Thailand, Myanmar and the Pollution of Thai Waterways

Thai and United Wa State Army soldiers meeting on the border near Mae Hong Son in early 2025. (Credit: Royal Thai Army)

Don Pathan
www.mizzima.com

A ranking member of the Thai Senate, Ms. Angkhana Neelaphaijit, has called for United Nations intervention regarding the pollution of the Kok and Sai rivers, contaminated by Chinese gold and rare earth extraction operations in territories controlled by the Wa militia, located mere kilometers from Thailand’s border with Myanmar.

Angkhana Neelaphaijit

Angkhana referenced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to justify such intervention.

The 2019 Ramon Magsaysay Award winner, who joined the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances in 2022, argued that China bears moral and legal responsibility to address this issue. She suggested Thailand should petition the UN to raise concerns with China, given Myanmar’s inability to control the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-member ethnic armed group maintaining a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s government since 1989.

According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation, while recent media coverage has concentrated on gold extraction along the Kok and Sai rivers near UWSA territory approximately 25 kilometers from Thailand’s border, satellite imagery reveals rare earth mining operations at two sites in Mong Yawn, southern Mong Hsat, roughly 25 kilometers from northern Thailand’s border, facing Mae Ai district in Chiang Mai province.

Recent months have witnessed a series of public protests in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, demanding government action to address the issue with both Myanmar and the UWSA. In early 2025, Thai conservative media sources even advocated military intervention against the Wa, claiming three UWSA outposts had violated Thai territory by 200 meters.

The powerful UWSA controls an autonomous territory along the China-Myanmar frontier. During the late 1990s, the UWSA expanded southward toward the Thai border after collaborating with Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, to eliminate their longtime adversary, Shan opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army (MTA).

Access to UWSA territories remains strictly controlled. Myanmar military personnel and government representatives must surrender weapons and accept escort.

Responding to mounting public pressure regarding river contamination, Thailand and Myanmar took a modest bilateral initiative last week, agreeing during Naypyidaw discussions to establish a joint committee addressing the Kok and Sai river pollution.

Both nations are committed to enhancing river water quality, sharing water management information, and creating a joint technical working group for concrete cooperation on contamination solutions. However, the agreement made no reference to the UWSA or China.

A senior Thai military official from the Third Army Area command said there have been internal discussions about approaching China directly, since negotiations with the UWSA and seeking the Myanmar government's assistance have proven ineffective.

Thailand’s communications with the UWSA have consistently involved the group’s southern command, which invariably defers major decisions to Panghsang, their organization’s headquarters on the Sino-Myanmar border. This includes Thailand’s request for UWSA to move back from at least nine outposts that are situated right on the Thai border; three of these outposts are allegedly positioned 200 meters inside Thai territory. Wa forces maintain that orders must originate from Panghsang and suggest Thailand address border demarcation issues with Myanmar’s government, as they concern state sovereignty.

Other ethnic armed organizations said the UWSA will take no action without receiving concessions from Thailand. Like similar groups, legitimacy and recognition are something that are often desired. However, Thailand refuses to offer concessions to the UWSA, particularly given its drug trafficking history.

Several UWSA leaders face US Federal Court indictments for heroin trafficking and related crime, while their southern commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, carries a US$2 million bounty from American authorities for his conviction as far back as 1993.

Wei and his brothers, originally from Yunnan, arrived in the Burmese Golden Triangle during the 1970s, initially as Kuomintang operatives before entering the profitable heroin trade. When the UWSA formed in 1989 following the Communist Party of Burma’s dissolution, Wei provided financial backing, transforming the organization into Myanmar’s most formidable ethnic armed group. The UWSA granted him access to opium supplies needed for producing premium grade 4 heroin, known as “China White.”

The Tatmadaw quickly established a ceasefire arrangement with the UWSA, and within a decade, the Wa had effectively moved southward, displacing longtime rival Khun Sa’s now-defunct Mong Tai Army (MTA) and occupying territories along the Thailand-Myanmar frontier. Currently, UWSA installations, camps, and strongholds populate newly constructed settlements along Myanmar’s border adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and portions of Mae Hong Son provinces.

Thailand’s requests for Tatmadaw mediation with the UWSA are not unprecedented. In 2014, the Thai Army discussed UWSA border positions with Myanmar leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing during his Thailand visit. As of today, the Tatmadaw possesses limited influence over the UWSA.

But the same cannot be said about China. Last week, the UWSA declared it would terminate all assistance to allied groups battling Myanmar’s military, citing a request from China.

“Beginning immediately, Wa State will not provide weapons, military transit, or economic assistance to other organizations under any circumstances, at any time or location,” announced Zhao Guoan, Wa Vice Chairman and Foreign Relations Minister, informing representatives from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) during an August 20, 2025 high-level meeting in Panghsang.

The Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) reported that Zhao attributed this reluctant decision to intense Beijing pressure. Chinese authorities had frozen billions in Wa State institutional, corporate, and individual assets, implemented comprehensive border restrictions, and threatened severe measures unless the Wa ceased supporting armed groups in active conflict, according to SHAN, citing Wa News Land, the UWSA’s media outlet, as saying.

Since the Brotherhood Alliance’s late 2023 offensive began, China has served as a peace broker between Myanmar and ethnic armed organizations. Beijing's position gradually shifted toward supporting the Burmese junta, demanding that certain groups, particularly the TNLA and MNDAA, return territories captured from Myanmar’s military. Analysts believe China views Myanmar’s military government as the sole entity capable of maintaining national unity, with current support aimed at ensuring the upcoming December 2025 and January 2026 General Elections proceed smoothly enough to legitimize the new administration. Ultimately, this concerns risk mitigation for Chinese investments, trade routes, and strategic interests rather than power-sharing arrangements between the Myanmar military government and the ethnic armed organizations.

UWSA: An Uncomfortable Neighbor

Surprisingly, there were periods when Thai soldiers and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops engaged in friendly volleyball matches along the northern border.

These games represented friendly overtures from new neighbors whose presence deeply concerned the Thai Army for multiple reasons. The UWSA’s notorious drug trafficking reputation and their regional commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, certainly didn’t help matters.

Furthermore, Thailand and the UWSA never developed the necessary comfort level for peaceful coexistence. Typically, ethnic armed organizations maintaining ceasefires with the Tatmadaw are perceived as threats to Thailand, while those fighting Myanmar for self-governance or independence are considered allies and sometimes serve as buffers or proxies for Thai military forces.

After securing their southern command along the Thai border, the UWSA forcibly relocated over 100,000 Wa villagers from their China-Myanmar border stronghold to the southern command area.

However, the UWSA failed to convince Thai military leadership they posed no national threat. The massive population movement from the north, Wa drug operations and illicit regional investments, and the general perception that ceasefire-holding ethnic armed organizations threaten Thailand’s security—all contributed to maintaining this suspicious outlook.

Undoubtedly, historical distrust between Thailand and Burma shaped this threat perception, which traditionally views Myanmar’s friends and allies as dangers to Thailand.

Nevertheless, Thailand-Myanmar bilateral relations have not always been straightforward. Despite mistrust, various Thai governments since decolonization have served as Myanmar’s bridge to the international community, seeking to isolate the regime for its severe human rights abuses. Thailand was the first to enter Burma following the 1988 bloody crackdown against the pro-democracy uprising. Thaksin Shinawatra, shortly after assuming power in 2001, made extraordinary efforts to strengthen bilateral economic relations with the country. His assistance to Myanmar included whitewashing the UWSA through the Yongka Project development initiative, which never materialized due to a lack of international funding.

Over time, Wa-Thai military clashes gradually ceased, but tensions persisted. Thai security officials report the UWSA has not forgotten the “Surisri 143” incident—allegedly a Thai Army training exercise in May 2002 that saw Thai forces cross the border in tracked vehicles, supported by mortars and artillery, conducting a 24-hour operation eliminating several Wa positions. Some outposts were jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin later claimed the Army had “overreacted.”

While the UWSA sought to avoid war with Thailand and desired peace, they were unlikely to easily forget the May 2002 violence. Although both sides no longer engage in border gunfights, that two-decade-old hostility continues influencing Wa attitudes toward Thailand.

Unlike the early 2000s when Wa troops regularly exchanged gunfire with Thai soldiers, UWSA leaders would grant interviews and permit foreign media access to their China-Burma border territory. Today, statements are released through media platforms. Most posts showcase military strength through parades, troop movements, and daily training activities.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Bordered by History: Tension in The Thailand-Myanmar Frontier (Part I)

Part I

Don Pathan
(www.stratsea.com)

Introduction

Along the Thailand-Myanmar border, remnants of China’s lost army persist, transforming into tourist attractions where visitors sample Yunnanese cuisine and traditional Chinese tea.

