Car-bomb in Narathiwat: A wake-up call for Bangkok

EDITORIAL
The Nation

Drama shows that govt claims of progress and a drop in violence are not soundly based

The huge car-bomb that rocked Narathiwat on Friday has cast a cloud over the supposed progress that authorities say they have made over recent months in their fight against insurgency in the far South.

More than 10 people were injured and about 20 shophouses and food stalls damaged by the blast.

For some months now, the government has pointed to the fact that the overall number of violent incidents has dropped by more than 40 per cent compared to the previous year.

But if anything, the Narathiwat car-bomb was a reminder that the number of violent incidents alone is not enough to justify a claim of success or progress.

For the past decade or so the central government has been sounding like a broken record: The insurgents hit us because we are on the right track; the insurgents don't hit us because we are on the right track.

With Thai society largely indifferent to the plight and grievances of ethnic Malays in the southernmost provinces, the government could just about say anything and get away with it.

Over recent months, the authorities have been telling the general public and the world that the number of "green zone" areas is up while the number of troubled "red" zones has dropped.

Superficial attempts to quantify progress are straight out of a warfare textbook. But the conflict in the far South is anything but conventional.

Insurgents, at this point in time, are not out to win geographical space, but mental space. This is a war of hearts and minds - at least at this stage anyway.

And if the current crop of Thai security planners can't understand this point, they should step aside and let people with better understanding of sub-national conflict take over.

It's amazing how the authorities can blindly believe their own propaganda - about how they have won over the hearts and minds of the local people.

Yes, intelligence has improved as more and more moles are being placed in various pockets and communities throughout the region. And they do, every once in a long while, provide information leading to the arrest of suspects.

And of course, forensic science has been stepped up tremendously to help secure convictions. In the past, most suspects would confess to whatever allegations the police made against them - then retract their statement when the case gets to court.

And without concrete evidence, the court has no choice but to let them go. This explained why, until just over a year ago, more than 80 per cent of such cases were thrown out by the courts. People will say anything, it seems, if they are being tortured.

But it would take a lot more than just forensic science and an improved judicial system to secure peace in this highly and historically contested region.

Understanding the root cause is a good start. From that our policy makers could see the difference between the Thai state-constructed narrative and the narrative embraced by the Malays of Patani. Perhaps our leaders could understand why the Malays in Patani refer to them as colonial masters and call themselves colonial subjects.

If we get this far, then we can start talking about what kind of concessions the state is willing to give to the Malays of Patani. But sadly, our attitude to the Malays of Patani has not been that different from the longstanding notion of the "white man's burden" - the duty of colonisers to civilise indigenous people.

The locals may take our freebies and we immediately think they are on our side because they wouldn't bite the hands that feed them.

Well, it has been more than 10 years now - this wave of insurgency - and more than 6,000 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died. It's high time to rethink the whole thing. It is up to us to find a better way to resolve this problem.

Chickens come home to roost in Myanmar

The Nation 

The government is blaming ethnic rebels for instigating battles on the Chinese border, but its own murky role in this longstanding conflict cannot be ignored

Fighting between Myanmar troops and rebels on the northern border with China has yet to subside and a political solution is nowhere in sight after the central government placed the region under army control for the next three months.

The fighting erupted 11 days ago in Kokang region and has so far claimed the lives of about 50 Myanmar army soldiers and 30 rebels.

Meanwhile a Red Cross convoy on a mission to help civilians displaced by the fighting came under attack, resulting in injuries to several of its personnel. As expected, each side is blaming the other for the attack on the aid workers.

As is often the case with conflict, it's easier to point fingers than to address the underlying causes.

The central government is blaming the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) for instigating the latest round of fighting.

But the roots of the conflict lie in the previous round, five years ago, when the Myanmar military launched an all-out offensive against the ethnic-Chinese MNDAA and ousted its leader, Peng Jiasheng. The motivations for that action remain murky and certainly contradict any claim that the government side is an "innocent victim".

