Thailand has no clue how to end the insurgency in the South

Don Pathan
The Nation

Justice and equality for the Malay-Muslims in the three southernmost provinces is high on the agenda of the high-level representatives of the 56-member Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), as Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul confirmed that the delegates have asked about the use of the controversial Emergency Degree to quell the ongoing insurgency.

The delegation is headed by Ambassador Sayed Kassem El-Masry, an Egyptian envoy who visited the country last in 2005. In spite of the long absence between the previous and this visit, the OIC has consistently to look for ways to engage in resolution of the conflict in the restive region, meeting with the Patani Malay diaspora and people who keep a close watch on developments in Thailand's deep South.

But Bangkok, under successive governments, has never been comfortable with the idea of permitting the OIC, or any outsiders for that matter, to get involved in mediation or peace talks with the rebels, for fear that the issue would be internationalised. But denying them the political capital has not changed the course of the violence either.

Thailand’s was granted the status of Permanent Observer in the OIC in the late 1990s during the Chuan Leekpa administration. It was Thailand’s way of blocking the separatists from the setting any official recognition from the Islamic grouping.

To Bangkok's disappointment, in late 2010, the OIC met for two days with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and in Kuala Lumpur. The meetings were carried out simultaneously from the end of September to the start of October. The OIC secretary-general, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, chaired the meeting in Jeddah, while Talal A Daous, the organisation's director for the Muslim Minorities and Communities Department, chaired the gathering in Kuala Lumpur.

According to diplomatic and exiled sources, the OIC urged the long-standing separatist groups to combine efforts and form a United Patani People's Council (UPPC). As for the question of the mandate, the Patani People's Congress (PCC) would be the forum that draws its legitimacy from the people in the Malay historical homeland that is now part of Thailand's three southernmost provinces. How the PCC would operate, violating Thailand's sovereignty, remained a big question.

But the then foreign minister, Kasit Piromya, decided to pour cold water on the idea of permitting the OIC to mediate in the conflict, and the organisation was forced to retreat to the drawing baard.

Today, just weeks after massive car bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala that resulted in the deaths of more than ten people and injuries to more than 100 others, the OIC is back in the spotlight. Thailand is hard pressed to come up with answers to the insurgency because the business-as-usual approach can no longer contain the violence. The devastating nature of the Yala and Hat Yai attacks suggest that a new threshold has been crossed and the worst is yet to come. And the fact that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra repeated the same old mantra during her recent visit to the region is not very encouraging.

The OIC's visit could very well be part of Thailand's effort to put on a brave, positive, active face, to create the impression that the state is doing something about the conflict.

The OIC mediating in the conflict might not be part of the official agenda but one can be certain that many stakeholders, especially the separatist leaders, wouldn't mind seeing the OIC involved in some kind of peace process.

One thing Thailand is concerned about is that the OIC could be too sympathetic to the separatist movement. But one prominent exiled leader, who has had dealings with the the OIC over the past three decades, said the organisation respects Thailand's territorial integrity and has never really entertained the idea of seeing the Muslim-majority deep South divided from the Kingdom.

"The OIC is essentially a state actor. It would be in Thailand's interest to have the OIC involved in mediation, but successive Thai governments are just too afraid to take the chance," said the exiled leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Although the Foreign Ministry has been the public face for Thailand in answering nagging questions about the ongoing conflict in the Malay-speaking region, it is the military and policy-makers at Government House that are the ones who set the policy and directions on how the country deals with the separatists.

During the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the National Security Council (NSC) was given the task of formulating peace talks with the separatist movement. The Army wasn't too thrilled with the idea but nevertheless, sent a senior officer to observe the NSC-led process. One explanation for the willingness to appear to be cooperative may have to with the fact that the Army and the Democrat-led government were on good terms.

But when the Pheu Thai Party came to power, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra handed responsibility for the situation to the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), which is headed by Thawee Sodsong, one of the party's favourite bureaucrats.