Ban Rak Thai, locally known as Mae Aw, exemplifies one of the numerous villages where descendants of the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces established settlements in the 1960s.

Author, Don Pathan at Shan State Army camp.

Forced out of the Shan State of Myanmar – also known as Burma – after several failed attempts to stage attacks against Communist China, these communities represent a complex geopolitical legacy

“Between 1950 and 1952, the Kuomintang army in Burma’s Shan States tried no fewer than seven times to invade Yunnan but was repeatedly driven back across the border. The Burmese Army then entered the Shan States to rid the country of its uninvited guests, and that in turn led to an unprecedented militarization of the Shan States,” wrote Chiang Mai-based Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner in his book, “The Wa of Myanmar and China’s Quest for Global Dominance,” published in 2021.

“But the areas east of the Salween River were too remote to be affected by the buildup. There, the Kuomintang reigned supreme through alliances it had established with local warlords, most of them from Kokang and the eastern Shan States, but some of whom were also Wa,” Lintner added. One of the few cash crops in the Wa Hills and other mountainous areas where the KMT had established bases was opium, which they used to finance their campaign against the communists.

By 1961, the combined forces between Burma and the People’s Liberation Army began to push back against the KMT. A turning point came in January 1968 when the China-trained Communist Party of Burma (CPB) militias crossed the border from Yunnan into Shan State and went straight to the KMT bases.

Eventually, it was time for the KMT to move. Some were evacuated to Taiwan while others crossed into Thailand to form communities like the one here in Ban Rak Thai, a 90-minute drive north of Mae Hong Son provincial seat.

The Thai government convinced the KMT leaders as well as the hill tribes in the region to kick the opium habit in exchange for tea and other cash crops. Thai citizenship was gradually given first as a reward to those fighting against the Communist Party of Thailand and gradually to KMT descendants.

Warlords and Militia Leaders

With the KMT gone, it did not mean Shan State was at peace. New warlords and militia groups would emerge in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle to continue with the opium and heroin business, sending it halfway around the world to the streets of New York.

One such person was Chang Shi-fu, who, incidentally, started as a young government village militia to fight the CPB.

Born in 1933 to a Chinese father and a Shan mother in northern Shan State, Shi-fu rose from a young government militia to become the head of his own outfit. He was convicted of high treason in 1973 by the Burmese government and released the following year after his supporter kidnapped two Soviet doctors and ransomed them for his freedom. His release was brokered by a Thai Army general.

From 1974 onward, Shi-fu directed his fight against the Burmese Government, proclaiming himself a Shan nationalist, and adopted the name Khun Sa, or “Prince Prosperous”, in the Shan/Tai language.

Another figure was Wei Hsueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese who fled Yunnan after the Communist victory and relocated to northern Shan State to do business with the local soapha, or chaofah in Thai, which means “lord of the sky”, a royal title used by the hereditary Tai rulers in mainland Southeast Asia.

Wei and his two brothers would relocate to an area near Thailand’s border, where they joined Khun Sa and his outfit. A fallout with Khun Sa forced him out of the Shan circle. They then reconnected with his old network in Shan State and later linked this newly formed alliance with the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) when it was established in 1989. Afterwards, they gained access to the vast poppy field in the Wa Hills where raw opium could be refined into heroin.

In 1993, the United States indicted Wei with heroin trafficking and offered a US$2 million reward for information leading to his arrest. Three years earlier, in March 1990, Khun Sa was indicted by the United States for the same crime, with the same amount of bounty placed on his head.

By mid-1990, relentless assault on Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA) by its arch-rival the UWSA and the Burmese government troops forced him to surrender in exchange for amnesty.

After Khun Sa’s defeat, the Burmese Government told the UWSA to return to the Sino-Burma border in the north. They refused and instead mobilised more than 100,000 villagers from its Special Region 2 along the Sino-Burma border to newly built towns along the Thai border that stretches from Chiang Rai to Chiang Mai and southward to the northern part of Mae Hong Son province. Special Region 2 is an autonomous area secured from the Myanmar Government in 1989 in exchange for an unwritten ceasefire agreement.

UWSA forced migration from north to south. 

About 10,000 UWSA troops control this so-called UWSA southern command under the leadership of Wei and his brothers. Border outposts and camps along the border once under Khun Sa were immediately taken over by the UWSA. Wherever possible, the UWSA set up a volleyball court on hard-dirt plains – daily matches were supposed to bring them and the Thai troops closer together.

The turning point came one morning in February 1999 when authorities found nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death, with their hands tied behind their backs. Authorities said it was a drug deal gone bad. All fingers pointed to the UWSA.

Deteriorating Relationship

Closing the border leading to Wa’s towns built by Thai contractors was the next logical thing. Thai contractors were told to pull out. For the Thai troops along the border, it meant their daily volleyball game with the Wa soldiers had to come to an end.

Clashes between the two sides became frequent as drug caravans carrying Wa’s methamphetamines make their way into Thailand.

Don athan in Panghsang, UWSA HQ on the Sino-Burma border, 2003

An all-out offensive occurred on 20 May 2002. The battles took place well within Myanmar’s territory and went on throughout the day. Artillery fire supported the advancing Thai soldiers carrying out search-and-destroy missions against the UWSA’s outposts several kilometers inside the Myanmar border.

Thai Army’s armored personnel carrier, along with soldiers from Special Forces, cavalry squadrons and artillery units had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces for the past weeks to await instruction.

The mobilisation was called Surasri 143, supposedly a military training exercise. One elite unit was tasked with capturing Wei but could not find him as he had fled deeper into Myanmar.

When the dust settled, the UWSA began to build nine outposts that sit smack on the Thai fence. Three of these crossed into Thai territory, according to Google Map. Thai conservative media and right-wing press decided to play this up, calling on the government to take action against the UWSA, giving both the government and the Army that much more headache.

The Current Landscape

Today, no one in Thailand wants to turn back the clock to 2002. Thai troops and UWSA soldiers at the local level are talking to one another in a much calmer atmosphere; local troops described their conversations as friendly but Wa’s crystal meth and methamphetamines continue to find their way into Thai soil.

No one is turning a blind eye to the drug caravan as massive drug bust along the border demonstrated but the Thai government has retreated from politicising the drug issues, as it was not worth the cost.

Talking is better than shooting one another, said a Thai Army unit commander on the border.

For years, the Thai Army in the region has wrecked their brain on how to get the UWSA to move the nine outposts, particularly the three that allegedly crossed into the Thai side, just a little bit back to avoid any possible confrontation. The UWSA has had a presence there since the fall of Khun Sa in the late 1990s.

UWSA Chairman Bao Yuxiang with author, 2003

The Thai Army even asked Myanmar’s supreme commander, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing during his visit to Thailand in 2014, to intervene on Thailand’s behalf. Still, the UWSA refused to pull back.

Thai Army has held several face-to-face meetings with the local command, including with senior UWSA officials in Mong Hsat back in November 2024, but no solution has been reached. Wa soldiers at the Thai border said they are not authorised to pull back without an order from Panghsang, their main headquarters located on the Sino-Burma border.

According to Thai Army sources, Panghsang has suggested the Thais take up any allegation of territorial dispute with the Myanmar Government. Interestingly, the UWSA treats territory under their command as a country within a country; this is despite Myanmar soldiers and officials being required to disarm and be escorted when entering the Wa territory.

Many critics, especially those on social media, appear to want the Thai Army to use force to push the UWSA back. Officials on the border said a military victory would not be difficult. However, no one wants to turn the clock back to the old days when clashes between the two sides were all too common.

The hard parts are obviously an all-out offensive and its aftermath. There are just too many tourist attractions and foreign visitors along the northern border; the stakes are just too high for Thailand, particularly the tourism industry, Thailand’s golden goose.

https://stratsea.com/bordered-by-history-tension-in-the-thailand-myanmar-frontier-part-i/

------------------------------------------------------------------

Part II

Bordered by History: Tension in the Thailand-Myanmar Frontier (Part II)

Don Pathan
(www.stratsea.com)
March 21, 2025

Thai security planners are concerned that the Thailand-Myanmar border could fall under China’s sphere of influence as highlighted in the banner. 

Introduction

A 30-minute walk from the glamour and glittering of Ban Rak Thai village is a quiet border crossing that divides Thailand from a nameless checkpoint. It is manned by a lone soldier from the Wa National Army (WNA), a small outfit that came into being in 1973 under the leadership of Maha Sang, the son of Sao Maha, the saohpa of Vingngun, a region in Shan State just north of Panghsang.

They sided with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang – KMT) against the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) back in the day. Like other warlords, Maha Sang survived the rugged Golden Triangle through deals and alliances with militia groups and their warlords.

