Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
Authorities in Thailand’s Deep South undertook a rare move by charging two troops with murder in the killings of three unarmed woodcutters, and conceding that soldiers mistook the civilians for insurgents hiding out atop a mountain in Narathiwat province.
It’s not very often that the Thai army admits to committing mistakes with deadly consequences in its counter-insurgency operations in the far south. But in the wake of the Dec. 16 killings, the military came out with a different kind of message.
When extrajudicial killings took place in the past under questionable circumstances, authorities would opt to buy more time and tell the public the case was under investigation.
Past practices also showed that militants from the National Revolutionary Front (BRN), the main southern separatist rebel group National Revolutionary Front (BRN), would retaliate – and often ferociously – when they deemed that “ground rules” in the conflict had been violated.
The BRN would go beyond the usual roadside bombings often followed by a brief gunfight with government forces, by carrying out coordinated and organized attacks as a form of retaliation.
Like in all insurgencies, violence is a form of communicative action.
In the context of Thailand’s Deep South, the communication over the past 15 years has been between militant separatists under the leadership of BRN and the Thai security forces, made up of police, soldiers and paramilitaries.
As the BRN sees it, armed civilians including village chiefs and defense volunteers – all of whom fall under the Ministry of Interior’s chain of command – are legitimate targets when they cross a red line by becoming part of the government’s security apparatus, and/or spying for the state.
The killings of 15 mostly armed village officials in Yala province during a twin attack by suspected insurgents on two security posts in early November was a case in point.
But Dec. 16 incident on a mountain top in Narathiwat that resulted in the deaths of three young men begged the question: why has the BRN so far not retaliated this time around?
“The mood on the ground calls for retaliation but it appears that the BRN is showing restraint. The Thai army, on the other hand, is reciprocating the BRN’s restraint by taking a moral high ground on this incident,” said Asmadee Bueheng, the communications director from The Patani, a political action group that closely monitors the conflict and advocates for the right to self-determination for local Malay Muslims.
Artef Sohko, a prominent political activist in the region who chairs The Patani, said: “The villagers have made some progress with the authorities, and the BRN may not want to carry out retaliation for fear that it could jeopardize whatever agreement the state agencies and the relatives have achieved.”
At first, the initial report from the military unit to the regional commander, Lt. Gen. Pornsak Poolsawat, said the soldiers came across a group of loggers in a restricted area and instructed them to identify themselves and be subjected to a search.
Around the same time, three to four gunshots were heard in the immediate area and the woodcutters ran.
Some of the woodcutters who fled the scene but survived the shooting are keeping quiet and not talking to reporters. It was not clear if they had reached a deal with the authorities, or they worried for their own safety or did not want to complicate the matter while the two sides negotiate a settlement.
Asmadee said authorities could have clung to their narrative because they were no witnesses, except for loggers who fled the scene and lived.
But they didn’t.
Instead, Thai Army Chief Gen. Apirat Kongsompong expressed regrets over the deaths of the three young men and vowed to take legal and disciplinary actions. He suggested that the security forces needed to improve their understanding of the rules of engagement.
Moreover, Lt. Gen. Pornsak no longer lends credence to the initial report about a possible gunfight at the scene of the deadly shootings on the mountain.
Observers said the army chief was trying to win the hearts and minds of the local people who had overwhelmingly voted for the opposition parties at the last General Election, in March 2019. Compared with other regions, Thailand’s Malay-speaking South had the highest voter turnout.
In some ways, faith in Thailand’s parliamentary politics was somewhat restored. But the fact that a majority of locals voted for the opposition who had campaigned on an anti-military platform means the current administration is resting on shaky ground.
Expressing regret and vowing to take legal action against soldiers who allegedly took part in killing the loggers will not be a game-changer for the conflict in the far south. But, nevertheless, it is the correct path to take if Thailand is to succeed in winning hearts and minds of the local Malays.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/Pathan-civilians-killed-12302019162612.html
https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-pathan-deepsouth-12302019143415.html (Thai)
DON PATHAN Senior Program Officer for Regional Security Cooperation at The Asia Foundation
Monday 30 December 2019
Tuesday 3 December 2019
Thai Negotiator Looks to Involve All Rebel Groups in Southern Peace Talks
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Bangkok
Thailand’s new chief negotiator in peace talks with Deep South rebels expressed his determination to end the long-running separatist conflict in the border region as he introduced himself and his team to the international community last week.
Wanlop Rugsanaoh did not name Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the Patani Malay insurgent group that controls virtually all of the combatants on the rebel side. But his team intended to talk to all the armed separatist groups, especially those that could influence the situation in the field, the retired army general and former National Security Council chief said during a press conference Friday in Bangkok.
Engaging in a peace process with the southern rebels was part of a national agenda, Wanlop told reporters. The tone of his remarks contrasted with recent comments by the Thai army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong, and other government officials on how Bangkok should handle the conflict in the far south.
The negotiator spoke about the importance of human dignity, compromise and respecting differences as he outlined his approach to the new job, while Apirat had talked tough by suggesting that the southern rebels must be crushed by any necessary means.
The current wave of insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, whose population is mainly Muslim and Malay-speaking, erupted in early 2004 and has claimed more than 7,000 lives.
Peace initiatives have since come and gone but nothing seems to work because the most important separatist group of all, the BRN, has refused to join the talks.
“We can first learn from the past roles and lessons on why the talks failed. The best way is to meet the right man so that we fix the trouble correctly,” said Thanakorn Buaras, head of the National Intelligence Agency, one of four panelists who appeared at Friday’s press conference at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand.
That said, peace initiatives in the Deep South over the past 15 years have been a trial-and-error process.
From the Langkawi Process to the Berlin initiative, the Thai government and the Patani Malay rebels have come face to face in various cities in Southeast Asia and Europe.
Many of these discussions have been kept off the public’s radar screen. And to play it safe, people involved with these peace initiatives often bill them as “pre-talks.”
Peace initiatives gone by
One reason that none of the peace initiatives have gained traction is that the Thai side is not willing to make any concessions.
Of course, there was a launch of talks in February 2013 by the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, when Bangkok gave Kuala Lumpur a mandate to “facilitate” the efforts.
The Yingluck initiative generated a great deal of excitement. It marked the first time a Thai government had stated publicly that it would talk to the rebels and resolve the conflict through political means.
But it didn’t take long to realize that Yingluck’s initiative was something between a hoax and a big leap of faith. First of all, the entire inception process was carried out without the knowledge of the Thai military or the participation of the BRN. In short, it was doomed to fail from the start.
A coup toppled Yingluck in May 2014, after which a military government reluctantly resumed the talks. Gen. Aksara Kerdpol, retired army chief of staff, was appointed as the chief Thai negotiator and Malaysia resumed its role as official facilitator.
Kuala Lumpur helped put together an umbrella organization made up of longstanding separatist movements, some of which surfaced during the previous wave of insurgency in the 1960s but went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
As with Yingluck’s initiative, MARA Patani lacked the participation of BRN leaders who controlled the group’s fighters. The BRN didn’t see it as a credible process.
In late 2018, Aksara was replaced by Gen. Udomchai Thamsarorat, another retired general who spent much of his professional career in the Fourth Army Area, the command that oversees the Deep South.
One of his first orders of business was to drop Aksara’s Safety Zone pilot project. He knew MARA Patani could not deliver on its ceasefire component, because they didn’t control the insurgents, and BRN, the group that did, was not about to support something that would enhance the legitimacy of another group without getting anything in return.
Udomchai, from the start, reached out to as many people as he could, including members of the international community, to seek advice on how to advance the talks.
Udomchai’s decision to request help from a foreign NGO to reach out to the BRN’s ruling council irked some officials in the Malaysian facilitation secretariat because they had not been consulted and, therefore, this was seen as a violation of protocol.
The Thai government likes to point out that the number of violent incidents in the Deep South has dropped dramatically, compared to a peak in 2007.
But the BRN has demonstrated that they can crank up the violence in the Deep South at any time. This was the case with the killings of two Buddhist monks and five public school employees in January this year. More recently, twin attacks in early November killed 15 people, mostly village defense volunteers and police, in Lam Phaya, a sub-district of Yala province.
The ground rule in Thailand’s far south is that the local officials are to be left alone if they do not cross the line to become part of the government’s security apparatus. It was not clear what line, if any, the 15 victims in Lam Phaya had crossed.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/Don-Pathan-peace-talks-12032019095130.html?fbclid=IwAR2oIcg_n8bgY97gCLdiXxwDF38Zc400OMCVUuT6_tgc3xNQId4UJwYnxik
BenarNews
Bangkok
Thailand’s new chief negotiator in peace talks with Deep South rebels expressed his determination to end the long-running separatist conflict in the border region as he introduced himself and his team to the international community last week.
Wanlop Rugsanaoh did not name Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the Patani Malay insurgent group that controls virtually all of the combatants on the rebel side. But his team intended to talk to all the armed separatist groups, especially those that could influence the situation in the field, the retired army general and former National Security Council chief said during a press conference Friday in Bangkok.
 |
| Left to Right: HRW's Sunai Phasuk, Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, Gen. Chinawat Mandate, and Don Pathan |
Engaging in a peace process with the southern rebels was part of a national agenda, Wanlop told reporters. The tone of his remarks contrasted with recent comments by the Thai army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong, and other government officials on how Bangkok should handle the conflict in the far south.
The negotiator spoke about the importance of human dignity, compromise and respecting differences as he outlined his approach to the new job, while Apirat had talked tough by suggesting that the southern rebels must be crushed by any necessary means.
The current wave of insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, whose population is mainly Muslim and Malay-speaking, erupted in early 2004 and has claimed more than 7,000 lives.
Peace initiatives have since come and gone but nothing seems to work because the most important separatist group of all, the BRN, has refused to join the talks.
“We can first learn from the past roles and lessons on why the talks failed. The best way is to meet the right man so that we fix the trouble correctly,” said Thanakorn Buaras, head of the National Intelligence Agency, one of four panelists who appeared at Friday’s press conference at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand.
That said, peace initiatives in the Deep South over the past 15 years have been a trial-and-error process.
From the Langkawi Process to the Berlin initiative, the Thai government and the Patani Malay rebels have come face to face in various cities in Southeast Asia and Europe.
Many of these discussions have been kept off the public’s radar screen. And to play it safe, people involved with these peace initiatives often bill them as “pre-talks.”
Peace initiatives gone by
One reason that none of the peace initiatives have gained traction is that the Thai side is not willing to make any concessions.
Of course, there was a launch of talks in February 2013 by the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, when Bangkok gave Kuala Lumpur a mandate to “facilitate” the efforts.
The Yingluck initiative generated a great deal of excitement. It marked the first time a Thai government had stated publicly that it would talk to the rebels and resolve the conflict through political means.