But instead of addressing the root cause of the conflict, Thawee has treated the job as if he is preparing for a sort of summit with de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra; that being the goal in itself. Thaksin met with a group of about 16 exiled leaders in mid-March but nothing meaningful came out of it. Moreover, it was heavily politicised by the opposition and the military when the event became public information. Thawee and Pheu Thai are back to the drawing board.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting with Thaksin was not so much who was there but who wasn't. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relations with the militants on the ground, boycotted the meeting, saying it could never forgive Thaksin for "what he has done to the Malays of Patani". They were referring to his heavy-handed tactics during his rule, which he blamed on bureaucrats for providing him with inaccurate information.

But the BRN-Coordinate says it is not completely ruling out the idea of talking to the Thais, as long as it is not Thaksin's camp. Moreover, senior members in the movement say they have yet to establish an adequate command-and-control relationship with the militants on the ground.

It remains to be seen if Bangkok will ask the OIC to get the BRN-Coordinate to let bygones be bygones and take up any olive branch from the Pheu Thai camp. But if the recent devastating car bombs in Yala and Hat Yai tell us anything, it is that the insurgents are not in the mood to talk.

Peace in the South demands historical recognition

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Published on August 25, 2009

THE Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been working hard to create understanding in the international community, especially in Islamic countries, that the ongoing violence in the Muslim-majority South is not in any way part of the global war on terror. Since January 2004, the violence has claimed more than 3,500 lives.

Over the past seven months, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has made at least four visits to the restive region, accompanying Thai ambassadors and foreign envoys. Recently, he hosted diplomats from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and journalists from Arab countries.

Like those before them, the OIC delegation was taken to Army-run projects where they were greeted by smiling Malay-Muslim villagers, flag-waving children, smiling drug addicts and former insurgents who told them how they had been "misled" into taking up arms against the Thai state and how grateful they are to the government for the chance to redeem themselves.

Across the street from the Sirindhorn army camp in Yala, Fourth Army commander Lt General Pichet Wisaichorn showed off military-run community development projects that include the making of organic fertilisers.

"You are here because you wanted to be here, right?" hollered Pichet.

"Yes!" replied the Malay villagers as they huddled in the shade while curiously observing fellow Muslims who came from as far as Egypt and Oman.

Later in the day, speaking at what could be billed as a "town hall meeting" in a packed mosque in Narathiwat's Sueloh village, Kasit told local Muslims of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's determination to solve the conflict in the deep South. He also reminded them that they have the power to help make this happen if they are willing to put their hearts to it.

Outside the mosque entrance, villagers were whispering among themselves about the June 8 massacre by a group of government-trained village militiamen who fired into a mosque in Joh I Rong district, killing 11 Muslims who were praying at the time. The villagers said they didn't want to embarrass Kasit by confronting him with questions on the issue in front of the foreign dignitaries.

So far the police have issued just one arrest warrant. The leading suspect is Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, a former paramilitary ranger. Whether he turned rogue and took matters into his own hands or is a product of some security unit operating in the region, remains to be seen.

Not far from the Sueloh mosque were about 100 former insurgents who came to greet the delegation during its brief stopover in this highly contested district of Sungai Padi district. They were part of the "Pracha Ruamjai" project. The project combines religious education with civic responsibility for these former rebels who took up arms against the state about two decades ago. Most, if not all, enrolled in the project to clear their names from any possible "blacklist".

It was obvious that these men were not part of the new generation of militants, whose vast network stretches across the Malay-speaking South, and whose members do not appear to be interested in talking to anyone, much less the government of Thailand.

Wherever he went, Kasit told the audience that the current government is committed to peaceful means to resolve the conflict. Together with development funding and political accountability, it is hoped that the foundation for a lasting peace and reconciliation between the Thai state and the Malay-speaking region will be paved.

