Persecuting the peacemakers: A dismal tale from the South

The systematic harassment of men like Artef Sohko has shut down grass-roots activism and blocked the path to lasting peace in this contested region

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Artef Sohko says he is fed up with being constantly harassed by unnamed government or pro-government entities, but he's not sure what he can do about it.

Since 2007, when he became the first ethnic Malay to be elected president of the Student Federation of Thailand, Artef says Thai security agencies have routinely persecuted him because of his outspoken demands for justice and equality for ethnic Malays in the historically contested deep South.

Artef Sohko (right) speaking at the FCCT. 

The year 2007 saw a peak in violence as allegations of rape and torture were made against security forces in the region. Artef and other student leaders felt they had enough and they decided to seize the Pattani Central Mosque in protest.

"There were allegations that a [Paramilitary] Ranger had raped a woman in front of her mother in [Yala's] Yaha district. We also heard about other rape incidents, but the victims and their families were too ashamed to speak out," Artef said.

Senior military commanders agreed to set up a joint working group to look into the allegations. But like every other ad-hoc committee set up by authorities in this region, it slowly slipped from the agenda and out of the minds of government officials.

Meanwhile relations between ethnic Malays and Thai Buddhist communities in the South took a nosedive as innocent bystanders became the targets - often as part of tit-for-tat vendettas between security forces and insurgents.

International watchdogs such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have condemned actions on both sides, but they consistently criticise Thai security forces for a "culture of impunity" and have urged the government to punish wrongdoers. But such requests have fallen on deaf ears and quickly slipped from public consciousness - even in high-profile cases like the beating to death of Imam Yapa Kaseng. A full seven years after the Muslim religious leader's killing, the National Anti-Corruption Commission last week suggested that the accused, Army Sub-Lieutenant Sirikhet Wanitbamrung, face disciplinary and criminal action.

Artef says he has never been tortured, but he describes how a security official once beat a person in front of him as a way of demonstrating his unrestrained power.

"The idea was to demoralise me. He wanted to show what he could do and that there was not a thing that I could do about it," he said.

The persecution also took on a devious, personal angle. An elaborate flowchart was faked-up showing him, his wife and her father linked in a crime syndicate and drug trafficking ring. It was released via the social media, making it difficult to trace without help from the authorities. But given that no Thai government in the last decade has taken legal action against an official in the deep South, Artef said it would be a pipe dream to expect help in this case.

"The attitude of many Thai officials is you are either with us or you are with the insurgents. And if you're with the state, you shouldn't criticise us even when the conduct of an official is wrong or illegal," Artef said.

He is not the only activist to face harassment. Others both in and outside of his network have faced similar trouble, being detained or having their DNA taken on flimsy pretences, or have their residences searched without probable cause or warrant.

Zawawee Zawawee Jujur, a 26-year-old local activist and former member of Media Selantan, a Pattani-based community radio station, says he has been DNA tested three times already. When he refused a fourth test earlier this year, police threatened him at the point of a gun.

The authorities' action is based, Zawawee says, on the assumption that he will eventually commit an illegal act, at which time "they will already be prepared to charge me".

Security officials even visited his village in Narathiwat's Tak Bai district and told the headman there to keep an eye on this "young man who has joined an anti-state organisation".

Artef's outspokenness has won a great deal of support not just from the grass roots in this majority-Malay Muslim region but also from foreign governments, who have often sought his insights into the ongoing conflict and the peace process. He doesn't think very highly of the latter, explaining that the participants lack any real influence over the insurgent combatants.

Thailand's approach to peace has always been very short-sighted, usually seeking quick gains while avoiding asking the central question of how the two sides can coexist peacefully and with mutual respect.

On the public front, Artef is often the key speaker at the Bicara Patani, a political rally that draws crowds of up to 10,000, mostly villagers - which gives an idea of his popularity with local people.

Many of these events are documented by Wartani, a grass-roots media organisation run by local Patani Malay activists closely associated with Artef. Wartani reporters say that they too have been harassed by Thai security officials.

Artef refuses to tar all Thai officials with the same brush, though, explaining that many have a great working relationship with him and the youth network.

Yet many others in authority continue to insist that Artef and his activist colleagues are either part of the separatist movement or inspired by the political wing of its umbrella group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - a claim he vociferously denies. But he does admit that Thai authorities, both security and political, have asked him to act as a go-between with the BRN and other separatist leaders.

