Southern insurgency: Islamic schools next in firing line?

Bangkok ruling over renowned ponok in Pattani could be a bleak precedent for the peace process

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Pattani

Two weeks ago a Bangkok court ruled that the 14-rai grounds of Jihad Withya School at Tha Dan village be confiscated as state property - an order that dismayed local Muslims in Pattani.

The school is a renowned ponok (or pondok in standard Malay), a traditional boarding school where just about every local Muslim boy is sent to learn about Islam and what it means to be Malay. Each ponok is run by a headmaster, known as a tok guru, who is held in high esteem by his community.

Jihad Withaya School. Court ruled a state property.

Historians say this longstanding institution helped forge Patani as the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia.

Even today, the mystique of the ponoks and the Islamic education they provide continues to attract students from across of Southeast Asia. Jihad Withya was one of several hundred traditional boarding schools that dot this historically contested region.

Citing the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the court ruled that the state had the right to seize Jihad Withya's land since, according to two testimonies, it was being used to support insurgency activities.

The state's definition of "support for insurgency activities" is ambiguous since almost every form of social gathering or forum in this region appears to feature talk of independence.

Local tok gurus have tried in vain to convince state security agencies that the ponoks do not teach separatism. That topic is woven into public discourse in the far South, which makes it unfair to single out any one single institution.

In one case, for example, 19 suspected insurgents who were executed extrajudicially at a restaurant in Saba Yoi, Songkhla, during an uprising on April 28, 2004, were members of a local football team. And they all came from different schools.

If a football team can provide the forum for separatist militants to come together, then just about any social gathering can do the same, provided that its members share the same cultural and historical narrative of Patani as a homeland occupied illegitimately by the Thai state.

A petition from the state prosecutor on behalf of the Anti-Money Laundering Office claimed two insurgents had confessed to being trained at the school by, among others, the then-tok guru Abdulloh Waemanor.

Abdulloh, also known as Poksu Loh, fled Southern Thailand 10 years ago to escape arrest. His whereabouts are unknown, but Thai security officials believe he is in Malaysia.

Poksu Loh is reckoned to be one of the key leaders in the secretive ruling council of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls the vast majority of insurgents in the South.

Jihad Withya was ordered closed in May 2005. For the past 10 years, authorities have kept a close watch on the school, questioning those going in and out.

The close monitoring reflects their conviction that Poksu Loh has great influence over the course of the conflict in this historically contested region, where more than 6,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence since January 2004.

The timing of the decision to seize the school also raises many questions. Why did the state wait so long when it could have moved 10 years ago, separatist sources have asked.

Thai military and security officials confirmed they had reached out to Poksu Loh for his support in the ongoing Malaysia-facilitated peace talks, but to no avail.

Launched by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra on February 28, 2013 and reluctantly taken up by the current military-backed administration, the peace process has brought negotiators from Bangkok face to face with leaders of six longstanding separatist movements under the umbrella organisation known as MARA Patani.

Bangkok has claimed that BRN members are at the table, but it has become clear that these self-proclaimed BRN cadres in MARA Patani have no command and control over the militants.

The Yingluck government dumped international mediators who worked on "pre-talks" initiatives between 2005 and 2011, handing the role of facilitator to Kuala Lumpur.

Officially, the Thai government and MARA Patani are still in the unofficial pre-talks phase, though negotiators on both sides have been paraded before the media for public consumption.

MARA Patani has insisted that Bangkok make the talks a national agenda item, which would entail parliamentary endorsement.

It has also demanded that the Thai government grant MARA Patani legitimacy as a group negotiating on behalf of the people of the Malays' historical homeland. With that demand comes an

insistence that its negotiators be granted immunity from prosecution.

Yet Bangkok is not in the mood to grant MARA Patani much in the way of legitimacy. For the junta, said one top security adviser, the willingness to talk to separatists it regards as "criminals" represents all the legitimacy they are likely to get.

In fact, Bangkok even refuses to use the name MARA Patani, fearing it would entail acknowledgement of the Malays' historical homeland. Instead it refers to the separatist umbrella organisation by the neutral moniker "Party B".

Other security officials say Bangkok's half-hearted attitude towards MARA Patani stems from the fact that it is not convinced the umbrella organisation has genuine influence over the militants.

And so, Thai authorities continue to reach out behind the scenes to exiled leaders like Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, who is regarded as one of the region's top spiritual leaders, with influence over the militants.

But the seizing of Jihad Withya has brought an end to the quiet charm offensive, at least with Abdulloh Waemanor.

BRN militants along with observers of the conflict have said that, while these men are important in their own right, the conflict is about much more than them. It concerns the historical mistrust and an absence of justice in dealings between the state and the Malays of Patani. These are beyond the control of any one spiritual or insurgent leader, they said.

Local activists said the seizing of the ponok has worked in the separatists' favour as it drives an even bigger wedge between the government and the Pattani residents it has been trying to win over.

Others are concerned that the ruling could set an unwanted precedent for the confiscation of other ponoks and local institutions, grounded in allegations of insurgency activity.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Bomb exposes fatal flaw in far South security plan

Transfer of defence responsibilities is pushing local residents further into the line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani

Security forces inspect the scene of a bomb attack on a village defence post that killed four volunteers in Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani province, on November 12.

The stacks of tyres and cement barricade at this temporary outpost were meant to protect the half-dozen village defence volunteers, known locally as Chor Ror Bor, from attacks by intruders.

But when a powerful home-made bomb exploded from within, killing four of the volunteers, injuring five others and ripping apart the makeshift structure, the impact was felt through the entire region.

For outsider observers, the details are all-too familiar: Malay Muslim insurgents killed Buddhist militiamen with an explosive hidden inside their makeshift outpost.

But for officials and observers on the front line of this conflict, the November 12 incident was far from a routine attack by insurgents bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims.

It was directed at a group of village defence volunteers who are normally left alone because they pose little or no threat to the insurgents.

Chor Ror Bor receive shotguns and weapons training at the order of the Interior Ministry. Members don't patrol beyond their village limits and only join up in the evening for guard duty. Each unit receives a small budget, enough to buy a monthly supply of coffee and other drinks to make the nights a little more bearable.

So when they were targeted in November 12's deadly attack, eyebrows were raised.

Hovering over these village defence volunteer outposts is the controversial Village Protection Force, also known as the Or Ror Bor, a network of exclusively Buddhist militiamen that stretches across the Malay-speaking region of the three southernmost provinces and four districts in Songkhla province.

While the Chor Ror Bor is a village-based outfit, the Or Ror Bor has a much higher degree of mobility and commands a bird's-eye view of the situation in this historically contested region.

But Cha-ont Bualern 52, a local Or Ror Bor militiaman, was speechless, unable to make sense of the attack on the Chor Ror Bor outpost at Ban Khok Khilek.

"What happened here was unprecedented," Cha-ont said, as fellow Buddhist villagers stood silently observing what was left of the security outpost.

Unlike the Chor Ror Bor, members of the region-wide Or Ror Bor have been declared targets by insurgents.

Thai military officials have quietly expressed concern over the kind of flexibility that the Or Ror Bor enjoy, and the group's tendency to take matters into their own hands.

Local observers - both Muslim and Buddhist - have been cautious about drawing conclusions from the November 12 attack, though there's general agreement it was meant as a "strong message" from insurgents that local militia would pay a price for going beyond their traditional, non-threatening role.

In other words, it was a direct attack on the Army's so-called Thung Yang Daeng Model, a half-baked strategy to outsource security responsibilities to local villagers via the Chor Ror Bor, village chiefs and Defence Volunteers, all of whom fall under the Interior Ministry's line of command.

Authorities believe insurgents had planted the bomb while the outpost was deserted. Nevertheless, it was a daring raid considering the prominence and visibility of the fortification.

The community in and around Ban Khok Khilek is a mix of Muslims and Buddhists, with the latter in the slight majority. The outpost was manned in the evening by a group of local Buddhist volunteers. A separate, all-Muslim Chor Ror Bor unit is based just a kilometre away.

The two groups continue to mingle with one another, but local Muslims say the November 12 incident has driven a psychological wedge between the two sides because the attack had singled out one ethnic group.

The bombing wasn't the first time the Tung Yang Daeng Model has come under the spotlight. Shortly after midnight on July 31, a group of about 20 insurgents armed with machine guns opened fire on a Defence Volunteers' camp in Yala's Yaha district, injuring 18 men, all of whom were local Malay Muslims.