His ailing brother, Maha Ja, took over Khun Sa’s Hua Muang stronghold immediately after his surrender and assumed the role of the town’s mayor with his own militia that functioned more like his personal security details.

Following the death of Maha Sang in 2007, the WNA placed itself under the United Wa State Army (UWSA) command and control. The group was permitted to keep their flag and uniform, as Thai authorities along the border are much more comfortable dealing with the WNA.

There are just too many histories with the UWSA, a senior Thai Army officer on the border said.

Thorny Relations

The UWSA and the Myanmar government established a ceasefire in 1989, but this was a far cry from a peace treaty. Thus, getting Myanmar to “talk sense” to get the UWSA to pull back – so that Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra does not have to look weak and bad in the eyes of the critics – is still a pipe dream.

UWSA and Thai soldiers talking on the border (Credit: RTArmy) 

In fact, said sources on the border, the Myanmar junta wants Thailand to “teach the Wa a lesson.” Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) could not do it, as it would open a new can of worms that the Tatmadaw may not be able to handle.

A Thai think tank Center for Strategic Policy presented its report “Myanmar and Thailand: Strategic Pathways to Regional Peace and Stability” at a December 2024 seminar. Author Supalak Ganjanakhundee said Thailand should not rule out the idea of strengthening cooperation with the UWSA as well as other ethnic groups on cross-border management that could facilitate trade, movement of people and humanitarian responses.

The question is this: why does Thailand want to be seen courting the UWSA?

Like any other organisations, the UWSA wants acceptance and recognition. Having demonised the group over the years, presenting the Wa as a trusted partner of the Thai government will not be an easy sell. The two sides have had several rounds of face-to-face talks between unit commanders on the ground, but these were not negotiations, as the Thai side did not go there with anything to offer.

Ethnic armed organisations along the Thai border are similarly disturbed by the UWSA southward expansion. These include the Shan State Army-South, the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Karen National Army and the Kawtoolei Army. Wa flags have been planted at locations where the Three Brotherhood Alliance scored victory.

Chinese Presence

The UWSA is presenting itself as a “peacekeeping force” in places like Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State that was captured by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in late June 2024. This current role and newly conquered territories left open the question of what exactly constitutes a Wa state.

Moreover, will this arrangement become permanent and serve as a link between the UWSA in the north on the Chinese border and its southern command on the Thai border?

The UWSA and Chinese officials have always insisted that their relationship is more nuanced and based on mutual interest and respect. Thai security planners, on the other hand, are concerned that the Thailand-Myanmar border could fall under China’s sphere of influence.

Beside the UWSA, Thai authorities are not comfortable with the presence of Chinese law enforcement officers poking around the Tak province and the adjacent areas. These are where militia-protected cyber scam centres operate freely in Myawaddy Township, opposite from the Mae Sot district.

In early 2024, dozens of Chinese police operated out of a resort that they had rented out for months. Royal Thai Police HQ in Bangkok instructed local officers to assist their Chinese counterparts to make their stay worthwhile.

But there was no sharing of intel. The Chinese police handled the investigation all by themselves, including their engagement with the Chinese crime syndicates behind the scam centres in and around the Myawaddy border town, adjacent to Mae Sot.

Things heated up in early February 2025 during the visit of Vice Minister Liu Zhongyi to Thailand. Pressured by China to do something, the government ordered a power cut to several towns on the Myanmar side of the border, including areas where the scam centres were operating.

Similar actions were taken two years ago, but the scam centres made up for it with powerful generators and a Starlink Internet connection.

Falling in Line

This time around, however, sensing that the Thais were serious, Colonel Chit Thu, leader of the 7,000-strong Karen National Army (KNA), the outfit that protects sizeable Chinese crime syndicates in his area, began to make moves. Starting with the press conference on 17 February 2025, he conveyed to Thai journalists that “We will take responsibility for clearing out the call centers in KK Park, Myawaddy, and Shwe Kokko and will send all foreign nationals to Myawaddy.”

“It is then the responsibility of the Myanmar police, as the Naypyidaw central government has sent officers to handle the cases. From the tripartite meeting, each country will take their people back, but how they return, I don’t know,” said Chit Thu.

He added that he was disappointed that some Thai lawmakers were calling for a warrant for his arrest, insisting that he had not broken any law. A number of Western countries beg to differ.

A much smaller outfit, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), responded to Thailand’s request and set a 28 February 2025 deadline for all Chinese scam operators to leave Phayatongsu. This is a DKBA-controlled area (about 133 miles south of Myawaddy) opposite the Three Pagoda Pass of Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province.

On 13 February 2025, the DKBA sent 260 people of various nationalities over the border to Chong Kaeb subdistrict, 76 km south of Mae Sot. The group said another 400 of mostly Africans and South Asians were stranded with them, waiting to be sent to the Thai side of the border where they could link up with diplomats of their respective countries.

“It’s obvious that the DKBA wants to be seen as being helpful to Thailand as they depend so much on us for their survival,” said a Thai police officer with working relations with this Karen outfit.

The DKBA controlled an area opposite from the Chong Kaeb subdistrict where several casinos had been operating until Chinese scam centres moved in this past year. Obviously, however, the DKBA weighed the two options – income from the Chinese scam centres vs a long-standing relationship with Thailand – and the latter made more sense for the outfit’s survivability. The KNA’s Chit Thu, on the other hand, is still holding out, weighing his next move carefully. If the history of this rugged region tells us anything, it is that the leaders and warlords of the Golden Triangle know how to compromise if the conditions and situations are right. They may not rush to the negotiation table, as seen by Panghsang not being too eager to resolve the border dispute with Thailand. Yet it does not mean they are unwilling to make compromises.

https://stratsea.com/bordered-by-history-tension-in-the-thailand-myanmar-frontier-part-ii/

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Myanmar's mighty narco armies refuse to surrender the fight

The ceasefire deal being signed today with ethnic rebels will not cover the badlands bordering Thailand

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

The nationwide ceasefire agreement set to be signed today by the Myanmar government and eight ethnic armed groups has thrown a spotlight on notorious rebel groups who have refused to make peace.

Thai border security officials who monitor insurgency activity in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle say they are not surprised that the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which is still at war with the Myanmar government, are refusing to sign the peace agreement.

Wa soldiers in Panghsang, UWSA's HQ. Photo by: DON PATHAN

With 20,000-strong combat force plus reserves, the UWSA refuses to be placed in the same category as far smaller armed ethnic groups, who are not in a position to dictate terms to the government.

Moreover, reports that China is meddling in the ceasefire talks suggest the giant communist neighbour wants to maintain its dominant longstanding influence over the Wa, said one officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The UWSA inked a ceasefire deal with the Myanmar government in 1989 but it had virtually no impact on the group's relations with China, its main backer.

Armed Wa rebels served as China's entry point into Myanmar during the days of communist insurgency, when they acted as foot soldiers for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The CPB fell apart along ethnic lines in 1989.

The Wa State Army came into being in the aftermath of the CPB's disintegration, with a vow to keep on fighting for another 10 years.

Fearing that the UWSA would forge alliances with neighbouring rebel groups such as the Karen National Union, Myanmar's security tsar, Lt-General Khin Nyunt, moved quickly to secure a ceasefire.

In exchange for agreeing to sign, the UWSA was permitted self-rule in the so-called Special Region 2. Other groups operating in areas adjacent to the UWSA stronghold - the Kokang Chinese and the Mong La group - were given similar semi-autonomous status.

While the ceasefire with these groups halted military confrontations, it also allowed the ethnic armies to grow both militarily and economically. The trade of choice for these groups was, of course, opium.

Barely had the ink on the ceasefire deal dried when clandestine factories brewing high-grade heroin began to pop up in remote areas controlled by the narco-armies.

Government efforts at getting the Wa to kick the habit in 2001 didn't do much good, even with Thailand's help.

In a strange twist of diplomacy, the Thaksin Shinawatra administration was working with Rangoon to set up the Yongkha Development Project in UWSA-controlled territory near the Thai border. It was supposed to be a comprehensive crop-substitution project for Wa villagers who had been forcibly relocated from the China-Myanmar border in the late 1990s.

The Thai government injected Bt20 million into the project with the hope that others in the international community would follow. But the world knew that Thai and US authorities had already convicted half a dozen Wa leaders on charges of heroin trafficking, so no funds were forthcoming.

The USWA declaration that it would end opium cultivation in June 2005 didn't fool anybody. The Wa army was already churning out methamphetamine (yaba), which was flooding into Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.

Bao Yu-xiang (left) , chairman of the UWSA, with Don Pathan
centre) in Panghsang, Wa's capital on the Sino-Burma border, 2003.