Kasit briefly touched on the issue of cultural differences, saying that the authorities assigned to the region will be more sensitive towards the local people.

The idea of bringing foreign diplomats to the deep South was to convince them that the problem in the region is not a religious one and that Muslims in the southernmost provinces, like anywhere else in the country, have all the freedom they need to practice their religion.

But it doesn't take an Islamic expert to see that such freedom is self-evident. As pointed out by Muslim clerics here, Muslims in Thailand probably have more freedom to practice their religion than Muslims in Arab countries.

Speaking to the Arab journalists who accompanied him in the region, Kasit, without singling out ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra or dwelling on the root cause of the problem, said past administrations may have employed questionable security tactics that have made the situation worse.

Given Thaksin's all-or-nothing attitude toward the conflict in the deep South, as well as his decision to dissolve certain institutions such as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) - an organisation viewed favourably by the local population - the former premier has often received much of the blame for what has gone wrong in the region.

But while Thaksin's approach to the conflict may have made things worse and driven a bigger wedge between the Patani Malays and the rest of the country, one can't deny the fact that the new generation of militants had been in the making long before he assumed power in 2001.

Like the generation of militants before them, the young men who have been carrying out roadside bombing and ambushes over the past five years grew up under a cultural narrative that is different from the rest of the Thai people. In this case, it is the century-old occupation of the Malay historical homeland by Siamese invaders.

The state's so-called reconciliation process has never seriously addressed the sticky issue of historical mistrust and the ethnocentric nature of Thailand's nation-state building. And so for the time being, the Malays of the deep South are conveniently dismissed as "Thai Muslims". But "Thai" Muslims don't question the legitimacy of the Thai state. It's the Malays of the southernmost border provinces that do.

Crisis in south rooted in ethnic Malay identity

Govt's charm offensive may be winning support abroad, but it won't end bloodshed in region 

Don Pathan
The Nation

Not long after Thai soldiers and police stacked hundreds of unarmed Muslim demonstrators on the back of military transport trucks - suffocating 78 of them in the process - the Thai Foreign Ministry went through their rolodex's looking for Muslim organisations.

The aftermath of the Tak Bai tragedy generated all kinds of fears and concerns.

Besides the possibility of a diplomatic fallout with Islamic countries over the death of 78 unarmed demonstrators, many were worried the incident would change the course of the insurgency in the deep South, turning local grievances into a struggle for Islamic causes. But nearly three years later, the banner is still very much Malay nationalism.

Prior to the Tak Bai incident, the then Thaksin Shinawatra administration didn't give much thought about generating political capital from international Islamic organisations or institutions.

But like most organisations, foreign or local, an institution is only as good as what you churn out of it. The previous government of Chuan Leekpai succeeded in securing a "permanent observer" seat in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). In doing so it dashed the hopes of separatist movements such as the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) or Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) from using it as a launching pad to attack Thailand.

As part of its effort to get the Muslim countries off its back, Bangkok launched a charm offensive. Diplomatic old hands and Muslim VIPs were dispatched to the Middle East and to OIC meetings.

There were some difficult moments, however. The OIC rattled the government's cage on more than one occasion, issuing some strong statements in 2005 over Thailand's handling of the far South.

After more than two years of diplomatic offensive, Thailand has succeeded in obtaining some breathing space.

But Bangkok also made some concessions. In a joint press statement in May 2007, the Foreign Ministry had to acknowledge the OIC's desire for "prompt and effective investigation of any allegation of human rights abuses". It also said that "long-term solutions to the problem in the South should entail granting the people of the region greater responsibility in governing effectively their local affairs".

Although no one knows what this will translate to in real terms, diplomatically speaking, the language of the joint statement suggested that the tricky topic of structural or administrative reform could be on the table in the future.

But while its charm offensive gives Thai officials some breathing space in the international arena, back in the deep South, the government's campaign to win hearts and minds is being clipped by reports and allegations of targeted killings and heavy handed measures.

