The Nation
A spike in violence in the deep South can be traced directly to the Army's rough reactions to events
The Army’s so-called “Tung Yang Daeng model” – an effort to integrate the operation of the military, villagers and local security into one cohesive unit – is facing a severe test in that Pattani district after back-to-back incidents that illustrated the vulnerability of security units in remote areas.
The first incident came in mid-July, with some 40 insurgents surrounding a police substation and sparking an intense exchange of gunfire.
Road spikes, felled trees and a roadside bomb stalled the reinforcements and an Army helicopter had to be dispatched to the scene. The attack left two soldiers seriously wounded and several more with severe burns after the station was set aflame and razed.
In a routine response, a group of young men from nearby Islamic boarding schools were rounded up and interrogated. Locals said the way they were mistreated set the stage for the second attack, in which insurgents burned down six public schools on October 12, apparently to demonstrate their disapproval of the authorities’ tactics.
The Army billed the arson attacks as a response to its recent arrest of key figures in the insurgency, though no names were mentioned.
In a bid for damage control, “the Tung Yang Daeng model” was conjured up. How this differs from previous attempts to outsource security work to local residents – or try to get villagers involved in security details – is anybody’s guess. It has strong echoes of the so-called “Pentagon II initiative” concocted after a truckload of insurgents killed four soldiers patrolling on motorbikes in Pattani’s Ma-Yor district in July 2012.
That incident was caught on CCTV and broadcast all over the social media. The government of Yingluck Shinawatra had to give the impression that it was in control of the situation, and so units, agencies and people were shifted around to create Pentagon II. And yes, the policymakers said more or less the same thing about how they were going to step up coordination among the security agencies.
This time around, the Army is counting on village protection units as part of the line-up. But the military has tried handing off security duties to the villagers before and knows the results can be disastrous.
Witness, for example, the protest in Tak Bai in October 2004 that led to what many now call a massacre. The protesters were calling for the release of a group of village-defence volunteers who had been accused of handing their weapons to insurgents. The volunteers had said they surrendered the weapons to avoid being slaughtered by a superior force. The military opened fire on the demonstrators and then stacked the survivors in trucks, resulting in 85 deaths, mainly from suffocation.
For some reason the Army continues to believe that residents in the Muslim-majority deep South are obligated to put their lives on the line for the nation, despite the fact that authorities often fail to respect their cultural difference and address their historical grievances.
Perhaps the military needs to look closer to home when it comes to accountability and responsibility for security.
The killing of a Malay Muslim child, 14-year-old Muhammad-Azuwan Sohoh, by a paramilitary Ranger in Narathiwat’s Sri Sakorn district on August 21 is a case in point.
Muhammad-Azuwan’s case deserves attention because investigators discovered that the Ranger involved, Aekapot Samansuan, had shot the boy and then placed a pistol in the victim’s hand to disguise him as an insurgent.
Then, just a week ago, Marines opened fire on a pickup truck at a checkpoint in Hutaeyulo in Narathiwat’s Bacho district, killing 10-year-old Hizula Taemoh and wounding her mother and younger sister. The family was heading to market to sell coconuts.
Once again, the military unit involved tried to portray the victims as insurgents. But this time around, eyewitnesses spoke out and revealed the truth.
Human Rights Watch called on the government to “wake up to the fact that attempts to cover up misconduct of its security units and protect them from criminal responsibility fan the flames of violent reprisals”.
“Insurgents have repeatedly used the impunity of government forces to
justify brutal attacks on civilians,” it said.
Thai security forces in the South must clean up their own house before they can expect others to join in efforts to keep the peace.
DON PATHAN Senior Program Officer for Regional Security Cooperation at The Asia Foundation
Friday 31 October 2014
Wednesday 22 October 2014
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/confronting-ghosts-thailands-shapeless-southern-insurgency
In this Lowy Institute Paper, Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan examine the ongoing violence in the majority Muslim Malay provinces of Thailand’s south. Through unprecedented fieldwork, the authors provide the deepest and most up-to-date analysis of the insurgency and problems the Thai Government faces in dealing with it.
Joseph Chinyong Liow is the Associate Dean at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Don Pathan is a senior reporter at The Nation newspaper in Bangkok.
The Lowy Institute is an independent, nonpartisan international policy think tank located in Sydney, Australia. Ranked as Australia's leading think tank, it provides high - quality research and distinctive perspectives on the international trends shaping Australia and the world.
Wednesday 8 October 2014
New approach to peace efforts offers hope in deep South
By Don Pathan
Bangkok's move to verify militant groups' involvement through back-channel talks could create inclusive process so far lacking
The Thai government is assembling a peace-negotiating team to revive talks with Patani Malay separatist leaders, and this time around, Bangkok wants it to be as inclusive as possible.
Because there are many groups claiming to have command-and-control over the militants, the Thai side would like to meet each of them individually to better assess their involvement in the insurgency.