Not only had Thaksin failed to whitewash the UWSA through the development project, his efforts had also angered many in the Thai military, whose Third Army Area troops were engaged in frequent skirmishes with Wa drug caravans along the border.

For China, the UWSA presence along the Thai border was an opportunity to extend its long reach even further. But the Thai military and security agencies were not willing to let bygones be bygones and refused to play along.

Reeling from the flood of drugs into the country, Bangkok was further humiliated when top Wa commander Wei Hsueh-kang escaped after being granted bail on drug trafficking charges by a Thai court. So upset was Washington that it decided to raise the bounty for his capture to US$2 million. Nevertheless, Wei continues to control one of the three UWSA regiments near the Thai border.

Though security tsar Khin Nyunt tried hard to build on the ceasefire with the UWSA, the Wa leaders continue to enjoy strong ties with Chinese authorities in Yunnan.

UWSA-owned casinos on the border with Yunnan province are open 24 hours a day, even though gambling is illegal. Cars with Wa licence plates travel deep inside Yunnan freely, while Wa leaders can be seen walking in and out of banks there with wads of dollars.

Nay Pyi Taw officials visiting UWSA-controlled Special Region 2 often quip that the area seems more like an extension of China than a semi-autonomous region of Myanmar. The preferred choice of currency and cellphone or landline operators add to that impression.

Meanwhile, credible reports that China is selling weapons, including helicopters and surface-to-air missiles, to the UWSA are keeping a spotlight on longstanding relations that Chinese officials would prefer not to talk about.

Myanmar is well aware of the strong ties between Chinese authorities and rebel groups like the Kokang, Kachin and the Wa. But they also feel that these relations should not come at the expense of national security.

To show the Chinese that they mean business, Myanmar troops attacked the Kokang in August 2009, forcing thousands of Chinese citizens to flee back over the border.

Ousted Kokang leaders also took refuge in China and used Wa-controlled territory to regroup.

Thai officials believe Myanmar will refrain from using military means to force the Wa to comply and come under the command of the country's army. Indirect pressure, such as the need to integrate economically with the rest of Myanmar, will be the main factor that pushes the UWSA closer to the state, they say.

Meanwhile the so-called nationwide ceasefire agreement will be signed with only about half of the 15 groups the government has been negotiating with over the past couple of years. For President Thein Sein, who wants to cement a legacy as the leader who ended decades of civil war - in which he himself played a battlefield role - this is not the ideal scenario.

Major rebel powers like the Wa and their allies, the Mong La and the Kokang, will have to be engaged with on their on terms, in separate negotiations.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and consultant based in Thailand.

Chickens come home to roost in Myanmar

The Nation 

The government is blaming ethnic rebels for instigating battles on the Chinese border, but its own murky role in this longstanding conflict cannot be ignored

Fighting between Myanmar troops and rebels on the northern border with China has yet to subside and a political solution is nowhere in sight after the central government placed the region under army control for the next three months.

The fighting erupted 11 days ago in Kokang region and has so far claimed the lives of about 50 Myanmar army soldiers and 30 rebels.

Meanwhile a Red Cross convoy on a mission to help civilians displaced by the fighting came under attack, resulting in injuries to several of its personnel. As expected, each side is blaming the other for the attack on the aid workers.

As is often the case with conflict, it's easier to point fingers than to address the underlying causes.

The central government is blaming the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) for instigating the latest round of fighting.

But the roots of the conflict lie in the previous round, five years ago, when the Myanmar military launched an all-out offensive against the ethnic-Chinese MNDAA and ousted its leader, Peng Jiasheng. The motivations for that action remain murky and certainly contradict any claim that the government side is an "innocent victim".

The MNDAA is among the several ethnic rebel armies that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government of Myanmar, also known as Burma, since 1989.

In exchange, the MNDAA and fellow rebel groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) were granted a degree of autonomy to run affairs in their respective regions. Like the Wa, the MNDAA were part of the Communist Party of Burma insurgency network, an outfit that fell apart in 1989.

But in 2009, after two decades of ceasefires, it became clear that none of these groups was willing to disband its army and submit to the authority of the government's Border Guard Forces. So the central government decided to teach them all a lesson by focusing its ire on the Kokang's MNDAA. The group is much smaller and doesn't have the firepower of rebel armies like the 30,000-strong UWSA.

And so, in August 2009, Myanmar reneged on its two-decade-old ceasefire agreement and sent troops into the semi-autonomous Kokang, ousting its leader Peng and replacing him with its own proxy. Now, six years later, Peng has made good on his promise to return to retake the territory from government troops.

For Myanmar - and especially for current army chief Min Aung Hlaing, who led the assault that ousted Peng in 2009 - this is a case of chickens coming home to roost. And, in the rugged hills of the Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps, the payback can be brutal.

For the past five years Peng has sought dialogue with Myanmar top brass in a bid to return to power, but they weren't interested in listening to what he had to say. He certainly has their attention now, but it's still not clear whether they are willing to sit down with him, given they were the ones who violated the 1989 ceasefire.

The government claims it ousted Peng because his army traded in drugs. That claim seems hollow when you consider that the state has neglected to tackle the many other drug-dealing groups in the Golden Triangle.

Naturally, Beijing is concerned that the conflict raging on its border might affect its relations with Myanmar, which extend to huge investments and strategic interest. Many of the Golden Triangle's warlords are former Communist Party of China proxies and maintain links with their old masters. But there is no solid evidence to support rumours that China is supporting Peng in this latest conflict.

While the warlords retain personal ties with the Chinese leadership, to suggest they have the power to shape bilateral relations is far-fetched.

Talk of reopened border stirs bad memories for army

By Don Pathan
The Nation

A mobile unit from the Foreign Ministry recently visited the northern border to check on a request from the business sector about opening up a couple of border passes linking Thailand with Myanmar's Shan State.

The argument is that the passes would help promote cross-border trade and boost the local economy. It was also reported that the Third Army Area was not exactly thrilled with the idea for fear it could boost drug traffic coming from the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle.

On the surface, the Third Army Area has reason for concern. A sizeable chunk of the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle is controlled by armed ethnic groups and warlords with either peace or cease-fire agreements with the government of Myanmar.

But given the fact that the Thai-Myanmar border is so porous, it wouldn't make sense to send drug caravans through the proposed checkpoints likely to be manned by security officials.

One of the crossings local businessmen would like to reopen is, of course, at San Thon Doo in Chiang Rai. It leads to Muang Yawn, one of the strongholds of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-strong outfit that produces some of the world's finest heroin. The Wa also floods the streets of Bangkok and other major cities around Southeast Asia with millions of methamphetamine tablets.

Perhaps the question to ask is: who would benefit the most from these proposed border crossings should the government give the green light for them to be reopened? In the mid-1990s, local businesses were using the same argument - about the need for more cross-border trade, and so on. They bypassed the Army and went straight to the National Security Council (NSC) who was authorised by local officials to set up a border crossing, but with a limited capacity. But that was all that was needed - just enough so they could transport their trucks, tractors, and other heavy machinery to help build towns in the UWSA-controlled areas.

All the while, Thai soldiers on the border were not at all comfortable with the idea that Thai citizens were having so many business dealings with the Wa, much less the fact that the outfit had set up three regiments along the common border. The Thai Army and the UWSA already had uneasy relations. Soldiers from both sides would play volleyball almost on a daily basis at the Sun Thon Doo crossing but kept their firearms within reach.

The three Wa regiments were in areas once occupied by the Mong Tai Army (MTA), an outfit under the control of the late Shan opium warlord Khun Sa. One of the regiments is today commanded by a notorious warlord, Wei Hsueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese with a US$2 million (Bt62 million) reward from the United States on his head.

The UWSA helped the Myanmar army defeat the MTA in 1997. But instead of returning to their stronghold along the Sino-Myanmar border, the UWSA stayed put and built new towns - with the help of Thai contractors.

The turning point for the Thai-UWSA relationship came one morning in February 1999 when authorities found nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai's Fang district beaten to death, with their hands tied behind their backs.

Some authorities believed the gruesome murders were the result of a drug-deal gone wrong, while the locals insisted the victims were innocent villagers out on a hunting trip. In the final analysis, all fingers pointed to the newly built Mong Yawn, a southern stronghold of the UWSA, about 20 kilometres from the Thai northern border, inside Shan State.

Local media played up the stories, and the military and police came out in force blasting the UWSA. A curfew was imposed in a number of districts in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai visited San Thon Doo checkpoint. Sealing off the border crossing that leads directly to the UWSA stronghold seemed a logical move.