"It's a fine line to walk and the best way to go about it is to maintain your integrity. I don't take sides or support any particular [separatist] organisations," Artef said.

When asked if his agenda includes independence for the Malay-speaking region, Artef said: "It's not my decision to make. It's up to all the people of this region. But I do want to see peace and justice for all sides."

Artef says that though he is often followed by plainclothes officials, the authorities can never pin anything on him because he hasn't done any wrong. "Nevertheless, it is still irritating," he adds.

In the aftermath of the May 2014 coup, security officials suggested that he leave the country for about three years, which he did. For everybody's sake, he decided to leave his wife and three-year-old son behind and live in India, where he studied English. "The cost of living was affordable," he said.

The low point came late last week when a hooded man in black broke into the home of his mother-in-law in the middle of the night in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong sub-district and took all the printed documents from the bedroom where his wife and his son normally sleep.

"They didn't take any of the valuable stuff. Perhaps it was an indication of things to come," he said.

Don Pathan is a Yala-based freelance security and development consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

EDITORIAL: Army needs to act on the fatal beating of Imam Yapa

Our indifference to the plight of the Malays of Patani brings shame on Thai society; we need to face our shared destiny

This past week the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has recommended that the army and criminal prosecutors take legal action against Sub Lt Sirikhet Wanitbamrung over the alleged killing of a Narathiwat imam seven years ago.

Imam Yapa Kaseng was beaten to death in front of his son while he was being kept at a Narathiwat military detention site in March 2008. He was accused of being part of a local militant separatist cell bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces.

According to the autopsy report, Yapa's ribs were fractured and the broken bones punctured his lungs.

Sub Lt Sirikhet was attached to the 39th Special Taskforce Unit in Rueso district in Narathiwat, an area with a high concentration of militant activity.

Yapa's death drew an outcry from the local and international community, especially human right organisations, who accused the government of turning a blind eye to the culture of impunity in this highly contested region, where more than 6,500 have been killed over 10 to 11 years, most of them Malay Muslims.

Even some foreign embassies in Bangkok inquired into this death and urged the Thai government and the Army to uphold its principles of law and order.

Many feared that the killing of Islamic leaders, be it Imam Yapa or others who have been shot dead by government or pro-government death squads, would radicalise the insurgents, who have over the past 11 years pretty much kept their campaign of violence against the state to the Malay-speaking region.

In response to the growing pressure, the Army has promised a thorough investigation into the case. Some observers said the vow from the top brass at the time was to get foreign governments off their back for the time being.

Seven years later, the NACC has got around to making a recommendation as to what legal action should be taken. The fact it took this long to come to this point reflects poorly on Thailand's justice system, which this and previous governments consistently vowed to improve and made accessible to all parties and stakeholders.

But from the look of how the state treats this and other similar cases, such promises appear to be little more than lip service.

The attitude of Thai state agencies have always been "let bygones be bygones". But can the Malays of Patani, or anybody for that matter, move on as one nation with a shared destiny with the rest of the people in Thailand without first addressing the historical wounds between the two sides?

The suggestion to let bygones be bygones is nothing less than wishful thinking on the country's part and the handling of Imam Yapa's case is a testimony of the lack of commitment on the country's part.

Sad to say, most Thai people could not care less about Imam Yapa's case because of their blind support for the government's action in the deep South. We blindly embrace nationalism to the point that we paint the Malays of Patani as an ungrateful minority who can't appreciate the goodness and generosity of the state.

That racist attitude lies at the base of Thailand’s policy of failed assimilation, which Malays in the deep South say comes at the expense of their cultural, historical and religious identity.

Because they do not want to embrace our state-constructed narrative, we become indifferent to their historic grievances and the obvious injustice and illegal action by our officers, in episodes such as the Tak Bai massacre and the fatal beating of Imam Yapa.

Seriously, did any Thai people weep with the Patani Malays when 78 of their sons suffocated to death on the back of military trucks in late 2004? And let's not forget the seven shot dead at the protest site.

Security officials and state agencies tend to see the years of tit-for-tat killings and murders as acceptable. 'They may be Thai citizens but they are not on "our side" - so what's the big deal?' That appears to be the attitude of our officials and society.

