Thailand should just accept that South is different

Only way to bring the violent struggle to an end would be to listen to and acknowledge the Malays of Patani

Don Pathan
The Nation

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak came to Thailand with a clear message: the Malay-speaking region in the country's southernmost provinces was an integral part of the Kingdom.

While respecting Thailand's territorial integrity, Najib also reminded the government that the region had different characteristics that would need special attention. Historical grievances and aspirations of the Malays of Patani must be addressed if the conflicts are to end, he warned.

However, perhaps as a move to show that he is a good sport, Najib backed away from the "autonomy" idea, and instead endorsed Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's "decentralisation" approach.

Amid the spate of bomb attacks against security forces, the two leaders were reminded that where they go from here will not be easy, because behind these bombings was the message: what's acceptable to the two countries may not necessarily be acceptable to the Patani Malays or the separatist movements.

Nevertheless, the cordial atmosphere was an indication that the two countries had moved beyond recent history when Thaksin Shinawatra's arrogance brought bilateral relations to its knee.

Today, that kind of microphone diplomacy is not applied, but that doesn't mean it won't happen again. Thailand's culture of impunity in the restive region could very well have forced Malaysia and other Muslim countries to break their silence.

Apparently, some ill-intentioned people in the restive region don't like the fact that the two countries are moving closer. Posters and banners saying, "Patani is a part of Malaysia" were scattered all over the region, while local residents think some ultra-Thai nationalists looking to distort the significance of the visit might have been behind the incidents.

As pointed out by Senator Warawit Baru, a respected academic from the region, the insurgents don't relate to Malaysia as a nation-state, instead they feel distanced from the Thai state.

It's an open secret that hardliners think Abhisit is giving away too much political capital by allowing Kuala Lumpur to move closer to what they deem as domestic problems. In their mind, a good insurgent is a dead insurgent, so when things such as the banners surfaced, these hardliners in the security community came to mind.

In fact, if one were to go deep enough into the back roads of this restive region, one would see "Patani Merdeka" written all over the place. It means "Free Patani" - free from Thailand and free from Malaysia.

Locals said they were reminded of last year's hoax when a group of ethnic Malays, in fake moustaches and beards, declared an end to insurgency. They called themselves the "Southern Thai Muslims". People with half a brain can figure out who wrote the script. Never in the history of this restive region have the militants called themselves "Southern Thai".

The deep South is undergoing an ethno-nationalistic dispute, one that challenges the Thai state's legitimacy there. Resolving this would require a great deal of sophistication and sensitivity because it centres on national pride, history and the dignity of all the affected parties.

Unfortunately, we never hear the words "human dignity" coming out of either leader's mouth. All we heard were the usual sound bites of how development would cure all. If the past six years are any indication, the billions of baht spent have not really won the state that many hearts. This is not because a big chunk of it is being skimmed off the top, but because handouts do not mean empowerment. They do nothing to enhance one's sense of ownership.

Bangkok will have to let go of its "I know better" attitude and give the Patani Malays enough political space to talk about their grievances, resentments and aspirations.

We may not like the fact that the Thai-Patani history is full of blood, but acknowledging history for what it is can help all sides come to terms with the past and move forward as a united country. Surely the two leaders understand how disturbing an ethno-nationalist struggle can be. After all, they both studied in Britain.

Sadly though, both Abhisit and Najib have been unable to go beyond their narrow mindset of a nation-state. Patani should not be reduced to a footnote in Thailand's nationhood. It has its own myths, legends and tales that are not related to Thailand's history. And if this point is not taken into consideration, any political model, a development scheme or a peace process put forward is doomed to fail.

Fireworks set to go off in the Golden Triangle

THE SHOOTING has stopped and the refugees have returned to their homes on the Burmese side of the border. But it would be a grave mistake to think the fighting and bloodshed on the Sino-Burmese border is over and done with.

By DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Immediately after the mid-August attack on ethnic Chinese Kokang rebels by the Burmese army, politics in the Golden Triangle went into a tailspin. Jolted by the attack against the Kokang, Chinese authorities moved quickly to ensure that the Burmese junta would not make further advances against other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA).

The junta, on the other hand, justified its attack on the Kokang, after two decades of cease-fire, saying the group was illegally producing arms. Perhaps accusing them of trafficking illicit drugs would be too easy given the fact that just about every ethnic army in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle is growing opium and making heroin and methamphetamine.

In fact, almost immediately after they came into being, these splinter groups of the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, have flooded the world with heroin and, over the past few decades, methamphetamine. But that was fine as long as some of that money helped build roads, other infrastructure and trickled down into the pockets of Burmese army commanders. This arrangement, however, has effectively come to an end. In the aftermath of the August attack, horse-trading between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's junta, and the UWSA has been going on. It won't be the same, but the Wa are trying to hold on to whatever they believe is rightfully theirs. So far, neither side appears to be giving in.

The end of October is reportedly the deadline for the Wa to surrender their arms and come under direct command of the junta. But similar ultimatums have been issued before, and the two sides have always wiggled their way out of such tight spots. In 1996, for example, after joining up with the Wa to defeat the then Shan opium warlord, Khun Sa, and his Mong Tai Army, Rangoon ordered the Wa back to the so-called Special Region 2 on the Sino-Burmese border. But the way the Wa see it, they fought and died for those patches of land along the Thai border. Not long after that, nearly 200,000 villagers along the northern Wa region were relocated to UWSA-controlled areas along the Thai border. With the help of heroin money, temporary outposts became permanent Wa villages.

To begin with, the ceasefire agreements between the junta and the cease-fire groups were never really built on solid ground. The absence of clashes didn't mean peace. It just meant they had agreed to stop shooting at each other for a while. Prior to his ouster in 2004, the then Burmese security chief, General Khin Nyunt, would make annual visits to the Wa stronghold of Panghsang, where UWSA chairman Bao Yuxiang would greet him with a bundle of sugar cane - a symbol of strong friendship. But since Khin Nyunt's fall from grace, a new reality has kicked in. Burmese army commander, Deputy Snr-General Maung Aye, and junta chief Snr-General Than Shwe, have repeatedly made efforts to redefine Rangoon's relationship with the ethnic armies.

The SPDC has, over the years, made overtures to smaller rebel groups and succeeded in getting several of them to surrender their weapons. These outfits would police their own districts, but conventional security would be up to the national army, the Tadmadaw. One such model is Huamuang, a former stronghold of the late Khun Sa, the Shan opium warlord who surrendered in 1997 in exchange for amnesty. In Huamuang, Maha Ja now operates more like a mayor rather than the fearsome warlord he once was. To make certain that he toes the line, Huamuang is surrounded by two Burmese army battalions. But by ousting the Kokang Chinese, the junta effectively shredded the two-decade-old cease-fire agreements. It was also a slap in the face to the Chinese government, which sees these ethnic armies as more or less their proxies even after direct and open support ended in 1989 when the Communist Party of Burma, the umbrella that held these groups together, fell apart. Khin Nyunt then orchestrated a series of cease-fires with these groups.