For the Thai soldiers along the border, the new anti-UWSA policy meant their daily volleyball game with the Wa troops had to come to an end. For the Thai nationals who had business dealings with the Wa, the closure of the Son Thon Doo crossing meant alternative routes would have to be found. The call for a border checkpoint in nearby Baan San Maket in Chiang Rai was quickly shot down by the NSC, the very organisation that approved the opening of the Son Thon Doo crossing just a year ago in earlier 1998.

Thai businessmen turned to the Mae Sai-Tachilek border crossing in Chiang Rai to transport their goods to Mong Yawn, while a number of Thai workers began to use the Kok River to travel back and forth to their work sites. The final move came in August 1999 when the NSC declared the UWSA-controlled area off-limits and ordered all Thai nationals and construction companies to return home.

The UWSA desired an entrance into Thailand more than anything. The drug army wanted to befriend Thailand because it does not want to rely solely on China as its only window to the world. The Wa didn't trust Myanmar in spite of signing a cease-fire agreement with it in 1989. In other words, the Wa wanted to diversify their relationships. Pretty ambitious, indeed, for a drug army many of whom were head-hunters just a generation ago.

But the aftermath of the Fang massacre heightened the hostility between the two sides that would turned into a full blown battle. In March 2002 an advance unit was dispatched to Chiang Mai's Wiang Haeng district as part of routine security details to prepare for the visit of HM the Queen of Thailand, who was due to arrive later in the day.

But out of the blue, a Wa drug caravan slithering through Thai territory was intercepted by HM's security details. A firefight went on for four hours, ending with the death of a Thai soldier. Her Majesty was advised to remain in her palace in Chiang Mai.

For the Thai Army, the clash was not just another border skirmish with another Wa drug caravan. The fact that the Queen could not travel freely in her own kingdom was a deep affront to the soldiers. Again, all fingers pointed to the UWSA. It was generally agreed the pro-Myanmar outfit had to be taught a lesson.

Two months later in a pre-dawn raid in May 20, 2002, Thai infantry units and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) supported by light and heavy artillery launched an all-out offensive to take out positions manned by the UWSA.

The APCs, along with soldiers from Special Forces units, cavalry squadrons and artillery units, had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son provinces in the past weeks to await instruction. It was supposed to be a military training exercise, the Surasri 143. Few had thought from the onset this field exercise would turn out to be one of the biggest military operations since the Vietnam War.

The battles took place well within Myanmar's territory and went on throughout the day. Artillery fire supported the advancing Thai soldiers carrying out search-and-destroy missions against the UWSA's drug labs and military outposts just kilometres inside the Myanmar border. At the Kiw Pha Wok border checkpoint in Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao district, hundreds of Thai villagers fled deeper inside the country and took refuge at a nearby Buddhist temple until it was safe to return to their villages in a day or two.

The following day, Yangon protested "in the strongest possible terms that the unprovoked attack violated our sovereignty and territorial integrity". Then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was speechless but the Thai Army insisted Surasri 143 was just a military exercise.

The Myanmar Army held a press conference condemning the Thai military action and made reference to Thailand as "Ayothaya" - to remind the Thai nation of a past that Thailand didn't want to remember. Bilateral ties went into a tailspin and it would be some time before some form of normalcy returned to the border.

Talk of reopened border stirs bad memories for army

Don Pathan
The Nation

A mobile unit from the Foreign Ministry recently visited the northern border to check on a request from the business sector about opening up a couple of border passes linking Thailand with Myanmar's Shan State.

The argument is that the passes would help promote cross-border trade and boost the local economy. It was also reported that the Third Army Area was not exactly thrilled with the idea for fear it could boost drug traffic coming from the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle.

On the surface, the Third Army Area has reason for concern. A sizeable chunk of the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle is controlled by armed ethnic groups and warlords with either peace or cease-fire agreements with the government of Myanmar.

But given the fact that the Thai-Myanmar border is so porous, it wouldn't make sense to send drug caravans through the proposed checkpoints likely to be manned by security officials.

One of the crossings local businessmen would like to reopen is, of course, at San Thon Doo in Chiang Rai. It leads to Muang Yawn, one of the strongholds of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-strong outfit that produces some of the world's finest heroin. The Wa also floods the streets of Bangkok and other major cities around Southeast Asia with millions of methamphetamine tablets.

Perhaps the question to ask is: who would benefit the most from these proposed border crossings should the government give the green light for them to be reopened? In the mid-1990s, local businesses were using the same argument - about the need for more cross-border trade, and so on. They bypassed the Army and went straight to the National Security Council (NSC) who was authorised by local officials to set up a border crossing, but with a limited capacity. But that was all that was needed - just enough so they could transport their trucks, tractors, and other heavy machinery to help build towns in the UWSA-controlled areas.

All the while, Thai soldiers on the border were not at all comfortable with the idea that Thai citizens were having so many business dealings with the Wa, much less the fact that the outfit had set up three regiments along the common border. The Thai Army and the UWSA already had uneasy relations. Soldiers from both sides would play volleyball almost on a daily basis at the Sun Thon Doo crossing but kept their firearms within reach.

The three Wa regiments were in areas once occupied by the Mong Tai Army (MTA), an outfit under the control of the late Shan opium warlord Khun Sa. One of the regiments is today commanded by a notorious warlord, Wei Hsueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese with a US$2 million (Bt62 million) reward from the United States on his head.

The UWSA helped the Myanmar army defeat the MTA in 1997. But instead of returning to their stronghold along the Sino-Myanmar border, the UWSA stayed put and built new towns - with the help of Thai contractors.

The turning point for the Thai-UWSA relationship came one morning in February 1999 when authorities found nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai's Fang district beaten to death, with their hands tied behind their backs.

Some authorities believed the gruesome murders were the result of a drug-deal gone wrong, while the locals insisted the victims were innocent villagers out on a hunting trip. In the final analysis, all fingers pointed to the newly built Mong Yawn, a southern stronghold of the UWSA, about 20 kilometres from the Thai northern border, inside Shan State.

Local media played up the stories, and the military and police came out in force blasting the UWSA. A curfew was imposed in a number of districts in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai visited San Thon Doo checkpoint. Sealing off the border crossing that leads directly to the UWSA stronghold seemed a logical move.

For the Thai soldiers along the border, the new anti-UWSA policy meant their daily volleyball game with the Wa troops had to come to an end. For the Thai nationals who had business dealings with the Wa, the closure of the Son Thon Doo crossing meant alternative routes would have to be found. The call for a border checkpoint in nearby Baan San Maket in Chiang Rai was quickly shot down by the NSC, the very organisation that approved the opening of the Son Thon Doo crossing just a year ago in earlier 1998.

Thai businessmen turned to the Mae Sai-Tachilek border crossing in Chiang Rai to transport their goods to Mong Yawn, while a number of Thai workers began to use the Kok River to travel back and forth to their work sites. The final move came in August 1999 when the NSC declared the UWSA-controlled area off-limits and ordered all Thai nationals and construction companies to return home.

The UWSA desired an entrance into Thailand more than anything. The drug army wanted to befriend Thailand because it does not want to rely solely on China as its only window to the world. The Wa didn't trust Myanmar in spite of signing a cease-fire agreement with it in 1989. In other words, the Wa wanted to diversify their relationships. Pretty ambitious, indeed, for a drug army many of whom were head-hunters just a generation ago.

But the aftermath of the Fang massacre heightened the hostility between the two sides that would turned into a full blown battle. In March 2002 an advance unit was dispatched to Chiang Mai's Wiang Haeng district as part of routine security details to prepare for the visit of HM the Queen of Thailand, who was due to arrive later in the day.

But out of the blue, a Wa drug caravan slithering through Thai territory was intercepted by HM's security details. A firefight went on for four hours, ending with the death of a Thai soldier. Her Majesty was advised to remain in her palace in Chiang Mai.

For the Thai Army, the clash was not just another border skirmish with another Wa drug caravan. The fact that the Queen could not travel freely in her own kingdom was a deep affront to the soldiers. Again, all fingers pointed to the UWSA. It was generally agreed the pro-Myanmar outfit had to be taught a lesson.

Two months later in a pre-dawn raid in May 20, 2002, Thai infantry units and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) supported by light and heavy artillery launched an all-out offensive to take out positions manned by the UWSA.

The APCs, along with soldiers from Special Forces units, cavalry squadrons and artillery units, had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son provinces in the past weeks to await instruction. It was supposed to be a military training exercise, the Surasri 143. Few had thought from the onset this field exercise would turn out to be one of the biggest military operations since the Vietnam War.

The battles took place well within Myanmar's territory and went on throughout the day. Artillery fire supported the advancing Thai soldiers carrying out search-and-destroy missions against the UWSA's drug labs and military outposts just kilometres inside the Myanmar border. At the Kiw Pha Wok border checkpoint in Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao district, hundreds of Thai villagers fled deeper inside the country and took refuge at a nearby Buddhist temple until it was safe to return to their villages in a day or two.