Local observers and sources in the separatist movement said the insurgents had shown restraint in the Yaha attack, with the militants deliberately stopping short of killing the Defence Volunteers because they merely wanted to send the Thai government, as well as local residents, a stern warning of what they could do to counter the Thung Yang Daeng initiative.

Sources in the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of insurgent militia, say the routine work of locally elected officials and village defence volunteers had never posed a threat to insurgency activities.

But any government move to arm them and push them into the front line would make them targets, BRN sources say.

One component of the strategy governing the Thung Yang Daeng Model is to slowly phase out regular Army patrols and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers, preferably hired locally so they know the terrain.

One village chief in Narathiwat reports that two young Malay Muslim men from his community have joined the Paramilitary Rangers. Their local knowledge is helping reconnaissance patrols search for insurgents' training sites and makeshift camps.

But the task is not easy: the insurgents are mobile and have sympathetic local villagers to serve as their eyes and ears.

The two Rangers are making decent money - about Bt15,000 a month - but they are afraid to visit their parents because they know the insurgents now consider them fair game. Meanwhile relations between the Rangers' parents and their community have become somewhat awkward, said the chief. "They walk past one another but won't say anything or look at each other's faces," he said.

Nevertheless, Malay Muslim villagers in the far South think the Thung Yang Daeng Model will backfire because they doubt that many in this region are willing to put their lives on the line for the state.

The fact that most local residents share the insurgents' mistrust of the state does not help the situation.

Security officials are aware of this sentiment, said the village chief.

"They [the military] are taking it slow. They are asking us to go on joint patrols with them but they are only asking us to man certain positions at certain times," he said.

Local Army officials say they are fully aware that public mistrust of the state and its security officials poses a tremendous challenge for the Thung Yang Daeng Model.

But that's life in the far South, say locals and government officials, where the reality on the ground continues to be a world apart from policy coming out of Bangkok.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant based in Yala, and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

EDITORIAL: An inconvenient truth in the deep South opinion

The Thai state's propaganda machine cannot win the battle for hearts and minds

The Nation

Citizens and activists who take a more critical view of the government’s policy and actions in the Malay-speaking South have not only been subjected to harassment by the authorities but also nasty propaganda often referred to as “IO”, or information operations.

The idea of IO is to discredit those perceived by the authorities to be obstructing the effort to win hearts and minds among the local residents, about 90 percent of whom are Muslims of Malay ethnicity.
The authorities believe that if they can win over the locals, they can quell the armed separatist movements by denying them support and legitimacy.
One group now bearing the brunt of the government’s IO machine is the Federation of Patanian Students and Youth, or PerMAS, a network of university and high-school students.
Though the group’s stronghold in the deep South, PerMAS membership stretches throughout Thailand and even into neighbouring countries.
Because of their outspoken stance against the culture of impunity among government security officials, PerMAS has been consistently accused of collaborating with separatist organisations, particularly the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), believed by Thai officials to control vast majority of the insurgents on the ground. Thailand’s IO paints PerMAS as the “political wing” of the BRN, a label that members strongly reject.
Though 11 years have passed since the current wave of insurgency first emerged, regular and cordial dialogue between Thai security officials and PerMAS has not resolved the differences.
Undermining the efforts is the government’s semi-secret IO machine, which continues to churn out propaganda attacking and harassing these activists.
Whether a deliberate strategy or not, this double-faced approach only makes the authorities look bad. If anything, it illustrates a lack of unity of purpose and strategy on the government side.
Intelligence and security officials need to ask themselves whether such propaganda tactics against groups like PerMAS are even necessary. And if they continue to insist that IO is a legitimate approach, they should be more truthful about the information they dish out.
Rallies organised by PerMAS and associated groups like Lempar, Nusantara, Perwani and Wartani draw upwards of 10,000 people. The criticism voiced at such large public events is no doubt uncomfortable for the authorities.
But attacking these groups with distorted information won’t help the situation. For many locals, it only enforces a longstanding lack of trust in state officials.
Positive change won’t be achieved by the state reaching out to them with an olive branch in one hand while holding a whip in the other.
There are far more productive ways to engage these activists.
First, actions speak louder than words. Acting to end the culture of impunity among security forces by clamping down on dubious tactics such as torture and extrajudicial killing would be a crucial step in the right direction. The best way to show local residents that the state cares deeply about their concerns would be to take up their grievances and look into them with an open mind.
The authorities must ask themselves why local residents have diverted their hope and trust towards these youth activists. Is it perhaps that they have good reason to believe no one else will stand up for their rights?
Like it or not, an “us versus them” mentality still prevails in the deep South, where the “Siamese” are more often than not seen as outsiders.
The authorities need to grasp this inconvenient truth. It may not fit neatly into their official explanation of the situation, but if we are to get to the bottom of this longstanding and deadly conflict, we must stop fooling ourselves with our own propaganda.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/An-inconvenient-truth-in-the-deep-South-30271893.html

BRN call for foreign observers at peace talks a key test for Bangkok

Insurgent group says it is willing to negotiate if Thailand follows international norms

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

For an organisation whose leadership is very secretive, Barisan Revolusi Nasional is drifting into uncharted territory as its "Information Department" reaches out to foreign media to make their case about Thailand's questionable effort to secure peace in its southernmost provinces.

Bomb squad inspecting scene in Narathiwat earlier this month following attack.

Reaching out to foreign media may have come out of a desire to remind the world that BRN's leadership has yet to endorse Thailand's current peace initiative.

Nevertheless, it was a step in a more conventional direction - one that could force the Thai government to rethink its own information strategy, according to a Thai government official working on the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

What was interesting, noted the Thai official and Artef Sohko, a youth activist and member of a political action group, the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development (Lempar), was that the BRN Information Department had reached out to Anthony Davis, a veteran writer who has for decades written on security issues and conflicts around Asia for Jane's Defence Weekly and other major publications.

For years, much of the information about the conflict in Thailand's southernmost provinces had been provided by the state, making any reporting lopsided.

But the Thai government will no longer enjoy a monopoly on the flow of information should groups like the BRN, which controls a vast majority of the insurgents on the ground, begin to seriously exercise their communication strategy.

A BRN source said the leadership in the movement, namely the Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, agreed to the interview because they wanted to set the record straight regarding the peace initiative of Thailand, the Malaysian government and MARA Patani, the recently established umbrella organisation.

Whether this was a one-time thing remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it was enough to get Thais to seriously think about what the future holds in the realm of communication strategy.

Besides the recent interview with Davis, BRN's leadership also issued a four-page statement slamming Thailand for deceiving the world with the initiative but not being willing to make any meaningful concession.

BRN said they are willing to negotiate for peace but the process must be carried out along international norms and the talks must be witnessed by foreign states.

As expected, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan rejected the demand that foreign governments observe the peace talks.

Bangkok has never liked the idea of foreign mediation for fear of "internationalising" the conflict, which they feel would give too much legitimacy to the separatists.

BRN sources said the DPP would only endorse the peace talks if their negotiators are properly prepared and their political wings receive the needed immunity.

Earlier last month, just 10 days after the August 27 launch of MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, the DPP reminded the world about their feeling about the Thai state through a statement read out by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of the movement's youth wing who's also part of the BRN Information Department.

In the video statement, he criticised the Thai state for being insincere and lacking legitimacy in Malays' historical homeland, which is today's southern border provinces.

It was hard to dismiss Abdulkarim's statement as irrelevant because he was not an unknown entity. The man was at the negotiating table at the previous round of talks launched by the Yingluck government in February 2013.

Abdulkarim was sent to the talks by the DPP under a very strict mandate. He could not negotiate - as the BRN's DPP did not officially endorse the Yingluck initiative - but would observe and report back to the top leaders.

That initiative ended in late 2013 when the designated "BRN liaison", Hasan Taib, threw in the towel and went incommunicado. Street protests in Bangkok also sent the Yingluck government into survival mode until her administration was ousted in May of last year by a military coup.

Seven months after the putsch, the junta decided to pick up where the Yingluck team had left off, but with conditions. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha demanded that the separatist leaders develop a common platform and implement "a period of peace".

Thai officials said "the period of peace", or ceasefire, was to demonstrate that MARA Patani members had adequate command-and-control over the militants on the ground.

