Negotiating Peace in the Far South, Anutin Style

sECURITY

High-Level Meeting between Thai and BRN negotiators in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Jan. 2026.

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

The Kissinger Conundrum

Thailand’s new negotiating team for the far south – formed under the new government – moved quickly by inviting senior military officers from the Philippines and Indonesia to Bangkok to share lessons from the Mindanao and Aceh peace processes with the Thai army.

The new Thai team is led by a civilian, Thanut Suvarnananda, the country’s chief of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which has been central to the efforts in resolving this long-running conflict between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state.

Thanut Suvarnanada

Progress has not come easily. As a key stakeholder, the army has never accepted the idea of engaging separatists on equal terms.The military continues to believe the insurgency can be defeated through force alone. It has also spoken of winning the hearts and minds of local Malays, but that goal has remained out of reach.

Henry Kissinger once observed that military forces can clear an area, but without a political plan, insurgent networks simply reconstitute themselves once the troops withdraw. 

The new team’s most pressing challenge is persuading the Thai military to abandon this all-or-nothing approach.

Part of the problem is a fundamental mismatch in how each side frames the conflict. The military treats the insurgency as a security matter, while the insurgents view their struggle as political. Without a revised counterinsurgency strategy that addresses this gap, the stalemate and violence will continue.

Why Bangkok Refuses to “Negotiate”

But even if the Thai army abandons its zero-sum mindset, the question of concessions remains. Thailand has shown little willingness to give ground. In fact, all previous chief representatives, with the exception of Dr Mark Thamthai, refused to use the word “negotiation” in reference to the peace talks, fearing it would grant the Melayu rebels too much recognition and legitimacy.

One advantage the Mindanao and Aceh peace initiatives had that Thailand lacks is the direct involvement of the international community. The Malaysian mediator at the time, Tengku Datu Abdul Ghafar Tengku Mohamad, was backed by the International Contact Group (ICG), a body comprising states and international NGOs that played a direct and decisive role in steering the Mindanao peace process toward final peace agreement. The Aceh process had similar support and arrangement.

The Thai initiative once included five international observers, a concession to Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN). This long-standing separatist movement commands nearly all the combatants on the ground. However, the process failed to make effective use of their expertise, as their role was kept narrowly limited.

A further advantage the Mindanao and Aceh processes shared was genuine political will—a commitment from their respective governments to make concessions. Thailand’s peace process, formally launched on 28 February 2013, has never progressed beyond the confidence-building measure (CBM) stage to address substantive issues.

The Thai process ground to a halt under Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s administration, which refused to resume talks unless the BRN first ended all forms of violence. BRN countered that any reduction in violence – or ceasefire – would itself need to be negotiated, and that an international monitoring team working alongside local CSOs would have to be permitted to observe the process.

Both sides held firm until Paetongtarn was removed from office on ethical grounds in August 2025, paving the way for Anutin Charnvirakul’s first government – a three-month caretaker administration – that established a new negotiating team.

Buzzwords vs Autonomy

BRN viewed Anutin’s initiative as a hollow gesture, given that his government would only be in office for three months. Nevertheless, the two sides met three times during that brief window.

Their final meeting took place on 8-9 January 2026 in Malaysia, which unfortunately did not go well. Two days later, BRN blew up 11 petrol stations, along with the attached convenience stores, across the Malay-speaking south. The signal was unmistakable: BRN would not be treated as a prop. The rebels resented being exploited to bolster Anutin’s political image.

A BRN officer dismissed Anutin’s decision to form a peace negotiation team as “pretentious.” Critics argue the move was a public relations stunt to portray Anutin as a man of action during his brief three-month government. In contrast, his predecessor, Paetongtarn, sent no representatives to the negotiating table.

The Thai delegation introduced the buzzword “end state” during three meetings but failed to define any concrete government concessions. While Anutin’s faction heavily promoted the phrase, BRN interprets “end state” strictly as “self-governance”.

For BRN, this requires a regional assembly that grants the Patani people self-determination, local tax collection rights and a formal power-sharing mechanism with Thailand’s central government.