Some of the longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups welcome face-to-face talks with the Thai military, as these would give them the opportunity to show what they are capable of. Some are prepared to claim responsibility for violent attacks, as well as outline their plans for future action.
Militants say the idea of this "secret track" in negotiations sounds interesting because it opens a way for horse trading, including asking for the release of their members from prison as part of exchanges to be discussed at the table.
One senior official said the idea of individual separatist groups wanting to be credited with their respective activities is understandable and that it's a part of the natural progress of any insurgency towards peace.
Of course, these back-channel meetings will be strictly off the public radar. And for this to work the two sides will have to keep the number of participants very small, with the understanding that there will be virtually no room for bluffing.
Ideally, participants in the backdoor meetings must have some degree of command-and-control over combatants so that they can deliver what is agreed upon. Items on the table may include rules of engagement, establishing a demilitarised zone for certain routes and/or ceasefires for certain areas or occasions.
One member of a longstanding separatist group said his cadres were turned off by the fact that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), an umbrella organisation of separatist combatants, is credited with carrying out virtually all insurgent violence. The back channel, he said, would allow the Thai side to see what his network is capable of.
Others say they are wary of the divide-and-rule nature of this approach. But since there is no real unity among the established separatist groups as they compete among themselves for legitimacy and recognition, such a concern is not that big a deal.
The Army is hoping that the back channel can deliver tangible progress in the deep South, since the current crop of coup-makers needs to show the public quantifiable results.
However, the idea of conducting secret talks with the separatist movements is easier said than done, and both sides say there are obstacles that they will have to overcome for this initiative to succeed. These challenges include getting all the Thai security agencies to agree to a common agenda. In other words, no more turning a blind eye to rogue security units taking matters into their own hands.
As for the separatist side, the problem is a lack of unity, especially among the established groups and their exiled leaders. Like the Thais, they are plagued with longstanding rivalries. And even if the groups unanimously agreed to the idea of a secret track of negotiations, there are plenty of spoilers - drug dealers, smugglers, crime syndicates - with an axe to grind with the security agencies.
As for the official track, Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr has said Malaysia will continue to be the facilitator. The process was launched on February 28, 2013 in Kuala Lumpur with Hasan Taib, a member of the BRN-C, designated as the "liaison".
Hasan threw in the towel late last year after he realised that he could not achieve the task that Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok had set for him, which was to generate enough traction for the process and bring other groups on board.
BRN-C sources and combatants said his role was doomed from the beginning because Hasan never had the support or endorsement of the group's leaders or those actually doing the fighting. A similar lack of cohesion plagued peace efforts by the Yingluck Shinawatra government, which failed to get the Army on board before launching the February 28, 2013 initiative.
The BRN-C source also admitted that the inclusiveness of this new phase adds tremendous pressure for the group to participate in the talks one way or another.
This is not to say that the BRN-C does not want to talk; it just wants to be sure about what it is getting into, because it maintains it has far more to lose than other groups.
Its claims have been echoed by Thai military sources, who said the BRN-C's participation in the process is crucial because the vast majority of the separatist combatants fall under its network.
Meanwhile, Bangkok is in the process of putting a team of negotiators together. This team will report to a policy body made up of various ministries and agencies, with the Army chief as head.
The jury is still out on who will get the job of chief negotiator for the Thai side, though local media point to retired General Akanit Muansawat, a long-time friend of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, as favourite for the position. Akanit has spent much of his career working on the insurgency in the Malay-speaking South.
Rumours of Akanit's possible appointment have generated a great deal of discussion, much of it in the form of criticism, as reflected in recent media reports that quote unnamed exiled separatist sources explaining why Akanit should not get the job. Others have come out in his defence, saying the retired general is a capable person and familiar with the conflict in the southernmost provinces.
"We still have a long way to go before the government appoints a negotiating team and a policy body, not to mention the fact that a sound policy and strategy has yet to be worked out," said a senior Thai Army source.
In what was billed by the Thai military as an attempt to "test the water", Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, head of the longstanding separatist organisation Patani Malay Consultative Congress (MPRMP), recently issued a statement via YouTube announcing the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand.
Wae Hamad, in 2008, led a delegation to Bogor, Indonesia to meet with a representative from Bangkok sent by then-prime minister Samak Sundaravej. Mediated by Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla, the event quickly fell apart after it became public knowledge.
So far, only Akanit's name has been made public as a potential chief negotiator for the Thai side. That it has generated so much heated debate reflects the enthusiasm of the stakeholders and the people who want to be at the negotiating table.
But from the perspective of one BRN-C cadre, "These so-called stakeholders and want-to-be players can debate all they want. If we [the BRN-C] are not part of the process, it will be just a bunch of old men griping about this and that."
Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance security consultant based in Yala.