The following day, Yangon protested "in the strongest possible terms that the unprovoked attack violated our sovereignty and territorial integrity". Then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was speechless but the Thai Army insisted Surasri 143 was just a military exercise.

The Myanmar Army held a press conference condemning the Thai military action and made reference to Thailand as "Ayothaya" - to remind the Thai nation of a past that Thailand didn't want to remember. Bilateral ties went into a tailspin and it would be some time before some form of normalcy returned to the border.

Talk of reopened border stirs bad memories for army

Don Pathan
The Nation

A mobile unit from the Foreign Ministry recently visited the northern border to check on a request from the business sector about opening up a couple of border passes linking Thailand with Myanmar's Shan State.

The argument is that the passes would help promote cross-border trade and boost the local economy. It was also reported that the Third Army Area was not exactly thrilled with the idea for fear it could boost drug traffic coming from the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle.

Wa opium farmers on the outskirts of Panghsang (Pathan-2003)

On the surface, the Third Army Area has reason for concern. A sizeable chunk of the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle is controlled by armed ethnic groups and warlords with either peace or cease-fire agreements with the government of Myanmar.

But given the fact that the Thai-Myanmar border is so porous, it wouldn’t make sense to send drug caravans through the proposed checkpoints likely to be manned by security officials.

One of the crossings local businessmen would like to reopen is, of course, at San Thon Doo in Chiang Rai. It leads to Muang Yawn, one of the strongholds of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-strong outfit that produces some of the world’s finest heroin. The Wa also floods the streets of Bangkok and other major cities around Southeast Asia with millions of methamphetamine tablets.

Perhaps the question to ask is: who would benefit the most from these proposed border crossings should the government give the green light for them to be reopened? In the mid-1990s, local businesses were using the same argument – about the need for more cross-border trade, and so on. They bypassed the Army and went straight to the National Security Council (NSC) who was authorised by local officials to set up a border crossing but with a limited capacity. But that was all that was needed – just enough so they could transport their trucks, tractors, and other heavy machinery to help build towns in the UWSA-controlled areas.

All the while, Thai soldiers on the border were not at all comfortable with the idea that Thai citizens were having so many business dealings with the Wa, much less the fact that the outfit had set up three regiments along the common border. The Thai Army and the UWSA already had uneasy relations. Soldiers from both sides would play volleyball almost on a daily basis at the Sun Thon Doo crossing but kept their firearms within reach.

The three Wa regiments were in areas once occupied by the Mong Tai Army (MTA), an outfit under the control of the late Shan opium warlord Khun Sa. One of the regiments is today commanded by a notorious warlord, Wei Hsueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese with a US$2 million (Bt62 million) reward from the United States on his head.

The UWSA helped the Myanmar army defeat the MTA in 1997. But instead of returning to their stronghold along the Sino-Myanmar border, the UWSA stayed put and built new towns – with the help of Thai contractors.

The turning point for the Thai-UWSA relationship came one morning in February 1999 when authorities found nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death, with their hands tied behind their backs.

Some authorities believed the gruesome murders were the result of a drug deal gone wrong, while the locals insisted the victims were innocent villagers out on a hunting trip. In the final analysis, all fingers pointed to the newly built Mong Yawn, a southern stronghold of the UWSA, about 20 kilometres from the Thai northern border, inside Shan State.

Local media played up the stories, and the military and police came out in force blasting the UWSA. A curfew was imposed in a number of districts in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai visited San Thon Doo checkpoint. Sealing off the border crossing that leads directly to the UWSA stronghold seemed a logical move.

For the Thai soldiers along the border, the new anti-UWSA policy meant their daily volleyball game with the Wa troops had to come to an end. For the Thai nationals who had business dealings with the Wa, the closure of the Son Thon Doo crossing meant alternative routes would have to be found. The call for a border checkpoint in nearby Baan San Maket in Chiang Rai was quickly shot down by the NSC, the very organisation that approved the opening of the Son Thon Doo crossing just a year ago in earlier 1998. 

Thai businessmen turned to the Mae Sai-Tachilek border crossing in Chiang Rai to transport their goods to Mong Yawn, while a number of Thai workers began to use the Kok River to travel back and forth to their work sites. The final move came in August 1999 when the NSC declared the UWSA-controlled area off-limits and ordered all Thai nationals and construction companies to return home.

The UWSA desired an entrance into Thailand more than anything. The drug army wanted to befriend Thailand because it does not want to rely solely on China as its only window to the world. The Wa didn’t trust Myanmar in spite of signing a cease-fire agreement with it in 1989. In other words, the Wa wanted to diversify their relationships. Pretty ambitious, indeed, for a drug army many of whom were head-hunters just a generation ago.

But the aftermath of the Fang massacre heightened the hostility between the two sides that would turned into a full blown battle. In March 2002 an advance unit was dispatched to Chiang Mai’s Wiang Haeng district as part of routine security details to prepare for the visit of HM the Queen of Thailand, who was due to arrive later in the day.

But out of the blue, a Wa drug caravan slithering through Thai territory was intercepted by HM’s security details. A firefight went on for four hours, ending with the death of a Thai soldier. Her Majesty was advised to remain in her palace in Chiang Mai.

For the Thai Army, the clash was not just another border skirmish with another Wa drug caravan. The fact that the Queen could not travel freely in her own kingdom was a deep affront to the soldiers. Again, all fingers pointed to the UWSA. It was generally agreed the pro-Myanmar outfit had to be taught a lesson.

Two months later in a pre-dawn raid in May 20, 2002, Thai infantry units and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) supported by light and heavy artillery launched an all-out offensive to take out positions manned by the UWSA.

The APCs, along with soldiers from Special Forces units, cavalry squadrons and artillery units, had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son provinces in the past weeks to await instruction. It was supposed to be a military training exercise, the Surasri 143. Few had thought from the onset this field exercise would turn out to be one of the biggest military operations since the Vietnam War.

The battles took place well within Myanmar’s territory and went on throughout the day. Artillery fire supported the advancing Thai soldiers carrying out search-and-destroy missions against the UWSA’s drug labs and military outposts just kilometres inside the Myanmar border. At the Kiw Pha Wok border checkpoint in Chiang Mai’s Chiang Dao district, hundreds of Thai villagers fled deeper inside the country and took refuge at a nearby Buddhist temple until it was safe to return to their villages in a day or two.

The following day, Yangon protested “in the strongest possible terms that the unprovoked attack violated our sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was speechless but the Thai Army insisted Surasri 143 was just a military exercise.

The Myanmar Army held a press conference condemning the Thai military action and made reference to Thailand as “Ayothaya” – to remind the Thai nation of a past that Thailand didn’t want to remember. Bilateral ties went into a tailspin and it would be some time before some form of normalcy returned to the border.

BURMA: Mekong incident proves that the Golden Triangle is still volatile

Don Pathan
The Nation

In early 2002, when the Chinese authorities were breaking huge boulders to improve the navigational route between China and northern Laos and Thailand on the Mekong River, local residents and environmentalists were half joking when they said they would be

They were opposed to the Chinese-funded project out of concern that it would affect fish stocks and consequently their livelihood. A series of reefs and rapids would be removed, making it possible for 500-tonne cargo vessels to travel further up and down the river.

But while the Chinese engineers were busy dynamiting the rocks and reefs, the authorities conveniently overlooked one glaring security concern – that the stretch of river between the Chinese border and Thailand’s territorial waters is also the domain of opium warlords and drug armies operating out of the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle.

Prior to the coming of the Chinese cargo ships, the notorious United Wa State Army (UWSA) – dubbed the world’s largest armed drug-trafficking outfit by the US State Department – at one time even set up a small port of its own in the northern Burmese border region. Embarrassed by the Wa’s flag flying high, the Burmese government asked its Wa allies to close the port down, or at least not make it so obvious.

There is always a sense of nervousness – whenever passing through this no man’s land – among those who observe the Golden Triangle’s opium trade and its related ethnic insurgents. But regional integration cannot wait for Burma’s internal conflict to subside, thus, the decision by China to improve the trade link through this area.

Over the years, the authorities and stakeholders have tolerated the banditry and armed robberies that often take place along this route. But earlier this month their worst fears were realised when a group of bandits hijacked two Chinese-flagged cargo vessels and killed 12 people. A 13th person is still missing.

According to the Thai police, a gang run by Nor Kham, a Shan warlord, is thought to be behind the simultaneous hijack attempt that appears to have gone wrong. The incident took place about 20 kilometres from Thai territory.

Most of the victims had been handcuffed, tied and blindfolded. Nearly one million methamphetamine tablets were found on the two cargo ships.

