EDITORIAL: An inconvenient truth in the deep South opinion

The Thai state's propaganda machine cannot win the battle for hearts and minds

The Nation

Citizens and activists who take a more critical view of the government’s policy and actions in the Malay-speaking South have not only been subjected to harassment by the authorities but also nasty propaganda often referred to as “IO”, or information operations.

The idea of IO is to discredit those perceived by the authorities to be obstructing the effort to win hearts and minds among the local residents, about 90 percent of whom are Muslims of Malay ethnicity.
The authorities believe that if they can win over the locals, they can quell the armed separatist movements by denying them support and legitimacy.
One group now bearing the brunt of the government’s IO machine is the Federation of Patanian Students and Youth, or PerMAS, a network of university and high-school students.
Though the group’s stronghold in the deep South, PerMAS membership stretches throughout Thailand and even into neighbouring countries.
Because of their outspoken stance against the culture of impunity among government security officials, PerMAS has been consistently accused of collaborating with separatist organisations, particularly the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), believed by Thai officials to control vast majority of the insurgents on the ground. Thailand’s IO paints PerMAS as the “political wing” of the BRN, a label that members strongly reject.
Though 11 years have passed since the current wave of insurgency first emerged, regular and cordial dialogue between Thai security officials and PerMAS has not resolved the differences.
Undermining the efforts is the government’s semi-secret IO machine, which continues to churn out propaganda attacking and harassing these activists.
Whether a deliberate strategy or not, this double-faced approach only makes the authorities look bad. If anything, it illustrates a lack of unity of purpose and strategy on the government side.
Intelligence and security officials need to ask themselves whether such propaganda tactics against groups like PerMAS are even necessary. And if they continue to insist that IO is a legitimate approach, they should be more truthful about the information they dish out.
Rallies organised by PerMAS and associated groups like Lempar, Nusantara, Perwani and Wartani draw upwards of 10,000 people. The criticism voiced at such large public events is no doubt uncomfortable for the authorities.
But attacking these groups with distorted information won’t help the situation. For many locals, it only enforces a longstanding lack of trust in state officials.
Positive change won’t be achieved by the state reaching out to them with an olive branch in one hand while holding a whip in the other.
There are far more productive ways to engage these activists.
First, actions speak louder than words. Acting to end the culture of impunity among security forces by clamping down on dubious tactics such as torture and extrajudicial killing would be a crucial step in the right direction. The best way to show local residents that the state cares deeply about their concerns would be to take up their grievances and look into them with an open mind.
The authorities must ask themselves why local residents have diverted their hope and trust towards these youth activists. Is it perhaps that they have good reason to believe no one else will stand up for their rights?
Like it or not, an “us versus them” mentality still prevails in the deep South, where the “Siamese” are more often than not seen as outsiders.
The authorities need to grasp this inconvenient truth. It may not fit neatly into their official explanation of the situation, but if we are to get to the bottom of this longstanding and deadly conflict, we must stop fooling ourselves with our own propaganda.

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BRN call for foreign observers at peace talks a key test for Bangkok

Insurgent group says it is willing to negotiate if Thailand follows international norms

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

For an organisation whose leadership is very secretive, Barisan Revolusi Nasional is drifting into uncharted territory as its "Information Department" reaches out to foreign media to make their case about Thailand's questionable effort to secure peace in its southernmost provinces.

Bomb squad inspecting scene in Narathiwat earlier this month following attack.

Reaching out to foreign media may have come out of a desire to remind the world that BRN's leadership has yet to endorse Thailand's current peace initiative.

Nevertheless, it was a step in a more conventional direction - one that could force the Thai government to rethink its own information strategy, according to a Thai government official working on the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

What was interesting, noted the Thai official and Artef Sohko, a youth activist and member of a political action group, the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development (Lempar), was that the BRN Information Department had reached out to Anthony Davis, a veteran writer who has for decades written on security issues and conflicts around Asia for Jane's Defence Weekly and other major publications.

For years, much of the information about the conflict in Thailand's southernmost provinces had been provided by the state, making any reporting lopsided.

But the Thai government will no longer enjoy a monopoly on the flow of information should groups like the BRN, which controls a vast majority of the insurgents on the ground, begin to seriously exercise their communication strategy.

A BRN source said the leadership in the movement, namely the Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, agreed to the interview because they wanted to set the record straight regarding the peace initiative of Thailand, the Malaysian government and MARA Patani, the recently established umbrella organisation.

Whether this was a one-time thing remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it was enough to get Thais to seriously think about what the future holds in the realm of communication strategy.