Two decades later, with the attack on the Kokang, the agreements are more or less in pieces. For the Burmese, there is no turning back. Where the region goes from now is anybody's guess. But for the time being, the Thai authorities are scrambling for any scrap of information - just to get an indication as to what the UWSA, the Chinese government, and the SPDC have up their sleeves. Like Thailand, all these actors are stakeholders.

Whatever happens in this rugged region affects them all - thus the eagerness to know, especially when, in the coming weeks, the Wa leaders and the Burmese junta will get together for what a senior Thai military intelligence officer called the "final showdown". The Burmese are expected to issue another ultimatum to the UWSA this month that basically calls on it to transform into some sort of border patrol police unit under the directive of the Burmese army.

"All are convinced that the Wa will reject this, but no one knows for sure what kind of measures the junta will take up after the rejection," said a Thai officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

For the Thai government, an all-out war between the Wa and the Burmese could mean hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. For the Chinese, watching the Kokang force crumble has not been easy. Their influence in and access to the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, not to mention their access to the Indian Ocean, was put into question.

All are certain that the UWSA, another of China's long-time friends, is next on the Burmese hit list. Taking out the UWSA may create a new set of ground rules for the Burmese and the remaining cease-fire groups. It won't shut the door on China's entry into Burma, however.

It just means that the Chinese will have one less proxy in Burma. Cross-border friendship is common in this part of the world, where opium warlords and drug armies play for keeps. But by eliminating the Kokang, the Burmese are telling their Chinese neighbour that such friendship will no longer come at the expense of national security.

EDITORIAL: The double standard of our attitude towards the people in the deep South

Seeing things from a different perspective

Published on September 18, 2009

While Bangkokians cry foul over the deaths of political protesters, the daily slaughter in the South continues almost unnoticed
About three years ago a Border Patrol police officer was praying in a village mosque in Panare district in Pattani. Moments after he concluded his prayers, a gunman came from behind and shot him at point-blank range in the head.The killer was presumably a member of a shadowy insurgent cell, part of the new generation of Islamic militants who surfaced about eight years ago but were never taken seriously until January 2004, when scores of them raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat province and made off with nearly 400 weapons.

As hard as it may be for many Thai people to swallow this reality, the word on the streets in the Malay-speaking South was that the killing of the police officer was fair. After all, the victim, regardless of his religion, was a member of the government security forces, caught up in a conflict that few understand.

But there was one small detail to this ground rule. As a Muslim, the victim was not supposed to be touched while he was communicating with his creator. This explained why the shooter had to wait until the victim finished his daily prayers.
This is obviously not part of the Geneva Convention, but it is nevertheless a rule observed by this generation of Malay-Muslim insurgents. Fortifying oneself in a mosque and fighting the Thai security forces to the death – as seen in the April 28, 2004 stand-off at the Krue Se mosque – was deemed heroic and a dignified way to die for one’s cause, in this case the struggle for the recognition of the Malay historical homeland, known as Patani.
Fast-forward to June 8 this year at the Al Furqan Mosque in Narathiwat’s Joh I Rong district, in a village called Ai Bayae. Six gunmen with automatic rifles and shotguns fired indiscriminately into a mosque full of people, killing 11 on the pot and injuring 12 others while they were in the middle of evening prayers.
Local residents who understood the unwritten ground rules immediately dismissed the statements from Thai security officials that blamed the incident on the Malay-Muslim insurgents.
They were correct. Almost two months later, police named Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, as one of the suspects. This incident has become a major embarrassment for the security forces because Sutthirak is a former Ranger who later became part of a government-trained village militia organisation. Whether he and his associates ran amok of their own volition when they fired into the mosque, or whether they acted on someone’s order, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the incident has driven one of the biggest wedges between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai state since the Tak Bai massacre in 2004.
When the idea of outsourcing security duties was floated years ago, no one thought about the possible fallout of handing weapons to villagers and motivating them by showing footage of dead Buddhist monks and civilians.
But when it became clear that some of these Buddhist village militias had taken matters into their own hands, no one wanted to take credit for establishing this exclusively Buddhist network. Moreover, no one can even explain the chain of command that these village militias are supposed to fall under, or whether they are supposed to be accountable to anybody at all.
Since January 2004, more than 3,500 people have been killed in the South. Most of the victims have been Malay-Muslims. It is safe to presume that Malay-Muslim insurgents have killed these fellow-Muslims, and the state would have us believe that the Malay insurgents have indeed carried out most if not all of the killings.
For people who buy into the simple and shallow explanation that the men behind the ongoing violence in the deep South are victims of distorted history who have embraced a false teaching of Islam, it is hard to come to terms with the fact that there is a community living inside the borders of this country that challenges the legitimacy of the state. We conveniently place these insurgents in the simple category of “bad guys” so we can sleep well at night and not think about the complexity of the conflict.
Indeed, we demand unconditional loyalty from the Patani Malays without seeing things from their side, much less looking at our own conduct. And because of their unwillingness to assist our security officials, much less embrace our national identity, we become indifferent to their plight and grievances, such as the massacre at Tak Bai and the killings at the Ai Bayae mosque. More than 80 unarmed Malay-Muslims died at the hands of government officials during the Tak Bai demonstration.
And yet, in Bangkok, we are up in arms over the deaths of two anti-Thaksin demonstrators during the October 2008 seizure of Parliament. One was presumably killed by police officers, who fired teargas canisters into the crowd, injuring hundreds of other anti-government demonstrators. A second person died when a car exploded, apparently because one of the bombs he had kept inside the vehicle exploded prematurely.
If we are unable to see the double standard of our attitude towards the people in the deep South, we cannot move forward as a nation, much less reconcile the differences between the Patani Malays and the Thai state.

Conflict flare up in Triangle

SOMETHING IS BREWING in the Burmese corner of the Golden Triangle and it's more than just the chemicals boiling in the clandestine heroin and methamphetamine labs.

DON PATHAN
The Nation
Published on August 31, 2009

Bluffing between the military government and one of the cease-fire groups - the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Chinese Kokang - turned into an armed clash last Thursday. Tens of thousands of residents were sent fleeing to China's Yunnan province, Thai and Chinese officials monitoring the border situation said.

