Three years after coup, peace remains elusive in southern Thailand

Don Pathan
The Nation

EVEN though the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) did not cite the conflict in the far South as one of the reasons for launching a coup three years ago, the generals nevertheless inherited a mess of a challenge as they decided to continue with the peace initiative with the separatists initiated by the previous government.

The then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra kicked off her peace initiative on Feb 28, 2013, one year after her fugitive brother, Thaksin — with the help of his associates and cronies — paved the way for the official launch.

The Thai army was more or less kept in the dark throughout the entire planning and preparation process. The same goes for the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one long-standing separatist movement that today controls virtually all militants on the ground, which was pretty much caught off-guard when the initiative was officially launched.

Hasan Taib was designated as the “liaison” by Thailand and Malaysia; his job was to convince all other long-standing separatist groups and leaders, especially members of the secretive BRN ruling council, to come to the negotiating table. When it was clear that the BRN wouldn’t budge, Hasan threw in the towel and went incommunicado.

At about the same time, the government in Bangkok went into a tailspin as “Shutdown Bangkok” set the stage for a coup in May 2014.

While the generals did not create the February 2013 peace initiative, they were stuck with this hot potato, and some wanted to scrap it altogether.

In the end, after nearly seven months of deliberation, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha went to Kuala Lumpur to meet his Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak and formally request that Kuala Lumpur continue to act as the facilitator for the talks.

Security planners in Bangkok do not see Malaysia as an honest broker but rather as a stakeholder. But that is all the more reason for the Malaysians to be at the table.

Having three stakeholders in the talks with no neutral mediator would prove to be a disastrous endeavour given the historical mistrust among the three parties that still prevails.

The NCPO asked that a new phase of talks be inclusive, meaning all the long-standing separatist groups working under one common platform.

The junta also wanted to be sure that they were talking to the right people, and that participants at the talks could prove they had command-and-control on the ground. Their short-term goal was to reduce violence on the ground.

The problem with the Thai generals was that they were not interested in making concessions or addressing the historical grievances of Patani Malays. Their aim was to get the “real guys” to the table and go from there, they thought.

BRN members said the junta was only concerned with its own legacy and did not want to be seen as the people who “gave away Patani”, so they were not about to give much legitimacy to whoever came to the table.

By August 2016, MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation made up of long-standing separatist groups, was introduced to the public at a press conference in Kuala Lumpur. It was billed as a platform for the separatists to make their case. The focus of attention was on a group of young religious teachers who participated under the BRN banner.

But BRN operatives on the ground and abroad insisted these few self-proclaimed “BRN leaders” did not have the mandate of the group’s ruling council. The BRN information department would issue a rare public statement late last year to say that they were not involved in this peace initiative. They issued a similar statement last month to say much the same thing, reiterating that any talk with the Thais must be observed by foreign governments.

Like previous Thai governments, the current junta wanted to treat the dialogue process as a domestic issue as much as possible. With the exception of Malaysia’s involvement, Bangkok will continue to resist any attempt by the international community, such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to assist with facilitation or mediation.

Attempts by OIC to raise the conflict in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South in their forum have been resisted by the current and previous Thai governments. The Foreign Ministry has been quick to send Thai diplomats, along with friendly Thai Muslims, to lobby groups such as the OIC and other Muslim countries.

Over the past three years, the NCPO launched various programmes to win the hearts and minds of the local villagers, the main backers of the BRN militants.

Projects such as “Bring People Back Home”, a half-baked public relations exercise that was billed as an amnesty programme, was carried out but did nothing in terms of changing the course of violence. Mistrust between local Malay Muslims and the Thai state continues unabated.

The junta also pulled out regular army troops from the region and replaced them with locally hired, poorly trained paramilitary Rangers who form part of the military’s security grid in the restive region.

Outsourcing security work to locally hired officials, such as kamnan, village chiefs and defence volunteers is a work in progress. These local officials who fall under the interior ministry have been accused by the army of turning a blind eye to insurgents’ activities. But forcing them to put their lives on the line by going on foot patrols with regular soldiers has not produced the kind of outcome the army has been hoping for.

Former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, in an interview with The Nation, said the junta paid lip service to the long-standing argument that counter-insurgency work is political, not military.