Moreover, Muslims in the restive South, as well as those living exile, said Bangkok has been barking up the wrong tree with its insistence on playing the Islamic card.

The problem in the restive region is not about Islam; it is deep rooted in the ethnic Malays' refusal to embrace the pillars and values that define Thailand's nation-state building, they insist.

But Thai officials continue to ignore the complexity of the long-standing problem of assimilation and the question of identity the ethnic Malays face.

Oversimplifying the problems in the deep South tends to turn many Muslims off, particularly those who would like to work with the state but are disgusted by the government's futile policies.

Although it has put off many Muslims around the country, the government continues with its search for a model Muslim citizen, or "moderate", as the government likes to say, for others to emulate.

One big problem for Bangkok is that the model isn't catching on - no one wants to be seen as a "Muslim Uncle Tom".

‘REFUGEE’ INCIDENT: Pulo denies role in Muslim exodus

Outlawed separatist group says flight of 131 Narathiwat asylum seekers into Malaysia was spurred by harassment 

Don Pathan
The Nation

The Pattani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) has dismissed allegations by the Thai government that it hatched a plot for 131 Thai Muslims to flee to Malaysia and to smear Thailand’s reputation by drawing international attention to the incident.

In a statement delivered to The Nation last weekend from the exiled outlawed Muslim militant organisation’s headquarters in Europe, Pulo said the 131 Thai nationals were ordinary villagers who fled their homes in southern Thailand because “they cannot live under Thai harassment.”

Pulo officials also dismissed accusations that the Pattani Malay Human Rights Organisation was their political “front” organisation. The Pulo statement said the Malay human rights organisation had been formed shortly after the Tak Bai demonstration last October when 78 Muslim demonstrators died in the custody of Thai security forces.

The organisation is an independent organisation with no link to Pulo, and that it helps “displaced people who need shelter and basic needs for survival”, according to Pulo. The 131 Thai Muslims seeking asylum in Malaysia are residents of Narathiwat’s border districts and appear to have crossed into Malaysia simultaneously before taking refuge in two mosques in the state of Kelantan.

They have since been relocated to a shelter and are being interviewed by officials working for a UN refugee agency. The incident took on a bitter diplomatic note when Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra accused some of the purported refugees of being insurgents. The Malaysian government responded by inviting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to interview the Thai Muslims to determine their status.

Outspoken former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad ratcheted up the controversy when he suggested the 131 Thai Muslims be given asylum once their status as refugees was established. Muslim residents in Narathiwat said they believed the asylum-seekers had fled because of a misunderstanding with security officials who ordered locals to report to provincial offices to undergo a week-long “re-education programme” aimed instilling a heightened sense of patriotism.

 Residents said a recently passed controversial emergency decree, described by critics as “a license to kill”, may also have been a factor in further alarming local Muslims fearing abuse at the hands of security forces. Pulo surfaced in the 1970s at the height of the armed struggle by ethnic Malays seeking independence from Thailand.

Hostilities died down in the previous decade before they resurfaced again in January 2004 with a raid on an army arsenal. Since then nearly 900 people have been killed in the South. “As you may have notice, we are back,” the exiled organisation’s statement read. Pulo also accused the Thai government of misleading the Organisation of Islamic Conference in order to enhance relations with Muslim countries.

The statement by Pulo asserted that it was police and army “brutality” that had led to the renewed insurgency. The statement stated that Thai security forces had carried out extra-judicial killings of at least 17 Muslims prior to the assassination of Imam Stopa Yusoh in Lahar village in Narathiwat. It said these incidents had fostered resentment against the state, particularly after the killings were not properly investigated.

“We are engaged in defending and protecting local people who, as you know, are confronting Thai security men,” the statement said. In another statement issued by the organisation, exiled deputy president Abae Kamae dismissed recent news reports that Pulo was holding talks with government officials. He also dismissed a statement by an unnamed “spokesman” that the organisation was planning attacks in Phuket, Bangkok, and Pattaya. “It is not our policy” to stage such attacks, he said.