The MNDAA is among the several ethnic rebel armies that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government of Myanmar, also known as Burma, since 1989.

In exchange, the MNDAA and fellow rebel groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) were granted a degree of autonomy to run affairs in their respective regions. Like the Wa, the MNDAA were part of the Communist Party of Burma insurgency network, an outfit that fell apart in 1989.

But in 2009, after two decades of ceasefires, it became clear that none of these groups was willing to disband its army and submit to the authority of the government's Border Guard Forces. So the central government decided to teach them all a lesson by focusing its ire on the Kokang's MNDAA. The group is much smaller and doesn't have the firepower of rebel armies like the 30,000-strong UWSA.

And so, in August 2009, Myanmar reneged on its two-decade-old ceasefire agreement and sent troops into the semi-autonomous Kokang, ousting its leader Peng and replacing him with its own proxy. Now, six years later, Peng has made good on his promise to return to retake the territory from government troops.

For Myanmar - and especially for current army chief Min Aung Hlaing, who led the assault that ousted Peng in 2009 - this is a case of chickens coming home to roost. And, in the rugged hills of the Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps, the payback can be brutal.

For the past five years Peng has sought dialogue with Myanmar top brass in a bid to return to power, but they weren't interested in listening to what he had to say. He certainly has their attention now, but it's still not clear whether they are willing to sit down with him, given they were the ones who violated the 1989 ceasefire.

The government claims it ousted Peng because his army traded in drugs. That claim seems hollow when you consider that the state has neglected to tackle the many other drug-dealing groups in the Golden Triangle.

Naturally, Beijing is concerned that the conflict raging on its border might affect its relations with Myanmar, which extend to huge investments and strategic interest. Many of the Golden Triangle's warlords are former Communist Party of China proxies and maintain links with their old masters. But there is no solid evidence to support rumours that China is supporting Peng in this latest conflict.

While the warlords retain personal ties with the Chinese leadership, to suggest they have the power to shape bilateral relations is far-fetched.

Educating the BRN for the sake of peace in deep South

Don Pathan

Special to The Nation
Yala, THAILAND

A hose is trained on the ruins of one of five schools burned down in suspected insurgent attacks in Pattani

With talks set to begin again, the separatists need help forging a political wing

A new Thai negotiating team for the latest round of talks with Patani Malay separatist movements is taking shape as top policymakers enter the final selection stage for the daunting task ahead.

The selection should be finalised by the end of this month, furnishing a team made up of mid-ranking government officials from various agencies and ministries. They include the National Intelligence Agency, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, the ministries of Justice and of Foreign Affairs, the Internal Security Operation Command, and representatives from the Fourth Army Area and the Royal Thai Army.

Former Army chief-of-staff General Aksara Kherdphol was appointed chief negotiator by Prime MinisterPrayuth Chan-o-cha some months ago. Thailand will continue to use Malaysia as the designated facilitator.

There is also a hidden component to the talks - a backdoor channel by which Thai security officials meet face to face with representatives from individual separatist groups without Malaysia's participation. But it is not yet clear how this covert track will complement the official process.

The secret track is expected to address operational issues, such as rules of engagement, while politically charged issues will be confined to the official track.

According to both Thai officials and insurgency sources, the official and the backdoor channel must complement one another, or it would defeat the purpose of having a two-track process. While the official talks will take place in public, negotiations on military matters will be clandestine, they said.

There have already been two such face-to-face backdoor meetings, between senior officers of the Fourth Army Area command and leaders from two long-standing separatist movements. Both were held in December in Indonesia.

But military insiders say the meetings were conducted without the endorsement of Aksara and that any agreement reached could not be honoured. Thailand's dealings with Patani Malay separatist organisations over this past half century have been shaped by mistrust and the inability to honour promises made. No one is certain whether things will be any different this time around.

It is not yet clear who will be leading the secret talks. Sources say the junta might give the job to retired General Akanit Maunsawat, a close personal friend of Premier Prayut.

