Monday 24 September 2001

Forced Withdrawal

Drug users in Mae Sot are finding themselves shunned by the community. It's a tough stand but one that seems to be working. Story The Nation's Don Pathan

A man like Samart Loifah comes around once in a blue moon. People say he is an endangered species - a civil servant who does not sit around and wait to be told what to do by his superiors.

"The top-down approach doesn't work," admitted the enthusiastic Mae Sot district chief, whose crusade against drug abuse has made him one of the most noted Interior Ministry officers in the country.

About two years ago, Samart was transferred from Lampang province to Tak's Mae Sot, where he is now the district chief. With the area becoming an emerging route for more and more illicit drugs coming out of Burma, just across the Moei River, Samart said he was shocked when he realised what lay ahead of him.

When he arrived, Mae Sot district was home to 750 known drug dealers, mostly in methamphetamines, and, it was estimated, more than 1,700 regular users. Samart, whose name means "capable of flying", soon lived up to his name. Under his guidance, the district was able to cut down the number of addicts to 388 and dealers to 147 in just over a year.

Samart said it has long been his goal to empower the local community to take care of its own. The method Samart employed in his war against drugs is commonly referred to as "social sanction".

All the adults in each of the 78 villages in the district are asked to take part in electing a committee to draft a set of rules for all to abide by. Once this is completed, Samart explained, the villagers hold a hearing and vote on anti-drug resolutions to serve as guidelines.

"We make no exception as to who the person is. All must abide by the rules, which the villagers themselves develop," said Khanthiya Srikirisawan, a 30-year-old ethnic Karen woman who is chief of 484-strong Yang Huay Ya-u village in Mae Sot district.

"If [you don't follow the rules], then you become an outcast and are eventually forced to leave the community."

Some of the measures include prohibiting drug dealers or users from using village funds and property, such as tents and utensils, and cutting off water and electricity.

After helping nine opium addicts kick the habit, Khanthiya's village proudly declared itself drug-free in May of this year.

The approach has been tremendously successful in other areas as well, officials and villagers said.

"I couldn't bear the fact that my family and I would become outcasts if I didn't stop doing drugs," said former addict Charoon Thiemphanya, a 27-year-old resident of Mae Khuluang village, also in the Mae Sot district.

If all else fails, said Mae Khunluang Kamnan Lert Kerkham, 58, the person is either forced out of the village or handed over to the police to face legal actions. 

To make sure that the suspected drug users are living a clean life, a urinalysis is carried on a regular basis. One urinalysis kit, which costs about Bt1,000, can be used to test up to 50 people. But money and equipment are hard to come by and the district accepts donations, Samart told a group of foreign journalists during a recent visit organised by the Thai Army's Civil Affairs Department.

Samart dismissed what he called "publicity stunts" staged by the government, such as getting students to drink holy water and pledge that they would not take drugs, or walkathons designed to promote anti-drug efforts.

"These measures don't really do anything because only clean kids show up for these events," Samart said. "What is important is that we stop demonising the people who are addicted to the substances and let them know that people are capable of making mistakes and that there is always room for forgiveness.

"And, of course, the villagers have to carry out urinalyses on a regular basis," he added.

The social-sanction approach employed by the villages in Mae Sot district, said Samart, starts off by emphasising compassion and understanding, not condemnation.

Ko Koh, a 60-year-old ethnic Karen who kicked his opium addiction two years ago after using for over two decades, said he never felt better.

"It was so painful," Ko Koh said, recalling his withdrawal symptoms. "My whole body was aching for five to six days. I couldn't sleep. I was shitting blood."

For Ko Koh, it was the threat of an outright sanction that got him to think about quitting. Being a male and an elder in a traditional Karen setting like Yang Huay Ya-u, Ko Koh said the threat of being an outcast had forced to think hard about his place in his community and the loss of dignity if he was forced to leave. Today, he is a proud owner of a new plow his children purchased as a gift for kicking the habit.

Samart and the villagers themselves insisted that social sanction is much more effective then the law itself. "The thought of being persecuted by their fellow villagers is more powerful than the threat of legal action," Samart said. "They have to look at each other's faces day after day."

"The vast majority of the people in the villages would like to help but the question is how to gain their trust and get them to join hands," Samart said. "The villagers know better than us which of their neighbours are dealing drugs. So when we approach them, we let them know what we know, and most of the time the villager will respond positively."

"A lot of times it is the parents of kids addicted to drugs who need to know where to turn to."

The chief maintained that his data about dealers and users are accurate. "We have our own statistics and the villagers have theirs. And almost one hundred per cent of the time, theirs and our numbers of dealers and users matches," he said.

"Of course, one way of ensuring that the figure is accurate is through urinalysis."

If you are interested in making donations to help the Mae Sot district's anti-drug campaign, please call the district office at 055-531-297, or write: Mae Sot District Office, Tak Province, Thailand. 