But it didn’t take long to realize that Yingluck’s initiative was something between a hoax and a big leap of faith. First of all, the entire inception process was carried out without the knowledge of the Thai military or the participation of the BRN. In short, it was doomed to fail from the start.
A coup toppled Yingluck in May 2014, after which a military government reluctantly resumed the talks. Gen. Aksara Kerdpol, retired army chief of staff, was appointed as the chief Thai negotiator and Malaysia resumed its role as official facilitator.
Kuala Lumpur helped put together an umbrella organization made up of longstanding separatist movements, some of which surfaced during the previous wave of insurgency in the 1960s but went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
 |
| The Patani's Hakim Pongtikor and Gen. Wanlop at the FCCT. |
In late 2018, Aksara was replaced by Gen. Udomchai Thamsarorat, another retired general who spent much of his professional career in the Fourth Army Area, the command that oversees the Deep South.
One of his first orders of business was to drop Aksara’s Safety Zone pilot project. He knew MARA Patani could not deliver on its ceasefire component, because they didn’t control the insurgents, and BRN, the group that did, was not about to support something that would enhance the legitimacy of another group without getting anything in return.
Udomchai, from the start, reached out to as many people as he could, including members of the international community, to seek advice on how to advance the talks.
Udomchai’s decision to request help from a foreign NGO to reach out to the BRN’s ruling council irked some officials in the Malaysian facilitation secretariat because they had not been consulted and, therefore, this was seen as a violation of protocol.
The Thai government likes to point out that the number of violent incidents in the Deep South has dropped dramatically, compared to a peak in 2007.
But the BRN has demonstrated that they can crank up the violence in the Deep South at any time. This was the case with the killings of two Buddhist monks and five public school employees in January this year. More recently, twin attacks in early November killed 15 people, mostly village defense volunteers and police, in Lam Phaya, a sub-district of Yala province.
The ground rule in Thailand’s far south is that the local officials are to be left alone if they do not cross the line to become part of the government’s security apparatus. It was not clear what line, if any, the 15 victims in Lam Phaya had crossed.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/Don-Pathan-peace-talks-12032019095130.html?fbclid=IwAR2oIcg_n8bgY97gCLdiXxwDF38Zc400OMCVUuT6_tgc3xNQId4UJwYnxik
Thursday 17 October 2019
Future Forward’s Inroads in Thai Deep South Alarm Military, BRN
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Bangkok
Six months after the general election, Thailand is still trying to come to terms with the shock and awe brought upon the pro-military political establishment by democratic forces.
Among these was the newcomer Future Forward Party (FFP), which struck a nerve with the armed forces by calling for a constitutional amendment and military reform.
FFP also said the army should pull out of the Deep South, where a 15-year-old separatist insurgency has claimed more than 7,000 lives, according to figures provided by researchers from Prince of Songkhla University – Pattani Campus.
In so doing – and in demanding accountability for questionable counter-insurgency tactics and alleged torture of suspected insurgents – FFP succeeded in connecting with Malay Muslims in the Deep South.
Turnout at the recent election jolted the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one long-standing separatist group controlling virtually all combatants on the ground.
According to sources in the movement, in the period leading up to the March 2019 vote, there was discussions among local cell leaders about boycotting it.
But the idea did not evolve into a full-fledged campaign like the August 2016 drive by BRN calling on locals to vote “no” on the referendum on the Constitution drafted by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), as the junta called itself.
The referendum passed by a slim margin nationally, but the Muslim-majority Deep South strongly rejected it.
Some voters destroyed the ballot by scribbling on it. Villagers were even urged to write “Merdeka,” or “independence” on their ballot – but many feared that making such a bold statement could come back to haunt them.
Indeed, although 15 years have passed since this second wave of insurgency surfaced in the Deep South, frank and honest discussion about how the local population truly feels about self-determination is still a thing of the future. Voting “no” or destroying the ballot was the locals’ way of expressing their disagreement with the state.
A different story
But the 2019 general election tells a different story. The fact that the Muslim-majority Deep South had the highest voter turnout in the country irked the BRN.
The FFP did not win any of 13 parliamentary seats in the Deep South but earned almost three times the 30,000 votes they were expecting.
FFP’s leader, Thanathorn Jungroongruangkit, made at least four visits to the region during the campaign, generating excitement. Village boys in sarongs flocked to get a glimpse of him.
Others lined up for selfies with the leader of this start-up party that, in the view of many, helped restore faith in Thailand’s parliamentarian politics among Malay Muslims in the region.
It was a faith that pretty much disappeared following the October 2004 Tak Bai incident, when 78 demonstrators suffocated after being stacked on the back of military transport trucks.
Upset at the refusal of the Wadah faction – local Muslim parliamentarians – to speak out against the then-government, of which they were a key coalition partner, local Malays would not vote for them in the Parliament.
At the last general election, the Wadah rebranded itself, formed a party of its own and promoted greater Malay cultural space in the context of multiculturalism.
But for young voters in the region, it was FFP’s relentless assault on the military that attracted their support. Never mind that FFP was courting LGBTs and calling for gender equality – issues that don’t resonate with the conservative Deep South. Malay Muslims in the region still saw common ground.
BRN members were dumbstruck by the high voter turnout, and forced to go back to the drawing board and to contemplate what it meant for them as a “liberating force.”
Meanwhile, post-election, local politicians from various parties came together to form an ad-hoc caucus to advance the grievances of the local Muslim population.
‘Hybrid warfare’
Thailand’s powerful army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong, is also frustrated at the outcome of the general election.
Unlike the BRN, Apirat took his message straight to the new wave of young politicians and the people who support them. During a recent gathering that was more like a one-man political rally, Apirat said Thailand was facing “hybrid warfare” orchestrated by “ill-intentioned politicians.”
Apirat did not mention by name the FFP leader, but the public and participants at the army conference hall understood that the message was directed at Thanathorn.
Apirat also went on at great length about the Patani conflict, saying he had lost friends and colleagues in the fight, as he hit back at Army critics.
He pointed to the spate of bomb attacks in Bangkok on Aug. 2 that was allegedly carried out by young men from the Malay-speaking Deep South. He did not blame the BRN, but suggested the masterminds were the same “ill-intentioned” people.
Most Thai security officials believe the culprits behind the attacks were BRN members and that it was the movement’s way of sending a stern warning to Bangkok to stop pressuring their leaders to come to the negotiating table.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
_______________
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/party-inroads-10172019141435.html
https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-Pathan-politics-DeepSouth-10172019182439.html
BenarNews
Bangkok
 |
| ShareCommentEmailFuture Forward Party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit (center), poses for a photo with people at a market in the Deep South province of Narathiwat, Sept. 13, 2019. (AFP) |
Six months after the general election, Thailand is still trying to come to terms with the shock and awe brought upon the pro-military political establishment by democratic forces.
Among these was the newcomer Future Forward Party (FFP), which struck a nerve with the armed forces by calling for a constitutional amendment and military reform.
FFP also said the army should pull out of the Deep South, where a 15-year-old separatist insurgency has claimed more than 7,000 lives, according to figures provided by researchers from Prince of Songkhla University – Pattani Campus.
In so doing – and in demanding accountability for questionable counter-insurgency tactics and alleged torture of suspected insurgents – FFP succeeded in connecting with Malay Muslims in the Deep South.
Turnout at the recent election jolted the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one long-standing separatist group controlling virtually all combatants on the ground.
According to sources in the movement, in the period leading up to the March 2019 vote, there was discussions among local cell leaders about boycotting it.
But the idea did not evolve into a full-fledged campaign like the August 2016 drive by BRN calling on locals to vote “no” on the referendum on the Constitution drafted by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), as the junta called itself.
The referendum passed by a slim margin nationally, but the Muslim-majority Deep South strongly rejected it.
Some voters destroyed the ballot by scribbling on it. Villagers were even urged to write “Merdeka,” or “independence” on their ballot – but many feared that making such a bold statement could come back to haunt them.
Indeed, although 15 years have passed since this second wave of insurgency surfaced in the Deep South, frank and honest discussion about how the local population truly feels about self-determination is still a thing of the future. Voting “no” or destroying the ballot was the locals’ way of expressing their disagreement with the state.
A different story
But the 2019 general election tells a different story. The fact that the Muslim-majority Deep South had the highest voter turnout in the country irked the BRN.
The FFP did not win any of 13 parliamentary seats in the Deep South but earned almost three times the 30,000 votes they were expecting.
FFP’s leader, Thanathorn Jungroongruangkit, made at least four visits to the region during the campaign, generating excitement. Village boys in sarongs flocked to get a glimpse of him.
Others lined up for selfies with the leader of this start-up party that, in the view of many, helped restore faith in Thailand’s parliamentarian politics among Malay Muslims in the region.
It was a faith that pretty much disappeared following the October 2004 Tak Bai incident, when 78 demonstrators suffocated after being stacked on the back of military transport trucks.
Upset at the refusal of the Wadah faction – local Muslim parliamentarians – to speak out against the then-government, of which they were a key coalition partner, local Malays would not vote for them in the Parliament.
At the last general election, the Wadah rebranded itself, formed a party of its own and promoted greater Malay cultural space in the context of multiculturalism.
But for young voters in the region, it was FFP’s relentless assault on the military that attracted their support. Never mind that FFP was courting LGBTs and calling for gender equality – issues that don’t resonate with the conservative Deep South. Malay Muslims in the region still saw common ground.
BRN members were dumbstruck by the high voter turnout, and forced to go back to the drawing board and to contemplate what it meant for them as a “liberating force.”
Meanwhile, post-election, local politicians from various parties came together to form an ad-hoc caucus to advance the grievances of the local Muslim population.
‘Hybrid warfare’
Thailand’s powerful army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong, is also frustrated at the outcome of the general election.
Unlike the BRN, Apirat took his message straight to the new wave of young politicians and the people who support them. During a recent gathering that was more like a one-man political rally, Apirat said Thailand was facing “hybrid warfare” orchestrated by “ill-intentioned politicians.”
Apirat did not mention by name the FFP leader, but the public and participants at the army conference hall understood that the message was directed at Thanathorn.
Apirat also went on at great length about the Patani conflict, saying he had lost friends and colleagues in the fight, as he hit back at Army critics.
He pointed to the spate of bomb attacks in Bangkok on Aug. 2 that was allegedly carried out by young men from the Malay-speaking Deep South. He did not blame the BRN, but suggested the masterminds were the same “ill-intentioned” people.
Most Thai security officials believe the culprits behind the attacks were BRN members and that it was the movement’s way of sending a stern warning to Bangkok to stop pressuring their leaders to come to the negotiating table.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
_______________
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/party-inroads-10172019141435.html
https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-Pathan-politics-DeepSouth-10172019182439.html
Wednesday 14 August 2019
Pompeo to ASEAN: The U.S. Is Committed
By Don Pathan
Speaking to a packed house at the Siam Society on August 1, in the heart of Bangkok, Pompeo said the United States cherishes its 200-year relationship with Thailand, although America has sometimes appeared to forget the importance of these bilateral ties, and others, “who don’t have our mutual best interests at heart,” have attempted to exploit the situation when the relationship seemed to cool.