Bangkok did not get their "period of peace" but the separatists did form the MARA Patani, a platform for their common strategy and for dealing with the Thais collectively.

Prayut rejected the idea of granting MARA Patani formal recognition and legal immunity but said talks could continue - in an unofficial capacity.

MARA Patani was a sideshow, or Track 1.5, to the Yingluck official Track 1 initiative that has Malaysia as designated facilitator.

Today, with Hasan and Abdulkarim abandoning the initiative, the sideshow was elevated to a formal Track 1. But being on Track 1 does not guarantee MARA Patani members formal or meaningful recognition as Bangkok does not want to give away too much too soon to the Patani Malay groups.

But if MARA Patani could secure a buy-in from the DPP, Bangkok just might take them more seriously and grant them the recognition they want, security officials said.

For the time being, MARA Patani, Thailand's dialogue panel (negotiators) and the Malaysian facilitators are pinning their hopes on a small group of young BRN members who broke ranks and joined the peace talks.

Two of these individuals - Sukree Hari and Ahmad Chuwo - were paraded to the press in Kuala Lumpur with other MARA Patani representatives. They still called themselves "BRN" but combatants on the ground said, "Who cares?" What matters, in today's context, is who has command-and-control on the ground.

The Thai negotiators, MARA Patani and Kuala Lumpur were hoping that these former teachers from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala could bridge the gap between them and the BRN ruling council.

But the recently released four-page statement, along with Abdulkarim's statement on YouTube, not to mention the interview with Davis, was BRN's way of telling all stakeholders that there is no shortcut to peace.

Thai officials have quietly acknowledged that parading the pair to the media in late August along with the MARA Patani may have been a premature move.

Perhaps all sides should have waited until they are certain that these former teachers have secured the needed endorsement from the BRN's ruling council, he said.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

Myanmar's mighty narco armies refuse to surrender the fight

The ceasefire deal being signed today with ethnic rebels will not cover the badlands bordering Thailand

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

The nationwide ceasefire agreement set to be signed today by the Myanmar government and eight ethnic armed groups has thrown a spotlight on notorious rebel groups who have refused to make peace.

Thai border security officials who monitor insurgency activity in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle say they are not surprised that the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which is still at war with the Myanmar government, are refusing to sign the peace agreement.

Wa soldiers in Panghsang, UWSA's HQ. Photo by: DON PATHAN

With 20,000-strong combat force plus reserves, the UWSA refuses to be placed in the same category as far smaller armed ethnic groups, who are not in a position to dictate terms to the government.

Moreover, reports that China is meddling in the ceasefire talks suggest the giant communist neighbour wants to maintain its dominant longstanding influence over the Wa, said one officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The UWSA inked a ceasefire deal with the Myanmar government in 1989 but it had virtually no impact on the group's relations with China, its main backer.

Armed Wa rebels served as China's entry point into Myanmar during the days of communist insurgency, when they acted as foot soldiers for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The CPB fell apart along ethnic lines in 1989.

The Wa State Army came into being in the aftermath of the CPB's disintegration, with a vow to keep on fighting for another 10 years.

Fearing that the UWSA would forge alliances with neighbouring rebel groups such as the Karen National Union, Myanmar's security tsar, Lt-General Khin Nyunt, moved quickly to secure a ceasefire.

In exchange for agreeing to sign, the UWSA was permitted self-rule in the so-called Special Region 2. Other groups operating in areas adjacent to the UWSA stronghold - the Kokang Chinese and the Mong La group - were given similar semi-autonomous status.

While the ceasefire with these groups halted military confrontations, it also allowed the ethnic armies to grow both militarily and economically. The trade of choice for these groups was, of course, opium.

Barely had the ink on the ceasefire deal dried when clandestine factories brewing high-grade heroin began to pop up in remote areas controlled by the narco-armies.

Government efforts at getting the Wa to kick the habit in 2001 didn't do much good, even with Thailand's help.

In a strange twist of diplomacy, the Thaksin Shinawatra administration was working with Rangoon to set up the Yongkha Development Project in UWSA-controlled territory near the Thai border. It was supposed to be a comprehensive crop-substitution project for Wa villagers who had been forcibly relocated from the China-Myanmar border in the late 1990s.

The Thai government injected Bt20 million into the project with the hope that others in the international community would follow. But the world knew that Thai and US authorities had already convicted half a dozen Wa leaders on charges of heroin trafficking, so no funds were forthcoming.

The USWA declaration that it would end opium cultivation in June 2005 didn't fool anybody. The Wa army was already churning out methamphetamine (yaba), which was flooding into Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.

Bao Yu-xiang (left) , chairman of the UWSA, with Don Pathan
centre) in Panghsang, Wa's capital on the Sino-Burma border, 2003.

Not only had Thaksin failed to whitewash the UWSA through the development project, his efforts had also angered many in the Thai military, whose Third Army Area troops were engaged in frequent skirmishes with Wa drug caravans along the border.

For China, the UWSA presence along the Thai border was an opportunity to extend its long reach even further. But the Thai military and security agencies were not willing to let bygones be bygones and refused to play along.

Reeling from the flood of drugs into the country, Bangkok was further humiliated when top Wa commander Wei Hsueh-kang escaped after being granted bail on drug trafficking charges by a Thai court. So upset was Washington that it decided to raise the bounty for his capture to US$2 million. Nevertheless, Wei continues to control one of the three UWSA regiments near the Thai border.

Though security tsar Khin Nyunt tried hard to build on the ceasefire with the UWSA, the Wa leaders continue to enjoy strong ties with Chinese authorities in Yunnan.

UWSA-owned casinos on the border with Yunnan province are open 24 hours a day, even though gambling is illegal. Cars with Wa licence plates travel deep inside Yunnan freely, while Wa leaders can be seen walking in and out of banks there with wads of dollars.

Nay Pyi Taw officials visiting UWSA-controlled Special Region 2 often quip that the area seems more like an extension of China than a semi-autonomous region of Myanmar. The preferred choice of currency and cellphone or landline operators add to that impression.

Meanwhile, credible reports that China is selling weapons, including helicopters and surface-to-air missiles, to the UWSA are keeping a spotlight on longstanding relations that Chinese officials would prefer not to talk about.

Myanmar is well aware of the strong ties between Chinese authorities and rebel groups like the Kokang, Kachin and the Wa. But they also feel that these relations should not come at the expense of national security.

To show the Chinese that they mean business, Myanmar troops attacked the Kokang in August 2009, forcing thousands of Chinese citizens to flee back over the border.

Ousted Kokang leaders also took refuge in China and used Wa-controlled territory to regroup.

Thai officials believe Myanmar will refrain from using military means to force the Wa to comply and come under the command of the country's army. Indirect pressure, such as the need to integrate economically with the rest of Myanmar, will be the main factor that pushes the UWSA closer to the state, they say.

Meanwhile the so-called nationwide ceasefire agreement will be signed with only about half of the 15 groups the government has been negotiating with over the past couple of years. For President Thein Sein, who wants to cement a legacy as the leader who ended decades of civil war - in which he himself played a battlefield role - this is not the ideal scenario.

Major rebel powers like the Wa and their allies, the Mong La and the Kokang, will have to be engaged with on their on terms, in separate negotiations.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and consultant based in Thailand.

Persecuting the peacemakers: A dismal tale from the South

The systematic harassment of men like Artef Sohko has shut down grass-roots activism and blocked the path to lasting peace in this contested region

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Artef Sohko says he is fed up with being constantly harassed by unnamed government or pro-government entities, but he's not sure what he can do about it.

Since 2007, when he became the first ethnic Malay to be elected president of the Student Federation of Thailand, Artef says Thai security agencies have routinely persecuted him because of his outspoken demands for justice and equality for ethnic Malays in the historically contested deep South.

Artef Sohko (right) speaking at the FCCT. 

The year 2007 saw a peak in violence as allegations of rape and torture were made against security forces in the region. Artef and other student leaders felt they had enough and they decided to seize the Pattani Central Mosque in protest.

"There were allegations that a [Paramilitary] Ranger had raped a woman in front of her mother in [Yala's] Yaha district. We also heard about other rape incidents, but the victims and their families were too ashamed to speak out," Artef said.

Senior military commanders agreed to set up a joint working group to look into the allegations. But like every other ad-hoc committee set up by authorities in this region, it slowly slipped from the agenda and out of the minds of government officials.