With the help of Burmese government troops, Kokang's stronghold Laogai has now come under a splinter group led by the MNDAA's second in command, Bai Souqian, who broke away with about 200 troops, who accounted for 20 per cent of the outfit's total troop strength.

"It's a classical divide-and-conquer tactic. This is not the first time that the Burmese junta has done this," said a senior Thai Army officer on the border who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In response, MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng has dispatched a small outfit to carry out hit-and-run attacks against a Burmese outpost near the Kokang capital of Laogai and pockets manned by Burmese government troops.

Peng has also reportedly secured the support of other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), Shan State Army-North and Mong La-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), an outfit headed by his son-in-law Lin Mingxian, also known as U Sai Leun. Incidentally, the NDAA, on June 30, celebrated its 20th anniversary of "peace" with the Burmese.

Both Thai and Chinese sources downplayed the so-called military pact between the Kokang and other ethnic armies. Personal connections and common political and security interests aside, mobilising troops to take on the Burmese soldiers is easier said than done.

"It's all about logistics," said the senior Thai Army officer.

"The Burmese have all the holes plugged to prevent any major movement of troops along the border," added a senior officer from Thailand's' Narcotics Control Board.

In spite of the disturbing nature of the development, Chinese officials along the border area say it would not be in the interest of any stakeholder to let the situation escalate out of hand into an all-out war.

Behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts are being taken to minimise the damage before the situation spirals out of control, the Chinese officer said.

But even if the shooting stops, where all sides go from here is anybody's guess. It is undeniable that the two-decades-old cease-fire agreements that were orchestrated by then security chief Lt General Khin Nyunt in 1989 have been effectively shattered.

But for observers of the Golden Triangle, the real aim of this latest development is not to smash the Kokang's hold on Laogai but to send a brutal message to the 20,000-strong UWSA whose members are made up of some very interesting characters. The Wa rank-in-file include opium warlords and head-hunters turned militia. Chinese Red Guards who first entered the areas three decades ago to preach Marxism later discovered that opium was as good as gold, thus the moniker Golden Triangle.

They, too, joined forces with the Wa to seek fortune and glory. Prior to the 1989 cease-fire, Wa foot soldiers formed the largest block within the Communist Party of Burma. And when the CPB broke up in 1989 along ethnic lines, Khin Nyunt quickly neutralised the CPB remnants with a series of cease-fire agreements.

The end of the CPB didn't mean the end of cross-border personal and political ties, however. It means a proxy army has just changed its uniform.

Ever since Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004, the UWSA leadership, as well as other cease-fire groups, have felt that their days were numbered. Almost five years later, their worst fear came true. Their two-decades-old cease-fire has effectively crumbled.

"Picking on the much smaller Kokang reflects the old Thai saying of 'slit the chicken's throat to scare the monkeys'," said a Thai intelligence officer. The monkeys in this case are of course the Wa.

The Burmese junta will continue with its divide-and-conquer tactic, said the Thai Army officer, pointing to the SPDC's relentless drive to split the UWSA. They succeeded in bringing down the Karen National Union in 1994.

The UWSA's geographical foothold in the Golden Triangle resembles that of a dumbbell - with the northern stronghold on the Chinese border, while three regiments are situated near the Thai border. Boa Yuxiang and his brothers control the north while Wei Hsueh-kang and his brothers dominate the south.

The two families can't stand each other but there is an understanding that divided they fall. But that traditional acknowledgement is about to end, said a Chinese official, pointing to the recent mobilising of troops from Wei's Military Region 171 to head to the northern region.

According to the Chinese officer, Wei wants to break away from the UWSA and dispatching troops to Bao's turf is a way of testing the waters. So why can't Wei just announce the breakaway from a distance?

According to Thai and Chinese officials, Wei has been under tremendous pressure from the SPDC to press the UWSA to transform their outfit into a border security guard under the control of the government's army, known as the Tatmadaw. One leverage the SPDC can bring to bear on Wei is that much of his money is invested in Burma while Bao does his banking and money laundering in China.

Since the 1989 cease-fire, Burmese troops were not permitted to enter the territories under the control of these ethnic armies unescorted. In most cases, they had to be disarmed.

Last week's clash was a rude indication that things are about to change. In real terms, this could mean hundreds of thousands of villagers running for their lives to China. Thailand is watching the development closely in case the UWSA's three regiments along its border are drawn into the fight.

For Thailand, it would mean more refugees to look after. For China, it could very well mean the annihilation of an old friendship, namely with the UWSA, whose bonds with the Chinese leadership go all the way back to the days of the communist insurgency.

Loyalty dies hard in the rugged Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps. Some said friendship between the Chinese leaders and their proxies are forever. Apparently, the Burmese junta is saying it's time to part.

Massacre probe must provide answers

If anything, incidents such as the Bang Lang Dam shooting and the Al-Furqan massacre reveal a deep-seated problem of outsourcing security work to local civilians who have little consideration for the political consequences when they decide to fire indiscriminately into a mosque or a teashop full of people.

By DON PATHAN
 The Nation

The authorities are losing the battle to win hearts and minds in Thailand's deep South
Last Friday, the police in Thailand's deep South announced that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Suttirak Kongsuwan, 34, one of the suspects behind the massacre at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district. It was known for some days that a warrant, or a number of warrants, were going to be issued in connection with the massacre at the Al-Furqan mosque, but the fact that the authorities are releasing bits and pieces of information at a time indicates the extremely sensitive nature of this particular case.

The police accuse Suttirak of being one of the gunmen who fired machineguns into the mosque on the evening of June 8, killing 11 people and injuring more than ten others. The 12th victim has died in hospital. The victims were in the middle of evening prayers.

Commissioner of the Southern Border Provinces Police Bureau, Pol Lt General Peera Poompichet, said more warrants would be issued soon and added that authorities are committed to ensuring justice for all the victims in this case. Narathiwat police chief Pol Maj General Surachai Suebsuk said the number of suspects should be about ten in all.

Surachai said the gunmen at the Al-Furqan mosque might have used the same weapons that were fired on a group of Muslim villagers at a teashop in Rangae district on November 17 last year. Besides linking him to various attacks, the police are suggesting Suttirak may have been involved in drugs and other illicit business activities.

Needless to say, the massacre has driven a bigger wedge between the Malay-speaking community and the Thai State. This has been aggravated by the sloppy manner in which the case has been handled. From the start, no one believed the massacre at Al-Furqan was the work of Islamic insurgents, as suggested by top government officials.

What turned off the local community was the knee-jerk reaction from both Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Army chief General Anupong Paochinda that the authorities were not involved, when no investigation whatsoever had been conducted.