The culture of impunity and the systematic violation of human rights are not acceptable because these things have been done in the name of the state. The fact that we indifferent to this reflects poorly on our society.

We have rules, laws and regulations. And if they are going to be selective about how they are imposed, then the government should withdraw from all the international conventions against illegal killings, kidnapping and torture of suspected criminals and insurgents.

The international community and watchdog organisations have a moral obligation to remind Thailand of its commitment to these conventions and protocol.

In some countries, these obligations are legal, which would mean legal and political action must be considered and/or taken up.

Dialogue to Foaster Harmony in the Southern Border Provinces

General Aksra Kerdphol
Head of the Peace Dialogue Panel

In the past 11 years, the Royal Thai Government has tried continuously to resolve the conflict in the southern border provinces though the use of military, police and civilian forces with a large amount of weaponry along with all types of legal measures, military operations, and civic action programs to end violence in the area. However, these various attempts still have not been achieved because perpetrators of violence still have “capability” and still retain their action as “initiator” to carry out operations on every occasion, thus, forcing government officials to be on the defence and result in the loss of life and properties of innocent people.

Therefore, the Peace Dialogue Panel for Southern Border Provinces, consequently, reached out to every group of people who have different opinions from the state, urging them to participate in dialogue. This is based on the belief that violence will not do any good for any side. Apart from this, when violent incidents occur, it results in a necessity of the government to increase a number of troops and weaponry and impose stricter law-enforcement measures, and tougher military operations such closed-area search and more arrests.

This is not a positive outcome for any sides and brings us to a conclusion that dialogue is the best solution for everyone. So far, we have witnessed cooperation from people with different opinions who tried to unite their 6 different groups to participate in an informal full-panel dialogue which up until now has been held for 3 times.

I, as the head of dialogue panel, would like to state that in the past the government side tried to resolve the problem in southern border provinces in a unilateral manner. But now, we see the situation where people with different opinions “cooperate” with us to mutually resolve the problem while the people sector closely monitor, support and take part as witness for this cooperation. This is a positive development for resolving problems in the southern border provinces which is unprecedentedly an important success.

Regrettably, there are still people who still have a conservative mindset and do not have confidence in the dialogue process by misbelieving that this development is an elevation of the group status paving ways towards territorial separation. This is not something which can be easily done nowadays as the people sector always keeps an eye on this. And in the future, I personally believe that not only that Party A and B will talk to each other, but this people sector will join in the dialogue and define a roadmap for sustainable solution to the southern border provinces problem together. However, at the first stage, the dialogue panel needs to build trust and cooperation from the group with different opinions and, consequently, that cooperation will result in the gradual reduction of violence in the area.

For the peace dialogue that the panel currently works on is the dialogue which aims to “reduce intention” to use violence from all groups of people with different opinions and turn to use their current capability in an “peaceful way” instead of opting for violence like in the past. This is contrary from what most people understand that there must be negotiation and agreement on what we can get and what they can get.

This concept, which concerns bargaining for advantages, is out of date and will only cause more and more paranoia from each side rather than trust. This is totally different from what are doing now which emphasizes trust and confidence building to seek “cooperation” to jointly resolve violent problems together. We have tried to point out that if the use of violence persists, there will be no side who has complete victory but only damage to the country, loss of our brothers and sisters, and dark future of our children. Therefore, dialogue to foster cooperation is in fact an important thing determining how we can work together on the issues of safety, development and fair justice for all.

In summary, at present the dialogue panel has already set up a working group to work on each issue for justice process, there will be classification of each offence and determine possible ways for exemption under Thai legal framework so that people with different opinions can choose whatever is right for each group or each individual. For the issue of development and safety zones, working groups have been set up to identify urgent priorities which serve the need of our brother and sisters and identify safety zones in urban community, rural areas, transportation routes, and border areas.

Discussion about which area, village, tambon, district or province will first be a pilot safety zone project depends on the capability and preparedness of the government side and also cooperation from people with different opinions who will need to consider and choose the most appropriate methods together in due course.

The latest progress of dialogue panel is that we can mutually agree with the facilitator and group of people with different opinions from the state (Party B) on the formation of joint technical working group consisting of Party A, Party B, the facilitator, and the people sector will participate in the future in order to work on details together to make sustainable peace and harmony in the southern border provinces.



