Sources in southern Muslim separatist movement tell Anadolu Agency that bomb attacks and gunfight show new junta what militants are still capable of
By Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency
PATTANI, Thailand
Bomb attacks and a sporadic gunfight between security forces and Malay Muslim separatists in Thailand's three southernmost provinces this weekend were a contemptuous gesture to a new Thai junta, which has this week seized power through a coup and placed the Muslim-majority region under an even tighter leash.
Sources in the separatist movement told The Anadolu Agency on Sunday that the simultaneous attacks, which claimed three lives and injured more than 60 people, were in the planning for some time.
Nevertheless, the sources underlined that the timing of the coup was an opportunity for them to show the junta what they are capable of in spite of strict measures imposed on a southern region that has already been living under controversial martial law and security acts for nearly a decade.
The sources -- who did not wish to be named out of matters of personal security -- are part of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing armed separatist group that surfaced in the mid-1960s.
They told the AA that the attacks were a statement to the military forces that they will not let up on efforts to discredit their operations, and will make the area as ungovernable as possible.
More than 5,000 people have been killed in Thailand’s Muslim-majority southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and five Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004.
BRN said they are determined to reclaim their historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces.
In recent years the group has suggested that they are willing to enter into negotiation with the Thai government but has remained ambiguous on whether they are willing to settle for anything less than full independence.
Thailand announced in early 2013 that it had entered into peace talks with a faction of BRN, but a vast majority of the movement -- especially leaders with command-and-control over insurgents on the ground -- refused to go along with talks mediated by the Malaysian government.
Part of the reason, said the BRN sources and Thai officials speaking on condition of anonymity, was because the movement does not see Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker.
Moreover, the movement said it has yet to forgive Malaysian officials for secretly handing over to Thailand some of its leaders, some of whom are serving life in Thai prison on treason charges.
The Saturday evening explosions were mostly carried out in the city of Pattani, the historical capital of the Malay Muslim sultanates.
About a dozen power poles were brought down in the blasts, crippling power supplies and sending much of Pattani into darkness.
Many ATM's were also shut down due to the ensuing power shortage, and gas stations were forced to close for the day. Sporadic gunfights were heard in at least a couple of locations on the outskirts of Pattani.
Narong Sahamethapat, the permanent secretary for public health, was quoted by the Bangkok Post Sunday as saying that 51 of the injured had been released from hospitals and 22 were still being treated, including a two-year-old boy who was seriously wounded.
The Royal Thai Navy’s Adm Narong Pipattanasai reportedly ordered sailors and marines to go on high alert after a patrol boat anchored on Pattani River was hit by a grenade thrown by suspected insurgents.
"The explosion ripped a big hole in the side of the vessel and slightly injured three officers," Navy spokesman Rr Adm Kan Dee-ubon was quoted as saying by the Bangkok Post.
Colonel Banpote Poolpien, spokesman for the Fourth Army’s Internal Security Operation Command, the army-dominated multi-agencies that oversee the situation in Thailand’s deep South, told reporters that the military believes the Saturday night attacks were linked to the political turmoil in Bangkok.
Lt. General Walit Rojanaphakdi, commander of Army Region 4, however, ruled out blaming the attacks on the removal of Thawee Sodsong, the recently ousted secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SPBAC).
Thawee was the key figure behind the Malaysia-backed peace process that was formally launched in February 2012 by the recently ousted government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
His transfer put the already shaky Kuala Lumpur-backed peace process in jeopardy but sources in the Thai army said they are still interested in talking to the separatists, preferably without Malaysia’s participation. The army would like to keep the dialogue strictly between the combatants of both sides and without third party mediation or facilitation.
Sources in the BRN said they welcome the idea of a back channel communication to talk about various issues, such as rules of engagement, and to function as a sort of clearinghouse to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.
Both sides said that taking the first step toward establishing such a channel will be very difficult because it requires taking a big leap of faith, but insisted that the Thai side is willing to do so.
BRN sources, on the other hand, said they are not in a hurry and wanted to make sure that the channel will not be a trap.
aa.com.tr/en
DON PATHAN Senior Program Officer for Regional Security Cooperation at The Asia Foundation
Monday 26 May 2014
Saturday 24 May 2014
Map of violence could open a path to peace in deep South
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
May 24, 2014
Special to The Nation
May 24, 2014
Both sides want to create a channel of communication to verify which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal
As a result, the two warring factions have been left to unilaterally observe unwritten ground rules: no direct attacks against civilians - though "unavoidable collateral damage" is "acceptable".
Meanwhile the security apparatus, and the pro-government death squads working for "rogue" units, are not supposed to target religious leaders and imams, no matter how close they are to local militant cells. Insurgents reciprocate by excluding Buddhist monks, temples and Chinese religious shrines, as well as public schools and teachers, from their hit list.
