Friday 20 February 2015

Chickens come home to roost in Myanmar

The Nation 

The government is blaming ethnic rebels for instigating battles on the Chinese border, but its own murky role in this longstanding conflict cannot be ignored

Fighting between Myanmar troops and rebels on the northern border with China has yet to subside and a political solution is nowhere in sight after the central government placed the region under army control for the next three months.

The fighting erupted 11 days ago in Kokang region and has so far claimed the lives of about 50 Myanmar army soldiers and 30 rebels.

Meanwhile a Red Cross convoy on a mission to help civilians displaced by the fighting came under attack, resulting in injuries to several of its personnel. As expected, each side is blaming the other for the attack on the aid workers.

As is often the case with conflict, it's easier to point fingers than to address the underlying causes.

The central government is blaming the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) for instigating the latest round of fighting.

But the roots of the conflict lie in the previous round, five years ago, when the Myanmar military launched an all-out offensive against the ethnic-Chinese MNDAA and ousted its leader, Peng Jiasheng. The motivations for that action remain murky and certainly contradict any claim that the government side is an "innocent victim".

The MNDAA is among the several ethnic rebel armies that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government of Myanmar, also known as Burma, since 1989.

In exchange, the MNDAA and fellow rebel groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) were granted a degree of autonomy to run affairs in their respective regions. Like the Wa, the MNDAA were part of the Communist Party of Burma insurgency network, an outfit that fell apart in 1989.

But in 2009, after two decades of ceasefires, it became clear that none of these groups was willing to disband its army and submit to the authority of the government's Border Guard Forces. So the central government decided to teach them all a lesson by focusing its ire on the Kokang's MNDAA. The group is much smaller and doesn't have the firepower of rebel armies like the 30,000-strong UWSA.

And so, in August 2009, Myanmar reneged on its two-decade-old ceasefire agreement and sent troops into the semi-autonomous Kokang, ousting its leader Peng and replacing him with its own proxy. Now, six years later, Peng has made good on his promise to return to retake the territory from government troops.

For Myanmar - and especially for current army chief Min Aung Hlaing, who led the assault that ousted Peng in 2009 - this is a case of chickens coming home to roost. And, in the rugged hills of the Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps, the payback can be brutal.

For the past five years Peng has sought dialogue with Myanmar top brass in a bid to return to power, but they weren't interested in listening to what he had to say. He certainly has their attention now, but it's still not clear whether they are willing to sit down with him, given they were the ones who violated the 1989 ceasefire.

The government claims it ousted Peng because his army traded in drugs. That claim seems hollow when you consider that the state has neglected to tackle the many other drug-dealing groups in the Golden Triangle.

Naturally, Beijing is concerned that the conflict raging on its border might affect its relations with Myanmar, which extend to huge investments and strategic interest. Many of the Golden Triangle's warlords are former Communist Party of China proxies and maintain links with their old masters. But there is no solid evidence to support rumours that China is supporting Peng in this latest conflict.

While the warlords retain personal ties with the Chinese leadership, to suggest they have the power to shape bilateral relations is far-fetched.

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