But creating space to enhance state legitimacy in this historically contested region required a high degree of sophistication; the fact that the state agencies responsible for the conflict in the far South keep changing does not help the overall situation, especially when the aim is to enhance the capacity of those agencies.

Moreover, the front line cabinet dealing needs to be broadened so that diverse voices from the region can be represented.

Abhisit said the current inherited peace initiative should not open itself up too fast to the public, not before trust and confidence between negotiating parties can be established.

Last month, the BRN reissued their demand for talks with Bangkok. Similar demands were made in 2013 shortly after the Yingluck initiative was launched. But the idea then was to derail the process, according to sources in the movement. This time around, the intention is to engage in direct talks with the Thais.

Thai soldiers welcomed the move as they had pretty much lost hope with the current dialogue with MARA Patani. They said it would be good to establish a channel of communication with people who can actually control the combatants.

Bangkok did not rule out direct talks in principle but suggested that such a request should go through Malaysia, the designated facilitator.

Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur are also concerned that a second track would undermine the existing one, in which both countries have already invested a great deal of resources.

Both countries would rather see the BRN come on board in the existing dialogue. But given the bickering between MARA Patani and the BRN, Thailand and Malaysia might have to wait a very long time before these two Patani Malay movements can patch up their differences.

—The Nation/Thailand

Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2017
https://www.dawn.com/news/1335018/three-years-after-coup-peace-remains-elusive-in-southern-thailand 

Peace remains elusive in deep South amid local bickering and mistrust

DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION

EVEN THOUGH the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) did not cite the conflict in the far South as one of the reasons for launching a coup three years ago, the generals nevertheless inherited a mess of a challenge as they decided to continue with the peace initiative with the separatists initiated by the previous government.



The then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra kicked off her peace initiative on February 28, 2013, one year after her fugitive brother, Thaksin – with the help of his associates and cronies – paved the way for the official launch.

The Thai army was more or less kept in the dark throughout the entire planning and preparation process. The same goes for the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one long-standing separatist movement that today controls virtually all militants on the ground, which was pretty much caught off-guard when the initiative was officially launched.

Hasan Taib was designated as the “liaison” by Thailand and Malaysia; his job was to convince all other long-standing separatist groups and leaders, especially members of the secretive BRN ruling council, to come to the negotiating table. When it was clear that the BRN wouldn’t budge, Hasan threw in the towel and went incommunicado.

At about the same time, the government in Bangkok went into a tailspin as “Shutdown Bangkok” set the stage for a coup in May 2014.

While the generals did not create the February 2013 peace initiative, they were stuck with this hot potato, and some wanted to scrap it altogether.

In the end, after nearly seven months of deliberation, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha went to Kuala Lumpur to meet his Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak and formally request that Kuala Lumpur continue to act as the facilitator for the talks.

Security planners in Bangkok do not see Malaysia as an honest broker but rather as a stakeholder. But that is all the more reason for the Malaysians to be at the table.

Having three stakeholders in the talks with no neutral mediator would prove to be a disastrous endeavour given the historical mistrust among the three parties that still prevails.

The NCPO asked that a new phase of talks be inclusive, meaning all the long-standing separatist groups working under one common platform. The junta also wanted to be sure that they were talking to the right people, and that participants at the talks could prove they had command-and-control on the ground. Their short-term goal was to reduce violence on the ground.

The problem with the Thai generals was that they were not interested in making concessions or addressing the historical grievances of Patani Malays. Their aim was to get the “real guys” to the table and go from there, they thought.

BRN members said the junta was only concerned with its own legacy and did not want to be seen as the people who “gave away Patani”, so they were not about to give much legitimacy to whoever came to the table.

By August 2016, MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation made up of long-standing separatist groups, was introduced to the public at a press conference in Kuala Lumpur. It was billed as a platform for the separatists to make their case. The focus of attention was on a group of young religious teachers who participated under the BRN banner.

But BRN operatives on the ground and abroad insisted these few self-proclaimed “BRN leaders” did not have the mandate of the group’s ruling council. The BRN Information Department would issue a rare public statement late last year to say that they were not involved in this peace initiative. They issued a similar statement last month to say much the same thing, reiterating that any talk with the Thais must be observed by foreign governments.