Meanwhile relations between ethnic Malays and Thai Buddhist communities in the South took a nosedive as innocent bystanders became the targets - often as part of tit-for-tat vendettas between security forces and insurgents.

International watchdogs such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have condemned actions on both sides, but they consistently criticise Thai security forces for a "culture of impunity" and have urged the government to punish wrongdoers. But such requests have fallen on deaf ears and quickly slipped from public consciousness - even in high-profile cases like the beating to death of Imam Yapa Kaseng. A full seven years after the Muslim religious leader's killing, the National Anti-Corruption Commission last week suggested that the accused, Army Sub-Lieutenant Sirikhet Wanitbamrung, face disciplinary and criminal action.

Artef says he has never been tortured, but he describes how a security official once beat a person in front of him as a way of demonstrating his unrestrained power.

"The idea was to demoralise me. He wanted to show what he could do and that there was not a thing that I could do about it," he said.

The persecution also took on a devious, personal angle. An elaborate flowchart was faked-up showing him, his wife and her father linked in a crime syndicate and drug trafficking ring. It was released via the social media, making it difficult to trace without help from the authorities. But given that no Thai government in the last decade has taken legal action against an official in the deep South, Artef said it would be a pipe dream to expect help in this case.

"The attitude of many Thai officials is you are either with us or you are with the insurgents. And if you're with the state, you shouldn't criticise us even when the conduct of an official is wrong or illegal," Artef said.

He is not the only activist to face harassment. Others both in and outside of his network have faced similar trouble, being detained or having their DNA taken on flimsy pretences, or have their residences searched without probable cause or warrant.

Zawawee Zawawee Jujur, a 26-year-old local activist and former member of Media Selantan, a Pattani-based community radio station, says he has been DNA tested three times already. When he refused a fourth test earlier this year, police threatened him at the point of a gun.

The authorities' action is based, Zawawee says, on the assumption that he will eventually commit an illegal act, at which time "they will already be prepared to charge me".

Security officials even visited his village in Narathiwat's Tak Bai district and told the headman there to keep an eye on this "young man who has joined an anti-state organisation".

Artef's outspokenness has won a great deal of support not just from the grass roots in this majority-Malay Muslim region but also from foreign governments, who have often sought his insights into the ongoing conflict and the peace process. He doesn't think very highly of the latter, explaining that the participants lack any real influence over the insurgent combatants.

Thailand's approach to peace has always been very short-sighted, usually seeking quick gains while avoiding asking the central question of how the two sides can coexist peacefully and with mutual respect.

On the public front, Artef is often the key speaker at the Bicara Patani, a political rally that draws crowds of up to 10,000, mostly villagers - which gives an idea of his popularity with local people.

Many of these events are documented by Wartani, a grass-roots media organisation run by local Patani Malay activists closely associated with Artef. Wartani reporters say that they too have been harassed by Thai security officials.

Artef refuses to tar all Thai officials with the same brush, though, explaining that many have a great working relationship with him and the youth network.

Yet many others in authority continue to insist that Artef and his activist colleagues are either part of the separatist movement or inspired by the political wing of its umbrella group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - a claim he vociferously denies. But he does admit that Thai authorities, both security and political, have asked him to act as a go-between with the BRN and other separatist leaders.

"It's a fine line to walk and the best way to go about it is to maintain your integrity. I don't take sides or support any particular [separatist] organisations," Artef said.

When asked if his agenda includes independence for the Malay-speaking region, Artef said: "It's not my decision to make. It's up to all the people of this region. But I do want to see peace and justice for all sides."

Artef says that though he is often followed by plainclothes officials, the authorities can never pin anything on him because he hasn't done any wrong. "Nevertheless, it is still irritating," he adds.

In the aftermath of the May 2014 coup, security officials suggested that he leave the country for about three years, which he did. For everybody's sake, he decided to leave his wife and three-year-old son behind and live in India, where he studied English. "The cost of living was affordable," he said.

The low point came late last week when a hooded man in black broke into the home of his mother-in-law in the middle of the night in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong sub-district and took all the printed documents from the bedroom where his wife and his son normally sleep.

"They didn't take any of the valuable stuff. Perhaps it was an indication of things to come," he said.

Don Pathan is a Yala-based freelance security and development consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

EDITORIAL: Army needs to act on the fatal beating of Imam Yapa

Our indifference to the plight of the Malays of Patani brings shame on Thai society; we need to face our shared destiny

This past week the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has recommended that the army and criminal prosecutors take legal action against Sub Lt Sirikhet Wanitbamrung over the alleged killing of a Narathiwat imam seven years ago.

Imam Yapa Kaseng was beaten to death in front of his son while he was being kept at a Narathiwat military detention site in March 2008. He was accused of being part of a local militant separatist cell bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces.

According to the autopsy report, Yapa's ribs were fractured and the broken bones punctured his lungs.

Sub Lt Sirikhet was attached to the 39th Special Taskforce Unit in Rueso district in Narathiwat, an area with a high concentration of militant activity.

Yapa's death drew an outcry from the local and international community, especially human right organisations, who accused the government of turning a blind eye to the culture of impunity in this highly contested region, where more than 6,500 have been killed over 10 to 11 years, most of them Malay Muslims.

Even some foreign embassies in Bangkok inquired into this death and urged the Thai government and the Army to uphold its principles of law and order.

Many feared that the killing of Islamic leaders, be it Imam Yapa or others who have been shot dead by government or pro-government death squads, would radicalise the insurgents, who have over the past 11 years pretty much kept their campaign of violence against the state to the Malay-speaking region.

In response to the growing pressure, the Army has promised a thorough investigation into the case. Some observers said the vow from the top brass at the time was to get foreign governments off their back for the time being.

Seven years later, the NACC has got around to making a recommendation as to what legal action should be taken. The fact it took this long to come to this point reflects poorly on Thailand's justice system, which this and previous governments consistently vowed to improve and made accessible to all parties and stakeholders.

But from the look of how the state treats this and other similar cases, such promises appear to be little more than lip service.

The attitude of Thai state agencies have always been "let bygones be bygones". But can the Malays of Patani, or anybody for that matter, move on as one nation with a shared destiny with the rest of the people in Thailand without first addressing the historical wounds between the two sides?

The suggestion to let bygones be bygones is nothing less than wishful thinking on the country's part and the handling of Imam Yapa's case is a testimony of the lack of commitment on the country's part.

Sad to say, most Thai people could not care less about Imam Yapa's case because of their blind support for the government's action in the deep South. We blindly embrace nationalism to the point that we paint the Malays of Patani as an ungrateful minority who can't appreciate the goodness and generosity of the state.

That racist attitude lies at the base of Thailand’s policy of failed assimilation, which Malays in the deep South say comes at the expense of their cultural, historical and religious identity.

Because they do not want to embrace our state-constructed narrative, we become indifferent to their historic grievances and the obvious injustice and illegal action by our officers, in episodes such as the Tak Bai massacre and the fatal beating of Imam Yapa.

Seriously, did any Thai people weep with the Patani Malays when 78 of their sons suffocated to death on the back of military trucks in late 2004? And let's not forget the seven shot dead at the protest site.

Security officials and state agencies tend to see the years of tit-for-tat killings and murders as acceptable. 'They may be Thai citizens but they are not on "our side" - so what's the big deal?' That appears to be the attitude of our officials and society.

The culture of impunity and the systematic violation of human rights are not acceptable because these things have been done in the name of the state. The fact that we indifferent to this reflects poorly on our society.

We have rules, laws and regulations. And if they are going to be selective about how they are imposed, then the government should withdraw from all the international conventions against illegal killings, kidnapping and torture of suspected criminals and insurgents.

The international community and watchdog organisations have a moral obligation to remind Thailand of its commitment to these conventions and protocol.

In some countries, these obligations are legal, which would mean legal and political action must be considered and/or taken up.

Dialogue to Foaster Harmony in the Southern Border Provinces

General Aksra Kerdphol
Head of the Peace Dialogue Panel

In the past 11 years, the Royal Thai Government has tried continuously to resolve the conflict in the southern border provinces though the use of military, police and civilian forces with a large amount of weaponry along with all types of legal measures, military operations, and civic action programs to end violence in the area. However, these various attempts still have not been achieved because perpetrators of violence still have “capability” and still retain their action as “initiator” to carry out operations on every occasion, thus, forcing government officials to be on the defence and result in the loss of life and properties of innocent people.