U.S. secretary of state Michael R. Pompeo delivers a speech,”The U.S. in Asia: Economic Engagement for Good,” in Bangkok, Thailand, on August 2, 2019. Photo: Ron Przysucha / U.S. State Department.
Though Pompeo did not mention China by name, Beijing was on many people’s minds during the week-long meeting. In the last five years, under the military government of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha, Thailand has turned to China for military hardware, including submarines and armored personnel carriers. But Kavi Chongkittavorn, a senior fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies, a Thai think tank, says Thailand was merely looking after itself. “In reality, Thailand is for Thailand,” Kavi said.
Moreover, if the past five years saw a boost in Thai-Chinese defense ties, a retrenchment may be imminent. According to recent reports, the United States has just approved the sale of 60 Stryker armored personnel carriers to Thailand. Although this is just a fraction of what Thailand spent on Chinese military hardware, said Kavi, it makes Thailand the first non-U.S. user of the wheeled infantry vehicles.
While the United States condemned Thailand’s 2014 military coup and halted U.S. military aid to the Prayut government, Washington has been seeking warmer ties with Bangkok since as far back as February 2016, when President Barack Obama met Prayut on the side of an ASEAN summit in California. Prayut also visited President Donald Trump in the Oval Office in October 2017. General elections in March returned Prayut as the country’s prime minister, and in his speech Pompeo commended “our Thai friends for returning to the democratic fold.”
Pompeo held a brief side meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Both played down the rift between the two countries, with Wang describing the meeting as “deep communication” that “helped to increase our mutual understanding,” while Pompeo stated, “when it advances U.S. interests, we are ready to cooperate with China.”
Although Pompeo did not call on Thailand or other Southeast Asian nations to pick sides, insisting that U.S. engagement in the region is not a “zero-sum game,” he urged Australia, where he travelled from Bangkok, to stand up to what he considered to be China’s unfair trade practices and its militarization of the South China Sea.
Photo: Ron Przysucha / U.S. State Department.
Southeast Asia’s growing prosperity was not preordained, he said; it came about because of political freedom and free trade, and he reminded the audience that key shipping lanes in the Indo-Pacific region are protected by American sailors. “We want a free and open Indo-Pacific that’s marked by the core tenets of the rule of law, of openness, of transparency, of good governance, of respect for sovereignty of each and every nation, true partnerships,” Pompeo said.
Speaking at the Siam Society, Pompeo stressed the compatibility between American principles and Asian prosperity and pointed to the “solid partnership” with Thailand as a win-win proposition. He cited a working-class Thai couple who in 2006 transformed their small chicken farm into an enterprise that generates $78,000 monthly after they partnered with Cargill, an American company that has been in Thailand since 1968.
“[Cargill] worked with the family to improve productivity, to improve efficiency, to help them with management techniques. That partnership with America worked out pretty darn well,” Pompeo said. “And when they’re ready to grow further, they know they have a solid partner in that great American business.”
The formula is simple, said Pompeo: “property rights, the rule of law, lower taxes, an overall lighter touch from government regulation.” Governments in the region may have been instrumental in creating “national champion” companies, he argued, but state-led growth can only go so far, “because in the end, human flourishing only really blossoms when governments step back.”
That formula, said Pompeo, has created homegrown giants like Samsung, Honda, Taiwan Semiconductor, Mahindra & Mahindra, and many others. “And the United States was there. It was there with you all the way, and it will be, helping you grow and forging ever-closer ties. We built APEC, we built ASEAN and the Lower Mekong Initiative, and we did so with you, alongside of you,” Pompeo said.
“Importantly, too, we invested in your human capital. Our educational programs and universities have nurtured thousands of Asian leaders for decades, from local leaders to heads of state,” he added.
Pompeo said more than 4,200 American companies operate within ASEAN, investing over a trillion dollars in the region. “There is no other country anywhere that even comes close.”
But for former Thai ambassador Kobsak Chutikul, the specific details of U.S. investments in Thailand and the region did not bring greater clarity on America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. “Is it to be a new web of economic and trading arrangements, a defense-oriented alliance system, or a loose network of like-minded partners to counter the rise of China? And does the situation call for a Cold War clarity and new architecture?” Kobsak asked.
Kobsak said there was widespread uneasiness in the region, as reflected in the series of bilateral meetings on the sidelines in Bangkok between ministers who were trying to address new and ongoing bilateral disputes. “Deep down, people in the region quietly admire President Trump for standing up forcefully to China. But at the same time, they are not sure about the strength of American commitment to other countries that might choose to openly stand with the U.S.”
Pompeo’s visit to Bangkok came on the day that President Trump announced a new 10 percent tariff on an additional $300 billion worth of Chinese imports, adding to the existing 25 percent tariff on $250 billion of imports already in effect.
U.S. secretary of state Michael R. Pompeo meets with Thai foreign minister Don Pramudwinai at the Centara Grand in Bangkok, Thailand on August 1, 2019. Photo: Ron Przysucha / U.S. State Department.
During the question-and-answer session with Bloomberg’s Haslinda Amin, Pompeo urged China to return to an earlier agreement that he believes could provide the basis for a settlement between the two sides. “We want fairness, evenness, reciprocity. These are core concepts. They’re what I spoke about. And when that happens, Asia will thrive, Southeast Asia will thrive, the United States global trading system will thrive,” Pompeo said. “But it cannot be the case that a nation uses protectionism to protect its own goods and uses predatory tactics to deny others’ economies the chances to grow,” he added.
Pompeo praised China for its role in trying to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program and dismissed suggestions that Washington has not been tough enough on Pyongyang. He expressed “regret” that his North Korean counterpart did not attend the annual ASEAN meetings in Bangkok, but he said he was optimistic at the possibility of fresh discussions in the future.
Participants at the Siam Society event included members of the diplomatic community and business leaders. Most noticeable was a group of alumni from the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, a U.S.-funded project that promotes civic engagement and education for youth from the region.
Don Pathan is senior program officer for regional security cooperation for The Asia Foundation in Thailand. He can be reached at don.pathan@asiafoundation.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author, not those of The Asia Foundation.
https://asiafoundation.org/2019/08/14/pompeo-to-asean-the-u-s-is-committed/
Monday 1 July 2019
South talks to start again
PM EXPECTED TO MAKE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS A TOP PRIORITY
By DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
THE PEACE process in the Muslim-majority deep South is poised to resume after a long pause for the March general election, not to mention a couple of stumbles by the two negotiating parties – the state Peace Dialogue Panel and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of six long-standing Patani Malay separatist movements.
Bangkok wants to keep the talks in confidence-building mode, while MARA Patani wants to shift gear, institutionalise the process and ink whatever achievements and agreements the two sides have made. Peace talks came to a halt as Thailand prepared for the general election.
Now, with General Prayut Chan-o-cha re-appointed as prime minister, the conflict in the deep South is expected to be among the government’s top priorities. The current debate among security circles is whether General Udomchai Thamsarorat, Thailand’s chief negotiator, will continue to head the Peace Dialogue Panel now that he has become a senator.
Some believe it should not matter as chief negotiator is an unpaid position and the panel is ad hoc in nature with representatives from various agencies and ministries. Udomchai was appointed to the peace panel in October last year, replacing General Aksara Kherdpol. He immediately reached out to members of the international community and local civil-society organisations (CSOs).
He expressed hope that they could act as an interlocutor between the Thai government and Patani-Malay separatist movements, namely the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one long-standing separatist group that controls virtually all the militants but has refused to take part in peace talks. These efforts by Udomchai to explore avenues outside the formal Track 1 process had irked MARA Patani whose chief negotiator, Shukri Hari, in February issued a statement calling on the Thai government to replace him.
Just a month ago, Shukri resigned from his position citing health reasons. Malaysia’s facilitator Abdul Rahim Noor, during a recent visit to the far South, told Thai reporters that the talks would be back on track in about two weeks. But it is not clear what kind of agenda they will pursue.
Udomchai had already removed from the table the pilot project for a Safety Zone plus ceasefire component, in favour of direct engagement with the BRN. The BRN has issued several demands over the years, including the release of all those locked up on insurgency-related charges, the participation of international mediators and observers for the talks, as well as gaining Parliament’s stamp to make the talks a national agenda.
Observers note there are difficulties – political as well as legal – for the Thai government to meet any of these demands. But discussions on how to move the peace initiative forward have always been daunting for the government.
Furthermore, getting the BRN to negotiate is made difficult by the movement’s unbending commitment to southern independence. In other words, the BRN can’t be seen as making any concessions or compromises.
But that doesn’t mean negotiations or dialogue between the two sides is a lost cause. It does mean, though, that Malaysia has to be more creative in facilitating contact, coming up with ideas that can move the peace initiative forward.
Bangkok meanwhile may have to come up with unilateral initiatives that will have a positive impact on the mindset and attitude of BRN leaders.
The need to think outside the box was perhaps the reason behind the recent visit to the conflict-ridden area by Malaysia’s facilitator, Rahim Noor, who met with military and religious leaders, as well as academics, to exchange views and thoughts on the conflict.
Furthermore, there have been talks among Thai security planners about incentives for combatants to surrender in exchange for some form of amnesty. How this will play out in real terms remains to be seen.
---------------------------
Don Pathan is a former Regional Desk editor at The Nation and currently the senior programme officer at the Asia Foundation working on regional security cooperation.
By DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
THE PEACE process in the Muslim-majority deep South is poised to resume after a long pause for the March general election, not to mention a couple of stumbles by the two negotiating parties – the state Peace Dialogue Panel and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of six long-standing Patani Malay separatist movements.
Bangkok wants to keep the talks in confidence-building mode, while MARA Patani wants to shift gear, institutionalise the process and ink whatever achievements and agreements the two sides have made. Peace talks came to a halt as Thailand prepared for the general election.
Now, with General Prayut Chan-o-cha re-appointed as prime minister, the conflict in the deep South is expected to be among the government’s top priorities. The current debate among security circles is whether General Udomchai Thamsarorat, Thailand’s chief negotiator, will continue to head the Peace Dialogue Panel now that he has become a senator.
Some believe it should not matter as chief negotiator is an unpaid position and the panel is ad hoc in nature with representatives from various agencies and ministries. Udomchai was appointed to the peace panel in October last year, replacing General Aksara Kherdpol. He immediately reached out to members of the international community and local civil-society organisations (CSOs).