Not long after the current wave of insurgency went into full swing in January 2004, insurgents decapitated and castrated soldiers after gunning them down. The idea was to make a contemptuous gesture to the local commanders, nothing more.
Sources in the separatist movements said such acts were a far cry from the actions of South Asian or Middle Eastern jihadists, who often videotape the beheading-execution of their victims and post the clips on the Internet.
As for the insurgents in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, it took some time for the religious element within the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and other circles to convince the militants to end such practices.
Ironic as it may seem, a nationalist conflict in Thailand's Malay-speaking South is citing Islamic rules of war to end the practice of decapitation and mutilation, while self-proclaimed holy warriors in South Asia and the Middle East have no qualms about beheading their enemies to make a political statement.
The ground rules in Thailand's insurgency also extend to prohibiting arson attacks on public schools, the bastion of state-constructed narrative that local Malays dismissed as an assault on their historical and cultural identity.
But because there is little unity among Thai security agencies, and the fact that the command-and-control on the BRN side is still somewhat fluid, while other longstanding separatist groups also have militants in the field, abiding by the ground rule is easier said than done.
Too often, emotion gets the better of combatants on both sides, generating a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat killings.
The attack in February this year on a family in Narathiwat's Bacho district that ended in the killing of three brothers by two Paramilitary Rangers is a case in point. Authorities insisted that the two Rangers had acted on their own, seeking revenge against a suspect who had entered into a plea bargain with the authorities in exchange for their dropping legal action against him. Authorities said the man whose three sons were killed was affiliated with a local insurgent cell and that he had ordered a hit on a Rangers' family member some time ago.
Neither Muslim residents nor the insurgents bought the explanation, refusing to believe that the two rangers had acted without permission from above.
There were reports of a third assailant - a Buddhist member of the armed forces - but his identity was not revealed. According to government sources, the third attacker's identity had to be kept out of the public gaze because it would have raised unwanted questions and undermined the official line - that the killing of the boys was part of a blood feud between local Muslims and something the authorities had nothing to do with.
At about the same time, another series of tit-for-tat killings between Muslim residents and Muslim security officials was taking place in Yala's Bannang Sata. The killing spree escalated and the "collateral damage" spread as family members - parents, children and toddlers - from both sides were targeted.
Insurgents hit back with a two-day bomb blitz in Yala, including a car bomb that started a fire that burned down an entire block of wooden shophouses in the heart of the city's busy business district.
They also extended the "warning" attacks to Hat Yai, an area that is supposed to be off-limits but is targeted as a pressure point whenever the insurgents deem that the Thai side has violated the ground rules.
The last time insurgents hit Hat Yai was in March 30, 2012, two weeks after fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra met with 16 separatist leaders in his attempt to kick-start a peace process. The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention.
A similar spike in violence came later that year in November following the shooting death of a young and influential imam, Abdullateh Todir, in Yala's Yaha district, reportedly assassinated by a pro-government death squad. The "spike" - not so much in terms of the number of attacks but more their brutal nature and the fact that the targets were supposed to be off-limits - lasted for six weeks. Three Buddhist teachers were shot dead and three public schools torched during that period. A pro-government death squad hit back with a gangland-style shooting at a teashop full of Muslims on December 11, 2012 in Narathiwat's Rangae district, killing four, including an 11-month-old baby girl.
One of the biggest concerns for security agencies is the possibility that the insurgency violence could be expanded to areas outside the Malay-speaking region. Hat Yai is technically off-limits, but an attack against the city signals a strategic violation of the ground rules by the insurgents.
Phuket and Bangkok, on the other hand, are supposed to be totally off the radar screen. That psychological threshold was violated on December 22, 2013 when Phuket police discovered a massive bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres inside a stolen pickup truck parked inside the station's lot. The vehicle was stolen from Pattani's Sai Buri in May 2012, so how long it had been parked at the Phuket police station is anybody's guess.
Separatist sources said the bomb plot deliberately targeted Phuket. The idea, they said, was to send a stern warning to the authorities of what the movement is capable of.
Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng Soi 43/1 was hit in May 2013 by a Malay Muslim cell, but the official line is that the attack was part of a local dispute.
Meanwhile, Thai security forces are saying they want to set up a back channel of communication with the insurgents, especially those in direct contact with combatants, to function as a sort of clearing house to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.
Sources in the BRN say they welcome the idea, as it could clear up misunderstandings over who is doing what. But if security forces are planning to use the channel to spread the same half-truths they dish out to the public, the BRN will not be interested in talking to them.
Both warring sides say they are interested in seeing this back channel evolve into something bigger and better. But taking this first initial step won't be easy, as it requires each side to take a big leap of faith towards trust and confidence in the other.
Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Meanwhile the security apparatus, and the pro-government death squads working for "rogue" units, are not supposed to target religious leaders and imams, no matter how close they are to local militant cells. Insurgents reciprocate by excluding Buddhist monks, temples and Chinese religious shrines, as well as public schools and teachers, from their hit list.