Therefore, the Peace Dialogue Panel for Southern Border Provinces, consequently, reached out to every group of people who have different opinions from the state, urging them to participate in dialogue. This is based on the belief that violence will not do any good for any side. Apart from this, when violent incidents occur, it results in a necessity of the government to increase a number of troops and weaponry and impose stricter law-enforcement measures, and tougher military operations such closed-area search and more arrests.

This is not a positive outcome for any sides and brings us to a conclusion that dialogue is the best solution for everyone. So far, we have witnessed cooperation from people with different opinions who tried to unite their 6 different groups to participate in an informal full-panel dialogue which up until now has been held for 3 times.

I, as the head of dialogue panel, would like to state that in the past the government side tried to resolve the problem in southern border provinces in a unilateral manner. But now, we see the situation where people with different opinions “cooperate” with us to mutually resolve the problem while the people sector closely monitor, support and take part as witness for this cooperation. This is a positive development for resolving problems in the southern border provinces which is unprecedentedly an important success.

Regrettably, there are still people who still have a conservative mindset and do not have confidence in the dialogue process by misbelieving that this development is an elevation of the group status paving ways towards territorial separation. This is not something which can be easily done nowadays as the people sector always keeps an eye on this. And in the future, I personally believe that not only that Party A and B will talk to each other, but this people sector will join in the dialogue and define a roadmap for sustainable solution to the southern border provinces problem together. However, at the first stage, the dialogue panel needs to build trust and cooperation from the group with different opinions and, consequently, that cooperation will result in the gradual reduction of violence in the area.

For the peace dialogue that the panel currently works on is the dialogue which aims to “reduce intention” to use violence from all groups of people with different opinions and turn to use their current capability in an “peaceful way” instead of opting for violence like in the past. This is contrary from what most people understand that there must be negotiation and agreement on what we can get and what they can get.

This concept, which concerns bargaining for advantages, is out of date and will only cause more and more paranoia from each side rather than trust. This is totally different from what are doing now which emphasizes trust and confidence building to seek “cooperation” to jointly resolve violent problems together. We have tried to point out that if the use of violence persists, there will be no side who has complete victory but only damage to the country, loss of our brothers and sisters, and dark future of our children. Therefore, dialogue to foster cooperation is in fact an important thing determining how we can work together on the issues of safety, development and fair justice for all.

In summary, at present the dialogue panel has already set up a working group to work on each issue for justice process, there will be classification of each offence and determine possible ways for exemption under Thai legal framework so that people with different opinions can choose whatever is right for each group or each individual. For the issue of development and safety zones, working groups have been set up to identify urgent priorities which serve the need of our brother and sisters and identify safety zones in urban community, rural areas, transportation routes, and border areas.

Discussion about which area, village, tambon, district or province will first be a pilot safety zone project depends on the capability and preparedness of the government side and also cooperation from people with different opinions who will need to consider and choose the most appropriate methods together in due course.

The latest progress of dialogue panel is that we can mutually agree with the facilitator and group of people with different opinions from the state (Party B) on the formation of joint technical working group consisting of Party A, Party B, the facilitator, and the people sector will participate in the future in order to work on details together to make sustainable peace and harmony in the southern border provinces.



Thailand's Dialogue Panel (negotiators) 

EDITORIAL: Stumbling at the very outset

Lack of diplomacy marring peace talks between southern umbrella organisation and Thai government

The Nation September 13, 2015

The ongoing peace talks between the Thai government and a recently launched umbrella organisation, MARA Patani, is evolving into a spitting contest as Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and representatives from the separatist movement take up microphone diplomacy to make their case.

The sad thing about this is that the formal negotiations have not even begun.

About three weeks ago, MARA Patani met at an informal "pre-talk" session with a Thai "Dialogue Panel" led by chief negotiator General Aksara Kherdphol. After the talks, MARA Patani introduced themselves to the media at a press conference represented by leaders from six different organisations.

MARA Patani issued three demands for the pre-talks to become formal negotiations: Recognise MARA Patani as an official entity; grant immunity to all MARA Patani representatives; and designate the peace talks on the national agenda by Parliament.

Ten days later, Abdulkarim Khalid, member of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)'s youth wing who had sat in the previous round of talks initiated by the former government of Yingluck Shinawatra, issued a strongly worded statement on YouTube, slamming the Thai state of being cruel and insincere in its policy towards the Malay-speaking region of the southernmost border provinces.

Thai officials and MARA Patani members tried to play down Abdulkarim's statement, saying while he was attacking the state, he did not specifically single out peace talks between the government and umbrella organisations.

Nevertheless, Abdulkarim statement is a testimony to the difficulties that lie ahead for the dialogue process that was about to get off the ground.

But before the initiative could go anywhere, Prayut decided to pour cold water on the three demands.

He said there was no need to make the talks a national agenda because it already exists on the national agenda. But then again, just about every issue in Thailand is a "national agenda" so one wondered how important the conflict in the deep South is for this government.

Prayut shied away from the issue of immunity, probably because he wants to keep this big stick with him in case the peace process doesn't go the way he wants it to. But this is not very surprising because the junta, regardless of the issue at hand, has shown that they have difficulty understanding logic or accountability.

When pressed by reporters about the acceptance of the three points, Prayut shot back and asked if he was to grant MARA Patani these three demands, would the violence end and the conflict be resolved? This is what you call negotiation.

For the record, Prayut is not saying there will be no more talks. He is saying there has to be a new understanding between the two sides before the process can move further.

First thing is the need to establish confidence-building measures (CBMs). This is sensible. But what he didn't say is that just about every administration that comes to power, always goes back to square one with a brand new team of negotiators and its CBMs all over again.

To call it a let down would be an understatement if one looks at it from the perspective of the separatist movements.

Prayut also stated that inclusiveness is still lacking, pointing out that not all separatist movements have joined or agreed with the MARA Patani forum. Khalid's video statement is a testimony of that. And even though he did not single out MARA Patani, his statement undermined the so-called BRN representatives who had joined the umbrella organisation.

Khalid is not a non-entity. He had taken part in the peace talks launched by the Yingluck government.

Kasturi Mahkota, the president of one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation, blasted Prayut's outburst as "unprofessional", saying official channels of communication should have been used to relay the message, not through the public microphone.

But then again, there has not been any professionalism among the Thai negotiators, whether it's this government or the previous one.

Unfortunately, Bangkok never had a policy regarding the southern conflict. It has an attitude, sometimes confusing it with good intention, but never a meaningful policy that addressed the issue of historical mistrust and grievances of the Malays of Patani and how the state and the Muslims there could overcome these differences.

Like the previous policymakers, the current crop of junta is too full of themselves and don't seem to realise that their inflated ego, as well as their ethno-centric nation-state construct, is costing the lives of their own men, as well as innocent bystanders. More than 6,000 have died from this wave of insurgency violence that has been in full swing since January 2004.

The junta and the future government of Bangkok can talk to the armed separatists all they want - even into the next life, as Prayut said he was willing to do.

But if they don't realise that their state policy of assimilation is the problem, then there is not much hope for peace.

Junta going ahead with peace process it helped undermine

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Having fought against the talks under the Yingluck govt, its military-backed successor is now forging ahead with a flawed bid to end the southern insurgency

Wan Kadir Che Man, former leader of the now-defunct Bersatu, an umbrella organisation that emerged in the 1980s to unite the longstanding Patani Malay separatist organisations, has voiced criticism of the ongoing peace initiative in the far South.

His attack came just days after MARA Patani, a new forum comprised of six longstanding separatist organisations, had introduced itself to the public following a third round of informal talks with Thai negotiators led by the junta-appointed General Aksara Kherdphol.

Wan Kadir said the Bangkok government should not pin its hopes on MARA Patani as the forum does not represent all the groups involved in the southern unrest, particularly those with command-and-control over the insurgent combatants.

He told a gathering at the King Prajadhipok Institute on Friday that he personally knew at least six of the 15 MARA Patani members and that he was dismissive of their claims.

He also poured cold water on Malaysia's role as talks facilitator, noting that initiatives involving Kuala Lumpur come and go but nothing seems to change.

But the thing about this latest initiative - launched by the Yingluck government and picked up by the current crop of junta leaders - is that the media and the public will be regularly engaged.

Civil society organisations working on peace for the South think that's a good idea and that the process be as transparent as possible.