Because there are many groups claiming to have command-and-control over the militants, the Thai side would like to meet each of them individually to better assess their involvement in the insurgency.
Some of the longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups welcome face-to-face talks with the Thai military, as these would give them the opportunity to show what they are capable of. Some are prepared to claim responsibility for violent attacks, as well as outline their plans for future action.
Militants say the idea of this "secret track" in negotiations sounds interesting because it opens a way for horse trading, including asking for the release of their members from prison as part of exchanges to be discussed at the table.
One senior official said the idea of individual separatist groups wanting to be credited with their respective activities is understandable and that it's a part of the natural progress of any insurgency towards peace.
Of course, these back-channel meetings will be strictly off the public radar. And for this to work the two sides will have to keep the number of participants very small, with the understanding that there will be virtually no room for bluffing.
Ideally, participants in the backdoor meetings must have some degree of command-and-control over combatants so that they can deliver what is agreed upon. Items on the table may include rules of engagement, establishing a demilitarised zone for certain routes and/or ceasefires for certain areas or occasions.
One member of a longstanding separatist group said his cadres were turned off by the fact that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), an umbrella organisation of separatist combatants, is credited with carrying out virtually all insurgent violence. The back channel, he said, would allow the Thai side to see what his network is capable of.
Others say they are wary of the divide-and-rule nature of this approach. But since there is no real unity among the established separatist groups as they compete among themselves for legitimacy and recognition, such a concern is not that big a deal.
The Army is hoping that the back channel can deliver tangible progress in the deep South, since the current crop of coup-makers needs to show the public quantifiable results.
However, the idea of conducting secret talks with the separatist movements is easier said than done, and both sides say there are obstacles that they will have to overcome for this initiative to succeed. These challenges include getting all the Thai security agencies to agree to a common agenda. In other words, no more turning a blind eye to rogue security units taking matters into their own hands.
As for the separatist side, the problem is a lack of unity, especially among the established groups and their exiled leaders. Like the Thais, they are plagued with longstanding rivalries. And even if the groups unanimously agreed to the idea of a secret track of negotiations, there are plenty of spoilers - drug dealers, smugglers, crime syndicates - with an axe to grind with the security agencies.
As for the official track, Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr has said Malaysia will continue to be the facilitator. The process was launched on February 28, 2013 in Kuala Lumpur with Hasan Taib, a member of the BRN-C, designated as the "liaison".
Hasan threw in the towel late last year after he realised that he could not achieve the task that Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok had set for him, which was to generate enough traction for the process and bring other groups on board.
BRN-C sources and combatants said his role was doomed from the beginning because Hasan never had the support or endorsement of the group's leaders or those actually doing the fighting. A similar lack of cohesion plagued peace efforts by the Yingluck Shinawatra government, which failed to get the Army on board before launching the February 28, 2013 initiative.
The BRN-C source also admitted that the inclusiveness of this new phase adds tremendous pressure for the group to participate in the talks one way or another.
This is not to say that the BRN-C does not want to talk; it just wants to be sure about what it is getting into, because it maintains it has far more to lose than other groups.
Its claims have been echoed by Thai military sources, who said the BRN-C's participation in the process is crucial because the vast majority of the separatist combatants fall under its network.
Meanwhile, Bangkok is in the process of putting a team of negotiators together. This team will report to a policy body made up of various ministries and agencies, with the Army chief as head.
The jury is still out on who will get the job of chief negotiator for the Thai side, though local media point to retired General Akanit Muansawat, a long-time friend of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, as favourite for the position. Akanit has spent much of his career working on the insurgency in the Malay-speaking South.
Rumours of Akanit's possible appointment have generated a great deal of discussion, much of it in the form of criticism, as reflected in recent media reports that quote unnamed exiled separatist sources explaining why Akanit should not get the job. Others have come out in his defence, saying the retired general is a capable person and familiar with the conflict in the southernmost provinces.
"We still have a long way to go before the government appoints a negotiating team and a policy body, not to mention the fact that a sound policy and strategy has yet to be worked out," said a senior Thai Army source.
In what was billed by the Thai military as an attempt to "test the water", Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, head of the longstanding separatist organisation Patani Malay Consultative Congress (MPRMP), recently issued a statement via YouTube announcing the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand.
Wae Hamad, in 2008, led a delegation to Bogor, Indonesia to meet with a representative from Bangkok sent by then-prime minister Samak Sundaravej. Mediated by Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla, the event quickly fell apart after it became public knowledge.
So far, only Akanit's name has been made public as a potential chief negotiator for the Thai side. That it has generated so much heated debate reflects the enthusiasm of the stakeholders and the people who want to be at the negotiating table.
But from the perspective of one BRN-C cadre, "These so-called stakeholders and want-to-be players can debate all they want. If we [the BRN-C] are not part of the process, it will be just a bunch of old men griping about this and that."
Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance security consultant based in Yala.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)