away from government’s security checkpoints. The explosions were set off simultaneously, about half an hour after sunset when Muslims broke their daily fast and the streets were mostly clear.

Many observers rushed to the conclusion that the attacks were in response to a dispute between teachers and a group of Muslim parents at the Anuban Pattani (Elementary) School over a ban on the hijab, or Islamic headscarf, for Muslim students.

But rebel sources said the attacks were a reminder to the Thai government that they hadn’t forgotten about the 2004 Tak Bai massacre, when 78 unarmed Malay Muslims demonstrators died from suffocation after they were stacked one on top another in the back of military transport tracks. Seven were shot dead at the protest site.

The incident took place on October of that year and it was during Ramadan, an Islamic holy month that follows the lunar calendar. Needless to say, the incident radicalized a new generation of separatist militants and became part of the insurgent’s narrative.

What now for Zamzamin?

Meanwhile in Malaysia, Thailand and elsewhere, stakeholders of this peace initiative are waiting anxiously to see Kuala Lumpur’s next move.

Many believe that Ahmad Zamzamin bin Hashim, the designated facilitator of the current official peace process, will be replaced following last month’s change of governments in Malaysia. Zamzamin was deemed too close to former Prime Minister Najib Razak.

BRN sources said it wouldn’t matter if Zamzamin stayed or left because the foundation of this peace initiative had never been sound. Besides the fact that the most important player is not at the table, Thailand has never been interested in addressing the root cause of the conflict.

BRN sources said their leaders wouldn’t even consider negotiating with the Thais until their own negotiators and political wing were properly trained and prepared.

Some in the Thai policy circles believe that “internationalizing” the process should be considered if it means BRN participation. But if Gen. Aksara Kerdpol remains as chief negotiator for Thailand, and Zamzamin stays on as the designated facilitator, one can be certain that BRN will continue to resist being involved in the peace talks.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/violence-halt-06042018142131.html