Others think the public should be kept out until the state is certain beyond any doubt that the people they are dealing with have the ability to influence the combatants and can deliver on whatever goods and promises are made at the table. The official terms of reference for talks must also be agreed upon before negotiations can proceed.

The criticism launched by Wan Kadir on Friday came as no surprise since it was in line with what he has been saying all along. But worth closer scrutiny is the story of how this exiled leader emerged into the Thai public spotlight. It helps shed light on the feeble and sometimes appalling attitude of Thai governments and authorities towards peace and peace initiatives for the deep South.

After living in exile for more than five decades, Wan Kadir was permitted by the Thai Army to return to Thailand on a secret trip in January 2013.

The military was against the peace initiative being put together by Yingluck's team but knew it couldn't publicly criticise the leader of the nation. So that's where Wan Kadir came in.

Wan Kadir had announced back in 2004 his desire to return to Thailand to work from within to resolve a fresh wave of conflict involving a new generation of fighters that had surfaced a couple of years earlier.

At first, then-premier Thaksin Shinawatra was reluctant, fearing his return would upset his security advisors, including General Chavalit Yongchaiyud, who was at the time on a quirky ambition to "destroy" Bersatu, even though the group was already defunct.

One of Wan Kadir's main supporters at the time was then-Fourth Army commander Lt-General Pisarn Wattanawongkiri.

Pisarn's idea was to use Wan Kadir as his personal consultant and establish an understanding with the new generation of combatants that would at least cover rules of engagement.

His interest was understandable, coming in the wake of a disturbing April 28, 2004 incident in which more than 100 militants - apparently inspired by notions of invincibility conferred by local superstitions - charged against 10 police outposts and a station armed with little more than machetes.

And although Thaksin remained implacable, Wan Kadir continued with hush-hush lobbying for permission to return to his birthplace.

Later that year, his main supporter, Lt General Pisarn, was ousted from his post in the aftermath of the Tak Bai massacre. But that wasn't the reason why Wan Kadir gave up on his secret lobbying. According to several sources, separatist leaders - most likely operatives from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - told him that he "would not last more than 10 days" if he returned to Thailand.

BRN cadres said his return at that time would undermine the separatist community's effort to attain support from international actors - state and non-state.

But in January 2013, Wan Kadir was finally permitted to return for a secret visit to several cities, including Phuket, Bangkok and Chiang Mai, where he was received by senior state officials.

His first public appearance in Thailand came later that year in November, when in a speech at the Thai Journalists Association he criticised the Yingluck government's peace process. Bangkok-based diplomatic corps were eager to meet with him, but his hosts, the Royal Thai Police, kept them at arm's length.

Wan Kadir was invited back again the following month, when he tore the credibility of the peace talks' stakeholders to shreds during a speech at the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani.

The Thai Army was gratified - not because it was being criticised for lacking commitment and sincerity towards the peace initiative but over the fact that the initiative was being attacked in public.

Coup brings moment of truth

The Army didn't like the idea that civilians were dominating a public process which they believed was their exclusive right to run behind closed doors.

However, it didn't take long for Yingluck's initiative to fall apart, a victim not of Wan Kadir's criticism but of its shaky foundations laid by former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck's brother, one year before the official launch on February 28, 2013.

And then came the May 2014 coup and the moment of truth for the Thai Army. Failure to continue with the peace effort initiated by the government it had ousted would be a bad political move. But going along with it would mean climbing down from its previous stance.

In the end, the Army opted to continue the process, but junta chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha added demands of his own. Looking tough and in control was important to him.

The demands were that various separatist organisations must unite under a common platform and that there must be a period of peace - ie, a ceasefire - before a formal process could start.

The common platform came in the form of MARA Patani, launched about two weeks ago. They have presented themselves as men who are willing to negotiate a political settlement, leaving it to Bangkok to find ways of moving the initiative forward.

As for the "ceasefire", nobody has brought it up - at least not in public.

Finally came the re-emergence of Wan Kadir on Friday. By attacking the current initiative, he is also discrediting this latest crop of junta officials and their decision to continue with an initiative they had previously opposed.

In a recent interview in Pattani, Wan Kadir said the government should reconsider the peace initiative and switch to using a local interlocutor as the go-between. He recommended a bottom-up approach that starts with the combatants and works its way up to their leaders, who may or may not be living in exile.

The Army appears to have dug its own grave on this matter. If the Thai military and the Yingluck government had begun with a common understanding of how the peace process should be conducted, perhaps we wouldn't be in this predicament.

But instead, Thai institutions - political and military - prioritised their respective political agendas over the well-being of the nation and national security.

Sadly, everyone was out to protect their own turf, with little consideration of the problems at hand or the consequences of their actions. And from the look of it, the Thai Army is now getting a taste of its own medicine.

Don Pathan is a security analyst and a freelance consultant based in Yala. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com). 

MARA Patani and the question of legitimacy

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

YALA, Thailand __ The junta's refusal to lend official recognition to the separatist umbrella group could mean the latest peace process is stillborn

A press conference last week to introduce key figures of MARA Patani to the world produced few surprises - members of the separatist umbrella group had been talking to the media for some time.

The newly established forum (more like old wine in a new bottle) has for some time been promoting the idea it is a force to be reckoned with.

Speaking to the media, the Majlis Syura (MARA) Patani members chose their words carefully, probably to avoid the misunderstandings that burdened the previous peace initiative, launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013, with unrealistic expectations.

The launch two years ago generated a great deal of hope, as it was the first time in the history of the armed conflict between the Thai state and the Malay Muslims of the far South that a Bangkok government had publicly committed to a political settlement through negotiation. Sitting opposite Bangkok negotiators back then was the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of combatant insurgents.

Exiled separatists and BRN members said the talks were originally initiated by fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who, with Malaysia as facilitator, met with 16 separatist leaders in Kuala Lumpur in March 2012. He asked these leaders to put historic grievances behind them and let bygones be bygones.

The request was wishful thinking on Thaksin's part. The BRN responded with a massive triple car bomb in the heart of Yala, which killed 14 people and injured about 120.

Then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's sister, ignored the BRN's "warning message" and relaunched the peace initiative a year later on February 28, 2013.

Hasan Taib, an Islamic religious teacher who has been with the BRN for decades but never made it into the ruling council, was prodded to take up the post as the "liaison". His job was to bring the BRN ruling council and other movements to the negotiating table.

The problem was that BRN operatives didn't think much of Hasan, even though Thai security and intelligence agencies thought he represented the group's ruling council. It didn't take them long to realise that they were wrong about Hasan's influence over the movement.

Yet although Hasan wasn't able to influence insurgent combatants or the BRN inner circle, the group's leaders nevertheless managed to make use of his presence.

BRN used him to antagonise the Thai side and test Bangkok's will by issuing a much-talked-about five-point demand. This comprised of the release of all imprisoned combatants, official recognition for the BRN and an invitation to the peace talks for a representative of the people of Patani, permitting international observers, and official acknowledgement of the southernmost provinces as the Malay majority's historical homeland.

The BRN also used Hasan to inform the Thai side in July 2013 that the theatre of violence would broaden to include Songkhla's district of Sadao. The separatists lived up to their vow with simultaneous attacks - one car bomb and two motorbike bombs - in December 2013.

Another point that antagonised the Thai side was the separatist propaganda exercise conducted through YouTube. Now, in a bid to avoid a recurrence of online political grandstanding by MARA Patani members, the Thai negotiating team led by General Aksara Kherdphol is not objecting to them being interviewed by Thai and international media.

During the Yingluck initiative, civil society organisations were invited to participate in the public ("Track 1") process. But under the current arrangement, civil society will remain on the sidelines of talks while continuing to be engaged by the government team on the southern conflict.

MARA Patani began life in the so-called Track 1.5 - a side-show to the Yingluck initiative. Trusted retired government officials were asked to carry out this unofficial process through a series of negotiations in neighbouring countries.

Credit should also go to the then secretary-general of the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre, Pol Colonel Thawee Sodsong, who cultivated a working relationship with key exiled figures such as Sukree Hari, a BRN representative from Yala who fled in 2007 after receiving bail.

Transition from Track 1.5 to the official Track 1 wasn't exactly a walk in the park. Efforts to mobilise the support of insurgents and the grass-roots community came to a complete standstill after community leader and MARA Patani representative Ustaz Waesumae Sudden, a cleric from Pattani's Sai Buri district, was shot dead on September 28 last year. Nobody took responsibility for his murder, not even discreetly.