Like previous Thai governments, the current junta wanted to treat the dialogue process as a domestic issue as much as possible. With the exception of Malaysia’s involvement, Bangkok will continue to resist any attempt by the international community, such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to assist with facilitation or mediation.

Attempts by OIC to raise the conflict in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South in their forum have been resisted by the current and previous Thai governments. The Foreign Ministry has been quick to send Thai diplomats, along with friendly Thai Muslims, to lobby groups such as the OIC and other Muslim countries.

Over the past three years, the NCPO launched various programmes to win the hearts and minds of the local villagers, the main backers of the BRN militants.

Projects such as “Bring People Back Home”, a half-baked public relations exercise that was billed as an amnesty programme, was carried out but did nothing in terms of changing the course of violence. Mistrust between local Malay Muslims and the Thai state continues unabated.

The junta also pulled out regular army troops from the region and replaced them with locally hired, poorly trained paramilitary Rangers who form part of the military’s security grid in the restive region.

Outsourcing security work to locally hired officials, such as kamnan, village chiefs and Defence Volunteers is a work in progress. These local officials who fall under the Ministry of Interior have been accused by the army of turning a blind eye to insurgents’ activities. But forcing them to put their lives on the line by going on foot patrols with regular soldiers has not produced the kind of outcome the army has been hoping for.

Former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, in an interview with The Nation, said the junta paid lip service to the long-standing argument that counter-insurgency work is political, not military.

But creating space to enhance state legitimacy in this historically contested region required a high degree of sophistication; the fact that the state agencies responsible for the conflict in the far South keep changing does not help the overall situation, especially when the aim is to enhance the capacity of those agencies.

Moreover, the frontline Cabinet dealing, which is led by Deputy Defence Minister Udomdej Saithibutr, needs to be broadened so that diverse voices from the region can be represented.

Abhisit said the current inherited peace initiative should not open itself up too fast to the public, not before trust and confidence between negotiating parties can be established.

Last month, the BRN reissued their demand for talks with Bangkok. Similar demands were made in 2013 shortly after the Yingluck initiative was launched. But the idea then was to derail the process, according to sources in the movement. This time around, the intention is to engage in direct talks with the Thais.

Thai soldiers welcomed the move as they had pretty much lost hope with the current dialogue with MARA Patani. They said it would be good to establish a channel of communication with people who can actually control the combatants.

Bangkok did not rule out direct talks in principle but suggested that such a request should go through Malaysia, the designated facilitator. Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur are also concerned that a second track would undermine the existing one, in which both countries have already invested a great deal of resources.

Both countries would rather see the BRN come on board in the existing dialogue. But given the bickering between MARA Patani and the BRN, Thailand and Malaysia might have to wait a very long time before these two Patani Malay movements can patch up their differences.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/30315994

DON PATHAN is a security analyst and a consultant based in Yala, one of the three conflict-affected southernmost provinces. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil |society group dedicated to promoting critical discussion on the insurgency in Malay-speaking South.

Answers to the puzzle of Pattani Big C bombing

Attack on mainly Muslim shoppers may have been launched by rogue BRN militants, even as their handlers’ express willingness to talk peace  

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Pattani

Within hours of Tuesday’s bomb attack at a Big C supermarket in Pattani, Thai security officials were pointing the finger of blame at Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all the insurgent combatants.


Twenty-four hours later, authorities announced they had identified the four culprits but would not make their names public.

Photos and video were released of the stolen pickup loaded with a homemade bomb as it passed through the store’s security checkpoint.

Tinted windows that disguised the assailants’ faces were lowered just far enough to hand over an identification card, which belonged to the owner of the stolen vehicle, whose body was later found in a village in Pattani.

The security guard apparently didn’t bother to check if the face of the driver matched the photo ID. As at most security checkpoints in Thailand, it was a case of going through the motions and waving the customer through.

The two attackers transporting the bomb made it through with ease. Waiting for them on getaway motorbikes nearby were two accomplices.

Despite the forest of checkpoints and security cameras across this conflict-affected region, where an ongoing insurgency has claimed nearly 7,000 lives since January 2004, insurgents continue to evade detection by security officials and their network of informants.