Not long after the current wave of insurgency went into full swing in January 2004, insurgents decapitated and castrated soldiers after gunning them down. The idea was to make a contemptuous gesture to the local commanders, nothing more.
Sources in the separatist movements said such acts were a far cry from the actions of South Asian or Middle Eastern jihadists, who often videotape the beheading-execution of their victims and post the clips on the Internet.
As for the insurgents in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, it took some time for the religious element within the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and other circles to convince the militants to end such practices.
Ironic as it may seem, a nationalist conflict in Thailand's Malay-speaking South is citing Islamic rules of war to end the practice of decapitation and mutilation, while self-proclaimed holy warriors in South Asia and the Middle East have no qualms about beheading their enemies to make a political statement.
The ground rules in Thailand's insurgency also extend to prohibiting arson attacks on public schools, the bastion of state-constructed narrative that local Malays dismissed as an assault on their historical and cultural identity.
But because there is little unity among Thai security agencies, and the fact that the command-and-control on the BRN side is still somewhat fluid, while other longstanding separatist groups also have militants in the field, abiding by the ground rule is easier said than done.
Too often, emotion gets the better of combatants on both sides, generating a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat killings.
The attack in February this year on a family in Narathiwat's Bacho district that ended in the killing of three brothers by two Paramilitary Rangers is a case in point. Authorities insisted that the two Rangers had acted on their own, seeking revenge against a suspect who had entered into a plea bargain with the authorities in exchange for their dropping legal action against him. Authorities said the man whose three sons were killed was affiliated with a local insurgent cell and that he had ordered a hit on a Rangers' family member some time ago.
Neither Muslim residents nor the insurgents bought the explanation, refusing to believe that the two rangers had acted without permission from above.
There were reports of a third assailant - a Buddhist member of the armed forces - but his identity was not revealed. According to government sources, the third attacker's identity had to be kept out of the public gaze because it would have raised unwanted questions and undermined the official line - that the killing of the boys was part of a blood feud between local Muslims and something the authorities had nothing to do with.
At about the same time, another series of tit-for-tat killings between Muslim residents and Muslim security officials was taking place in Yala's Bannang Sata. The killing spree escalated and the "collateral damage" spread as family members - parents, children and toddlers - from both sides were targeted.
Insurgents hit back with a two-day bomb blitz in Yala, including a car bomb that started a fire that burned down an entire block of wooden shophouses in the heart of the city's busy business district.
They also extended the "warning" attacks to Hat Yai, an area that is supposed to be off-limits but is targeted as a pressure point whenever the insurgents deem that the Thai side has violated the ground rules.
The last time insurgents hit Hat Yai was in March 30, 2012, two weeks after fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra met with 16 separatist leaders in his attempt to kick-start a peace process. The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention.
A similar spike in violence came later that year in November following the shooting death of a young and influential imam, Abdullateh Todir, in Yala's Yaha district, reportedly assassinated by a pro-government death squad. The "spike" - not so much in terms of the number of attacks but more their brutal nature and the fact that the targets were supposed to be off-limits - lasted for six weeks. Three Buddhist teachers were shot dead and three public schools torched during that period. A pro-government death squad hit back with a gangland-style shooting at a teashop full of Muslims on December 11, 2012 in Narathiwat's Rangae district, killing four, including an 11-month-old baby girl.
One of the biggest concerns for security agencies is the possibility that the insurgency violence could be expanded to areas outside the Malay-speaking region. Hat Yai is technically off-limits, but an attack against the city signals a strategic violation of the ground rules by the insurgents.
Phuket and Bangkok, on the other hand, are supposed to be totally off the radar screen. That psychological threshold was violated on December 22, 2013 when Phuket police discovered a massive bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres inside a stolen pickup truck parked inside the station's lot. The vehicle was stolen from Pattani's Sai Buri in May 2012, so how long it had been parked at the Phuket police station is anybody's guess.
Separatist sources said the bomb plot deliberately targeted Phuket. The idea, they said, was to send a stern warning to the authorities of what the movement is capable of.
Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng Soi 43/1 was hit in May 2013 by a Malay Muslim cell, but the official line is that the attack was part of a local dispute.
Meanwhile, Thai security forces are saying they want to set up a back channel of communication with the insurgents, especially those in direct contact with combatants, to function as a sort of clearing house to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.
Sources in the BRN say they welcome the idea, as it could clear up misunderstandings over who is doing what. But if security forces are planning to use the channel to spread the same half-truths they dish out to the public, the BRN will not be interested in talking to them.
Both warring sides say they are interested in seeing this back channel evolve into something bigger and better. But taking this first initial step won't be easy, as it requires each side to take a big leap of faith towards trust and confidence in the other.
Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
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