Thailand's Dialogue Panel (negotiators) 

EDITORIAL: Stumbling at the very outset

Lack of diplomacy marring peace talks between southern umbrella organisation and Thai government

The Nation September 13, 2015

The ongoing peace talks between the Thai government and a recently launched umbrella organisation, MARA Patani, is evolving into a spitting contest as Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and representatives from the separatist movement take up microphone diplomacy to make their case.

The sad thing about this is that the formal negotiations have not even begun.

About three weeks ago, MARA Patani met at an informal "pre-talk" session with a Thai "Dialogue Panel" led by chief negotiator General Aksara Kherdphol. After the talks, MARA Patani introduced themselves to the media at a press conference represented by leaders from six different organisations.

MARA Patani issued three demands for the pre-talks to become formal negotiations: Recognise MARA Patani as an official entity; grant immunity to all MARA Patani representatives; and designate the peace talks on the national agenda by Parliament.

Ten days later, Abdulkarim Khalid, member of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)'s youth wing who had sat in the previous round of talks initiated by the former government of Yingluck Shinawatra, issued a strongly worded statement on YouTube, slamming the Thai state of being cruel and insincere in its policy towards the Malay-speaking region of the southernmost border provinces.

Thai officials and MARA Patani members tried to play down Abdulkarim's statement, saying while he was attacking the state, he did not specifically single out peace talks between the government and umbrella organisations.

Nevertheless, Abdulkarim statement is a testimony to the difficulties that lie ahead for the dialogue process that was about to get off the ground.

But before the initiative could go anywhere, Prayut decided to pour cold water on the three demands.

He said there was no need to make the talks a national agenda because it already exists on the national agenda. But then again, just about every issue in Thailand is a "national agenda" so one wondered how important the conflict in the deep South is for this government.

Prayut shied away from the issue of immunity, probably because he wants to keep this big stick with him in case the peace process doesn't go the way he wants it to. But this is not very surprising because the junta, regardless of the issue at hand, has shown that they have difficulty understanding logic or accountability.

When pressed by reporters about the acceptance of the three points, Prayut shot back and asked if he was to grant MARA Patani these three demands, would the violence end and the conflict be resolved? This is what you call negotiation.

For the record, Prayut is not saying there will be no more talks. He is saying there has to be a new understanding between the two sides before the process can move further.

First thing is the need to establish confidence-building measures (CBMs). This is sensible. But what he didn't say is that just about every administration that comes to power, always goes back to square one with a brand new team of negotiators and its CBMs all over again.

To call it a let down would be an understatement if one looks at it from the perspective of the separatist movements.

Prayut also stated that inclusiveness is still lacking, pointing out that not all separatist movements have joined or agreed with the MARA Patani forum. Khalid's video statement is a testimony of that. And even though he did not single out MARA Patani, his statement undermined the so-called BRN representatives who had joined the umbrella organisation.

Khalid is not a non-entity. He had taken part in the peace talks launched by the Yingluck government.

Kasturi Mahkota, the president of one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation, blasted Prayut's outburst as "unprofessional", saying official channels of communication should have been used to relay the message, not through the public microphone.

But then again, there has not been any professionalism among the Thai negotiators, whether it's this government or the previous one.

Unfortunately, Bangkok never had a policy regarding the southern conflict. It has an attitude, sometimes confusing it with good intention, but never a meaningful policy that addressed the issue of historical mistrust and grievances of the Malays of Patani and how the state and the Muslims there could overcome these differences.

Like the previous policymakers, the current crop of junta is too full of themselves and don't seem to realise that their inflated ego, as well as their ethno-centric nation-state construct, is costing the lives of their own men, as well as innocent bystanders. More than 6,000 have died from this wave of insurgency violence that has been in full swing since January 2004.

The junta and the future government of Bangkok can talk to the armed separatists all they want - even into the next life, as Prayut said he was willing to do.

But if they don't realise that their state policy of assimilation is the problem, then there is not much hope for peace.

Junta going ahead with peace process it helped undermine

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Having fought against the talks under the Yingluck govt, its military-backed successor is now forging ahead with a flawed bid to end the southern insurgency

Wan Kadir Che Man, former leader of the now-defunct Bersatu, an umbrella organisation that emerged in the 1980s to unite the longstanding Patani Malay separatist organisations, has voiced criticism of the ongoing peace initiative in the far South.