Thursday 20 September 2001

American-trained, ready to kill US troops

Don Pathan
THE NATION

In 1986, then Central Intelligence Agency chief William Casey persuaded the US Congress to provide freedom fighters in Afghanistan with anti-aircraft missiles to strengthen their defences against Soviet warplanes.

He also asked lawmakers to approve the deployment of US advisors to work with the Pakistani Army in directing the Muslim radicals who had arrived from all over the world to play a part in repelling the Soviet invasion.

Casey was confident that his plan would be a success. He had secured the backing of the Pakistani government, and the blessing of Saudi Arabia.

Unfortunately, not much thought was given to the consequences of so many diverse groups of armed Muslim extremists being brought together in one place.

Forcing the Soviets out of Afghanistan was the name of the game, at any cost, it would appear. And in the process, everybody would benefit.

For the Saudis, it was an opportunity to rid their Kingdom of radicals opposed to the country's monarchy. It was also an opportunity to spread their puritanical brand of Islam, formally known as Wahabbism.

Widely regarded as a shadow government, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency considered an international Islamic brigade in a neighbouring country as a future ally.

Today, many Afghan war veterans are involved in fighting in the Kashmir region. Others provide the ISI with more leverage in dealings with countries in Central Asia. However, the ISI's plans are dependent on it being able to keep the rebels on a tight leash.

For the US, this loose union of Muslim extremists was an opportunity to convince the international community that the Islamic world stood against the Soviet Union.

This band of soldiers would later be called "Afghan-Arabs", even though none were Afghans, and most weren't Arabs.

"The group was made up of Filipino Moros, Uzbeks from Soviet Central Asia, Arabs from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and Uighurs from Xingjiang in China," wrote Pakistan-based author Ahmed Rashid in his book "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia."

The group's major sponsors failed to take into consideration that these freedom fighters also had their own agenda, and they eventually turned against their own regime and their American sponsors, Rashid added.

About four years after the US Congress threw its support behind Casey, an Afghan delegation was paraded in front of the press during an informal visit to Texas. 

Photographs of them trying on American sneakers were splashed on the front pages of local newspapers, and they were an instant hit.

But not long after this visit, citizens of America, and the rest of the word, began to look at these individuals in a different light. In 1993, associates of these enigmatic freedom fighters from Afghanistan killed six and injured about a thousand when they set off a bomb at New York's World Trade Centre.

They were subsequently blamed for back-to-back bombings in 1998 at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which left hundreds dead, and last year's suicide boat attack against the USS Cole in Yemen, in which 17 US sailors lost their lives.

All fingers pointed to Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi exile who had gone to Afghanistan to join the US-backed Mujahideen, and eventually led the radicals in their fight against the Soviets.

A number of the group's endeavours undertaken under the leadership of bin Laden, including the opening of an arms storage depot, were financed by the CIA, Rashid said.

The fall of the Soviet empire was met with great joy from all sides. 

For the Mujahideen, it was a victory for Islam, despite the fact that limitations within the Communist system were mostly to blame.

Aside from leaving in its wake an army of radicals intent on promoting Islam as the basis for violence against all non-Muslim forces, the Afghan war also created thousands of well-trained veterans who craved another victory.

An opportunity arose when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, but Saudi Arabia's King Fahd instead turned to Washington for help and invited US troops into the kingdom, where some remain today.

"This came as an enormous shock to bin Laden," according to Rashid.

As the US troops began arriving in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden lashed out at the Saudi royal family, urging the country's clerics to support his condemnation.

Eventually, he was expelled and his Saudi citizenship revoked.

In 1996, bin Laden openly declared a jihad (Holy War) on the United States, accusing it of occupying Saudi Arabia, home to some of Islam's holiest sites.

Since then, US policy toward Afghanistan has been based solely on its quest to "get bin Laden at all costs", without much thought given to alternative approaches, or the fact that many of the country's current problems were inherited from the former regime.

Today, the outlook for Afghanistan is very bleak.

Following last week's devastating suicide hijackings in New York and Washington, great uncertainties prevail for the Taleban as the US administration continues to press for the hand-over of bin Laden.

Evidence thus far would suggest that the Taleban will not budge in their refusal to arrest and extradite the Saudi dissident. 

Their stubbornness, experts say, is proof that they cannot be seen to be giving in to demands from the West. 

One Bangkok-based diplomat also pointed out that the Taleban simply do not have the manpower to oust bin Laden, who has a private army of some 13,000 bodyguards.

Moreover, bin Laden's "Afghan Arabs" also make up a significant portion of the overall Taleban troop strength against the opposition Northern Alliance.

Many believe that locating bin Laden would be extremely difficult. The worldwide network that he helps to finance is just too elusive to pin down long enough to be destroyed. 

Analysts believe it will take years to dismantle this band of militants, who have already proved, all too graphically, that they are more than willing to die for their cause.