Akanit was initially tipped to lead the Thai negotiating team but was removed from the line-up because Bangkok did not want to upset Malaysia by appointing him to this high-profile position.

Akanit has in the past made critical statements about Malaysia, accusing the Kuala Lumpur government of being half-hearted towards Thailand's peace initiative in the South.

He said Thailand had worked hard to help Malaysia bring an end to its communist insurgency and was hoping Kuala Lumpur would reciprocate over the Thai insurgency.

Observers said his return to the process - nominally as an "adviser to the government negotiating team" - has not only sent a wrong message to Kuala Lumpur but could very well undermine Aksara's role.

One concern relates to the line of command: It's not clear if Akanit will be accountable to Aksara or report directly to PM Prayuth - or be completely independent and free to speak his mind.

Akanit was the Army's point man in various talks with leaders of the longstanding separatist movements in the 1980s and '90s. Those encounters were treated as information-gathering exercises rather than formal negotiations or meaningful efforts at finding how the Malays of Patani could coexist peacefully with the Thai state. The main separatist group back then was the Patani United Liberation Organisation, or Pulo.

Today, the vast majority of insurgent combatants come under the network of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a secretive group of elders with strong religious credentials.

BRN operatives said the elders are not involved in combat operations but do intervene once in a while when they feel the fighters have strayed too far away from their loosely defined rules of engagement.

Between the elders and the combatants is the political wing, a group of mid-ranking figures, also with considerable religious credentials, who one day hope to be the public face of the BRN.

BRN representatives say the organisation is not interested in joining any peace process because the group gives priority to establishing a recognisable political wing that could represent the movement. There are also other related issues, such as immunity for insurgents and recognition of the group's political wing and negotiators. The group said it is willing to work with members of the international community to achieve this goal.

And if it does work with outsiders in whatever capacity, it would prefer that they be state entities, not local or international NGOs. 

BRN leaders have looked at other separatist organisations, such as the Free Aceh Movement and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and been impressed by their respective political wings.

Observers of the conflict say a political wing is necessary to serve as a buffer for the government in Bangkok. The government needs to be able to say it is dealing not with armed men but with a political group. Moreover, the two sides need to be able to communicate on the same wavelength.

But doing away with the zero-sum-game mentality will not be easy for the Thai military. Thailand's top brass have shown no willingness to make concessions. Observers said the junta just wants the number of violent incidents to drop so it can show the public that it is making headway.

In other words, educating the BRN so the movement can be on a par with its Thai counterpart if and when it enters peace talks is not exactly high on the agenda of the Bangkok administration.

BRN sources say they are well aware that, historically, the Thai Army has never been too thrilled about a formal peace process. They are also aware that the military had no role in the formulation of peace talks launched by the Yingluck government in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013.

The fact that the Army is running the show now has not changed that long-standing attitude. The BRN sees the rebooting of peace talks by the junta as a public relations stunt designed for both domestic and international consumption.

That view is shared by many in the international community, who have observed the developments with keen interest but are still wondering what kind of concessions Thailand is willing to make to the BRN or the Malay-speaking people of the deep South.

One positive for Bangkok is that the number of violent incidents has dropped by about 40 per cent compared to last year. But BRN sources dismiss that statistic, saying their group has succeeded in expanding to new ground - Yala's Betong and Songkhla's Sadao districts - and that they are attacking more meaningful targets and with greater intensity.

The BRN's military capability and activities make it relevant, its representatives said. But whether that capability is enough to convince Thai authorities to relinquish their zero-sum mentality remains to be seen.

But the "great game" has already begun, it seems, as international mediators look to gain entry to the process and secure a seat at the table. With the exception of the BRN, leaders of the longstanding separatist organisations are publishing photos and video of themselves in the public domain, apparently to create an impression that they are part of this contest.

BRN sources say they remain camera shy because they have too much to lose by surfacing at this juncture.

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance consultant based in Yala, Thailand.