His attack came just days after MARA Patani, a new forum comprised of six longstanding separatist organisations, had introduced itself to the public following a third round of informal talks with Thai negotiators led by the junta-appointed General Aksara Kherdphol.

Wan Kadir said the Bangkok government should not pin its hopes on MARA Patani as the forum does not represent all the groups involved in the southern unrest, particularly those with command-and-control over the insurgent combatants.

He told a gathering at the King Prajadhipok Institute on Friday that he personally knew at least six of the 15 MARA Patani members and that he was dismissive of their claims.

He also poured cold water on Malaysia's role as talks facilitator, noting that initiatives involving Kuala Lumpur come and go but nothing seems to change.

But the thing about this latest initiative - launched by the Yingluck government and picked up by the current crop of junta leaders - is that the media and the public will be regularly engaged.

Civil society organisations working on peace for the South think that's a good idea and that the process be as transparent as possible.

Others think the public should be kept out until the state is certain beyond any doubt that the people they are dealing with have the ability to influence the combatants and can deliver on whatever goods and promises are made at the table. The official terms of reference for talks must also be agreed upon before negotiations can proceed.

The criticism launched by Wan Kadir on Friday came as no surprise since it was in line with what he has been saying all along. But worth closer scrutiny is the story of how this exiled leader emerged into the Thai public spotlight. It helps shed light on the feeble and sometimes appalling attitude of Thai governments and authorities towards peace and peace initiatives for the deep South.

After living in exile for more than five decades, Wan Kadir was permitted by the Thai Army to return to Thailand on a secret trip in January 2013.

The military was against the peace initiative being put together by Yingluck's team but knew it couldn't publicly criticise the leader of the nation. So that's where Wan Kadir came in.

Wan Kadir had announced back in 2004 his desire to return to Thailand to work from within to resolve a fresh wave of conflict involving a new generation of fighters that had surfaced a couple of years earlier.

At first, then-premier Thaksin Shinawatra was reluctant, fearing his return would upset his security advisors, including General Chavalit Yongchaiyud, who was at the time on a quirky ambition to "destroy" Bersatu, even though the group was already defunct.

One of Wan Kadir's main supporters at the time was then-Fourth Army commander Lt-General Pisarn Wattanawongkiri.

Pisarn's idea was to use Wan Kadir as his personal consultant and establish an understanding with the new generation of combatants that would at least cover rules of engagement.

His interest was understandable, coming in the wake of a disturbing April 28, 2004 incident in which more than 100 militants - apparently inspired by notions of invincibility conferred by local superstitions - charged against 10 police outposts and a station armed with little more than machetes.

And although Thaksin remained implacable, Wan Kadir continued with hush-hush lobbying for permission to return to his birthplace.

Later that year, his main supporter, Lt General Pisarn, was ousted from his post in the aftermath of the Tak Bai massacre. But that wasn't the reason why Wan Kadir gave up on his secret lobbying. According to several sources, separatist leaders - most likely operatives from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - told him that he "would not last more than 10 days" if he returned to Thailand.

BRN cadres said his return at that time would undermine the separatist community's effort to attain support from international actors - state and non-state.

But in January 2013, Wan Kadir was finally permitted to return for a secret visit to several cities, including Phuket, Bangkok and Chiang Mai, where he was received by senior state officials.

His first public appearance in Thailand came later that year in November, when in a speech at the Thai Journalists Association he criticised the Yingluck government's peace process. Bangkok-based diplomatic corps were eager to meet with him, but his hosts, the Royal Thai Police, kept them at arm's length.

Wan Kadir was invited back again the following month, when he tore the credibility of the peace talks' stakeholders to shreds during a speech at the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani.

The Thai Army was gratified - not because it was being criticised for lacking commitment and sincerity towards the peace initiative but over the fact that the initiative was being attacked in public.

Coup brings moment of truth

The Army didn't like the idea that civilians were dominating a public process which they believed was their exclusive right to run behind closed doors.

However, it didn't take long for Yingluck's initiative to fall apart, a victim not of Wan Kadir's criticism but of its shaky foundations laid by former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck's brother, one year before the official launch on February 28, 2013.

And then came the May 2014 coup and the moment of truth for the Thai Army. Failure to continue with the peace effort initiated by the government it had ousted would be a bad political move. But going along with it would mean climbing down from its previous stance.