Besides the recent interview with Davis, BRN's leadership also issued a four-page statement slamming Thailand for deceiving the world with the initiative but not being willing to make any meaningful concession.

BRN said they are willing to negotiate for peace but the process must be carried out along international norms and the talks must be witnessed by foreign states.

As expected, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan rejected the demand that foreign governments observe the peace talks.

Bangkok has never liked the idea of foreign mediation for fear of "internationalising" the conflict, which they feel would give too much legitimacy to the separatists.

BRN sources said the DPP would only endorse the peace talks if their negotiators are properly prepared and their political wings receive the needed immunity.

Earlier last month, just 10 days after the August 27 launch of MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, the DPP reminded the world about their feeling about the Thai state through a statement read out by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of the movement's youth wing who's also part of the BRN Information Department.

In the video statement, he criticised the Thai state for being insincere and lacking legitimacy in Malays' historical homeland, which is today's southern border provinces.

It was hard to dismiss Abdulkarim's statement as irrelevant because he was not an unknown entity. The man was at the negotiating table at the previous round of talks launched by the Yingluck government in February 2013.

Abdulkarim was sent to the talks by the DPP under a very strict mandate. He could not negotiate - as the BRN's DPP did not officially endorse the Yingluck initiative - but would observe and report back to the top leaders.

That initiative ended in late 2013 when the designated "BRN liaison", Hasan Taib, threw in the towel and went incommunicado. Street protests in Bangkok also sent the Yingluck government into survival mode until her administration was ousted in May of last year by a military coup.

Seven months after the putsch, the junta decided to pick up where the Yingluck team had left off, but with conditions. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha demanded that the separatist leaders develop a common platform and implement "a period of peace".

Thai officials said "the period of peace", or ceasefire, was to demonstrate that MARA Patani members had adequate command-and-control over the militants on the ground.

Bangkok did not get their "period of peace" but the separatists did form the MARA Patani, a platform for their common strategy and for dealing with the Thais collectively.

Prayut rejected the idea of granting MARA Patani formal recognition and legal immunity but said talks could continue - in an unofficial capacity.

MARA Patani was a sideshow, or Track 1.5, to the Yingluck official Track 1 initiative that has Malaysia as designated facilitator.

Today, with Hasan and Abdulkarim abandoning the initiative, the sideshow was elevated to a formal Track 1. But being on Track 1 does not guarantee MARA Patani members formal or meaningful recognition as Bangkok does not want to give away too much too soon to the Patani Malay groups.

But if MARA Patani could secure a buy-in from the DPP, Bangkok just might take them more seriously and grant them the recognition they want, security officials said.

For the time being, MARA Patani, Thailand's dialogue panel (negotiators) and the Malaysian facilitators are pinning their hopes on a small group of young BRN members who broke ranks and joined the peace talks.

Two of these individuals - Sukree Hari and Ahmad Chuwo - were paraded to the press in Kuala Lumpur with other MARA Patani representatives. They still called themselves "BRN" but combatants on the ground said, "Who cares?" What matters, in today's context, is who has command-and-control on the ground.

The Thai negotiators, MARA Patani and Kuala Lumpur were hoping that these former teachers from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala could bridge the gap between them and the BRN ruling council.

But the recently released four-page statement, along with Abdulkarim's statement on YouTube, not to mention the interview with Davis, was BRN's way of telling all stakeholders that there is no shortcut to peace.

Thai officials have quietly acknowledged that parading the pair to the media in late August along with the MARA Patani may have been a premature move.

Perhaps all sides should have waited until they are certain that these former teachers have secured the needed endorsement from the BRN's ruling council, he said.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

Myanmar's mighty narco armies refuse to surrender the fight

The ceasefire deal being signed today with ethnic rebels will not cover the badlands bordering Thailand

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

The nationwide ceasefire agreement set to be signed today by the Myanmar government and eight ethnic armed groups has thrown a spotlight on notorious rebel groups who have refused to make peace.

Thai border security officials who monitor insurgency activity in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle say they are not surprised that the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which is still at war with the Myanmar government, are refusing to sign the peace agreement.

Wa soldiers in Panghsang, UWSA's HQ. Photo by: DON PATHAN

With 20,000-strong combat force plus reserves, the UWSA refuses to be placed in the same category as far smaller armed ethnic groups, who are not in a position to dictate terms to the government.

Moreover, reports that China is meddling in the ceasefire talks suggest the giant communist neighbour wants to maintain its dominant longstanding influence over the Wa, said one officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The UWSA inked a ceasefire deal with the Myanmar government in 1989 but it had virtually no impact on the group's relations with China, its main backer.