But as time passed and pressure mounted on the government to come clean, it was discovered the gunmen were Thai Buddhists. Some of the suspects were members of the Aor Ror Bor, or the Township Defence Volunteers, a network of government-trained militia organisations whose members are exclusively Buddhists.

The strategy now, it seems, is for the authorities to distance themselves as much as possible from these suspects, as more names will be made public in the coming days.

Like the April 2007 shooting incident in Narathiwat's Bang Lang Dam district - when similar, government-trained village militias fired into a group of Muslim funeral-goers, killing four and injuring six others - the Army initially tried to blame the mosque incident on insurgents. And when that didn't work, they tried to justify the attack by saying the Malay Muslims were armed with sticks and stones. Never mind that a unit of Border Patrol Police was just metres away from the scene of the 2007 clash, which started off with verbal abuse but ended in the death of the funeral mourners.

Authorities have not taken any action against the suspects and the incidents, like other similar cases, will probably fade from people's memories. They say that time heals all wounds. But for the Malays in the deep South, the opposite appears to be the truth. This is because such injustices are fed into the historical narrative that questions the legitimacy of the Thai State in the Malay historical homeland. In other words, it helps them justify the armed insurgency against the state and reinforces the notion that the deep South is an occupied territory.

If anything, incidents such as the Bang Lang Dam shooting and the Al-Furqan massacre reveal a deep-seated problem of outsourcing security work to local civilians who have little consideration for the political consequences when they decide to fire indiscriminately into a mosque or a teashop full of people. It also raises the question of training and motivation techniques for the village militias - like showing video footage of innocent Buddhist civilians and monks, to motivate them to sign up for jobs as village scouts or defence volunteers. This is the kind of thing that international terrorists do in the course of indoctrination and recruitment processes.

Senior security officials in the South say that relations between the authorities and the local Malay Muslim residents are at a low point, and any effort to get things back on track will depend heavily on how the authorities handle the investigation into the massacre at the mosque.

SPECIAL REPORT: MINORITY CONFLICTS – TOWARDS AN ASEM FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

6th ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE
10-12 June 2009 

The 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable “Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management “ was held on 10-12 June 2009 in Derry and Letterkenny in both jurisdictions in Ireland. It was the sixth in a series of meetings on conflict management, bringing together participants from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) member countries.

Go to: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07198.pdf

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE 6TH ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE

By Don Pathan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Building on the findings from the previous gatherings, the recently concluded 6th Asia-Europe Round Table (AER) examined different types of minority conflicts with a particular focus on “frozen conflicts” in which cessation of open hostility offers a chance for the regional and international community to explore possible solutions and frameworks for transforming the conflict into sustainable peace. While the 5th AER explored the various potential pitfalls of managing a peace process, the 6th AER facilitated discussion of relevant case studies to illustrate how conflicts developed and provided different perspectives on various possible solutions or framework for managing conflict. While keeping in mind that each conflict is unique in its character because of different underlying causes, contours and trajectories, participants at the 6th AER succeeded in teasing out some common threads on why these conflicts evolved along certain patterns and how they might be addressed. More than 40 Asian and European experts in conflict and peace studies and research, academics, specialised journalists, human rights activists, practitioners, and diplomats came together in Derry and Letterkenny in both jurisdictions in Ireland from June 10-12, 2009 to work towards a framework for conflict management. The following is a summary of some of the recommendations that the experts came up with. 

For full report: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07198.pdf (see page 11 for the Special Report by Don Pathan)

Special Report of the 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable                                                                         page 11 

Mr. Don Pathan
Journalist
The Nation

Executive Summary: Key Messages and Recommendations
Report on Proceedings

1. Setting the Scene: An Informal Briefing on Northern Ireland page 13
2. Two Case Studies: Asia and Europe page 14
3. “When, Who and How” of Conflict Management: The Success of ASEAN-EU Aceh Monitoring Mission page 20
4. Cafe Conversations and Open Space page 21
5. Dialogue with Local Community Leaders page 22

Anupong's remarks may add fuel to the fire in the South

By DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Published on June 17, 2009

For a man who is known for choosing his words carefully, Army chief General Anupong Paochinda has over this past week sounded more like a buck private who couldn't bribe his way out of an army draft.

Knowing that tension would be high in the aftermath of the massacre of 11 Muslims attending an evening prayer at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district, Anupong concluded prematurely that it was the work of insurgents.

He, along with deputy premier Suthep Thaugsuban, the so-called security tzar, was dispatched to the deep South immediately after the massacre at the Al Pukon mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district.

Instead of buying more time and looking for ways to ease the tension, the two security bigwigs made things worse. They prematurely dismissed any suggestion that the attackers could be anybody else other than Malay Muslim insurgents.

For local Muslims, their position drove in a bigger wedge between their community and the rest of the country. Few thought the mistrust could go any lower after a controversial court ruling on May 29 that cleared security officials of the Tak Bai massacre of 2004.

Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch noted a worrying trend over the past five years that has seen rogue elements in the volunteer and regular security units attacking mosque, Islamic schools and teashops in retaliation for the killings of Buddhist officials and civilians.

"This is a worrying trend that has fuelled communal tension and worsened the conflict in the South over the past five years," Sunai said. "The widespread suspicion in the Muslim community after the Al Pukon mosque massacre shows how the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable has led to deep distrust of the government," Sunai added.

While it may have crossed their minds that the massacre could have been the work of some rogue outfit, retaliating for a week-long mayhem that included brutal killings, beheadings, car bombs and an attack on a passenger bus full of Buddhists, Suthep and Anupong just did not want to confront other possibilities. Embracing old habits could be comforting.

If anything, the position taken by the two men became a much-needed comfort zone for officials who did not want to debate why a group of Malay Muslim insurgents would want to indiscriminately gun down people from an area where they probably received the most support.

In spite of a track record of abuses and extra-judicial killings, it is still unthinkable for the country's top political leaders to come to terms with the notion that one of their own may have committed such a thing.

Some of the security spin-doctors reiterated this half-baked but long-standing explanation that blamed the insurgents for all the atrocities because they want to raise the profile of the issue and draw the attention of the international community, such as the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Killing their own people was supposed to be the best way of attracting international sympathy.

In Bangkok, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva saw the deep South drifting further away from the kingdom, and tried to do some damage control.

He warned against reaching premature conclusions and added that "an attack on a mosque is unusual and not the style of separatists".

For the militants, it was payback time. Assoc Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani said the clock could be turned back to the scale of the violence in 2007 when collateral damage was also high - 164 public schools came under arson attack, a big jump from 43 in 2006.

Naturally, the security agencies take credit for the significant drop in 2008 that saw only 14 public schools coming under arson attacks.

