The Thai-Burmese border has a life of its own

MARCH 28, 2009

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

EIGHT YEARS ago, then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra came into power and vowed to patch things up with Burma’s military government, one of the world’s most condemned regimes.

He tried hard to convince Rangoon of his sincerity even if it meant going against international sentiment, not to mention the Army, which he accused of “over-reacting” in its dealing with a cross-border clash with Burmese forces.

Thaksin, in line with his shoot-from-the-hip nature, said Thailand’s armed forces would end their tacit policy of using Burmese insurgent groups as buffers.

In the same breath, the PM also said aid organisations tending more than 100,000 refugees displaced by fighting in Burma would have to scale down their operations. He said they were interfering with his efforts to normalise ties with the junta.

Thaksin believed that his brand of “personal diplomacy”, backed with promises of development and economic cooperation, would be sufficient to pave the way for a bigger and better future with the junta. And while all that sweet talk about development and assistance was expected, what caught many Burma-watchers’ attention was the word “buffer”.

Apparently loose-lipped Thaksin didn’t know that the insurgency along the Thai-Burmese had a life of its own. How Thailand positions itself in relation to Burma’s insurgency is also a factor that defines this relation.

In 2003, the foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, tried to push through the “Bangkok Process”, a multinational forum to steer Burma towards reform. He succeeded in getting the late Karen leader General Bo Mya and his son Ner Dah to visit Rangoon and map out a blueprint for peace talks, but nothing came of it.

Surakiart’s “road map” was essentially jinxed from the very beginning because the junta did not see Thailand as an honest broker, for obvious reasons.

A tactical retreat was made possible when Burmese prime minister Khin Nyunt announced in August 2003 that the junta’s seven-step reconciliation plan would include a constitutional drafting assembly and general elections by 2010.

One of the unwritten laws along the Thai-Burmese border is that if a rebel army is pro-Rangoon, it can be considered a threat to Thai security. The 20,000-strong United Wa State Army automatically comes to mind.

Likewise, if the outfit is fighting Rangoon for autonomy or secession then it is friendly to Thailand. Groups like the Karen National Union, Shan State Army and Karenni National Progressive Party fall into this category. This law is likely to prevail until security concerns take a back seat to bilateral cooperation. The question is what must be done for both sides to achieve that needed comfort level.

The Thaksin government tried to influence change in Burma by keeping the West at bay but failed. This time around, the Democrat Party, with a track record of being critical of the junta, is suggesting that there is a need to think outside the box.

During his recent visit, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya brought up the issue of these so-called proxies along the border. He was asked by the junta to urge the ethnic rebel armies along the border to join Burma’s seven-step national-reconciliation plan, a process that has been billed a sham by critics.

However, it is not clear what Kasit will do next with regard to this request, which from a historical perspective may be way over his head. A bit of wishful thinking, perhaps, if Thailand thinks it can “mediate” peace talks between the rebels and the junta. Facilitation, on the other hand, is more plausible.

From a bird’s-eye view, the Thai-Burmese border is characterised by its cut-throat politics where rebel leaders, opium warlords, the Thai Army and Burmese generals play for keeps. As long as anyone can remember, armed ethnic groups have always functioned as a buffer between the two nagging neighbours. At the behest of the Thai or Burmese militaries, these ethnic armies do all the dirty work, keeping the hands of their respective overlords clean.

Most of these groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta in exchange for limited self-rule in so-called “special regions” where they grow opium and churn out methamphetamines. Others have chosen legitimate businesses, granting Thai and Chinese businessmen logging and mining concessions along the border.

Burma doesn’t mind if these warlords fatten their wallets with the concession money as long as they remain in the junta’s “legal fold” and do not pose any security threats. Over the past two years, Burma has tried hard to get these groups to hand over their weapons, but success has been very limited.

On the surface, there haven’t been any outbursts along the border between the two sides for a fair while now.

But military officers on the frontline warn against reaching any premature conclusions. The absence of confrontation does not necessarily mean peace, they say. Mistrust still runs high. It is just that the two sides haven’t picked up their guns to display it.

https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/03/28/the-thai-burmese-border-has-a-life-of-its-own/

Peace in the South demands historical recognition

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Published on August 25, 2009

THE Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been working hard to create understanding in the international community, especially in Islamic countries, that the ongoing violence in the Muslim-majority South is not in any way part of the global war on terror. Since January 2004, the violence has claimed more than 3,500 lives.