For the past 13 years, this has been a cat-and-mouse game for the Thai security apparatus. Preventive measures and the security grid have failed to curb hit-and-run attacks against patrols and remote military and police outposts. Soldiers patrolling back roads are sitting ducks for militants manning detonators, with weapons locked and loaded to finish off casualties from the blast.

Many of the soldiers are young and sent to this historically contested region with little understanding of the conflict’s nature. They find themselves up against “ghosts” – no state official really knows who is an active insurgent – but also an entire Patani Malay community that is indifferent to the government’s counter-insurgency operation and wider plan for the region.

The authorities are quick to blame separatists for almost every violent incident. For the local Malays, however, it is clear that pro-government death squads are also part of the picture. When a group of armed men jump out of a pickup and start firing into a teashop full of Muslim villagers, it is difficult to reach any other conclusion.

On the other hand, coordinated and simultaneous attacks, roadside bombings, and ambushes against security units are generally understood to be the work of insurgents. News travels fast in this restive region. Yesterday’s incident is chewed over at breakfast the next morning in village teashops. “Were the victims goats or pigs?” is usually the first question as the men sip tea and eat roti. “Goats” means Malay Muslims while “pigs” refers to Thai Buddhists.

But on Tuesday in Pattani, the “goat and pig” distinction got all mixed up as both Malays and Thai Buddhists lay injured outside Big C waiting to be treated by paramedics.

More than meets the eye

A government spokesman wasted no time in lashing out at separatist militants. But senior officials monitoring the situation closely were scratching their heads over why the BRN would launch an attack against the people they are supposed to be “liberating”. Nothing is being ruled out, including the possibility of an attack by a rogue unit upset with BRN leadership for stating their willingness to negotiate with the Thai state last month.

Evidence from many attacks prior to Tuesday’s bombing suggests insurgents had not been targeting civilians. The raid on a Narathiwat district hospital last year saw 30-plus insurgents evacuate the building of medical staff before using it as a staging ground to assault the Paramilitary Ranger camp next door. Buddhist doctors and nurses even told reporters how polite the insurgents were.

In other incidents, innocent bystanders have been killed by insurgents’ stray bullets, though Thai authorities don’t make a distinction between such accidental killings and murder. In their eagerness to demonise the insurgents, they purposely leave out certain facts. In doing so, they also undermine their own analysis and credibility.

Insurgent sources in the South say they don’t believe anybody in their movement could have carried out Tuesday’s attack, given the fact that most shoppers at the supermarket were Muslims. However, the fluidity of the BRN command-and-control structure means that each cell is given freedom to decide which targets to hit. And given such leeway there is naturally a tendency to escalate the intensity and scale of the violence.

Attack on peace process?

One senior Thai security officer suggests the Big C bombing could be the latest in a wave of attacks avenging the extrajudicial killings of two militant suspects on March 29 by Rangers.

Sources in the BRN said the April attacks were also aimed at discrediting the ongoing peace dialogue between the government and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of several longstanding separatist movements.

It’s an open secret that MARA Patani and the BRN are competing to strengthen their constituencies – winning over combatants, as well as civil society organisations and community leaders in the region, to further their cause and agenda.

One advantage that MARA Patani has over others lies in its inclusion in the peace dialogue – the quasi-official track with the Thai state that is being facilitated by Malaysia.

The BRN insisted last month that it was the legitimate dialogue partner for talks with the Thais but that other foreign governments must also be involved as facilitator-observers.

Hope in BRN statement

Needless to say, the BRN statement generated a great deal of interest at all levels of Thai officialdom. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha didn’t shoot the idea down but instead suggested that the BRN talk to the facilitator, Malaysia.

But for Thai soldiers in the far South, the statement was a welcome one.

“It would be great to be able to talk to somebody who has command and control [over the insurgents],” said one Thai army intelligence officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

When asked if he thought Bangkok was prepared to make meaningful concessions to the BRN or the Malays in the far South, he replied, “Probably not. But at least it’s an opportunity to go over issues that are within our reach and to exchange ‘pigs’ and ‘cats’,” said the officer, using the Thai expression for horse-trading.

“We can go over things like rules of engagement, and use the meeting to verify which side was responsible for this or that particular incident. After all, there are many competing actors who have no qualms about using violence to get what they want in this region.”

Don Pathan is a security analyst and freelance consultant based in the far South and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation promoting critical discussion on the conflict in the far South.