But local residents say the real reason has more to do with the fact that the insurgents are losing support at the grass-roots level. In spite of the historical mistrust and dislike of state institutions, such as public school, essentially, a Siamese education for their children is better than no education at all, they said.

In spite of the unprecedented nature of these past two weeks, few want to make the connection between the spike in violence and the court verdict on May 29 that cleared soldiers, police and paramilitary rangers involved in dealing with the Tak Bai protest. The incident ended in the death of 85 Malay Muslims protesters, 78 from suffocation when they were stacked one on top of another, up to four, on the back of military trucks.

What complicated the situation further was that local media only picked up on Anupong's statement about not negotiating with the separatists. Few noted that the statement contradicted Abhisit who did not rule out the idea of talking to separatists.

What Abhisit said was that at the policy level the government does not have such a position but added that at the operational level a channel of communication with separatist groups is already in place.

But keeping the dialogue at the operation level may not be enough as security and intelligence personnel don't have the political will to go further than collect data and go after insurgents and kill them.

A number of professional mediators, including retired military top brass familiar with insurgency in the deep South and neighbouring countries, have been knocking on Abhisit's door asking him for permission to do the mediating job.

So far, Abhisit has not given anybody the much-sought-after mandate. Given the uncertain nature of the current political situation, as well as the fact that such a move will be costly in political terms, it may be a very long time before Abhisit puts all his eggs in anybody's basket.

Anupong's remarks may add fuel to the fire in the South

By DON PATHAN

For a man who is known for choosing his words carefully, Army chief General Anupong Paochinda has over this past week sounded more like a buck private who couldn't bribe his way out of an army draft.

Knowing that tension would be high in the aftermath of the massacre of 11 Muslims attending an evening prayer at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district, Anupong concluded prematurely that it was the work of insurgents.
He, along with deputy premier Suthep Thaugsuban, the so-called security tzar, was dispatched to the deep South immediately after the massacre at the Al Pukon mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district.

Instead of buying more time and looking for ways to ease the tension, the two security bigwigs made things worse. They prematurely dismissed any suggestion that the attackers could be anybody else other than Malay Muslim insurgents.

For local Muslims, their position drove in a bigger wedge between their community and the rest of the country. Few thought the mistrust could go any lower after a controversial court ruling on May 29 that cleared security officials of the Tak Bai massacre of 2004.

Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch noted a worrying trend over the past five years that has seen rogue elements in the volunteer and regular security units attacking mosque, Islamic schools and teashops in retaliation for the killings of Buddhist officials and civilians.

"This is a worrying trend that has fuelled communal tension and worsened the conflict in the South over the past five years," Sunai said. "The widespread suspicion in the Muslim community after the Al Pukon mosque massacre shows how the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable has led to deep distrust of the government," Sunai added.

While it may have crossed their minds that the massacre could have been the work of some rogue outfit, retaliating for a week-long mayhem that included brutal killings, beheadings, car bombs and an attack on a passenger bus full of Buddhists, Suthep and Anupong just did not want to confront other possibilities. Embracing old habits could be comforting.

If anything, the position taken by the two men became a much-needed comfort zone for officials who did not want to debate why a group of Malay Muslim insurgents would want to indiscriminately gun down people from an area where they probably received the most support.

In spite of a track record of abuses and extra-judicial killings, it is still unthinkable for the country's top political leaders to come to terms with the notion that one of their own may have committed such a thing.

Some of the security spin-doctors reiterated this half-baked but long-standing explanation that blamed the insurgents for all the atrocities because they want to raise the profile of the issue and draw the attention of the international community, such as the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Killing their own people was supposed to be the best way of attracting international sympathy.

In Bangkok, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva saw the deep South drifting further away from the kingdom, and tried to do some damage control.

He warned against reaching premature conclusions and added that "an attack on a mosque is unusual and not the style of separatists".

For the militants, it was payback time. Assoc Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani said the clock could be turned back to the scale of the violence in 2007 when collateral damage was also high - 164 public schools came under arson attack, a big jump from 43 in 2006.

Naturally, the security agencies take credit for the significant drop in 2008 that saw only 14 public schools coming under arson attacks.

But local residents say the real reason has more to do with the fact that the insurgents are losing support at the grass-roots level. In spite of the historical mistrust and dislike of state institutions, such as public school, essentially, a Siamese education for their children is better than no education at all, they said.

In spite of the unprecedented nature of these past two weeks, few want to make the connection between the spike in violence and the court verdict on May 29 that cleared soldiers, police and paramilitary rangers involved in dealing with the Tak Bai protest. The incident ended in the death of 85 Malay Muslims protesters, 78 from suffocation when they were stacked one on top of another, up to four, on the back of military trucks.

What complicated the situation further was that local media only picked up on Anupong's statement about not negotiating with the separatists. Few noted that the statement contradicted Abhisit who did not rule out the idea of talking to separatists.

What Abhisit said was that at the policy level the government does not have such a position but added that at the operational level a channel of communication with separatist groups is already in place.

But keeping the dialogue at the operation level may not be enough as security and intelligence personnel don't have the political will to go further than collect data and go after insurgents and kill them.
A number of professional mediators, including retired military top brass familiar with insurgency in the deep South and neighbouring countries, have been knocking on Abhisit's door asking him for permission to do the mediating job.

So far, Abhisit has not given anybody the much-sought-after mandate. Given the uncertain nature of the current political situation, as well as the fact that such a move will be costly in political terms, it may be a very long time before Abhisit puts all his eggs in anybody's basket.

The Thai-Burmese border has a life of its own

MARCH 28, 2009

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

EIGHT YEARS ago, then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra came into power and vowed to patch things up with Burma’s military government, one of the world’s most condemned regimes.

He tried hard to convince Rangoon of his sincerity even if it meant going against international sentiment, not to mention the Army, which he accused of “over-reacting” in its dealing with a cross-border clash with Burmese forces.

Thaksin, in line with his shoot-from-the-hip nature, said Thailand’s armed forces would end their tacit policy of using Burmese insurgent groups as buffers.

In the same breath, the PM also said aid organisations tending more than 100,000 refugees displaced by fighting in Burma would have to scale down their operations. He said they were interfering with his efforts to normalise ties with the junta.

Thaksin believed that his brand of “personal diplomacy”, backed with promises of development and economic cooperation, would be sufficient to pave the way for a bigger and better future with the junta. And while all that sweet talk about development and assistance was expected, what caught many Burma-watchers’ attention was the word “buffer”.

Apparently loose-lipped Thaksin didn’t know that the insurgency along the Thai-Burmese had a life of its own. How Thailand positions itself in relation to Burma’s insurgency is also a factor that defines this relation.

