THE SHOOTING has stopped and the refugees have returned to their homes on the Burmese side of the border. But it would be a grave mistake to think the fighting and bloodshed on the Sino-Burmese border is over and done with.
By DON PATHAN
THE NATION
Immediately after the mid-August attack on ethnic Chinese Kokang rebels by the Burmese army, politics in the Golden Triangle went into a tailspin. Jolted by the attack against the Kokang, Chinese authorities moved quickly to ensure that the Burmese junta would not make further advances against other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA).
The junta, on the other hand, justified its attack on the Kokang, after two decades of cease-fire, saying the group was illegally producing arms. Perhaps accusing them of trafficking illicit drugs would be too easy given the fact that just about every ethnic army in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle is growing opium and making heroin and methamphetamine.
In fact, almost immediately after they came into being, these splinter groups of the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, have flooded the world with heroin and, over the past few decades, methamphetamine. But that was fine as long as some of that money helped build roads, other infrastructure and trickled down into the pockets of Burmese army commanders. This arrangement, however, has effectively come to an end. In the aftermath of the August attack, horse-trading between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's junta, and the UWSA has been going on. It won't be the same, but the Wa are trying to hold on to whatever they believe is rightfully theirs. So far, neither side appears to be giving in.
The end of October is reportedly the deadline for the Wa to surrender their arms and come under direct command of the junta. But similar ultimatums have been issued before, and the two sides have always wiggled their way out of such tight spots. In 1996, for example, after joining up with the Wa to defeat the then Shan opium warlord, Khun Sa, and his Mong Tai Army, Rangoon ordered the Wa back to the so-called Special Region 2 on the Sino-Burmese border. But the way the Wa see it, they fought and died for those patches of land along the Thai border. Not long after that, nearly 200,000 villagers along the northern Wa region were relocated to UWSA-controlled areas along the Thai border. With the help of heroin money, temporary outposts became permanent Wa villages.
To begin with, the ceasefire agreements between the junta and the cease-fire groups were never really built on solid ground. The absence of clashes didn't mean peace. It just meant they had agreed to stop shooting at each other for a while. Prior to his ouster in 2004, the then Burmese security chief, General Khin Nyunt, would make annual visits to the Wa stronghold of Panghsang, where UWSA chairman Bao Yuxiang would greet him with a bundle of sugar cane - a symbol of strong friendship. But since Khin Nyunt's fall from grace, a new reality has kicked in. Burmese army commander, Deputy Snr-General Maung Aye, and junta chief Snr-General Than Shwe, have repeatedly made efforts to redefine Rangoon's relationship with the ethnic armies.
The SPDC has, over the years, made overtures to smaller rebel groups and succeeded in getting several of them to surrender their weapons. These outfits would police their own districts, but conventional security would be up to the national army, the Tadmadaw. One such model is Huamuang, a former stronghold of the late Khun Sa, the Shan opium warlord who surrendered in 1997 in exchange for amnesty. In Huamuang, Maha Ja now operates more like a mayor rather than the fearsome warlord he once was. To make certain that he toes the line, Huamuang is surrounded by two Burmese army battalions. But by ousting the Kokang Chinese, the junta effectively shredded the two-decade-old cease-fire agreements. It was also a slap in the face to the Chinese government, which sees these ethnic armies as more or less their proxies even after direct and open support ended in 1989 when the Communist Party of Burma, the umbrella that held these groups together, fell apart. Khin Nyunt then orchestrated a series of cease-fires with these groups.
Two decades later, with the attack on the Kokang, the agreements are more or less in pieces. For the Burmese, there is no turning back. Where the region goes from now is anybody's guess. But for the time being, the Thai authorities are scrambling for any scrap of information - just to get an indication as to what the UWSA, the Chinese government, and the SPDC have up their sleeves. Like Thailand, all these actors are stakeholders.
Whatever happens in this rugged region affects them all - thus the eagerness to know, especially when, in the coming weeks, the Wa leaders and the Burmese junta will get together for what a senior Thai military intelligence officer called the "final showdown". The Burmese are expected to issue another ultimatum to the UWSA this month that basically calls on it to transform into some sort of border patrol police unit under the directive of the Burmese army.
"All are convinced that the Wa will reject this, but no one knows for sure what kind of measures the junta will take up after the rejection," said a Thai officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
For the Thai government, an all-out war between the Wa and the Burmese could mean hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. For the Chinese, watching the Kokang force crumble has not been easy. Their influence in and access to the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, not to mention their access to the Indian Ocean, was put into question.
All are certain that the UWSA, another of China's long-time friends, is next on the Burmese hit list. Taking out the UWSA may create a new set of ground rules for the Burmese and the remaining cease-fire groups. It won't shut the door on China's entry into Burma, however.
It just means that the Chinese will have one less proxy in Burma. Cross-border friendship is common in this part of the world, where opium warlords and drug armies play for keeps. But by eliminating the Kokang, the Burmese are telling their Chinese neighbour that such friendship will no longer come at the expense of national security.