Major General Prakarn Chonlayuth, commander of the Pa Muang Task Force, reportedly said that authorities believe the gang demands protection money. But if any vessels refuse to pay, they will hijack them and use them to transport drugs into Thailand.

Somehow the Task Force was alerted to this incident and sent its men to go after the two ships after they had entered Thai territory in the Chiang Saen district of Chiang Rai province.

The official explanation as to what had taken place, and why so many drugs were on board, has raised more questions than answers.

The drug gangs in the Golden Triangle produce millions of methamphetamine tablets on a weekly basis and tonnes of opium and heroin on a seasonal basis annually. These illicit drugs are usually smuggled into Thailand via the land route. So why would a drug gang that knows the Thai-Burma border area like the back of its hand opt to use this particular strategy and entry point – a security bottleneck – to enter Thailand with hijacked ships with a massive amount of drugs on board.

Were the drugs already on the ships when they left the Chinese port? This wouldn’t make much sense, since the drug armies and warlords in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle operate somewhat freely without interference from the Burmese authorities.

In 1989 the Burmese junta granted the UWSA autonomous status in an area called Special Region 2. Trying to go “legitimate”, the UWSA announced in October 2005 that it would ban opium cultivation in Wa-controlled areas. But the world, with the exception of a hopeful handful of Chinese intelligence and security officials along the Sino-Burma border, paid them no mind because methamphetamines continue to flood out of the region.

Thailand’s Yong Kha Development Project, a crop substitution scheme, launched in Wa-controlled areas near the Thai border in December 2003, was another laughing stock, as no one fell for it. Shortly after that, the US announced more arrest warrants for Wa leaders. It was a big embarrassment for the then Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who permitted himself to be duped by his Burmese counterpart, General Khin Nyunt. The Yong Kha Project did more to whitewash the UWSA – and strengthen Thai-Burmese relations than address the plight and suffering of Wa peasants, or long-term peace and stability.

In the end, none of the piecemeal projects and initiatives worked.

Today, a cloud of uncertainty continues to hang over Burma’s sector of the Golden Triangle, and the river that runs by it, as warlords and drug armies continue to roam freely. If anything, the murder of the 12 Chinese crew members is a reminder of how things can go awfully wrong when officials overlook obvious security concerns.

Like opium and insurgency, development and stability in this rugged part of the world, where warlords and drug armies play for keeps, go hand in hand. Development and regional integration will always hit a snag if the security issue is not addressed in a comprehensive and meaningful way.

Massive refugee influx a worry in all-out conflict

By Don Pathan
The Nation

November 15, 2010

The writing was already on the wall, and so when armed clashes erupted on the Thai-Burmese border, just everybody was saying, “I told you so”.

But few thought the first crack of gunfire would have erupted in Myawaddi, a Burmese border town adjacent to Mae Sot district in Tak province.

Myawaddi fell temporarily under the hand of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), itself a splinter group that broke away from the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1995. But all sides knew that such occupation was symbolic as the rag-tag Karen outfit could not hold onto the seized area.

Fighting between government troops and rebel soldiers also erupted elsewhere. Militia from the Shan State Army-North engaged in sporadic gunfights with government troops in northern Shan state. A similar engagement between the junta and the rebel KNU also took place in areas adjacent to Kanchanaburi.

For months all eyes were on the Sino-Burmese border, where the 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA) were doing everything it could to avoid going to war with the Burmese junta. An all out fight between the Wa and the junta would devastate the entire border arrangement, but it appeared that the Burmese would have liked to “save the best for last”, said a Thai intelligence officer. He added that the junta may have preferred to take out smaller outfits before moving up to challenge the bigger fish.

The Burmese have yet to make their first move and for the time being there is no sign of mobilisation of troops against the Wa stronghold in Panghsang, said a UWSA official on condition of anonymity. He was speaking from the Wa stronghold on the Sino-Burmese border.

Ever since the ouster of former security tsar General Khin Nyunt in October 2004, the relationship between the Burmese government and groups with which it had a ceasefire has taken a turn for the worse.

None of these groups had worked with any other Burmese leader except Khin Nyunt. And with the security tsar removed from the top military line-up six years ago, the ethnic armies had no choice but to deal directly with the junta. But such a task would prove to be virtually impossible as General Muang Aye and Burmese supreme leader General Than Shwe weren’t interested in making any concessions, much less giving the groups an exit strategy.

The ruling State Peace and Development Council’s demand was that these ethnic armies lay down their weapons and transform themselves into the country’s border guards under the direct command of the Tatmadaw.

Some of the small groups had no choice but to swallow their pride, surrender their weapons and take up the border-guards position. But major groups such as the Wa and other major outfits decided they were not going to be a walkover.

These leaders were determined to protect their investments, business interests and their armed outfits all of which they had spent decades putting together. Some of these so-called investments stemmed from, among other things, heroin and opium cultivation, smuggling, logging, gems and fisheries.

Last year’s attack against the Kokang did not only catch Beijing off guard but it was also wake-up call for China. In the past Beijing pretty much allowed the Yunnan government a free hand to deal with the ethnic armies along the Sino-Burmese border. Many of these groups have historical and personal ties with the Chinese authorities dating back to the days of the communist insurgency. UWSA troops, for example, were once foot soldiers of the now defunct Communist Party of Burma.

But that strategic leverage was pretty much shattered when the Burmese junta turned their guns on the Kokang Chinese in August 2009, forcing more than 30,000 refugees to flee across the border. Besides sending a stern message to other ethnic armies, the attack was also a way of telling the Chinese leadership that their friendship with their so-called proxies would not come at Burma’s expense.

China responded by dispatching intelligence officers from Beijing, as well as beefing up border security. Yunnan’s border management and economic interests would have to take a backseat to Beijing’s overall concern, which is centered on Burma’s increasingly important role in its energy security.

China has also tried to mediate between the ethnic armies and the Burmese junta, but all Beijing’s mediation efforts have failed to produce any concrete results. The junta has never seen the Chinese as honest brokers because of the latter’s historical ties with the ethnic armies, which could feel abandoned if Beijing is unable to strike a balance between its needs and the security concern of the rebel outfits.

Besides expanding rapidly into Burma’s hydropower sector, China also has major oil and gas pipelines tapping into the country’s rich gas reserves. Beijing is certainly looking to shorten the transport time of its crude imports from the Middle East and Africa.

Today, a more immediate concern is the possible influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Burma into the Thailand and China if the sporadic gunfights between Burmese soldiers and the ethnic armies turn into an all-out conflict.

Surrendering their command to the junta would mean an end to whatever dream of autonomy they may have, not to mention the lucrative business deals these outfits have along the border. But from where things stand at this point in time, it appeares that these groups are not going down without a fight.

Beijing, meanwhile, is forced to sit back and watch its strategic leverage being shredded to pieces as its proxies dig deeper into the trenches to prepare for a big Burmese offensive.

“The Wa soldiers are doing push-ups every day,” said a Chinese security official monitoring the rugged Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, where opium warlords and ethnic militias play for keeps. “They want to be ready when the fighting breaks out,” he added.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2010/11/15/opinion/Massive-refugee-influx-a-worry-in-all-out-conflict-30142242.html

Conflict flare up in Triangle

SOMETHING IS BREWING in the Burmese corner of the Golden Triangle and it's more than just the chemicals boiling in the clandestine heroin and methamphetamine labs.

DON PATHAN
The Nation
Published on August 31, 2009

Bluffing between the military government and one of the cease-fire groups - the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Chinese Kokang - turned into an armed clash last Thursday. Tens of thousands of residents were sent fleeing to China's Yunnan province, Thai and Chinese officials monitoring the border situation said.

With the help of Burmese government troops, Kokang's stronghold Laogai has now come under a splinter group led by the MNDAA's second in command, Bai Souqian, who broke away with about 200 troops, who accounted for 20 per cent of the outfit's total troop strength.

"It's a classical divide-and-conquer tactic. This is not the first time that the Burmese junta has done this," said a senior Thai Army officer on the border who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In response, MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng has dispatched a small outfit to carry out hit-and-run attacks against a Burmese outpost near the Kokang capital of Laogai and pockets manned by Burmese government troops.

Peng has also reportedly secured the support of other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), Shan State Army-North and Mong La-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), an outfit headed by his son-in-law Lin Mingxian, also known as U Sai Leun. Incidentally, the NDAA, on June 30, celebrated its 20th anniversary of "peace" with the Burmese.

Both Thai and Chinese sources downplayed the so-called military pact between the Kokang and other ethnic armies. Personal connections and common political and security interests aside, mobilising troops to take on the Burmese soldiers is easier said than done.

"It's all about logistics," said the senior Thai Army officer.