In 2003, the foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, tried to push through the “Bangkok Process”, a multinational forum to steer Burma towards reform. He succeeded in getting the late Karen leader General Bo Mya and his son Ner Dah to visit Rangoon and map out a blueprint for peace talks, but nothing came of it.

Surakiart’s “road map” was essentially jinxed from the very beginning because the junta did not see Thailand as an honest broker, for obvious reasons.

A tactical retreat was made possible when Burmese prime minister Khin Nyunt announced in August 2003 that the junta’s seven-step reconciliation plan would include a constitutional drafting assembly and general elections by 2010.

One of the unwritten laws along the Thai-Burmese border is that if a rebel army is pro-Rangoon, it can be considered a threat to Thai security. The 20,000-strong United Wa State Army automatically comes to mind.

Likewise, if the outfit is fighting Rangoon for autonomy or secession then it is friendly to Thailand. Groups like the Karen National Union, Shan State Army and Karenni National Progressive Party fall into this category. This law is likely to prevail until security concerns take a back seat to bilateral cooperation. The question is what must be done for both sides to achieve that needed comfort level.

The Thaksin government tried to influence change in Burma by keeping the West at bay but failed. This time around, the Democrat Party, with a track record of being critical of the junta, is suggesting that there is a need to think outside the box.

During his recent visit, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya brought up the issue of these so-called proxies along the border. He was asked by the junta to urge the ethnic rebel armies along the border to join Burma’s seven-step national-reconciliation plan, a process that has been billed a sham by critics.

However, it is not clear what Kasit will do next with regard to this request, which from a historical perspective may be way over his head. A bit of wishful thinking, perhaps, if Thailand thinks it can “mediate” peace talks between the rebels and the junta. Facilitation, on the other hand, is more plausible.

From a bird’s-eye view, the Thai-Burmese border is characterised by its cut-throat politics where rebel leaders, opium warlords, the Thai Army and Burmese generals play for keeps. As long as anyone can remember, armed ethnic groups have always functioned as a buffer between the two nagging neighbours. At the behest of the Thai or Burmese militaries, these ethnic armies do all the dirty work, keeping the hands of their respective overlords clean.

Most of these groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta in exchange for limited self-rule in so-called “special regions” where they grow opium and churn out methamphetamines. Others have chosen legitimate businesses, granting Thai and Chinese businessmen logging and mining concessions along the border.

Burma doesn’t mind if these warlords fatten their wallets with the concession money as long as they remain in the junta’s “legal fold” and do not pose any security threats. Over the past two years, Burma has tried hard to get these groups to hand over their weapons, but success has been very limited.

On the surface, there haven’t been any outbursts along the border between the two sides for a fair while now.

But military officers on the frontline warn against reaching any premature conclusions. The absence of confrontation does not necessarily mean peace, they say. Mistrust still runs high. It is just that the two sides haven’t picked up their guns to display it.

https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/03/28/the-thai-burmese-border-has-a-life-of-its-own/

Peace in the South demands historical recognition

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Published on August 25, 2009

THE Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been working hard to create understanding in the international community, especially in Islamic countries, that the ongoing violence in the Muslim-majority South is not in any way part of the global war on terror. Since January 2004, the violence has claimed more than 3,500 lives.

Over the past seven months, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has made at least four visits to the restive region, accompanying Thai ambassadors and foreign envoys. Recently, he hosted diplomats from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and journalists from Arab countries.

Like those before them, the OIC delegation was taken to Army-run projects where they were greeted by smiling Malay-Muslim villagers, flag-waving children, smiling drug addicts and former insurgents who told them how they had been "misled" into taking up arms against the Thai state and how grateful they are to the government for the chance to redeem themselves.

Across the street from the Sirindhorn army camp in Yala, Fourth Army commander Lt General Pichet Wisaichorn showed off military-run community development projects that include the making of organic fertilisers.

"You are here because you wanted to be here, right?" hollered Pichet.

"Yes!" replied the Malay villagers as they huddled in the shade while curiously observing fellow Muslims who came from as far as Egypt and Oman.

Later in the day, speaking at what could be billed as a "town hall meeting" in a packed mosque in Narathiwat's Sueloh village, Kasit told local Muslims of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's determination to solve the conflict in the deep South. He also reminded them that they have the power to help make this happen if they are willing to put their hearts to it.

Outside the mosque entrance, villagers were whispering among themselves about the June 8 massacre by a group of government-trained village militiamen who fired into a mosque in Joh I Rong district, killing 11 Muslims who were praying at the time. The villagers said they didn't want to embarrass Kasit by confronting him with questions on the issue in front of the foreign dignitaries.

So far the police have issued just one arrest warrant. The leading suspect is Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, a former paramilitary ranger. Whether he turned rogue and took matters into his own hands or is a product of some security unit operating in the region, remains to be seen.

Not far from the Sueloh mosque were about 100 former insurgents who came to greet the delegation during its brief stopover in this highly contested district of Sungai Padi district. They were part of the "Pracha Ruamjai" project. The project combines religious education with civic responsibility for these former rebels who took up arms against the state about two decades ago. Most, if not all, enrolled in the project to clear their names from any possible "blacklist".

It was obvious that these men were not part of the new generation of militants, whose vast network stretches across the Malay-speaking South, and whose members do not appear to be interested in talking to anyone, much less the government of Thailand.

Wherever he went, Kasit told the audience that the current government is committed to peaceful means to resolve the conflict. Together with development funding and political accountability, it is hoped that the foundation for a lasting peace and reconciliation between the Thai state and the Malay-speaking region will be paved.

Kasit briefly touched on the issue of cultural differences, saying that the authorities assigned to the region will be more sensitive towards the local people.

The idea of bringing foreign diplomats to the deep South was to convince them that the problem in the region is not a religious one and that Muslims in the southernmost provinces, like anywhere else in the country, have all the freedom they need to practice their religion.

But it doesn't take an Islamic expert to see that such freedom is self-evident. As pointed out by Muslim clerics here, Muslims in Thailand probably have more freedom to practice their religion than Muslims in Arab countries.

Speaking to the Arab journalists who accompanied him in the region, Kasit, without singling out ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra or dwelling on the root cause of the problem, said past administrations may have employed questionable security tactics that have made the situation worse.

Given Thaksin's all-or-nothing attitude toward the conflict in the deep South, as well as his decision to dissolve certain institutions such as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) - an organisation viewed favourably by the local population - the former premier has often received much of the blame for what has gone wrong in the region.