He expressed hope that they could act as an interlocutor between the Thai government and Patani-Malay separatist movements, namely the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one long-standing separatist group that controls virtually all the militants but has refused to take part in peace talks. These efforts by Udomchai to explore avenues outside the formal Track 1 process had irked MARA Patani whose chief negotiator, Shukri Hari, in February issued a statement calling on the Thai government to replace him.
Just a month ago, Shukri resigned from his position citing health reasons. Malaysia’s facilitator Abdul Rahim Noor, during a recent visit to the far South, told Thai reporters that the talks would be back on track in about two weeks. But it is not clear what kind of agenda they will pursue.
Udomchai had already removed from the table the pilot project for a Safety Zone plus ceasefire component, in favour of direct engagement with the BRN. The BRN has issued several demands over the years, including the release of all those locked up on insurgency-related charges, the participation of international mediators and observers for the talks, as well as gaining Parliament’s stamp to make the talks a national agenda.
Observers note there are difficulties – political as well as legal – for the Thai government to meet any of these demands. But discussions on how to move the peace initiative forward have always been daunting for the government.
Furthermore, getting the BRN to negotiate is made difficult by the movement’s unbending commitment to southern independence. In other words, the BRN can’t be seen as making any concessions or compromises.
But that doesn’t mean negotiations or dialogue between the two sides is a lost cause. It does mean, though, that Malaysia has to be more creative in facilitating contact, coming up with ideas that can move the peace initiative forward.
Bangkok meanwhile may have to come up with unilateral initiatives that will have a positive impact on the mindset and attitude of BRN leaders.
The need to think outside the box was perhaps the reason behind the recent visit to the conflict-ridden area by Malaysia’s facilitator, Rahim Noor, who met with military and religious leaders, as well as academics, to exchange views and thoughts on the conflict.
Furthermore, there have been talks among Thai security planners about incentives for combatants to surrender in exchange for some form of amnesty. How this will play out in real terms remains to be seen.
---------------------------
Don Pathan is a former Regional Desk editor at The Nation and currently the senior programme officer at the Asia Foundation working on regional security cooperation.
Friday 12 April 2019
A new and brutal wave of insurgency looms in the deep South
By Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
YALA, Thailand
Efforts to introduce humanitarian principles to separatist combatants in Thailand’s Malay-speaking far South have hit trouble, with the younger generation of fighters questioning the merit of these ideas.
According to political activists behind the efforts, a growing number of young separatist fighters appear more interested in humiliating Thailand’s security apparatus and believe that attacking non-military targets is an effective way to do so.
They also vowed that insurgents would continue to hit “legitimate” military targets, but with greater intensity to inflict higher psychological impact. The vast majority of separatist combatants understand the need to embrace norms of civility in the conflict but the few hardliners who promote brutality appear to be gaining traction, the activists said.
The combatants in the southernmost provinces operate under the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), but the movement’s control over them is extremely fluid and untested. Decisions on attacks and targets are made at the cell level with information shared on a need-to-know basis. Simultaneous attacks, of course, require the participation of more than one cell, but these are rare.
Loose ground rules dictate that religious figures, women, and children are not to be targeted. But nothing is written in stone and there exists no negotiated text between the security forces and the rebels. Perceived violations of the loose rules have provoked vicious responses from the insurgents’ side.
Early this year, a string of “soft” targets were hit, spurring talk that insurgents had adopted a “new normal” of attacking non-military targets – including civilians. January saw four school guards shot dead, a retired teacher hanged outside his Songkhla home and his vehicle used for car bomb, and two Buddhist monks killed in a shooting in Narathiwat.
Youth activists believe the absence of meaningful dialogue between the government and stakeholders, including the BRN, is partly to blame for the rise in brutality. If the two sides could communicate, they might at least agree on the rules of engagement, the activists said. Instead, the Thai government was too busy trying to occupy the moral high ground, ignoring issues such as international humanitarian law (IHL), that could help bring some degree of civility and predictability to the conflict.
In fact, some senior military officers in the far South believe the introduction of IHL would legitimise the separatist conflict. With that legitimacy, members of the international community could interfere in what Thailand considered internal affairs, several military officers said. Besides meaningful communication between Bangkok and the BRN leadership, there is more that could be done to help the movement’s leaders understand international norms and humanitarian principles.
BRN operatives said their leaders are afraid to surface because they feel the atmosphere is not conducive for negotiation. They cite the ongoing political crisis, the lack of unity and continuity on the Thai side of negotiations and the absence of legal and political protections that would offer a “safe space” for rebels. The BRN believes the international community can offer them this safety, but Bangkok has never been interested in permitting outside participation, much less mediation.
There is also longstanding bitterness among the BRN leaders. In a statement released on March 13 to commemorate the movement’s founding 60 years ago, BRN said their historic homeland of Patani had been “abandoned by the world” and the “suffering” of its people has been ignored. Historical background A full-fledged armed insurgency in the far South surfaced in the early 1960s before dying down in the 1980s. A new generation of fighters surfaced in late 2001 but the conflict intensified after more than 350 military-grade weapons were stolen in a raid on an Army camp on January 4, 2004. While the separatist insurgency has always been fuelled by ethno-nationalist motives, radical ideas creep in every now and then.
A decade ago, there was the talk among separatist militants of expanding the range of “legitimate targets” and also denying Islamic burials to Muslims who found themselves targeted. This period, in 2006-07, saw a rise in brutality with the bodies of Thai soldiers beheaded and castrated and corpses set on fire. It also saw 140 arson attacks on public schools, many burnt to the ground. But the brutal excesses practically ended the following year after local activists and clerics spoke out against the vicious tactics, citing Islamic law and principles as a guide for rules of engagement. Separatist militants admitted it was the thought of losing public support that put a stop to the brutality.
Today, however, the restless young generation of fighters are less likely to heed the advice of ordinary villagers and grassroots leaders. There is a dangerous sense of frustration with the unchanging status quo among the combatants, who see no disadvantage in committing acts of violence that aggravate the situation.
Longstanding traditions and restrictions that helped shape the unofficial rules of engagement in this conflict may now be making way for more brutal tactics. – Special to The Nation, YalaDon Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organisations, and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to a critical discussion on the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30367579
Special to The Nation
YALA, Thailand
Efforts to introduce humanitarian principles to separatist combatants in Thailand’s Malay-speaking far South have hit trouble, with the younger generation of fighters questioning the merit of these ideas.
According to political activists behind the efforts, a growing number of young separatist fighters appear more interested in humiliating Thailand’s security apparatus and believe that attacking non-military targets is an effective way to do so.
They also vowed that insurgents would continue to hit “legitimate” military targets, but with greater intensity to inflict higher psychological impact. The vast majority of separatist combatants understand the need to embrace norms of civility in the conflict but the few hardliners who promote brutality appear to be gaining traction, the activists said.
The combatants in the southernmost provinces operate under the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), but the movement’s control over them is extremely fluid and untested. Decisions on attacks and targets are made at the cell level with information shared on a need-to-know basis. Simultaneous attacks, of course, require the participation of more than one cell, but these are rare.
Loose ground rules dictate that religious figures, women, and children are not to be targeted. But nothing is written in stone and there exists no negotiated text between the security forces and the rebels. Perceived violations of the loose rules have provoked vicious responses from the insurgents’ side.
Early this year, a string of “soft” targets were hit, spurring talk that insurgents had adopted a “new normal” of attacking non-military targets – including civilians. January saw four school guards shot dead, a retired teacher hanged outside his Songkhla home and his vehicle used for car bomb, and two Buddhist monks killed in a shooting in Narathiwat.
Youth activists believe the absence of meaningful dialogue between the government and stakeholders, including the BRN, is partly to blame for the rise in brutality. If the two sides could communicate, they might at least agree on the rules of engagement, the activists said. Instead, the Thai government was too busy trying to occupy the moral high ground, ignoring issues such as international humanitarian law (IHL), that could help bring some degree of civility and predictability to the conflict.
In fact, some senior military officers in the far South believe the introduction of IHL would legitimise the separatist conflict. With that legitimacy, members of the international community could interfere in what Thailand considered internal affairs, several military officers said. Besides meaningful communication between Bangkok and the BRN leadership, there is more that could be done to help the movement’s leaders understand international norms and humanitarian principles.
BRN operatives said their leaders are afraid to surface because they feel the atmosphere is not conducive for negotiation. They cite the ongoing political crisis, the lack of unity and continuity on the Thai side of negotiations and the absence of legal and political protections that would offer a “safe space” for rebels. The BRN believes the international community can offer them this safety, but Bangkok has never been interested in permitting outside participation, much less mediation.
There is also longstanding bitterness among the BRN leaders. In a statement released on March 13 to commemorate the movement’s founding 60 years ago, BRN said their historic homeland of Patani had been “abandoned by the world” and the “suffering” of its people has been ignored. Historical background A full-fledged armed insurgency in the far South surfaced in the early 1960s before dying down in the 1980s. A new generation of fighters surfaced in late 2001 but the conflict intensified after more than 350 military-grade weapons were stolen in a raid on an Army camp on January 4, 2004. While the separatist insurgency has always been fuelled by ethno-nationalist motives, radical ideas creep in every now and then.
A decade ago, there was the talk among separatist militants of expanding the range of “legitimate targets” and also denying Islamic burials to Muslims who found themselves targeted. This period, in 2006-07, saw a rise in brutality with the bodies of Thai soldiers beheaded and castrated and corpses set on fire. It also saw 140 arson attacks on public schools, many burnt to the ground. But the brutal excesses practically ended the following year after local activists and clerics spoke out against the vicious tactics, citing Islamic law and principles as a guide for rules of engagement. Separatist militants admitted it was the thought of losing public support that put a stop to the brutality.
Today, however, the restless young generation of fighters are less likely to heed the advice of ordinary villagers and grassroots leaders. There is a dangerous sense of frustration with the unchanging status quo among the combatants, who see no disadvantage in committing acts of violence that aggravate the situation.
Longstanding traditions and restrictions that helped shape the unofficial rules of engagement in this conflict may now be making way for more brutal tactics. – Special to The Nation, YalaDon Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organisations, and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to a critical discussion on the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30367579
Friday 22 March 2019
No sign of concrete policies for conflict in the far South
DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
Parties offer few if any answers for a 15-year-old deadly insurgency that successive govts have failed to quell.
Peace and conflict have never been significant parts of any political party platform in Thailand. This is because a sustainable solution calls for a long-term commitment to a policy that could prove to be politically costly.
Lasting peace requires self-reflection on the part of both the state and society. Policymakers have to rethink the policy of assimilation that has so far been rejected by the Malay Muslim populace of the southern border provinces because it comes at the expense of their cultural and religious identity.
Full-fledged armed insurgency erupted in the far South in the 1960s, some 50 years after the signing of the Anglo-Siam Treaty that defined our current political borders. There was a brief calm in the 1990s, but the absence of violence did not mean peace. A new generation of militants was being groomed by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and this time the separatists did not look to Arab countries for financial support and training but developed their own resources at the grassroots level.