"The Burmese have all the holes plugged to prevent any major movement of troops along the border," added a senior officer from Thailand's' Narcotics Control Board.

In spite of the disturbing nature of the development, Chinese officials along the border area say it would not be in the interest of any stakeholder to let the situation escalate out of hand into an all-out war.

Behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts are being taken to minimise the damage before the situation spirals out of control, the Chinese officer said.

But even if the shooting stops, where all sides go from here is anybody's guess. It is undeniable that the two-decades-old cease-fire agreements that were orchestrated by then security chief Lt General Khin Nyunt in 1989 have been effectively shattered.

But for observers of the Golden Triangle, the real aim of this latest development is not to smash the Kokang's hold on Laogai but to send a brutal message to the 20,000-strong UWSA whose members are made up of some very interesting characters. The Wa rank-in-file include opium warlords and head-hunters turned militia. Chinese Red Guards who first entered the areas three decades ago to preach Marxism later discovered that opium was as good as gold, thus the moniker Golden Triangle.

They, too, joined forces with the Wa to seek fortune and glory. Prior to the 1989 cease-fire, Wa foot soldiers formed the largest block within the Communist Party of Burma. And when the CPB broke up in 1989 along ethnic lines, Khin Nyunt quickly neutralised the CPB remnants with a series of cease-fire agreements.

The end of the CPB didn't mean the end of cross-border personal and political ties, however. It means a proxy army has just changed its uniform.

Ever since Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004, the UWSA leadership, as well as other cease-fire groups, have felt that their days were numbered. Almost five years later, their worst fear came true. Their two-decades-old cease-fire has effectively crumbled.

"Picking on the much smaller Kokang reflects the old Thai saying of 'slit the chicken's throat to scare the monkeys'," said a Thai intelligence officer. The monkeys in this case are of course the Wa.

The Burmese junta will continue with its divide-and-conquer tactic, said the Thai Army officer, pointing to the SPDC's relentless drive to split the UWSA. They succeeded in bringing down the Karen National Union in 1994.

The UWSA's geographical foothold in the Golden Triangle resembles that of a dumbbell - with the northern stronghold on the Chinese border, while three regiments are situated near the Thai border. Boa Yuxiang and his brothers control the north while Wei Hsueh-kang and his brothers dominate the south.

The two families can't stand each other but there is an understanding that divided they fall. But that traditional acknowledgement is about to end, said a Chinese official, pointing to the recent mobilising of troops from Wei's Military Region 171 to head to the northern region.

According to the Chinese officer, Wei wants to break away from the UWSA and dispatching troops to Bao's turf is a way of testing the waters. So why can't Wei just announce the breakaway from a distance?

According to Thai and Chinese officials, Wei has been under tremendous pressure from the SPDC to press the UWSA to transform their outfit into a border security guard under the control of the government's army, known as the Tatmadaw. One leverage the SPDC can bring to bear on Wei is that much of his money is invested in Burma while Bao does his banking and money laundering in China.

Since the 1989 cease-fire, Burmese troops were not permitted to enter the territories under the control of these ethnic armies unescorted. In most cases, they had to be disarmed.

Last week's clash was a rude indication that things are about to change. In real terms, this could mean hundreds of thousands of villagers running for their lives to China. Thailand is watching the development closely in case the UWSA's three regiments along its border are drawn into the fight.

For Thailand, it would mean more refugees to look after. For China, it could very well mean the annihilation of an old friendship, namely with the UWSA, whose bonds with the Chinese leadership go all the way back to the days of the communist insurgency.

Loyalty dies hard in the rugged Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps. Some said friendship between the Chinese leaders and their proxies are forever. Apparently, the Burmese junta is saying it's time to part.

Promotion of drug kingpin looms large over wa army's outside relations

Don Pathan
The Nation

Something has got into drug kingpin Wei Hsueh-kang, the notorious opium warlord who controls a sizeable army near Thailand's northern border.

According to Chinese and Thai military sources and others monitoring the notorious Golden Triangle, Commander Wei is hoping he will be selected to the topmost position in the United Wa State Army (UWSA), one of Burma's ceasefire groups responsible for flooding Thailand with methamphetamines and the world with pure-white grade four heroin.

If that happens, Wei would replace ailing UWSA chairman Bao Yu-xiang, who runs the 20,000-strong army out of Panghsang, a small town on the Sino-Burmese border.

The Bao and the Wei families, while part of the UWSA structure, have historically been rivals. But they need each other in order to maintain their bargaining leverage with the Burmese government with whom they entered a cease-fire agreement in 1989.

Wei and his brothers have a firm grip on the Wa troops along the Thai border, an area commonly referred to as the South Wa region, while the Bao siblings control the area along the Chinese border, officially known as Special Region Two.

Since early 2000, Bao has shown signs of being willing to leave the trade, but in exchange for some sort of recognition from the international community, particularly from Thailand.

Bao even ceased opium cultivation in 2005 as a gesture of goodwill. But nobody took him seriously as millions of methamphetamine tablets coming from Wa-controlled areas continued to flood Thailand on a weekly basis. The opium harvest can be monitored by satellite images and quantified accordingly, but that is not the case with the clandestine labs pumping out so-called yaa-baa.

Over the past couple of years, chairman Bao has been in and out of the hospital because of various illnesses. His brother Yu-yee, who used to command a Wa battalion near the Thai border when Wei had a run-in with Burmese Army commander Maung Aye in early 2001, has the potential to replace Bao.

But the extent of his influence in the so-called South Wa region near the Thai border is nothing compared to that of Wei Hsueh-kang and his brothers.

Besides the rivalries between the two families, the UWSA itself is a problem - a global one at that. 

Wei has long been on the list of America's most-wanted criminals ever since an indictment was filed against him in 1993 in the New York Federal Court accusing him of conspiring to distribute heroin to the United States. The US has placed a US$2 million(Bt66.8million) reward on his head. A Thai court sentenced him to death in 1997 on similar charges.

In January of 2005, the year that the UWSA announced it would put an end to its opium cultivation, the US Department of Justice charged seven more Wa leaders - including the three Bao brothers and two of Wei's siblings - with drug trafficking. Thai and Chinese narcotic officials were irked by the move, saying the charges against the Bao brothers really tied their hands.

Prior to the US charges being laid in January 2005, the Thais and the Chinese had been toying with various options in their dealings with the UWSA. While the Chinese saw Bao as someone they could deal with, whether clandestinely or otherwise, the Thai side wanted to pit the two families against one another.

Officials from Thailand's Office of the Narcotics Control Board said they were willing to let bygones be bygones and turn a new leaf in their relations with the UWSA if the organisation quit the drug trade.

This would have been a leap of faith indeed, considering how Wa militias and Thai soldiers have a history of engaging in bloody clashes along the border.

However, Thailand can't compromise on Wei because of legal implications, the officer added. In early 2003, the Thai Army even tried to split the UWSA by negotiating directly with Wei Sai-tang, a Wa commander who, like Hsueh-kang, controls a battalion in the South Wa region near the Thai border.

"Sai-tang was a nationalist and didn't think highly of the 'White Wa' - the Wei brothers. They were called white because they were ethnic Chinese," said a Thai intelligence source who had direct dealings with Sai-tang.

In exchange for parting with the UWSA, the Thai Army would provide Sai-tang's outfit with an economic and military lifeline from Thailand.

In this connection, Sai-tang would cleanse himself of the UWSA's past and effectively become a Thai proxy in the rugged hills of the Golden Triangle, a deadly region where everybody plays for keeps.

But when news got out, Hsueh-kang and Yu-xiang acted quickly. They whisked Sai-tang away from the Thai border and locked him up in Panghsang. He was charged with, among other things, producing illicit

drugs and fake banknotes.

Bao went ahead anyway and tried hard to befriend the international community. He allowed international NGOs to work inside Wa territory and public health and crop substitution projects, and reached out to UN agencies and foreign journalists.

While the Chinese and the Thais were willing to give Bao - not Wei - the benefit of the doubt, Washington didn't care to make the distinction between an opium warlord who wanted to kick the habit and a kingpin who didn't have much to lose.

But with an ailing Bao Yu-xiang's days numbered, the issue of succession has become a hot topic. Thai officials said they could forget about any future talk with the UWSA if Wei takes over. Chinese officials echoed the same sentiment. They said future dealings with the UWSA would be extremely difficult, given the US indictments.

For the time being, all eyes are on Xiao Ming-lien, the deputy chairman of the UWSA. "What's important is that Ming-lien is not on the US Department of  Justice's wanted list," said the Thai military officer. "There would still be some breathing room," he added.

Both sides see Ming-lien as clean. But that, too, could be a problem. Without drugs, Ming-lien has no money. Without money, he has no army.