But while Thaksin's approach to the conflict may have made things worse and driven a bigger wedge between the Patani Malays and the rest of the country, one can't deny the fact that the new generation of militants had been in the making long before he assumed power in 2001.

Like the generation of militants before them, the young men who have been carrying out roadside bombing and ambushes over the past five years grew up under a cultural narrative that is different from the rest of the Thai people. In this case, it is the century-old occupation of the Malay historical homeland by Siamese invaders.

The state's so-called reconciliation process has never seriously addressed the sticky issue of historical mistrust and the ethnocentric nature of Thailand's nation-state building. And so for the time being, the Malays of the deep South are conveniently dismissed as "Thai Muslims". But "Thai" Muslims don't question the legitimacy of the Thai state. It's the Malays of the southernmost border provinces that do.

Trigger-happy troops not the solution

Abhisit cannot win Malay hearts with more guns pointing at heads in the strife-torn South

Editorial
By The Nation

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said on Thursday that he would send an additional 4,000 troops to the plagued deep South to help quell the ongoing insurgency to which there seems no end in sight. Abhisit said the extra paramilitary rangers would work to improve relations between the authorities and the Malay-speaking South, where historical mistrust runs high.
"They will work towards a better understanding with the residents," Abhisit explained, after meeting with top military officials on Thursday.

The PM said the authorities could only maintain the status quo at present. However, he added that this was not enough because there were enough militants around who could still induce a climate of fear in the region.

While it is clear that the insurgents continue to have a capacity to inflict terror among the local population and the authorities, the suggestion that the authorities have succeeded in containing the violence to one geographical area is a bit of a stretch.

It's one thing to say that the militants don't have the capacity, or the desire, to expand their campaign of violence outside the Malay-speaking areas. But it is entirely another to suggest that the troops have been doing such a great job in containing the insurgents to a geographical area.

There are about 60,000 security officials in this highly contested region that was once a Malay homeland before Siam annexed it over a century ago. How will another 4,000 paramilitary rangers help the situation?

If anything, it seems as if Abhisit was just filling the blanks in an unspoken contract created by the Army. A new lease on life has been given to the nearly defunct Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc), and now it is time to make do. The 4,000 rangers, it seems, were just the latest item to go on the dotted line.

Yet how long must we continue this? Didn't Abisit himself once say that the military was not the solution to the trouble in the deep South?

He started off his administration nicely, talking about the return to civilian supremacy by setting up a bureau to administer the Army and the civilians. This bureau was supposed to take its directives from a mini-Cabinet of relevant ministries.

Moreover, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was supposed to be given a legal basis so it didn't have to go through Isoc for funding to carry out projects.

Abhisit also dispatched a high-level delegation that included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and Thai envoys to Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to touch base with clerics, local officials and youth. During the visit, Kasit explained why it was important for the foreign ministry to get involved and become part of the solution. He urged one and all to give this administration a chance and vowed to follow through with more visits to a region that has placed the Kingdom in the spotlight, albeit an unwanted one.

No doubt the first few weeks did indeed bring a breath of fresh air. After listening to the Army's quirky explanation and all sorts of conspiracy theories for the past five years, the initial messages from the new administration were refreshing.

Today, however, some three months into Abhisit's leadership, nobody is talking about a civilian-led bureau, nor has there been an update as to when SBPAC will be let off the Army's leash.

So when we get reports about more troops being sent to the deep South, one can't help but wonder how this is going to win the hearts and minds of the Malays who continue to question the legitimacy of Thai rule in their historical homeland.

Authorities often argue that including more ethnic Malays in these ranger units could ease the tension because they are fluent in the language and culture. Are they expected to feel grateful for this employment opportunity, or is it some kind of sick joke?

Don't our officials know that most of the victims in the deep South are ethnic Malays killed by Malay insurgents who suspect them of spying for Thailand?

As former US president George W Bush once said: "You are either with us or against us." Sadly, this unspoken policy is employed by both the Thai State and the insurgents.

This policy manifested itself in the State employing local Malay Muslims for Bt4,500 a month to serve as their eyes and ears, and then they get told that they should be grateful for what they get? Never mind that 80 per cent of the bureaucrats in the deep South are Buddhists hailing from other parts of the country.

So when the so-called "eyes and ears" get shot in the head, the State is quick to tell the media that so-and-so was killed because he or she was spying for them. See? These Malay Muslim victims are on the side of the State, or so the authorities would like the public to believe.

Are the authorities that desperate for brownie points, or do they just not care about the safety and well being of the victims' families?

The initiatives have not become any more sophisticated, partly because the Thai military personnel and security planners are not the most sophisticated people in the world. Perhaps it's time to bring in people with fresh ideas, not poorly trained rangers with a reputation for being trigger-happy.

It is also time to give the local Malays a real stake in their country, so they too can feel like citizens and not just colonial subjects.

Dear Prime Minister, have you ever heard of social mobility? Try that for a change.

Trigger-happy troops not the solution

Abhisit cannot win Malay hearts with more guns pointing at heads in the strife-torn South

Editorial
By The Nation

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said on Thursday that he would send an additional 4,000 troops to the plagued deep South to help quell the ongoing insurgency to which there seems no end in sight. Abhisit said the extra paramilitary rangers would work to improve relations between the authorities and the Malay-speaking South, where historical mistrust runs high.
"They will work towards a better understanding with the residents," Abhisit explained, after meeting with top military officials on Thursday.

The PM said the authorities could only maintain the status quo at present. However, he added that this was not enough because there were enough militants around who could still induce a climate of fear in the region.

While it is clear that the insurgents continue to have a capacity to inflict terror among the local population and the authorities, the suggestion that the authorities have succeeded in containing the violence to one geographical area is a bit of a stretch.

It's one thing to say that the militants don't have the capacity, or the desire, to expand their campaign of violence outside the Malay-speaking areas. But it is entirely another to suggest that the troops have been doing such a great job in containing the insurgents to a geographical area.

There are about 60,000 security officials in this highly contested region that was once a Malay homeland before Siam annexed it over a century ago. How will another 4,000 paramilitary rangers help the situation?

If anything, it seems as if Abhisit was just filling the blanks in an unspoken contract created by the Army. A new lease on life has been given to the nearly defunct Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc), and now it is time to make do. The 4,000 rangers, it seems, were just the latest item to go on the dotted line.

Yet how long must we continue this? Didn't Abisit himself once say that the military was not the solution to the trouble in the deep South?

He started off his administration nicely, talking about the return to civilian supremacy by setting up a bureau to administer the Army and the civilians. This bureau was supposed to take its directives from a mini-Cabinet of relevant ministries.

Moreover, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was supposed to be given a legal basis so it didn't have to go through Isoc for funding to carry out projects.