BRN fighters surfaced in 2001, only to be dismissed by then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra as “sparrow bandits”. That characterisation changed on January 4, 2004, when scores of armed insurgents raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat and stole more than 350 military weapons.
Successive governments have been dabbling in peace initiatives, but none succeeded in getting the BRN – which gives all of the armed combatants their orders – to participate in talks. At a recent public forum in Bangkok organised by Amnesty International, Pauline Ngarmpring, the Mahachon Party’s transgender candidate for PM, spoke in terms noticeably absent from the Democrat and Pheu Thai speeches – mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and cultural diversity.
The Future Forward Party’s representative blamed the 15 years of discord in the South on government mishandling and mistreatment of citizens. There is some truth to this, but it overlooks the fact that the Malays of Patani – the three border provinces – see themselves as having a unique identity that defies full assimilation.
The parties contesting Sunday’s election have generally been careful about the issue as they seek to impress both Muslim and Buddhist voters. Future Forward has risked campaigning for a reduced military presence in the South and insisted that the diplomacy of give and take be the guide in peace talks.
Canvassing for votes
Political canvassers can earn a lot of money in the far South. From shady warlords and influential figures to Muslim clerics and community leaders, the canvassers have particular attributes or profile in common. All they need to do to succeed is connect with the voters. Future Forward has scorned the deployment of canvassers, though, dismissing it as part of the patronage system they vow to curtail.
In the 2011 election campaign, all parties but one promised to give the Malay-speaking region “special administrative status”. The Democrats made no such pledge and still won 11 of the 12 available seats. In this campaign, no one is repeating the promise.
The Pheu Thai Party promised special status in 2011 and won the national election, but then reneged on it once in government. It only served to convince the southerners that promises given them can be broken at no political cost to the one making the pledge.
Seeking cultural identity
Despite the obvious religious connotations, the conflict is still largely ethno-nationalistic in nature, though the authorities have often tried to get Muslim clerics to condemn the violence on religious grounds. The clerics who do so then face the wrath of the combatants. (There are, of course, also religious leaders who say the BRN is justified in taking up arms against the state.)
Prachachat, the so-called “Muslim party” led by Wan Muhammed Noor Matha, a wily politician and close ally of |Thaksin, has had both Islam and multiculturalism prominent in its campaigning.
So far, though, there has been no elaboration on context or intent. Nor has any party broached last year’s hijab row at Anuban Pattani Elementary School, in which 20 Buddhist teachers walked off the job because Muslim girls came to class wearing headscarves.
About 85 per cent of the region’s two million residents identify themselves as Malay Muslim, not Thai. The teachers seemed to wish to remind the Malays of Patani that they’re a defeated people and must abandon traditions and assimilate as citizens of Thailand. Thus espousing the common denominator remains the safest track to electoral victory. Politicians know that most voters respond to patriotic evocations of “Thainess”.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/politics/30366263
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
Parties offer few if any answers for a 15-year-old deadly insurgency that successive govts have failed to quell.
Peace and conflict have never been significant parts of any political party platform in Thailand. This is because a sustainable solution calls for a long-term commitment to a policy that could prove to be politically costly.
Lasting peace requires self-reflection on the part of both the state and society. Policymakers have to rethink the policy of assimilation that has so far been rejected by the Malay Muslim populace of the southern border provinces because it comes at the expense of their cultural and religious identity.
Full-fledged armed insurgency erupted in the far South in the 1960s, some 50 years after the signing of the Anglo-Siam Treaty that defined our current political borders. There was a brief calm in the 1990s, but the absence of violence did not mean peace. A new generation of militants was being groomed by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and this time the separatists did not look to Arab countries for financial support and training but developed their own resources at the grassroots level.
BRN fighters surfaced in 2001, only to be dismissed by then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra as “sparrow bandits”. That characterisation changed on January 4, 2004, when scores of armed insurgents raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat and stole more than 350 military weapons.
Successive governments have been dabbling in peace initiatives, but none succeeded in getting the BRN – which gives all of the armed combatants their orders – to participate in talks. At a recent public forum in Bangkok organised by Amnesty International, Pauline Ngarmpring, the Mahachon Party’s transgender candidate for PM, spoke in terms noticeably absent from the Democrat and Pheu Thai speeches – mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and cultural diversity.
The Future Forward Party’s representative blamed the 15 years of discord in the South on government mishandling and mistreatment of citizens. There is some truth to this, but it overlooks the fact that the Malays of Patani – the three border provinces – see themselves as having a unique identity that defies full assimilation.
The parties contesting Sunday’s election have generally been careful about the issue as they seek to impress both Muslim and Buddhist voters. Future Forward has risked campaigning for a reduced military presence in the South and insisted that the diplomacy of give and take be the guide in peace talks.
Canvassing for votes
Political canvassers can earn a lot of money in the far South. From shady warlords and influential figures to Muslim clerics and community leaders, the canvassers have particular attributes or profile in common. All they need to do to succeed is connect with the voters. Future Forward has scorned the deployment of canvassers, though, dismissing it as part of the patronage system they vow to curtail.
In the 2011 election campaign, all parties but one promised to give the Malay-speaking region “special administrative status”. The Democrats made no such pledge and still won 11 of the 12 available seats. In this campaign, no one is repeating the promise.
The Pheu Thai Party promised special status in 2011 and won the national election, but then reneged on it once in government. It only served to convince the southerners that promises given them can be broken at no political cost to the one making the pledge.
Seeking cultural identity
Despite the obvious religious connotations, the conflict is still largely ethno-nationalistic in nature, though the authorities have often tried to get Muslim clerics to condemn the violence on religious grounds. The clerics who do so then face the wrath of the combatants. (There are, of course, also religious leaders who say the BRN is justified in taking up arms against the state.)
Prachachat, the so-called “Muslim party” led by Wan Muhammed Noor Matha, a wily politician and close ally of |Thaksin, has had both Islam and multiculturalism prominent in its campaigning.
So far, though, there has been no elaboration on context or intent. Nor has any party broached last year’s hijab row at Anuban Pattani Elementary School, in which 20 Buddhist teachers walked off the job because Muslim girls came to class wearing headscarves.
About 85 per cent of the region’s two million residents identify themselves as Malay Muslim, not Thai. The teachers seemed to wish to remind the Malays of Patani that they’re a defeated people and must abandon traditions and assimilate as citizens of Thailand. Thus espousing the common denominator remains the safest track to electoral victory. Politicians know that most voters respond to patriotic evocations of “Thainess”.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/politics/30366263
Wednesday 23 January 2019
For the South, civility first, even amid conflict
Artef Sohko
Special to The Nation
The attack last Friday against Buddhist monks at a temple in Sungai Padi district in Narathiwat province, which resulted in two deaths and two injuries, should be condemned in the strongest terms.
The three southern border provinces are together known locally as Patani, the historical homeland of the Malay people, whose feel their history, identity and narrative have been hijacked by the Thai state. Local activists and civil society organisations (CSOs) tend to believe the latest spike in violence is due to three factors: * The alleged torture of Muslim detainees in Thai military camps around the region.
Relentless pressure from Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur on the leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the only Patani secessionist group with control of the armed militants, to meet General Udomchai Thamsarorat, recently appointed to lead peace negotiations.
The gangland-style murders of three imams in the past recent months, killings that received little attention from the general Thai public and media and no acknowledgment from the government.
Dozens of southerners have been summoned for questioning by security officials, while others endure constant harassment. Silence from the state and the public reflects the indifference of Thai society towards the plight of the Malays of Patani, the Melayu.
The indifference stems from the fact that the Melayu view differs from that of the wider Thai society regarding the history that brought their region to such a sorry state today. According to various reports and academic research, the BRN is an organisation run by a secretive ruling council of elders with strong religious credentials.
The council is referred to as the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP). From the DPP elders to the individual cells of combatants at the village level, every command is passed down in secrecy on a need-to-know basis, a structure of confidentiality deemed crucial to the movement’s survival and that of its members.
The politicians in Bangkok refuse to acknowledge the political nature of the southern conflict, fearing the legitimacy that would lend to the BRN and other secessionist groups. They refuse to even use the name of the group that has long been involved in peace talks, the umbrella organisation MARA Patani, referring to it instead as “Party B”, again to deny it legitimacy.
The group I chair – The Patani, a political-action group that promotes rights to self-determination in the Malay homeland – strives to maintain a semblance of civility in the conflict, but it’s an ongoing challenge.
In our view, both warring sides need to understand and appreciate international humanitarian norms and principles. Besides enhancing their respective status as state and non-state actors, these principles will help give southerners some degree of certainty until a political solution can be achieved.
Both sides need to know there is no military solution to this conflict and the only way to move forward is through negotiation. The Thai side has consistently painted the BRN as unreasonable, spurning talks and understanding only violence. But the government must be asked what concessions it is willing to make to get the BRN to the table so talks can begin. Thai authorities have shown little interest in giving the people of Patani, much less the BRN, the respect, and dignity to which they have a right.
And when the state employs violence, it is only natural that retaliation will follow. While it would be unrealistic to expect the BRN to disarm at this juncture, it is not unreasonable to demand that both it and the Thai military respect certain rules of engagement and international humanitarian law. If the two sides are going to keep fighting, they should at least embrace some degree of civility. A political solution will require the government to recognize the political nature of the conflict rather than casting it as a crime wave requiring harsh repression.
For too long the government has peered at the insurgents through the narrow lens of security and decided the only way forward is to hunt them down and kill them. If it adopted a non-military approach, it would have worked towards a political solution. A meaningful start to this would be appointing a ministerial-level, non-military agency to handle the peace process. The Army has amply demonstrated its inability to develop a policy regarding minority populations.
Moreover, the state should allow more space for debate about the fate of Patani as a region, even if some of the debate centred on contentious issues such as rights to self-determination and independence. Allowing people to talk about independence is not the same thing as granting them independence. We as Muslims are told that all human beings are created equal.
Yet in the situation confronting the Patani Malays, this doesn’t hold true. We are not equal in each other’s eyes, as demonstrated by the outpouring of sympathy for the murdered monks while the killing of the imams went almost unnoticed.
Until we come to an understanding that all lives matter, that the lives of Melayu are just as precious as those of Buddhists, justice in the truest sense of the word is still a long way off.
Artef Sohko is chair of The Patani, a political-action group that promotes the right to self-determination in the Malays’ historical homeland that today constitutes the southern border provinces.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30362759
Special to The Nation
The attack last Friday against Buddhist monks at a temple in Sungai Padi district in Narathiwat province, which resulted in two deaths and two injuries, should be condemned in the strongest terms.
The three southern border provinces are together known locally as Patani, the historical homeland of the Malay people, whose feel their history, identity and narrative have been hijacked by the Thai state. Local activists and civil society organisations (CSOs) tend to believe the latest spike in violence is due to three factors: * The alleged torture of Muslim detainees in Thai military camps around the region.