Over the past seven months, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has made at least four visits to the restive region, accompanying Thai ambassadors and foreign envoys. Recently, he hosted diplomats from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and journalists from Arab countries.

Like those before them, the OIC delegation was taken to Army-run projects where they were greeted by smiling Malay-Muslim villagers, flag-waving children, smiling drug addicts and former insurgents who told them how they had been "misled" into taking up arms against the Thai state and how grateful they are to the government for the chance to redeem themselves.

Across the street from the Sirindhorn army camp in Yala, Fourth Army commander Lt General Pichet Wisaichorn showed off military-run community development projects that include the making of organic fertilisers.

"You are here because you wanted to be here, right?" hollered Pichet.

"Yes!" replied the Malay villagers as they huddled in the shade while curiously observing fellow Muslims who came from as far as Egypt and Oman.

Later in the day, speaking at what could be billed as a "town hall meeting" in a packed mosque in Narathiwat's Sueloh village, Kasit told local Muslims of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's determination to solve the conflict in the deep South. He also reminded them that they have the power to help make this happen if they are willing to put their hearts to it.

Outside the mosque entrance, villagers were whispering among themselves about the June 8 massacre by a group of government-trained village militiamen who fired into a mosque in Joh I Rong district, killing 11 Muslims who were praying at the time. The villagers said they didn't want to embarrass Kasit by confronting him with questions on the issue in front of the foreign dignitaries.

So far the police have issued just one arrest warrant. The leading suspect is Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, a former paramilitary ranger. Whether he turned rogue and took matters into his own hands or is a product of some security unit operating in the region, remains to be seen.

Not far from the Sueloh mosque were about 100 former insurgents who came to greet the delegation during its brief stopover in this highly contested district of Sungai Padi district. They were part of the "Pracha Ruamjai" project. The project combines religious education with civic responsibility for these former rebels who took up arms against the state about two decades ago. Most, if not all, enrolled in the project to clear their names from any possible "blacklist".

It was obvious that these men were not part of the new generation of militants, whose vast network stretches across the Malay-speaking South, and whose members do not appear to be interested in talking to anyone, much less the government of Thailand.

Wherever he went, Kasit told the audience that the current government is committed to peaceful means to resolve the conflict. Together with development funding and political accountability, it is hoped that the foundation for a lasting peace and reconciliation between the Thai state and the Malay-speaking region will be paved.

Kasit briefly touched on the issue of cultural differences, saying that the authorities assigned to the region will be more sensitive towards the local people.

The idea of bringing foreign diplomats to the deep South was to convince them that the problem in the region is not a religious one and that Muslims in the southernmost provinces, like anywhere else in the country, have all the freedom they need to practice their religion.

But it doesn't take an Islamic expert to see that such freedom is self-evident. As pointed out by Muslim clerics here, Muslims in Thailand probably have more freedom to practice their religion than Muslims in Arab countries.

Speaking to the Arab journalists who accompanied him in the region, Kasit, without singling out ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra or dwelling on the root cause of the problem, said past administrations may have employed questionable security tactics that have made the situation worse.

Given Thaksin's all-or-nothing attitude toward the conflict in the deep South, as well as his decision to dissolve certain institutions such as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) - an organisation viewed favourably by the local population - the former premier has often received much of the blame for what has gone wrong in the region.

But while Thaksin's approach to the conflict may have made things worse and driven a bigger wedge between the Patani Malays and the rest of the country, one can't deny the fact that the new generation of militants had been in the making long before he assumed power in 2001.

Like the generation of militants before them, the young men who have been carrying out roadside bombing and ambushes over the past five years grew up under a cultural narrative that is different from the rest of the Thai people. In this case, it is the century-old occupation of the Malay historical homeland by Siamese invaders.

The state's so-called reconciliation process has never seriously addressed the sticky issue of historical mistrust and the ethnocentric nature of Thailand's nation-state building. And so for the time being, the Malays of the deep South are conveniently dismissed as "Thai Muslims". But "Thai" Muslims don't question the legitimacy of the Thai state. It's the Malays of the southernmost border provinces that do.

