Don Pathan
The Nation
No one in their right mind expected to see any real breakthrough at the recent peace talks between a National Security Council (NSC)-led team and a group calling themselves Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) members.
The two sides entered into a historic “agreement” on February 28 in Kuala Lumpur. Representing the separatist side was Hasan Toib, an exiled figure who called himself a “liaison” officer for the BRN-C.
NSC chief Paradon Pattanabut, a close ally of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, co-signed the agreement that is billed by some as a spectacular development because it is the first time that a Thai government has given this much legitimacy to the Malay-Muslim separatist movement.
For others, the agreement is a big leap of faith because Hasan Toib doesn’t have much clout within the separatist community, much less command and control over militants on the ground, who have not ceased their campaign of violence in the deep South.
Hasan doesn’t have much to offer except a promise that he will talk to others, such as the BRN-C’s inner circle known as the Dewan Penilian Party (DPP), and ask them to come to the table. So far, the DPP is still giving Hasan and the Thai side the cold shoulder.
As a “liaison” officer, Hasan is stuck in limbo. BRN-C leaders do not take him seriously, but instead toy with him by asking him to raise certain sensitive issues knowing that the Thais do not have the stomach to accommodate them. These issues include the granting of diplomatic immunity to the negotiators and the rest of the BRN-C political wings, so that they can’t be charged with crimes. A well-placed source in the Malaysian government, which is faciliatating the talks, confirmed such demands.
Another issue the BRN-C would like the Thai side to take up is official and public acknowledgement that Patani, which constitutes the three southernmost provinces of Thailand, is the homeland of the Malay-Muslims. In other words, the Malays of Patani are Thailand’s equals, not inferiors, when it comes to their meeting at the table.
One leader from the BRN-Congress, a separate branch within the BRN circle, said that for his group, such official acknowledgement is also necessary because there has to be some understanding from the Thai side that there is a historical root to this conflict. “It’s about our dignity and the reason why we took up arms in the first place,” he said.
Another pending issue, said a BRN-C cadre, is the fact that the separatist movements and the Malaysian government have yet to get over their differences. Kuala Lumpur burned its bridges with exiled separatist leaders when when it deported some of them to the Thai side in the late 1990s and assisted Thailand in obtaining permanent observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Thailand’s status in the OIC has effectively blocked the long-standing Patani Malay separatist orgnisations from making any real headway in the 57-country organisation.
Desperate for public acceptance, the NSC and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) chief, Police Colonel Tawee Sodsong, threw names out, publicly and privately, at closed-door meetings with officials, about how certain individuals like Masae Useng and Sapae-ing Basor, would be coming to the March 28 meeting, or sending their representatives. Of course, these two men did not show up.
According to Paradon, among the groups that also came to the March 28 talks were the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and Barisan Islam Pembangunan Patani (BIPP), as well as Bersatu.
But the BIPP leaders confirmed to The Nation that they were not invited.
“It is very likely that they went to some friendly exiled individuals who, thirty years ago, were members of BIPP, and invited them,” said a top leader in this particular oganisation.
Moreover, Paradon and the SBPAC didn’t seem to realise that Bersatu, an umbrella organisation for the long-standing separatist groups, is now defunct, having fallen apart about two decades ago. Moreover, he didn’t seem to realise that there are three different people who claim to be the legitimate president of Pulo. So much for Thailand’s PR sound byte.
“The government needs to show more sincerity. If they are going to spin information for public consumption, they should base it on some facts. Bersatu is a thing of the past,” said Artef Sohko, a youth leader from Narathiwat.
Besides the clumsy public relations exercise, the Thai side has difficulties obtaining friends – people who matter, anyway – to endorse its initiatives or, better yet, join it at the negotiating table.
The Ulema Council, which is made up of traditionalist (Shafi’i jurisprudence) Muslim clerics in the three southernmost Malay-speaking provinces, has rejected an invitation from the government to take part in the peace talks. About 90 per cent of the local Malay-Muslims embrace the Shafi’i school of though.
Another group that gave the state the cold shoulder is the Saudara, a student/youth movement that works on the promotion of Patani-Malay cultural and historical identity.
Giving the government the cold shoulder is understandable because these groups – who are said to be only one-step removed from the insurgency because their relatives and friends are either locked up on charges of treason or are on the run because they are on the authorities’s “blacklist” – have too much to lose. Besides, say student leaders and clerics, the foundation for the historic February 28 “peace agreement” was based on the political necessities of Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, not the needs of the Malays of Patani.
Others who are indifferent to this “peace process” are the militants on the ground, who continue to carry out vicious attacks with even more intensity.
Perhaps the most interesting development is the fact that the ruling Pheu Thai Party has been quietly sending stratgists abroad to make deals with BRN-C elders. But so far these strategists have not been able to make any real headway, as the BRN-C’s DPP members are not in the mood to meet anybody for the time being.
But the fact that Pheu Thai has been sending strategists suggests that it, too, understands that the official track is somethig just for show and that there is only so much Paradon and Hasan can do in their capacity as chief negotiator and “liaison”, respectively.
The problem with Paradon and the SBPAC is that the platform they are working under was desgined to serve Thaksin, who was ousted in a 2006 coup because, among other reasons, of his handling of the deep South.
The BRN-C argues that Bangkok is using the February 28 peace dialogue as a way to clear Thaksin’s name, and that’s why it didn’t matter who Bangkok extended the olive branch to.
Until Bangkok can come to the understanding that there are differences between political interests and the national interest, bringing peace to this highly constested region will be a thing of the future.
https://www.nationthailand.com/perspective/30203136