Relentless pressure from Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur on the leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the only Patani secessionist group with control of the armed militants, to meet General Udomchai Thamsarorat, recently appointed to lead peace negotiations.
The gangland-style murders of three imams in the past recent months, killings that received little attention from the general Thai public and media and no acknowledgment from the government.
Dozens of southerners have been summoned for questioning by security officials, while others endure constant harassment. Silence from the state and the public reflects the indifference of Thai society towards the plight of the Malays of Patani, the Melayu.
The indifference stems from the fact that the Melayu view differs from that of the wider Thai society regarding the history that brought their region to such a sorry state today. According to various reports and academic research, the BRN is an organisation run by a secretive ruling council of elders with strong religious credentials.
The council is referred to as the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP). From the DPP elders to the individual cells of combatants at the village level, every command is passed down in secrecy on a need-to-know basis, a structure of confidentiality deemed crucial to the movement’s survival and that of its members.
The politicians in Bangkok refuse to acknowledge the political nature of the southern conflict, fearing the legitimacy that would lend to the BRN and other secessionist groups. They refuse to even use the name of the group that has long been involved in peace talks, the umbrella organisation MARA Patani, referring to it instead as “Party B”, again to deny it legitimacy.
The group I chair – The Patani, a political-action group that promotes rights to self-determination in the Malay homeland – strives to maintain a semblance of civility in the conflict, but it’s an ongoing challenge.
In our view, both warring sides need to understand and appreciate international humanitarian norms and principles. Besides enhancing their respective status as state and non-state actors, these principles will help give southerners some degree of certainty until a political solution can be achieved.
Both sides need to know there is no military solution to this conflict and the only way to move forward is through negotiation. The Thai side has consistently painted the BRN as unreasonable, spurning talks and understanding only violence. But the government must be asked what concessions it is willing to make to get the BRN to the table so talks can begin. Thai authorities have shown little interest in giving the people of Patani, much less the BRN, the respect, and dignity to which they have a right.
And when the state employs violence, it is only natural that retaliation will follow. While it would be unrealistic to expect the BRN to disarm at this juncture, it is not unreasonable to demand that both it and the Thai military respect certain rules of engagement and international humanitarian law. If the two sides are going to keep fighting, they should at least embrace some degree of civility. A political solution will require the government to recognize the political nature of the conflict rather than casting it as a crime wave requiring harsh repression.
For too long the government has peered at the insurgents through the narrow lens of security and decided the only way forward is to hunt them down and kill them. If it adopted a non-military approach, it would have worked towards a political solution. A meaningful start to this would be appointing a ministerial-level, non-military agency to handle the peace process. The Army has amply demonstrated its inability to develop a policy regarding minority populations.
Moreover, the state should allow more space for debate about the fate of Patani as a region, even if some of the debate centred on contentious issues such as rights to self-determination and independence. Allowing people to talk about independence is not the same thing as granting them independence. We as Muslims are told that all human beings are created equal.
Yet in the situation confronting the Patani Malays, this doesn’t hold true. We are not equal in each other’s eyes, as demonstrated by the outpouring of sympathy for the murdered monks while the killing of the imams went almost unnoticed.
Until we come to an understanding that all lives matter, that the lives of Melayu are just as precious as those of Buddhists, justice in the truest sense of the word is still a long way off.
Artef Sohko is chair of The Patani, a political-action group that promotes the right to self-determination in the Malays’ historical homeland that today constitutes the southern border provinces.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30362759
Tuesday 22 January 2019
Slaying of Buddhist Monks in Thai Deep South Jolts Nation
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/monk-deaths-01222019163803.html
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
This past Friday, suspected separatist insurgents gunned down two monks – an abbot and vice-abbot – and wounded two other clerics during an attack on a Buddhist temple in Sungai Padi, a district of southern Thailand’s Narathiwat province.
The shooting was the first killing targeting the Buddhist clergy in the southern border region in five years.
The slain abbot, Prakru Prachote Rattananurak, was said to have had close working relations with local residents from both the Buddhist and Muslim communities. They praised his positive outlook on life, no matter how bleak the situation got in the historically contested and predominantly Islamic Thai Deep South.
Human rights organizations were quick to condemn the shootings, as did Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha, who ordered a manhunt for the killers and urged people not to lose faith in the military government’s efforts to end the conflict in the southern border region.
And, in a statement released Monday, Prayuth accused the insurgents of trying to provoke a nasty retaliation from the government’s security forces aimed at attracting international intervention.
After visiting the temple where the monks were killed, Thailand’s Army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong told reporters that he planned to ask soldiers to volunteer to become ordained as monks in temples across the Far South to make locals feel safer. He didn’t say whether the undercover soldiers would carry weapons.
Insurgents targeted the monks in last week’s shooting to retaliate for the slayings in recent months of three Muslim clerics in the Deep South, and to reject pressure put on leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebel group to join Malaysia-brokered peace talks, sources familiar with the organization said.
BRN is a long-standing armed separatist group that controls virtually all insurgent forces in Thailand’s southernmost provinces.
According to the sources, top BRN leaders went into hiding because they grew tired of the relentless and nagging pressure on them to meet with Thailand’s negotiators in the talks.
What remains unclear is whether Friday’s killings represented a one-off incident or whether it marked a return to a period more than a decade ago, when insurgents regularly targeted Buddhist temples and monks as a way to humiliate the government’s security apparatus in the south.
Past attacks
In 2006-07, the region was gripped by a spate of arson attacks that targeted more than 100 public schools, and during which the bodies of dead soldiers were mutilated or decapitated. All that stopped after local Muslim leaders and activists spoke out and told the insurgents that the brutality only undermined their political objective.
Since then, there has been an understanding between the two warring sides, a sort of unwritten ground rule that no children and no religious figures, monks and imams should be harmed. However, there have been violations, which have usually fanned more violence.
On Jan. 11, Doloh Sarai, the last of the three imams to be slain in recent attacks, was shot dead by gunmen as he rode his motorbike in Narathiwat’s Ruesoh district.
The attack, in which the assailants used military-grade weapons, took place about 200 meters (656 feet) from an army checkpoint. Locals and separatist sources said a government or pro-government death squad was behind the killing.
There were little or no condolences from the country’s national leaders following the deaths of the three Muslim leaders, and investigations into their killings didn’t seem to be going anywhere, said a local Muslim activist, Suhaimee Dulasa.
“Peace will prevail when there is an understanding that all human lives are precious, regardless of who the victims may be,” said Suhaimee, a senior member of The Patani, a political action group that promotes the right to self-determination for the people of this restive region.
The last time a Thai Buddhist monk was killed in an insurgency-related incident was July 2015 in Sai Buri, a district of Pattani province, when an IED hidden in a trash can went off. The apparent target was a group of patrolling soldiers, not the monk.
In February 2014, in Pattani’s Mae Lan district, insurgents dressed in military fatigues opened fire on residents who were giving alms to monks. Four people, including a monk and a young boy, died in the attack.
It came days after three boys under age 10 were slain at their home in Narathiwat’s Bacho district. Two paramilitary rangers confessed to killing the boys – apparently to get a spate of retaliatory attacks to stop – but retracted their confession when the case went to court months later.
In November 2012, a member of the Islamic Committee of Yala province, imam Abdullateh Todir, was shot dead in Yaha district.
His killing ignited a six-week long spike of violence and a refusal by the Muslim leaders in the region to endorse a peace initiative by then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government that was officially launched in Kuala Lumpur in February 2013.
In May 2011, a roadside bomb killed, set off by insurgents who lay in wait from a nearby tree line, killed two monks in Yaha district. The attack fell on Visaka Bucha, the most important day on the Buddhist calendar.
Afterward Thai national media went crazy for days, concluding that the attack was a deliberate attempt to drive a bigger wedge between Buddhists and Muslims. But investigators said there was no line of vision and the perpetrators could not have seen the monks sitting inside a taxi.
‘Now it’s time to back off’
The killing of the monks on Friday came amid a spike since last November in violence by the insurgents. According to conversations with sources on both side of the conflict, the rebels were sending a message to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur to stop pressuring their leaders to come to the negotiating table.
The shooting death of the three imams over the past recent months was also a factor because it violated the aforementioned unwritten ground rule, the sources said.
The spike in violence in this restive region has come at a time when the current crop of the junta is about to announce the date for the next general election.
There isn’t much for Gen. Prayuth to show for in terms of a legacy for his counterinsurgency in the Deep South. A simple face-to-face meeting between Thai representatives and BRN leaders at this juncture would be considered a major breakthrough, and perhaps good enough for Prayuth to claim progress.
Prayuth recently replaced his chief negotiator for three years with another retired army general, Udomchai Thamsarorat, who appeared to be reaching out to members of the international community for advice – but not meditation – on how to advance the talks.
Other than that, Bangkok doesn’t appear to want to make any meaningful concessions to the BRN, who have already said they were not interested in negotiating with the Thais at this time.
And if and when they do decide to come to the table, according to the BRN’s demands, the peace process must be in line with international best practices – which means mediation by members of the international community.
The Friday killings of the monks jolted the entire nation, including representatives from local Malay civil society organizations (CSO) who have been quietly trying to convince the insurgents to respect humanitarian principles and international norms.
“They have made their point, and now it’s time to back off a little,” said one CSO member who spoke on condition of anonymity.
“Bringing in some degree of civility has been a very difficult challenge. A significant number of militants on the ground still see these humanitarian principles, such as International Humanitarian Law and rules of engagement, as foreign ideas that not only tie their hands in a fight where the playing field is already against them,” the source said.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/monk-deaths-01222019163803.html
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
This past Friday, suspected separatist insurgents gunned down two monks – an abbot and vice-abbot – and wounded two other clerics during an attack on a Buddhist temple in Sungai Padi, a district of southern Thailand’s Narathiwat province.
The shooting was the first killing targeting the Buddhist clergy in the southern border region in five years.
The slain abbot, Prakru Prachote Rattananurak, was said to have had close working relations with local residents from both the Buddhist and Muslim communities. They praised his positive outlook on life, no matter how bleak the situation got in the historically contested and predominantly Islamic Thai Deep South.
Human rights organizations were quick to condemn the shootings, as did Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha, who ordered a manhunt for the killers and urged people not to lose faith in the military government’s efforts to end the conflict in the southern border region.
And, in a statement released Monday, Prayuth accused the insurgents of trying to provoke a nasty retaliation from the government’s security forces aimed at attracting international intervention.
After visiting the temple where the monks were killed, Thailand’s Army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong told reporters that he planned to ask soldiers to volunteer to become ordained as monks in temples across the Far South to make locals feel safer. He didn’t say whether the undercover soldiers would carry weapons.