Today, participants of this side-show are sitting at the official Track I talks looking straight at the Thai government negotiators.

But BRN cadres who have command-and-control over the insurgents on the ground are still not interested in joining the peace initiative, prompting serious doubts over their chance of success.

BRN sources say their leaders are still not convinced that now is a good time to endorse any initiative, and doubt whether the ruling junta in Bangkok is serious about peace in the deep South.

Even the name "MARA Patani" must conjure unease for Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, with its connotations of institutionalisation and an internationalised process. To please the junta chief, the term "Party B" is being used to describe MARA Patani while "Party A" refers to the official side.

The terms of reference for the talks are due to be set by the end of this month. But already, both sides are vocalising their demands in public.

MARA Patani is demanding that the conflict be designated by Parliament as a national agenda so as to ensure peace efforts aren't dropped when this government ends. It also wants its 15 members to be granted immunity and the umbrella organisation officially recognised. Moreover, the group has suggested it would be willing to settle for something less than complete independence for the three southernmost provinces - possibly the right to "self-determination".

The Thai side, on the other hand, is asking MARA Patani to work towards creating a safe zone, which probably encompasses a ceasefire; improve livelihoods of the local people; and ensure that all sides have access to justice.

There is also a longstanding question over legitimacy. Thailand doesn't have to deal with this question once the junta hands the mandate back to the people. But the same can't be said for MARA Patani and its members.

There has been talk of setting up a national assembly for the region to serve as a rubberstamp for MARA Patani. But according to security official in the South, Bangkok is likely to object to any move to set up a shadow Parliament for the conflict-affected region.

And given the fact that Premier Prayut can't even stand the name "MARA Patani", the idea of him offering official recognition and legitimacy to this umbrella organisation may be just a pipe dream.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

An ominous silence among insurgents in the deep South

Refusal to disavow involvement in the Erawan Shrine bombing prompts concern that separatists could extend theatre of violence outside the region

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

It was supposed to be a press conference at which members of the MARA Patani, a forum of longstanding separatist groups, emerged in public in order to enhance their bargaining power with the Thai government.

But in the end, it was something that the panellists refused to say that wrenched the nerves of Thai security officials.

The question was whether the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had informed the Thai government that its organisation was not behind the August 17 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people injured over 100.

In spite of its silence, hardly anyone believes the BRN was behind the bombing, as the Bangkok attack was outside the separatist insurgents' traditional theatre of violence, namely the historically contested Malay-speaking southernmost provinces.

However, this doesn't mean that the BRN has never carried out an attack on the scale of the Erawan Shrine bombing. But the BRN will push the violence only up to a point, long-time observers within the Thai security community say. It cannot afford to lose its moral high ground or jeopardise its grass-roots support, they add.

In the early stages of the current wave of insurgency violence, which surfaced in 2001 and went into full swing in January 2004, combatants did push the limits too far, murdering public school teachers and Buddhist monks as well as mutilating corpses of soldiers killed in their attacks. If insurgency is a form of communicative action, then the audience at the time was mainly local communities, as well as military commanders who would naturally be demoralised to see their soldiers decapitated or castrated.

But the insurgents consistently gauged local community sentiment and adjusted their focus accordingly, away from "soft targets" and towards the military and police.

Although there are direct attacks against civilians once in while, these acts are understood to be tit-for-tat killings between the state and the insurgents. One example is the murders of three Buddhist women who were shot at close range in February 2014, their bodies then set on fire. The incident was apparently retaliation for the murder of three young boys in Pattani's Bacho district, reportedly carried out by two paramilitary rangers, who retracted their confession in court a year later.

The vast majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of ambush and roadside bombings against security force patrols, essentially aimed at discrediting the security apparatus.

In May, for example, the city of Yala was rocked by almost 40 explosions in a bombing spree that lasted three successive days. Security planners were left speechless when their hastily implemented measures failed to stop the bombing.

For the record, according to BRN sources, no shrapnel was used in the bombs and only a handful of people suffered injuries, which were minor.

Even when BRN combatants have attacked targets outside the region, like Hat Yai, Phuket and Samui, achieving a high body count has never been part of the plan.

In one such incident, for example, a pick-up truck bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres was parked at the Phuket Police Station on December 2013. BRN sources said the operative left the bomb switch off on purpose, choosing merely to demonstrate their capabilities, as well as their disapproval at the absence of rules of engagement among government troops.

The same operation also saw Songkhla's Sadao district come under simultaneous bomb attacks, fulfilling a vow made earlier by insurgents.

While the Sadao attacks demonstrated the BRN could live up to its word, the Samui attack in May this year was a stern warning against the flouting of rules of engagement and against a so-called peace process in which the separatist organisation's name was being used without their approval and their people harassed to come on board.

BRN sources said the groups' ruling council did not endorse the peace initiative begun under Thaksin Shinawatra's administration and continued under his sister Yingluck's rule, or the current "pre-talks" with MARA Patani aimed at reviving negotiations.

With no genuine channel of communication between the BRN and Bangkok, Thai authorities have rushed to rule out any connection with the southern insurgency whenever a fresh incident occurs - whether it be the explosives left at a Bangkok street corner in May 2013, the Phuket Police Station truck bomb in December 2013 or the Samui car bomb in April this year.

The only exception was the December 31, 2006 New Year bombings in which three people were killed and 40 injured.

A lengthy investigation implicated the insurgents, yet the military-installed government downplayed the findings and instead suggested it was the work of people who had been ousted from power, ie, the Thaksin camp.

Too often, the authorities' knee-jerk reaction has come back to haunt them when evidence emerges to undermine their claims. It was subsequently revealed that vehicles used to ferry the Phuket and Samui bombs were from Pattani and Yala. Meanwhile the culprits behind the May 2013 Bangkok bombing were said to be part of an organisation seeking to force its way into the Yingluck peace initiative. The irony was not lost on observers.

Although moral high ground is important, it doesn't mean that the BRN would never carry out an attack in the deep South of the size and scale of the Ratchaprasong bombing.

Take, for example, the triple car bombs on Yala's Ruammit Street that killed 14 people and injured about 120 in late March 2012. The attacks were in response to an overture made two weeks earlier by Thaksin Shinawatra towards the 16 leaders of various separatist organisations in a bid to have them join the peace process.

The absence of any attacks on this scale outside the region is another indication that the BRN realises that Bangkok and the international community would not tolerate such a broadening of the theatre of violence.

Failing to heed the warning sent by the Yala attack, the Yingluck government pressed on with the relaunch of peace talks a year later on February 28, 2013.

Today, MARA Patani is a manifestation of that half-baked peace initiative launched under Yingluck's watch, with the junta uncertain of what else to do except to go with the flow. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha must know he cannot afford the publicity disaster that would ensue if he was to ditch the initiative.

Back when the Yingluck initiative was in the pipeline, MARA Patani was treated as a side-show, often referred to as "Track 1.5".

The Ruammit triple car bomb shows that the BRN is willing to use a body count to make a point. The incident received significant media coverage, partly because the scale of the tragedy and partly because of the fact that Hat Yai was also hit. But it quickly became yesterday's news. The prevailing attitude among the Thai public and policymakers is that, as long as the violence is confined to the deep South, people will continue to tolerate it.

For the BRN and other separatist organisations, extending attacks beyond the historically contested region is a way of warning the Thai state of their disapproval of aspects of the peace negotiations and also the culture of impunity among security officials.

But more importantly, the perception of BRN moral high ground must remain intact, especially in the eyes of the local Malay Muslim residents. How long this quid pro quo arrangement will stand, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Insurgents focus ire on local defence volunteers

Army's 'Thung Yang Daeng Model' is under pressure after militants 'send 'warning'

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Ban Pulea, Yala __Shortly after midnight on Friday, a group of about 30 insurgents attacked a small security outpost run by a local Defence Volunteer (DV) unit in Yala's Yaha district.

Eighteen of the DVs were left injured, six seriously, after nearly 30 minutes of gunfire and grenade attacks.

DV camp in Yala's Yaha district. Photo by: DON PATHAN

Local residents said it wasn't much of a fight as the DVs either fled or lay flat on their stomachs in the bamboo hut where they had been sleeping. Bullet holes and damage from the M79 grenades also suggest it was a one-way battle. The militants made off with seven government-issued weapons.