In the end, the Army opted to continue the process, but junta chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha added demands of his own. Looking tough and in control was important to him.

The demands were that various separatist organisations must unite under a common platform and that there must be a period of peace - ie, a ceasefire - before a formal process could start.

The common platform came in the form of MARA Patani, launched about two weeks ago. They have presented themselves as men who are willing to negotiate a political settlement, leaving it to Bangkok to find ways of moving the initiative forward.

As for the "ceasefire", nobody has brought it up - at least not in public.

Finally came the re-emergence of Wan Kadir on Friday. By attacking the current initiative, he is also discrediting this latest crop of junta officials and their decision to continue with an initiative they had previously opposed.

In a recent interview in Pattani, Wan Kadir said the government should reconsider the peace initiative and switch to using a local interlocutor as the go-between. He recommended a bottom-up approach that starts with the combatants and works its way up to their leaders, who may or may not be living in exile.

The Army appears to have dug its own grave on this matter. If the Thai military and the Yingluck government had begun with a common understanding of how the peace process should be conducted, perhaps we wouldn't be in this predicament.

But instead, Thai institutions - political and military - prioritised their respective political agendas over the well-being of the nation and national security.

Sadly, everyone was out to protect their own turf, with little consideration of the problems at hand or the consequences of their actions. And from the look of it, the Thai Army is now getting a taste of its own medicine.

Don Pathan is a security analyst and a freelance consultant based in Yala. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com). 

MARA Patani and the question of legitimacy

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

YALA, Thailand __ The junta's refusal to lend official recognition to the separatist umbrella group could mean the latest peace process is stillborn

A press conference last week to introduce key figures of MARA Patani to the world produced few surprises - members of the separatist umbrella group had been talking to the media for some time.

The newly established forum (more like old wine in a new bottle) has for some time been promoting the idea it is a force to be reckoned with.

Speaking to the media, the Majlis Syura (MARA) Patani members chose their words carefully, probably to avoid the misunderstandings that burdened the previous peace initiative, launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013, with unrealistic expectations.

The launch two years ago generated a great deal of hope, as it was the first time in the history of the armed conflict between the Thai state and the Malay Muslims of the far South that a Bangkok government had publicly committed to a political settlement through negotiation. Sitting opposite Bangkok negotiators back then was the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of combatant insurgents.

Exiled separatists and BRN members said the talks were originally initiated by fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who, with Malaysia as facilitator, met with 16 separatist leaders in Kuala Lumpur in March 2012. He asked these leaders to put historic grievances behind them and let bygones be bygones.

The request was wishful thinking on Thaksin's part. The BRN responded with a massive triple car bomb in the heart of Yala, which killed 14 people and injured about 120.

Then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's sister, ignored the BRN's "warning message" and relaunched the peace initiative a year later on February 28, 2013.

Hasan Taib, an Islamic religious teacher who has been with the BRN for decades but never made it into the ruling council, was prodded to take up the post as the "liaison". His job was to bring the BRN ruling council and other movements to the negotiating table.

The problem was that BRN operatives didn't think much of Hasan, even though Thai security and intelligence agencies thought he represented the group's ruling council. It didn't take them long to realise that they were wrong about Hasan's influence over the movement.

Yet although Hasan wasn't able to influence insurgent combatants or the BRN inner circle, the group's leaders nevertheless managed to make use of his presence.

BRN used him to antagonise the Thai side and test Bangkok's will by issuing a much-talked-about five-point demand. This comprised of the release of all imprisoned combatants, official recognition for the BRN and an invitation to the peace talks for a representative of the people of Patani, permitting international observers, and official acknowledgement of the southernmost provinces as the Malay majority's historical homeland.

The BRN also used Hasan to inform the Thai side in July 2013 that the theatre of violence would broaden to include Songkhla's district of Sadao. The separatists lived up to their vow with simultaneous attacks - one car bomb and two motorbike bombs - in December 2013.

Another point that antagonised the Thai side was the separatist propaganda exercise conducted through YouTube. Now, in a bid to avoid a recurrence of online political grandstanding by MARA Patani members, the Thai negotiating team led by General Aksara Kherdphol is not objecting to them being interviewed by Thai and international media.