Insurgents targeted the monks in last week’s shooting to retaliate for the slayings in recent months of three Muslim clerics in the Deep South, and to reject pressure put on leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebel group to join Malaysia-brokered peace talks, sources familiar with the organization said.
BRN is a long-standing armed separatist group that controls virtually all insurgent forces in Thailand’s southernmost provinces.
According to the sources, top BRN leaders went into hiding because they grew tired of the relentless and nagging pressure on them to meet with Thailand’s negotiators in the talks.
What remains unclear is whether Friday’s killings represented a one-off incident or whether it marked a return to a period more than a decade ago, when insurgents regularly targeted Buddhist temples and monks as a way to humiliate the government’s security apparatus in the south.
Past attacks
In 2006-07, the region was gripped by a spate of arson attacks that targeted more than 100 public schools, and during which the bodies of dead soldiers were mutilated or decapitated. All that stopped after local Muslim leaders and activists spoke out and told the insurgents that the brutality only undermined their political objective.
Since then, there has been an understanding between the two warring sides, a sort of unwritten ground rule that no children and no religious figures, monks and imams should be harmed. However, there have been violations, which have usually fanned more violence.
On Jan. 11, Doloh Sarai, the last of the three imams to be slain in recent attacks, was shot dead by gunmen as he rode his motorbike in Narathiwat’s Ruesoh district.
The attack, in which the assailants used military-grade weapons, took place about 200 meters (656 feet) from an army checkpoint. Locals and separatist sources said a government or pro-government death squad was behind the killing.
There were little or no condolences from the country’s national leaders following the deaths of the three Muslim leaders, and investigations into their killings didn’t seem to be going anywhere, said a local Muslim activist, Suhaimee Dulasa.
“Peace will prevail when there is an understanding that all human lives are precious, regardless of who the victims may be,” said Suhaimee, a senior member of The Patani, a political action group that promotes the right to self-determination for the people of this restive region.
The last time a Thai Buddhist monk was killed in an insurgency-related incident was July 2015 in Sai Buri, a district of Pattani province, when an IED hidden in a trash can went off. The apparent target was a group of patrolling soldiers, not the monk.
In February 2014, in Pattani’s Mae Lan district, insurgents dressed in military fatigues opened fire on residents who were giving alms to monks. Four people, including a monk and a young boy, died in the attack.
It came days after three boys under age 10 were slain at their home in Narathiwat’s Bacho district. Two paramilitary rangers confessed to killing the boys – apparently to get a spate of retaliatory attacks to stop – but retracted their confession when the case went to court months later.
In November 2012, a member of the Islamic Committee of Yala province, imam Abdullateh Todir, was shot dead in Yaha district.
His killing ignited a six-week long spike of violence and a refusal by the Muslim leaders in the region to endorse a peace initiative by then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government that was officially launched in Kuala Lumpur in February 2013.
In May 2011, a roadside bomb killed, set off by insurgents who lay in wait from a nearby tree line, killed two monks in Yaha district. The attack fell on Visaka Bucha, the most important day on the Buddhist calendar.
Afterward Thai national media went crazy for days, concluding that the attack was a deliberate attempt to drive a bigger wedge between Buddhists and Muslims. But investigators said there was no line of vision and the perpetrators could not have seen the monks sitting inside a taxi.
‘Now it’s time to back off’
The killing of the monks on Friday came amid a spike since last November in violence by the insurgents. According to conversations with sources on both side of the conflict, the rebels were sending a message to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur to stop pressuring their leaders to come to the negotiating table.
The shooting death of the three imams over the past recent months was also a factor because it violated the aforementioned unwritten ground rule, the sources said.
The spike in violence in this restive region has come at a time when the current crop of the junta is about to announce the date for the next general election.
There isn’t much for Gen. Prayuth to show for in terms of a legacy for his counterinsurgency in the Deep South. A simple face-to-face meeting between Thai representatives and BRN leaders at this juncture would be considered a major breakthrough, and perhaps good enough for Prayuth to claim progress.
Prayuth recently replaced his chief negotiator for three years with another retired army general, Udomchai Thamsarorat, who appeared to be reaching out to members of the international community for advice – but not meditation – on how to advance the talks.
Other than that, Bangkok doesn’t appear to want to make any meaningful concessions to the BRN, who have already said they were not interested in negotiating with the Thais at this time.
And if and when they do decide to come to the table, according to the BRN’s demands, the peace process must be in line with international best practices – which means mediation by members of the international community.
The Friday killings of the monks jolted the entire nation, including representatives from local Malay civil society organizations (CSO) who have been quietly trying to convince the insurgents to respect humanitarian principles and international norms.
“They have made their point, and now it’s time to back off a little,” said one CSO member who spoke on condition of anonymity.
“Bringing in some degree of civility has been a very difficult challenge. A significant number of militants on the ground still see these humanitarian principles, such as International Humanitarian Law and rules of engagement, as foreign ideas that not only tie their hands in a fight where the playing field is already against them,” the source said.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/monk-deaths-01222019163803.html
Strong-handed approach not working in the South
 |
| Photo: CHAROON THONGNUAL |
DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
IN AN attempt to calm fears about the security situation in the deep South, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha issued a statement yesterday urging the public not to lose faith in his government’s efforts to bring an end to the conflict in this historically contested region.
The people behind the deadly attack on a temple in Narathiwat province last week wanted to provoke the forces into launching a forceful crackdown and in the process draw international attention to the situation in the South, Prayut said.
“Those who were behind the attack in Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district on January 19 intended to destroy the morale, spirit as well as the patience of Thailand in using peaceful methods to solve the ongoing conflict and violence in the South,” he said in the statement. His security tsar, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, urged security officials on the ground to exercise utmost restraint, to desist from any revenge motives, and to take recourse to the country’s justice system.
Analysts said there was nothing new in the government’s reaction. Prayut sounded very much like a broken record when he accused the separatist militants of trying to provoke a nasty retaliation by the security forces, of killing monks in order to discredit Thailand’s “peaceful approach” to the conflict, and of using violence to attract international attention.
Judging from the tone and content of his statement, it is clear that Prayut is worried about his legacy. He has been in power since the military coup in May 2014 and there is hardly anything that he and his government can point to in terms of success or progress in the deep South.
The government spent the past three years barking up the wrong tree, talking to MARA Patani – which has no control over the insurgents on the ground – about a quirky Safety Zone Project. Thai negotiators were led to believe by the previous Malaysian government – the official facilitator of the talks with MARA Patani – that a breakthrough was around the corner and that the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) would come to the table for face-to-face talks with the Thai negotiator, respect the Safety Zone and observe the ceasefire.
None of that was true. When a new government came to power in May last year in Kuala Lumpur, led by veteran Mahathir Mohamad, it adopted an all-or-nothing approach with the BRN leaders – come to the table to negotiate with the Thais or face unspecified consequences.
The BRN leaders decided to go into hiding, sources said. The problem with this strong-handed approach was that the BRN leaders and its political wing did not have a chance to prepare for the peace process, they said. The authorities in Bangkok knew that the peace process was uncharted territory for BRN leaders. They did not want the international community to work with the movement to prepare them for possible talks. Today, that zero-sum game approach is returning to haunt the authorities. Peace negotiations may be a no-go area for the BRN, but it does not mean that they will not come to the table someday. But the process, which can lead to that day, is yet to start.
The ongoing pressure on these leaders, coupled with the killings of imams in recent months, as well as allegations of torture in detention centres, have resulted in nasty retaliation from the militants on the ground. Prayut should have thought about his legacy four years ago when he decided to continue with the peace initiative that was started by the government he ousted. Pressuring the BRN leaders to come to the table so that Bangkok can claim some sort of a breakthrough will only invite more retaliation on the ground. Moreover, his defence planners should have seen the writing on the wall after the targeted killings of three imams in recent months. There is an unwritten rule that Muslim and Buddhist religious leaders and children should be free from harm.
The past decade, unfortunately, has seen bloody retaliations whenever this ground rule has been violated. The BRN militants look at their leaders as spiritual figures. And when these “spiritual leaders” get targeted, they stoop to a no-holds-barred approach. The past 15 years is a testimony of this sad reality.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/national/30362692
EDITORIAL
Eye for an eye: Why clerics are dying again in the South
The Nation
January 22, 2019
Both sides in the unrest are aware of an unwritten rule – leave the holy men alone or pay a high price
Insurgency violence in the southern border provinces looks to be entering another disturbing phase, matching the level of mayhem witnessed 10 years ago with attacks on Buddhist monks and temples.
The strategy appears the same – discredit the state security apparatus put in place to quell the separatist uprising. Friday’s attack in Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district left two monks dead and two others wounded, ensuring a jolt to the nation. Buddhists and Muslims alike are repelled by such attacks on defenceless targets in sanctified places.
There was room for doubt the last time a monk was murdered in the South, in 2015. It was argued that the bomb hidden in a roadside trash bin in Pattani was intended to kill or maim patrolling troops, not a passing holy man. This time there can be no doubt about the intent.
In February 2014 a monk was shot dead along with three laymen, one a youngster, at an alms-giving rite in Pattani’s Mae Lan district. Insurgents dressed in military fatigues opened fire on the crowd in retaliation for the killing days earlier of three little boys in Bacho district by a pair of paramilitary rangers. Only the monks’ own security detail prevented more deaths at the scene.
The revenge killings stopped after the two rangers admitted to killing the youths – confessions withdrawn months later when the case went to court. The rangers, both Muslims, insisted they acted alone, but there were reports of a Buddhist military officer also being present in what was described as an attempt to wipe out an entire family.
The slain boys’ father and four-months-pregnant mother were shot but survived. It was claimed that the presence of the third party was kept secret because the authorities wanted to dismiss the killings as part of a feud among Muslims. Charting the violence in the deep South in a bid to understand its causes and find solutions is of course exceedingly difficult.
Hampering efforts is the fact that the separatist movement has no identifiable spokesperson able to issue confirmations or denials. One clear trend in recent years, though, is that civility disappears whenever there is a perceived violation of the unwritten ground rule that religious figures must be left unharmed. When one side breaches that rule, the other side will respond with extreme force.
In the past two months, three imams – Muslim religious teachers – have been shot dead gangland-style and many more have been detained, interrogated and otherwise harassed.
There have been reports of Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur harassing people with strong religious credentials to help get peace negotiations rolling.
The pressure applied to bring forward leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has had the opposite effect – driving them deeper underground. The attack on the monks in Sungai Padi last Friday must be condemned in the strongest possible terms as an attack on the very fabric of local society.
It’s possible that the abbot, Prakru Prachote Rattananurak, was targeted – despite the enormous respect he commands among both Muslims and Buddhists – simply to test southerners’ resilience.