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BURNING ISSUE: Malaysia row may backfire
Thaksin’s bitter ‘refugee’ pillis entirely self-administered

Don Pathan
The Nation

September 16, 2005

Thailand and Malaysia have once again found themselves at loggerheads in the
aftermath of a diplomatic tussle that involves the 131 Thai Muslims who fled their
villages for the Malaysian state of Kelantan, reportedly because they were scared by
an impending crackdown on their community by government security forces.
But this round of a political tussle could prove very costly for Bangkok now that the
stakes have been raised. An unwanted international spotlight is shining brightly on the
restive region, although the government insists that the incident is an internal affair.
Senior security officials on the ground said the issue could have been settled at a very
local level between the immigration officers of the two countries.
40
They said the Foreign Ministry had hit the right note when suggesting on the first day
that it was a case of simple misunderstanding and that the villagers would be treated
with dignity upon their return. But Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could not stay
quiet long enough for diplomacy to take its due course.
Thaksin put the ball in Kuala Lumpur’s court when he stated that some of the 131
were Muslim insurgents, whom authorities accuse of trying to carve out a separate
homeland for the ethnic Malays in Thailand’s deep South.
Malaysia responded by permitting the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to get into the act – an unprecedented move on this sticky issue, which has
long been at the centre of dealings between the two countries.
Former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed turned up the heat even
further when he suggested that the 131 Narathiwat villagers should be given asylum if
they are deemed to be genuine refugees.
Defence Minister Thamarak Isarangura then shot back, suggesting that Kuala Lumpur
has turned a blind eye to supposed meetings among Thai Muslim insurgents on the
Malaysian island of Langkawi. But his move to implicate Malaysia could very well
pave the way for a completely new tone and context for future bilateral dialogues over
the border region, although not all stakeholders are convinced that this is best for the
two countries.
For one thing, the two governments have never really agreed between themselves
whether the violence in the South is criminal or political in nature.
The two sides cannot even agree on whether the extradition treaty dating from the
colonial period should be honoured.
Thailand has insisted all along that the violence in the deep South is a domestic matter
but overlooked the possibility that somehow along the way, Malaysia would be
brought into the picture.
So when the 131 local residents fled across the border, it was a question of too little
and too late to come up with an agreement about what is the appropriate terminology.
Diplomats and observers say that the Malaysian authorities have never really trusted
their Thai counterparts to treat the suspects whom they had previously handed over in
a proper manner – or at least in line with the country’s legal procedures.
If the UN deems the 131 to be genuine refugees, then any arrest warrants from the
Thai police would be almost meaningless as insurgent crimes in the unruly region
could be conveniently deemed political. And as refugees, they would have the right to
ask for resettlement in a third country.
At the recent Asean-UN summit in New York, Thaksin lashed out at an unnamed UN
agency for allowing itself to be “trapped into local political exploitation that could
lead to international misunderstanding”.
41
“Had the agency paid due respect to Thailand’s concern and had it tried to understand
the real cause of the incident, it would not have been so exploited,” Thaksin added.
But why hasn’t Thaksin asked Kuala Lumpur directly about this? Why couldn’t the
PM and his men stay quiet long enough to let officials handle the problem at the local
level?Some two years ago Thaksin said the UN was not his father – an angry remark
about the world body’s criticism of his government’s human rights record.
That may be true – the UN is not his father. But for the time being, Thaksin is
beginning to feel the might of an organisation often referred to as a “paper tiger”.
If the UNHCR grants the 131 “refugee” status, Thailand would know what a bitter pill
tastes like – the kind of pill that Burma and the Indochinese countries had been taking
for the most of the last half of the previous century when internal conflicts pushed
their own people across someone else’s border.
Don Pathan