During the Yingluck initiative, civil society organisations were invited to participate in the public ("Track 1") process. But under the current arrangement, civil society will remain on the sidelines of talks while continuing to be engaged by the government team on the southern conflict.

MARA Patani began life in the so-called Track 1.5 - a side-show to the Yingluck initiative. Trusted retired government officials were asked to carry out this unofficial process through a series of negotiations in neighbouring countries.

Credit should also go to the then secretary-general of the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre, Pol Colonel Thawee Sodsong, who cultivated a working relationship with key exiled figures such as Sukree Hari, a BRN representative from Yala who fled in 2007 after receiving bail.

Transition from Track 1.5 to the official Track 1 wasn't exactly a walk in the park. Efforts to mobilise the support of insurgents and the grass-roots community came to a complete standstill after community leader and MARA Patani representative Ustaz Waesumae Sudden, a cleric from Pattani's Sai Buri district, was shot dead on September 28 last year. Nobody took responsibility for his murder, not even discreetly.

Today, participants of this side-show are sitting at the official Track I talks looking straight at the Thai government negotiators.

But BRN cadres who have command-and-control over the insurgents on the ground are still not interested in joining the peace initiative, prompting serious doubts over their chance of success.

BRN sources say their leaders are still not convinced that now is a good time to endorse any initiative, and doubt whether the ruling junta in Bangkok is serious about peace in the deep South.

Even the name "MARA Patani" must conjure unease for Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, with its connotations of institutionalisation and an internationalised process. To please the junta chief, the term "Party B" is being used to describe MARA Patani while "Party A" refers to the official side.

The terms of reference for the talks are due to be set by the end of this month. But already, both sides are vocalising their demands in public.

MARA Patani is demanding that the conflict be designated by Parliament as a national agenda so as to ensure peace efforts aren't dropped when this government ends. It also wants its 15 members to be granted immunity and the umbrella organisation officially recognised. Moreover, the group has suggested it would be willing to settle for something less than complete independence for the three southernmost provinces - possibly the right to "self-determination".

The Thai side, on the other hand, is asking MARA Patani to work towards creating a safe zone, which probably encompasses a ceasefire; improve livelihoods of the local people; and ensure that all sides have access to justice.

There is also a longstanding question over legitimacy. Thailand doesn't have to deal with this question once the junta hands the mandate back to the people. But the same can't be said for MARA Patani and its members.

There has been talk of setting up a national assembly for the region to serve as a rubberstamp for MARA Patani. But according to security official in the South, Bangkok is likely to object to any move to set up a shadow Parliament for the conflict-affected region.

And given the fact that Premier Prayut can't even stand the name "MARA Patani", the idea of him offering official recognition and legitimacy to this umbrella organisation may be just a pipe dream.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

An ominous silence among insurgents in the deep South

Refusal to disavow involvement in the Erawan Shrine bombing prompts concern that separatists could extend theatre of violence outside the region

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

It was supposed to be a press conference at which members of the MARA Patani, a forum of longstanding separatist groups, emerged in public in order to enhance their bargaining power with the Thai government.

But in the end, it was something that the panellists refused to say that wrenched the nerves of Thai security officials.

The question was whether the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had informed the Thai government that its organisation was not behind the August 17 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people injured over 100.

In spite of its silence, hardly anyone believes the BRN was behind the bombing, as the Bangkok attack was outside the separatist insurgents' traditional theatre of violence, namely the historically contested Malay-speaking southernmost provinces.

However, this doesn't mean that the BRN has never carried out an attack on the scale of the Erawan Shrine bombing. But the BRN will push the violence only up to a point, long-time observers within the Thai security community say. It cannot afford to lose its moral high ground or jeopardise its grass-roots support, they add.

In the early stages of the current wave of insurgency violence, which surfaced in 2001 and went into full swing in January 2004, combatants did push the limits too far, murdering public school teachers and Buddhist monks as well as mutilating corpses of soldiers killed in their attacks. If insurgency is a form of communicative action, then the audience at the time was mainly local communities, as well as military commanders who would naturally be demoralised to see their soldiers decapitated or castrated.

But the insurgents consistently gauged local community sentiment and adjusted their focus accordingly, away from "soft targets" and towards the military and police.