Abhisit also dispatched a high-level delegation that included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and Thai envoys to Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to touch base with clerics, local officials and youth. During the visit, Kasit explained why it was important for the foreign ministry to get involved and become part of the solution. He urged one and all to give this administration a chance and vowed to follow through with more visits to a region that has placed the Kingdom in the spotlight, albeit an unwanted one.

No doubt the first few weeks did indeed bring a breath of fresh air. After listening to the Army's quirky explanation and all sorts of conspiracy theories for the past five years, the initial messages from the new administration were refreshing.

Today, however, some three months into Abhisit's leadership, nobody is talking about a civilian-led bureau, nor has there been an update as to when SBPAC will be let off the Army's leash.

So when we get reports about more troops being sent to the deep South, one can't help but wonder how this is going to win the hearts and minds of the Malays who continue to question the legitimacy of Thai rule in their historical homeland.

Authorities often argue that including more ethnic Malays in these ranger units could ease the tension because they are fluent in the language and culture. Are they expected to feel grateful for this employment opportunity, or is it some kind of sick joke?

Don't our officials know that most of the victims in the deep South are ethnic Malays killed by Malay insurgents who suspect them of spying for Thailand?

As former US president George W Bush once said: "You are either with us or against us." Sadly, this unspoken policy is employed by both the Thai State and the insurgents.

This policy manifested itself in the State employing local Malay Muslims for Bt4,500 a month to serve as their eyes and ears, and then they get told that they should be grateful for what they get? Never mind that 80 per cent of the bureaucrats in the deep South are Buddhists hailing from other parts of the country.

So when the so-called "eyes and ears" get shot in the head, the State is quick to tell the media that so-and-so was killed because he or she was spying for them. See? These Malay Muslim victims are on the side of the State, or so the authorities would like the public to believe.

Are the authorities that desperate for brownie points, or do they just not care about the safety and well being of the victims' families?

The initiatives have not become any more sophisticated, partly because the Thai military personnel and security planners are not the most sophisticated people in the world. Perhaps it's time to bring in people with fresh ideas, not poorly trained rangers with a reputation for being trigger-happy.

It is also time to give the local Malays a real stake in their country, so they too can feel like citizens and not just colonial subjects.

Dear Prime Minister, have you ever heard of social mobility? Try that for a change.

No one wants to live under colonial rule

Editorial

Malay Muslims in the South are content to be part of the Thai state, but with their own identity

The Foreign Ministry should be commended for making the problems in the deep South one of its top priorities. Earlier this week, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya led a high-level delegation of Thai ambassadors, and envoys from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, to Pattani, the heart of the Malay-speaking South, where he held meetings with a wide range of people. Participants included students who receive grants and scholarships from the government, Islamic religious leaders, governors of the southernmost provinces and military top brass. Kasit gave each group time to make its case, as well as letting them know the ministry's concerns. Kasit reminded the officials assigned to the restive region that the entire world is watching, and stressed the need to be more sensitive with regards to cultural differences. The international community has good intentions and the issue of human rights is one of its biggest concerns, he said.

He was correct to say that Thailand has an obligation to explain to the Thai people, as well as the international community, the progress the government has made in this trouble-plagued region, where more than 3,200 people have been killed since January 2004.

As a way to strengthen ties between the local community and the state, Kasit said budget allocations should be spread out to include local NGOs working at the community level. While it might not take a rocket scientist to figure out that that these ideas are good, Kasit and the ministry should not get caught up in a false sense of confidence. Good intentions are not policy. Tough decisions will have to be made if the problem in the deep South is to be resolved.

Like other ministries, Foreign Affairs will have to get the rest of the country to prepare for what could be a rough journey. As it stands, any move to accommodate the deep South will be costly in political terms. The rest of the country will look at it as favouritism when, in fact, meaningful effort to improve the livelihood of the region is long overdue.

For too long the Muslim-majority region has been neglected in more ways than one. We know about the historical mistrust and we know that the Patani Malays have always questioned the legitimacy of Thai rule. But instead of trying to come to terms with the past and working towards improving the social mobility of the local Malays so they felt they had a stake in this country, the state repeatedly tampered with the issue of identity. It was believed that, eventually, the Patani Malays would become "Thais" like the Chinese in Yaowarat or the Lao in Isaan. They were wrong. No matter how we look at this, tension in the South always comes back to the question of identity, the question of human dignity.

Like it or not, the Patani Malays have their own history, myths, heroes and legends, and these happen to be a completely different set of narratives from those of the Thai state. In spite of the fact that armed separatist movements surface every generation or so, there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that the local Muslims want to break away from Thailand. If anything, we believe that they want to be part of Thailand, but on their own terms.

Like others, Kasit needs to know that any move to accommodate the Patani Malays will not be easy. It is, indeed, hard for any Thai to swallow the notion that there are actually Thai citizens out there who refuse to come to terms with the ideologies that define what this nation-state is and should be.

For too long, the state has worked hard to mould the Patani Malays into something they are not and do not wish to be - at least to the point where they don't challenge the authority or question the legitimacy of the state. But for the Patani Malays, this has been something they cannot compromise on, as Malay identity and Islam are inseparable. An attack on one is an attack on the other.

Historically, state officials, including aristocrats sent to the region over the past century, see themselves as benevolent rulers. A century after the region came under the direct rule of Bangkok, we continue to believe that sending good and honest officials to administer over the Malay-speaking region will help improve the situation.

Today, with a new generation of insurgents forming a web of cells in the region, we are still scratching our heads over what to do. For five years, the military-led initiatives have tried everything under the sun - both carrot and stick have been employed and yet the Patani Malays just won't get in line. We don't seem to understand that, from the Malays' perspective, a benevolent Siamese colonial master is still a Siamese colonial master.

This may be a bit hard for us to swallow, but many people in the three southernmost provinces actually see Thai officials and residents as foreign occupiers - which naturally makes the local people colonial subjects. This is probably why extremely few local people have stepped forward to point the finger at suspected insurgents. They may not agree wit the brutal methods employed by the insurgents but we can't deny the fact that they share the same overall sentiment.

Perhaps it's time to think outside the box. Perhaps we should start to look for ways to change the equation so that the Patani Malays feel they have a stake in this country, a shared destiny. Our initiative has to go beyond giving local Malay Muslims free trips to Bangkok and Chiang Mai to show them grand temples and whisper in their ears, "This is yours, too".

Funny how none of these trips ever include a visit to the Praya Tani cannons in front of the Defence Ministry. What would we say? "This used to be yours, but not anymore. Learn to live with it buddy; you are a defeated people"?