The government spent three years talking about establishing “safety zones” free of violence and conducive to peacemaking, only to jettison the idea recently when a new chief negotiator arrived on the scene. This is what ratcheted up the pressure to find the BRN. The murder and harassment of Muslim clerics cannot continue with impunity and without repercussions. We will all continue paying a high price for violations of the rules.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30362681
Thursday 10 January 2019
Insurgency flare-up signals Bangkok still on wrong track
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
(www.nationmultimedia.com)
Treating insurgents as criminals only pour fuel on a conflict underpinned by historical grievances
This past Tuesday, a group of separatist militants killed a retired schoolteacher in Songkhla, stole his pickup truck and used it for a car-bomb attack on a military target. Investigating officers found him hanging from his neck in the bathroom of his home in Saba Yoi district. Separately, just before the New Year, on December 28, a group of separatist militants entered a community hospital in Rangae district of Narathiwat to use it either as a launching pad to attack the Army unit next door or to take cover from return fire.
As expected, the incidents triggered another round of debate about civility and rules of engagement in a 15-year-old conflict that still has no end in sight. Local Malay villagers sympathetic to the insurgents’ struggle (though not necessarily in agreement with their tactics) said the militants were merely dodging gunfire from a Thai Army unit that shares the same fence as the Rangae community hospital.
Thai officials, meanwhile, predictably seized on the incident for public relations gain. A small public protest was organised, and the separatist militants accused of using hospital staff and patients as a human shield.
Sending a message One senior Thai Army officer in Narathiwat offered a different reading: the insurgents knowingly entered the hospital, but not to use its occupants as a shield. “I think they wanted to make couple points,” said the officer, who spent much of the past decade in the far South.
“First, they wanted to see what kind of reaction this would generate from the Thai side. And second, they wanted to highlight the fact that the community hospital and the Army unit share the same fence.” The positioning of security units in and around civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals and places of worship has long been a sore point between locals and the military.
Local Thai Buddhists want the military around, but not so close that they risk getting caught up in the crossfire. Patani Malays, on the other hand, see the presence of the soldiers as intimidation, made worse by a culture of impunity within the ranks. For many, the presence of government troops is a constant reminder that the historical homeland of the local Malays is now occupied territory. International norms prohibit military bases being located amid civilian communities, much less next to sensitive landmarks such as places of worship, schools, and medical facilities.
In March 2016, Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district was rocked when some 30 militants seized a hospital and used it as a base to attack the paramilitary outpost next door. An unusually high number of militants were mobilised resulting in an especially lengthy battle which saw bullets flying back and forth for about 30 minutes. Nobody was killed since this was not the aim of the attack.
The idea, it seems, was to put on a “performance” via the scores of security cameras placed in and around the medical facility. Insurgency is largely a communicative action, and in Cho Ai Rong the message of the militants’ capability was loud and clear. The militants thought that by first making efforts to place hospital and staff out of harm’s way, they could legitimately use the hospital to launch the attack. But the loudest condemnation came afterward from the local Muslim villagers, who accused the insurgents of recklessly placing them in the line of fire.
Thai authorities often exploit attacks such as this for publicity. But at the same time, they know well that such incidents can place an unwanted spotlight on their conduct in this historically contested region. It’s natural for locals to question why a military unit, however small, has to be situated right by a community hospital.‘Bandits, not guerrillas’ In an effort to deny the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) movement the recognition and legitimacy that it craves, Thai authorities continue to classify the southern violence as “disturbances” rather than armed conflict. In the view of many Thai policymakers, these Patani Malay insurgents are nothing but a bunch of criminals.
But BRN cadres insist they are more than just “jone” (bandits) – the term that Thai authorities like to apply to the outfit that controls virtually all the combatants in the Malay-speaking South.
The militants operate with loose guidance but no strict code of conduct for their attacks. Decisions on what to target and how to carry out attacks are made at the cell level by operatives who don’t always think about rules of engagement, international norms or humanitarian principles. Recent attacks are part of an ongoing spike in violence including a bombing spree from December 26-29 that began with the destruction of an iconic mermaid sculpture on a Songkhla beach.
The spike is in response to efforts by Thailand, and talks facilitator Malaysia, to pressure BRN leaders to come to the table and meet General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the newly appointed chief negotiator for Bangkok’s peace initiative for the far South.BRN not ready to talk BRN sources said their leaders are not yet ready to talk and have other priorities – like enhancing the understanding of international norms across their whole organisation.
Udomchai was supposed to meet BRN leaders Abdulloh Waemanor and Deng Awaeji on November 24 in Malaysia. But the two refused to show up and went into hiding. One Thai Army source said the two leaders had decided on December 5 to step down from the BRN ruling council “in order to save the movement”.
“If they do come to the table and meet Udomchai, it will be in a personal capacity,” said the Army officer. But another Army officer, from a military intelligence unit, said rumours the pair had resigned were a ploy generated by the BRN to get the Thais off its back.
Artef Sohko, an activist from The Patani, a political action group promoting rights to self-determination for the locals in this predominantly Malay-speaking region, said: “The idea of a BRN figure stepping down or leaving the organisation to save the movement is not far-fetched. It has been done before.” Unlike other Patani Malay movements, the BRN is not ruled by any one particular person but by a secretive council of elders who have strong religious credentials.
In short, the BRN decision-making process is not led by one person; decisions are made collectively. As such, Abdulloh and Deng could be easily cast aside by the BRN should they change their minds, for whatever reason, and come to the negotiating table.
That fate befell Sukri Hari, a well-known and respected figure in the far South who surfaced in August 2014 to join negotiations on the side of MARA Patani. The separatist umbrella group still has very little control over militants in the far South, but it remains the only group with whom Bangkok is negotiating.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development and security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
Special to The Nation
(www.nationmultimedia.com)
Treating insurgents as criminals only pour fuel on a conflict underpinned by historical grievances
This past Tuesday, a group of separatist militants killed a retired schoolteacher in Songkhla, stole his pickup truck and used it for a car-bomb attack on a military target. Investigating officers found him hanging from his neck in the bathroom of his home in Saba Yoi district. Separately, just before the New Year, on December 28, a group of separatist militants entered a community hospital in Rangae district of Narathiwat to use it either as a launching pad to attack the Army unit next door or to take cover from return fire.
As expected, the incidents triggered another round of debate about civility and rules of engagement in a 15-year-old conflict that still has no end in sight. Local Malay villagers sympathetic to the insurgents’ struggle (though not necessarily in agreement with their tactics) said the militants were merely dodging gunfire from a Thai Army unit that shares the same fence as the Rangae community hospital.
Thai officials, meanwhile, predictably seized on the incident for public relations gain. A small public protest was organised, and the separatist militants accused of using hospital staff and patients as a human shield.
Sending a message One senior Thai Army officer in Narathiwat offered a different reading: the insurgents knowingly entered the hospital, but not to use its occupants as a shield. “I think they wanted to make couple points,” said the officer, who spent much of the past decade in the far South.
“First, they wanted to see what kind of reaction this would generate from the Thai side. And second, they wanted to highlight the fact that the community hospital and the Army unit share the same fence.” The positioning of security units in and around civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals and places of worship has long been a sore point between locals and the military.
Local Thai Buddhists want the military around, but not so close that they risk getting caught up in the crossfire. Patani Malays, on the other hand, see the presence of the soldiers as intimidation, made worse by a culture of impunity within the ranks. For many, the presence of government troops is a constant reminder that the historical homeland of the local Malays is now occupied territory. International norms prohibit military bases being located amid civilian communities, much less next to sensitive landmarks such as places of worship, schools, and medical facilities.
In March 2016, Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district was rocked when some 30 militants seized a hospital and used it as a base to attack the paramilitary outpost next door. An unusually high number of militants were mobilised resulting in an especially lengthy battle which saw bullets flying back and forth for about 30 minutes. Nobody was killed since this was not the aim of the attack.
The idea, it seems, was to put on a “performance” via the scores of security cameras placed in and around the medical facility. Insurgency is largely a communicative action, and in Cho Ai Rong the message of the militants’ capability was loud and clear. The militants thought that by first making efforts to place hospital and staff out of harm’s way, they could legitimately use the hospital to launch the attack. But the loudest condemnation came afterward from the local Muslim villagers, who accused the insurgents of recklessly placing them in the line of fire.
Thai authorities often exploit attacks such as this for publicity. But at the same time, they know well that such incidents can place an unwanted spotlight on their conduct in this historically contested region. It’s natural for locals to question why a military unit, however small, has to be situated right by a community hospital.‘Bandits, not guerrillas’ In an effort to deny the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) movement the recognition and legitimacy that it craves, Thai authorities continue to classify the southern violence as “disturbances” rather than armed conflict. In the view of many Thai policymakers, these Patani Malay insurgents are nothing but a bunch of criminals.
But BRN cadres insist they are more than just “jone” (bandits) – the term that Thai authorities like to apply to the outfit that controls virtually all the combatants in the Malay-speaking South.
The militants operate with loose guidance but no strict code of conduct for their attacks. Decisions on what to target and how to carry out attacks are made at the cell level by operatives who don’t always think about rules of engagement, international norms or humanitarian principles. Recent attacks are part of an ongoing spike in violence including a bombing spree from December 26-29 that began with the destruction of an iconic mermaid sculpture on a Songkhla beach.
The spike is in response to efforts by Thailand, and talks facilitator Malaysia, to pressure BRN leaders to come to the table and meet General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the newly appointed chief negotiator for Bangkok’s peace initiative for the far South.BRN not ready to talk BRN sources said their leaders are not yet ready to talk and have other priorities – like enhancing the understanding of international norms across their whole organisation.
Udomchai was supposed to meet BRN leaders Abdulloh Waemanor and Deng Awaeji on November 24 in Malaysia. But the two refused to show up and went into hiding. One Thai Army source said the two leaders had decided on December 5 to step down from the BRN ruling council “in order to save the movement”.
“If they do come to the table and meet Udomchai, it will be in a personal capacity,” said the Army officer. But another Army officer, from a military intelligence unit, said rumours the pair had resigned were a ploy generated by the BRN to get the Thais off its back.
Artef Sohko, an activist from The Patani, a political action group promoting rights to self-determination for the locals in this predominantly Malay-speaking region, said: “The idea of a BRN figure stepping down or leaving the organisation to save the movement is not far-fetched. It has been done before.” Unlike other Patani Malay movements, the BRN is not ruled by any one particular person but by a secretive council of elders who have strong religious credentials.
In short, the BRN decision-making process is not led by one person; decisions are made collectively. As such, Abdulloh and Deng could be easily cast aside by the BRN should they change their minds, for whatever reason, and come to the negotiating table.
That fate befell Sukri Hari, a well-known and respected figure in the far South who surfaced in August 2014 to join negotiations on the side of MARA Patani. The separatist umbrella group still has very little control over militants in the far South, but it remains the only group with whom Bangkok is negotiating.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development and security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
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