Although there are direct attacks against civilians once in while, these acts are understood to be tit-for-tat killings between the state and the insurgents. One example is the murders of three Buddhist women who were shot at close range in February 2014, their bodies then set on fire. The incident was apparently retaliation for the murder of three young boys in Pattani's Bacho district, reportedly carried out by two paramilitary rangers, who retracted their confession in court a year later.

The vast majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of ambush and roadside bombings against security force patrols, essentially aimed at discrediting the security apparatus.

In May, for example, the city of Yala was rocked by almost 40 explosions in a bombing spree that lasted three successive days. Security planners were left speechless when their hastily implemented measures failed to stop the bombing.

For the record, according to BRN sources, no shrapnel was used in the bombs and only a handful of people suffered injuries, which were minor.

Even when BRN combatants have attacked targets outside the region, like Hat Yai, Phuket and Samui, achieving a high body count has never been part of the plan.

In one such incident, for example, a pick-up truck bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres was parked at the Phuket Police Station on December 2013. BRN sources said the operative left the bomb switch off on purpose, choosing merely to demonstrate their capabilities, as well as their disapproval at the absence of rules of engagement among government troops.

The same operation also saw Songkhla's Sadao district come under simultaneous bomb attacks, fulfilling a vow made earlier by insurgents.

While the Sadao attacks demonstrated the BRN could live up to its word, the Samui attack in May this year was a stern warning against the flouting of rules of engagement and against a so-called peace process in which the separatist organisation's name was being used without their approval and their people harassed to come on board.

BRN sources said the groups' ruling council did not endorse the peace initiative begun under Thaksin Shinawatra's administration and continued under his sister Yingluck's rule, or the current "pre-talks" with MARA Patani aimed at reviving negotiations.

With no genuine channel of communication between the BRN and Bangkok, Thai authorities have rushed to rule out any connection with the southern insurgency whenever a fresh incident occurs - whether it be the explosives left at a Bangkok street corner in May 2013, the Phuket Police Station truck bomb in December 2013 or the Samui car bomb in April this year.

The only exception was the December 31, 2006 New Year bombings in which three people were killed and 40 injured.

A lengthy investigation implicated the insurgents, yet the military-installed government downplayed the findings and instead suggested it was the work of people who had been ousted from power, ie, the Thaksin camp.

Too often, the authorities' knee-jerk reaction has come back to haunt them when evidence emerges to undermine their claims. It was subsequently revealed that vehicles used to ferry the Phuket and Samui bombs were from Pattani and Yala. Meanwhile the culprits behind the May 2013 Bangkok bombing were said to be part of an organisation seeking to force its way into the Yingluck peace initiative. The irony was not lost on observers.

Although moral high ground is important, it doesn't mean that the BRN would never carry out an attack in the deep South of the size and scale of the Ratchaprasong bombing.

Take, for example, the triple car bombs on Yala's Ruammit Street that killed 14 people and injured about 120 in late March 2012. The attacks were in response to an overture made two weeks earlier by Thaksin Shinawatra towards the 16 leaders of various separatist organisations in a bid to have them join the peace process.

The absence of any attacks on this scale outside the region is another indication that the BRN realises that Bangkok and the international community would not tolerate such a broadening of the theatre of violence.

Failing to heed the warning sent by the Yala attack, the Yingluck government pressed on with the relaunch of peace talks a year later on February 28, 2013.

Today, MARA Patani is a manifestation of that half-baked peace initiative launched under Yingluck's watch, with the junta uncertain of what else to do except to go with the flow. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha must know he cannot afford the publicity disaster that would ensue if he was to ditch the initiative.

Back when the Yingluck initiative was in the pipeline, MARA Patani was treated as a side-show, often referred to as "Track 1.5".

The Ruammit triple car bomb shows that the BRN is willing to use a body count to make a point. The incident received significant media coverage, partly because the scale of the tragedy and partly because of the fact that Hat Yai was also hit. But it quickly became yesterday's news. The prevailing attitude among the Thai public and policymakers is that, as long as the violence is confined to the deep South, people will continue to tolerate it.

For the BRN and other separatist organisations, extending attacks beyond the historically contested region is a way of warning the Thai state of their disapproval of aspects of the peace negotiations and also the culture of impunity among security officials.

But more importantly, the perception of BRN moral high ground must remain intact, especially in the eyes of the local Malay Muslim residents. How long this quid pro quo arrangement will stand, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).