Trigger-happy troops not the solution

Abhisit cannot win Malay hearts with more guns pointing at heads in the strife-torn South

Editorial
By The Nation

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said on Thursday that he would send an additional 4,000 troops to the plagued deep South to help quell the ongoing insurgency to which there seems no end in sight. Abhisit said the extra paramilitary rangers would work to improve relations between the authorities and the Malay-speaking South, where historical mistrust runs high.
"They will work towards a better understanding with the residents," Abhisit explained, after meeting with top military officials on Thursday.

The PM said the authorities could only maintain the status quo at present. However, he added that this was not enough because there were enough militants around who could still induce a climate of fear in the region.

While it is clear that the insurgents continue to have a capacity to inflict terror among the local population and the authorities, the suggestion that the authorities have succeeded in containing the violence to one geographical area is a bit of a stretch.

It's one thing to say that the militants don't have the capacity, or the desire, to expand their campaign of violence outside the Malay-speaking areas. But it is entirely another to suggest that the troops have been doing such a great job in containing the insurgents to a geographical area.

There are about 60,000 security officials in this highly contested region that was once a Malay homeland before Siam annexed it over a century ago. How will another 4,000 paramilitary rangers help the situation?

If anything, it seems as if Abhisit was just filling the blanks in an unspoken contract created by the Army. A new lease on life has been given to the nearly defunct Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc), and now it is time to make do. The 4,000 rangers, it seems, were just the latest item to go on the dotted line.

Yet how long must we continue this? Didn't Abisit himself once say that the military was not the solution to the trouble in the deep South?

He started off his administration nicely, talking about the return to civilian supremacy by setting up a bureau to administer the Army and the civilians. This bureau was supposed to take its directives from a mini-Cabinet of relevant ministries.

Moreover, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was supposed to be given a legal basis so it didn't have to go through Isoc for funding to carry out projects.

Abhisit also dispatched a high-level delegation that included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and Thai envoys to Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to touch base with clerics, local officials and youth. During the visit, Kasit explained why it was important for the foreign ministry to get involved and become part of the solution. He urged one and all to give this administration a chance and vowed to follow through with more visits to a region that has placed the Kingdom in the spotlight, albeit an unwanted one.

No doubt the first few weeks did indeed bring a breath of fresh air. After listening to the Army's quirky explanation and all sorts of conspiracy theories for the past five years, the initial messages from the new administration were refreshing.

Today, however, some three months into Abhisit's leadership, nobody is talking about a civilian-led bureau, nor has there been an update as to when SBPAC will be let off the Army's leash.

So when we get reports about more troops being sent to the deep South, one can't help but wonder how this is going to win the hearts and minds of the Malays who continue to question the legitimacy of Thai rule in their historical homeland.

Authorities often argue that including more ethnic Malays in these ranger units could ease the tension because they are fluent in the language and culture. Are they expected to feel grateful for this employment opportunity, or is it some kind of sick joke?

Don't our officials know that most of the victims in the deep South are ethnic Malays killed by Malay insurgents who suspect them of spying for Thailand?

As former US president George W Bush once said: "You are either with us or against us." Sadly, this unspoken policy is employed by both the Thai State and the insurgents.

This policy manifested itself in the State employing local Malay Muslims for Bt4,500 a month to serve as their eyes and ears, and then they get told that they should be grateful for what they get? Never mind that 80 per cent of the bureaucrats in the deep South are Buddhists hailing from other parts of the country.

So when the so-called "eyes and ears" get shot in the head, the State is quick to tell the media that so-and-so was killed because he or she was spying for them. See? These Malay Muslim victims are on the side of the State, or so the authorities would like the public to believe.

Are the authorities that desperate for brownie points, or do they just not care about the safety and well being of the victims' families?

The initiatives have not become any more sophisticated, partly because the Thai military personnel and security planners are not the most sophisticated people in the world. Perhaps it's time to bring in people with fresh ideas, not poorly trained rangers with a reputation for being trigger-happy.

It is also time to give the local Malays a real stake in their country, so they too can feel like citizens and not just colonial subjects.