Nevertheless, villagers in the area expressed surprise at the fact that the Malay Muslim insurgents had launched an attack against the DVs.

Their logic was simple: DVs are part of the local community and that should count for something in the eyes of the Malay Muslim insurgents. That logic is backed by the low number of violent confrontations between insurgents and DVs since January 2004.

But Friday's attack signalled a change in that trend, exiled separatist leaders said.

Sources in the separatist community said the idea behind this latest attack was to issue a stern warning to local Malay Muslims not to join up with the security apparatus.

Specifically, Friday's attack was a slap in the face for the Thung Yang Daeng Model, an Army initiative to outsource routine security work to local residents including the DVs, village chiefs and kamnans.

With the initiative, the Thai military is basically telling village-based officials that they no longer have the luxury of "looking the other way", and that if they are going to be on the government's payroll, they have to put their lives on the line for the state security apparatus.

DVs comprise locally recruited security details that come under a chain of command that runs from the Interior Ministry through the provincial government, district chiefs, village heads and kamnans.

The DVs are sometimes called on to provide security for ministry officials, and the insurgents rarely single them out for attack.

The attack on Friday marked the first time that a DV camp had been overrun by insurgents. It also marked the first time since February 2013 that Malay Muslim insurgents had launched an operation on any sort of military-security camp in this restive region, where more than 6,000 people have been killed since January 2004.

The February 2013 operation saw some 50 insurgents charge a Royal Thai Marine camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district. The marines had prior warning of the attack thanks to information found on the body of an insurgent who had been killed two weeks earlier in nearby Sai Buri district.

The incident ended in the death of 16 insurgents but revealed a level of support for their cause among the local residents, many of whom attended funerals at which the attackers were celebrated as martyrs in line with Islamic tradition.

The attack on Friday in Yaha shared features with other insurgent operations. Two roadside bombs were placed to the east of the camp, while on the west side, a huge tree was felled and road spikes laid to slow the arrival of reinforcements. Yaha police station is just four kilometres away.

Besides mobilising the local officers in the Interior Ministry chain of command, the Thung Yang Daeng Model also calls for the recruiting of local Muslims as reconnaissance scouts for Paramilitary Ranger patrols.

The military believes that locally hired Rangers should have a better idea of where the local cells are concealed. Unlike the DVs, the Rangers don't see themselves as sitting ducks for the insurgents.

And with locally recruited young men working as their scouts and directives from the regular Army unit commanders, these Rangers are constantly conducting long-range reconnaissance patrols to hunt down insurgents.

For the time being, their family members are being left alone. Separatist leaders said the militants are not permitted to harass the family members of local Rangers, though the movement considers those who join the paramilitary unit "fair game".

Speaking to reporters at the scene of Friday's attack, Lt-General Prakarn Cholayuth, commander of the 4th Army Region, said the incident was an example of how such security units were at the "receiving end" partly through being exposed and out in the open.

Prakarn said the role of DVs would continue unabated but added that certain adjustments would have to be made in order to strengthen their capacity to counter the militants. He didn't say what sort of adjustment would be made. But from the look of it, all sides - the Army and officials at the village level - will have to do some serious soul searching.

The separatist militants have already let the government know how far they are willing to go to rattle the much-praised Thung Yang Daeng Model. The ball, it seems, is now in the Thai court.

Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Yala. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

A goodwill gesture brutally batted aside by insurgents

A history of mistrust has come back to haunt the latest peace efforts in the South

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

The recent release of a senior Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) member from prison was seen as a goodwill gesture by the Bangkok government, but the group that controls the vast majority of the insurgents in the deep South has demonstrated its campaign of violence in the region will continue unabated.

Last week a bomb attack in Pattani province's Sai Buri district killed a monk and a soldier and left eight people injured.

Members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) separatist umbrella organisation said they welcomed the release of Ma-ae Sa-a, better known to his peers as Sama-ae Thanam, or Ismail Gadaffi. But the move will have no effect on the ongoing peace talks with the separatists, or their struggle for a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the so-called Patani region.

Sama-ae was arrested by Malaysian authorities in 1998 and secretly handed over to the Thai police. Others captured in the same operation were Haji Abdul Rahman Bazo (aka Haji Beudo Betong), Abdul Rahman Haji Yala, and Haji Da'oud Thanam.

Bazo was released in November 2013 after he turned 70. Government sources said the release of Bazo and Sama-ae, as well as the pending release of Da'oud, was in line with Justice Ministry regulations on early parole for good conduct. But in this case the releases also had a political dimension, observers said.

Efforts to get these Pulo leaders released are nothing new. In the aftermath of the day-long stand-off between Thai security forces and Patani Malay insurgents at the Kru Se Mosque on April 28, 2004, exiled separatist leaders quietly suggested to the Thai side that the men should be released so they could serve as go-betweens with the new generation of insurgents, who had gone on the offensive a few months earlier following an arms heist in January.

The April 28, 2004 operation saw well over 100 young men, armed with little more than machetes and knives, charge into a hailstorm of machinegun bullets.

Thai officials and exiled leaders from longstanding separatist groups were shaken by the incident and its ramifications: if so many militants were willing to charge to almost certain death, what were the possibilities?

The old guard, once released from prison, might not be able to convince the new generation of fighters to lay down their arms. But it was suggested that they could broker an understanding, such as over rules of engagement, between the two sides.

But nobody on the Thai side was willing to act on these suggestions.

A closer look at the militant network behind the Kru Se incident, which was under the directive of charismatic religious teacher Ismail Yaralong (aka Ustaz Soh), revealed that the militants were influenced by what some called "folk Islam".

Those who took part in the simultaneous attack on 10 police outposts and one station in Pattani, Songkhla and Yala on April 28, 2004, said they had imbibed holy water, inscribed their machetes with "bismillah" - in the name of God - and gone into trance before launching their operation at the break of dawn.

Copies of a motivational pamphlet "Bir Jihad di Patani" (The Struggle of Patani) were found on some of the insurgents. Though it contained no theology, zealous Thai officials took it upon themselves to call it the "new Koran".

Though Ustaz Soh's network was short-lived for obvious reasons -machetes proved no match for Thai machineguns - their operation inspired great respect among locals. Not only did it instill real fear in the Thai security apparatus, but many locals said they were moved by the fact that these young men gave up their lives for the cause. During the stand-off, one militant used loudspeakers to call on local Muslims to rise up against the "Siamese invaders". General Pallop Pinmanee, the highest ranking military officer in Pattani at the time, ordered an all-out assault on the mosque for fear that the locals would actually rise up against state officials.

The idea of releasing the Pulo leaders has surfaced several times over the years, but no Bangkok government has acted on it for fear of political repercussions.

In fact, both Malaysian and Thai officials failed to see the consequences of arresting the Pulo leaders until then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra decided she wanted to talk peace.

Sama-ae said recently he never thought he would be arrested by the Thai authorities as he had been involved in facilitating secret talks between the two sides.

Sources in the BRN said they didn't want to end up like the Thanam brothers and added that they would never endorse any peace negotiation until properly prepared and that Bangkok would not deceive them the way they did these Pulo leaders.

The extradition of the prisoners reminded leaders of longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups that Kuala Lumpur will always place bilateral ties with Thailand over the wellbeing of their people.

The 1998 arrests of the Pulo leaders violated an unwritten agreement between Thailand and Malaysia that no such action would be taken as long as former combatants and operatives did not make trouble for their host country.

Members of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) have received Thai citizenship, while the Patani Malay exiled leaders were granted Malaysian citizenship or permitted to relocate to a third country.

The armed struggle of the CPM and the Patani Malays surfaced in the mid-1960s but went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The former was a communist insurgency and the latter ethno-nationalist in nature.

But Thai authorities didn't make the distinction between the two and were busy applauding themselves for a job well done. As for the current wave of separatist militants, the 1990s proved to be the lull before the storm - a period when a new generation of combatants were being groomed to take up where their predecessors had left off.

This time around, instead of relying on help from Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, they would become self-sufficient. And as long as the Patani Malay narrative remained alive, the moral and logistical support of local residents was more or less guaranteed.

Today, in spite of the rhetoric concerning peace and the peace process, insurgency violence in Thailand's Malay-speaking South continues unabated and with no end in sight.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and security analyst based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).