Armed Wa rebels served as China's entry point into Myanmar during the days of communist insurgency, when they acted as foot soldiers for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The CPB fell apart along ethnic lines in 1989.

The Wa State Army came into being in the aftermath of the CPB's disintegration, with a vow to keep on fighting for another 10 years.

Fearing that the UWSA would forge alliances with neighbouring rebel groups such as the Karen National Union, Myanmar's security tsar, Lt-General Khin Nyunt, moved quickly to secure a ceasefire.

In exchange for agreeing to sign, the UWSA was permitted self-rule in the so-called Special Region 2. Other groups operating in areas adjacent to the UWSA stronghold - the Kokang Chinese and the Mong La group - were given similar semi-autonomous status.

While the ceasefire with these groups halted military confrontations, it also allowed the ethnic armies to grow both militarily and economically. The trade of choice for these groups was, of course, opium.

Barely had the ink on the ceasefire deal dried when clandestine factories brewing high-grade heroin began to pop up in remote areas controlled by the narco-armies.

Government efforts at getting the Wa to kick the habit in 2001 didn't do much good, even with Thailand's help.

In a strange twist of diplomacy, the Thaksin Shinawatra administration was working with Rangoon to set up the Yongkha Development Project in UWSA-controlled territory near the Thai border. It was supposed to be a comprehensive crop-substitution project for Wa villagers who had been forcibly relocated from the China-Myanmar border in the late 1990s.

The Thai government injected Bt20 million into the project with the hope that others in the international community would follow. But the world knew that Thai and US authorities had already convicted half a dozen Wa leaders on charges of heroin trafficking, so no funds were forthcoming.

The USWA declaration that it would end opium cultivation in June 2005 didn't fool anybody. The Wa army was already churning out methamphetamine (yaba), which was flooding into Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.

Bao Yu-xiang (left) , chairman of the UWSA, with Don Pathan
centre) in Panghsang, Wa's capital on the Sino-Burma border, 2003.

Not only had Thaksin failed to whitewash the UWSA through the development project, his efforts had also angered many in the Thai military, whose Third Army Area troops were engaged in frequent skirmishes with Wa drug caravans along the border.

For China, the UWSA presence along the Thai border was an opportunity to extend its long reach even further. But the Thai military and security agencies were not willing to let bygones be bygones and refused to play along.

Reeling from the flood of drugs into the country, Bangkok was further humiliated when top Wa commander Wei Hsueh-kang escaped after being granted bail on drug trafficking charges by a Thai court. So upset was Washington that it decided to raise the bounty for his capture to US$2 million. Nevertheless, Wei continues to control one of the three UWSA regiments near the Thai border.

Though security tsar Khin Nyunt tried hard to build on the ceasefire with the UWSA, the Wa leaders continue to enjoy strong ties with Chinese authorities in Yunnan.

UWSA-owned casinos on the border with Yunnan province are open 24 hours a day, even though gambling is illegal. Cars with Wa licence plates travel deep inside Yunnan freely, while Wa leaders can be seen walking in and out of banks there with wads of dollars.

Nay Pyi Taw officials visiting UWSA-controlled Special Region 2 often quip that the area seems more like an extension of China than a semi-autonomous region of Myanmar. The preferred choice of currency and cellphone or landline operators add to that impression.

Meanwhile, credible reports that China is selling weapons, including helicopters and surface-to-air missiles, to the UWSA are keeping a spotlight on longstanding relations that Chinese officials would prefer not to talk about.

Myanmar is well aware of the strong ties between Chinese authorities and rebel groups like the Kokang, Kachin and the Wa. But they also feel that these relations should not come at the expense of national security.

To show the Chinese that they mean business, Myanmar troops attacked the Kokang in August 2009, forcing thousands of Chinese citizens to flee back over the border.

Ousted Kokang leaders also took refuge in China and used Wa-controlled territory to regroup.

Thai officials believe Myanmar will refrain from using military means to force the Wa to comply and come under the command of the country's army. Indirect pressure, such as the need to integrate economically with the rest of Myanmar, will be the main factor that pushes the UWSA closer to the state, they say.

Meanwhile the so-called nationwide ceasefire agreement will be signed with only about half of the 15 groups the government has been negotiating with over the past couple of years. For President Thein Sein, who wants to cement a legacy as the leader who ended decades of civil war - in which he himself played a battlefield role - this is not the ideal scenario.

Major rebel powers like the Wa and their allies, the Mong La and the Kokang, will have to be engaged with on their on terms, in separate negotiations.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and consultant based in Thailand.