Dear Prime Minister, have you ever heard of social mobility? Try that for a change.

Trigger-happy troops not the solution

Abhisit cannot win Malay hearts with more guns pointing at heads in the strife-torn South

Editorial
By The Nation

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said on Thursday that he would send an additional 4,000 troops to the plagued deep South to help quell the ongoing insurgency to which there seems no end in sight. Abhisit said the extra paramilitary rangers would work to improve relations between the authorities and the Malay-speaking South, where historical mistrust runs high.
"They will work towards a better understanding with the residents," Abhisit explained, after meeting with top military officials on Thursday.

The PM said the authorities could only maintain the status quo at present. However, he added that this was not enough because there were enough militants around who could still induce a climate of fear in the region.

While it is clear that the insurgents continue to have a capacity to inflict terror among the local population and the authorities, the suggestion that the authorities have succeeded in containing the violence to one geographical area is a bit of a stretch.

It's one thing to say that the militants don't have the capacity, or the desire, to expand their campaign of violence outside the Malay-speaking areas. But it is entirely another to suggest that the troops have been doing such a great job in containing the insurgents to a geographical area.

There are about 60,000 security officials in this highly contested region that was once a Malay homeland before Siam annexed it over a century ago. How will another 4,000 paramilitary rangers help the situation?

If anything, it seems as if Abhisit was just filling the blanks in an unspoken contract created by the Army. A new lease on life has been given to the nearly defunct Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc), and now it is time to make do. The 4,000 rangers, it seems, were just the latest item to go on the dotted line.

Yet how long must we continue this? Didn't Abisit himself once say that the military was not the solution to the trouble in the deep South?

He started off his administration nicely, talking about the return to civilian supremacy by setting up a bureau to administer the Army and the civilians. This bureau was supposed to take its directives from a mini-Cabinet of relevant ministries.

Moreover, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was supposed to be given a legal basis so it didn't have to go through Isoc for funding to carry out projects.

Abhisit also dispatched a high-level delegation that included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and Thai envoys to Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to touch base with clerics, local officials and youth. During the visit, Kasit explained why it was important for the foreign ministry to get involved and become part of the solution. He urged one and all to give this administration a chance and vowed to follow through with more visits to a region that has placed the Kingdom in the spotlight, albeit an unwanted one.

No doubt the first few weeks did indeed bring a breath of fresh air. After listening to the Army's quirky explanation and all sorts of conspiracy theories for the past five years, the initial messages from the new administration were refreshing.

Today, however, some three months into Abhisit's leadership, nobody is talking about a civilian-led bureau, nor has there been an update as to when SBPAC will be let off the Army's leash.

So when we get reports about more troops being sent to the deep South, one can't help but wonder how this is going to win the hearts and minds of the Malays who continue to question the legitimacy of Thai rule in their historical homeland.

Authorities often argue that including more ethnic Malays in these ranger units could ease the tension because they are fluent in the language and culture. Are they expected to feel grateful for this employment opportunity, or is it some kind of sick joke?

Don't our officials know that most of the victims in the deep South are ethnic Malays killed by Malay insurgents who suspect them of spying for Thailand?

As former US president George W Bush once said: "You are either with us or against us." Sadly, this unspoken policy is employed by both the Thai State and the insurgents.

This policy manifested itself in the State employing local Malay Muslims for Bt4,500 a month to serve as their eyes and ears, and then they get told that they should be grateful for what they get? Never mind that 80 per cent of the bureaucrats in the deep South are Buddhists hailing from other parts of the country.

So when the so-called "eyes and ears" get shot in the head, the State is quick to tell the media that so-and-so was killed because he or she was spying for them. See? These Malay Muslim victims are on the side of the State, or so the authorities would like the public to believe.

Are the authorities that desperate for brownie points, or do they just not care about the safety and well being of the victims' families?

The initiatives have not become any more sophisticated, partly because the Thai military personnel and security planners are not the most sophisticated people in the world. Perhaps it's time to bring in people with fresh ideas, not poorly trained rangers with a reputation for being trigger-happy.

It is also time to give the local Malays a real stake in their country, so they too can feel like citizens and not just colonial subjects.

Dear Prime Minister, have you ever heard of social mobility? Try that for a change.