A second message carried comparable importance: BRN has expressed dissatisfaction with ongoing discussions that lack a substantive and actionable agenda. To BRN, the talks should progress beyond CBM and address concrete issues. Topics such as self-governance, power-sharing, and the establishment of a regional assembly must be included in the dialogue.

Before that can happen, BRN must consult its constituency – the people of Patani – to determine whether its demands align with the community’s aspirations.

This process, known as public consultation, is one of three core agenda items that have been on the negotiating table for some time. The other two are cessation of violence and a political solution to the conflict. All three were enshrined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP), the agreed roadmap for the peace process.

Since Anutin took office in August 2025, the JCPP has been rebranded as the Peace Dialogue Plan Implementation Framework (PDPIF), signalling a rhetorical shift from “planning” to “implementation”.

Information Operations

There has been a discussion among the Thai defense planners about using Thai CSOs to replace the five international observers. How far their involvement would extend remains unclear, but the most credible CSOs – those with strong ties to the Malay community and the respect of BRN – will likely refuse to participate.

The military and local CSOs have long been at odds, locked in a battle over control of the conflict’s narrative. The CSOs have faced persistent harassment through legal proceedings and disinformation campaigns on social media platforms, orchestrated by military actors who regard CSO criticism as a security threat.

Several CSO leaders face criminal charges simply for using terms such as Bangsa Patani (the Patani nation) or advocating the right to self-determination for the people of this historically disputed region. Groups like The Patani and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (CAP) are among those affected, alongside human rights defenders who face ongoing death threats because of toxic nationalism and coordinated attacks by pro-government accounts operating across social media and through information operations (IO).

BRN, however, has stated it will continue to insist on international community participation as observers of any official talks.

While the number of violent incidents has fallen sharply – from 1,400 in 2007 to 150 in 2025 – the outlook for the new negotiating team is not encouraging. The first four months of 2026 alone saw a surge in violence to 258 incidents.

Squeezing the Narrative as Violence Escalates

The decline in incidents from 2007 to 2025 was driven by an expanded security presence with Paramilitary Rangers deployed to remote areas, which significantly reduced response times to insurgent activity.

But the statistics alone do not capture the full picture. Insurgents have compensated for fewer attacks by maximising psychological impact. The era of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that went largely unnoticed is over.

Today’s attacks are designed to be seen, heard, and felt – above all by policymakers in Bangkok. Besides the attacks on the 11 petrol stations, in July 2025, the government bomb squad unearthed 11 EIDs in Krabi and Phuket—two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast.

The then defence minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the insurgency in the far south, even though the arrested culprits were from the region. He urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage. Security officials, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.

Another high-profile incident is the 9 March 2025 attack on the Sungai Kolok district office by a 10-strong BRN unit, killing two Defence Volunteers (DVs) and injuring eight others. The assault ended with a car bomb that ripped through the compound moments after the combatants retreated.

As things stand, the Thai army opposes any formal commitments—no MoUs, no ceasefire agreements. Any suggestion of granting BRN a degree of legitimacy, or even acknowledging the political dimension of its activities, is likely to be rejected. Many Thai military officials continue to regard the BRN simply as criminals.

As for the so-called peace talks, many observers regard Thailand’s participation as insincere. The prevailing view is that Bangkok’s sole objective is to reduce violence to a manageable level. There is no genuine appetite to make concessions to BRN or the Malays of Patani, or to explore a framework for peaceful coexistence between the far south and the rest of the country.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit to the authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far south.

Don Pathan

Thailand’s million-dollar gold heist reveals costly price of peace in insurgency-hit south

The robbery in Sungai Kolok, near the Thai-Malaysian border, bore the hallmarks of a rebel-led operation, the defence minister said

The suspects are caught on CCTV fleeing the scene after grabbing bags of gold on October 5. Photo: Thai police

Don Pathan

www.scmp.com 

A million-dollar gold heist in Thailand’s far south by armed robbers who blocked roads with spikes and set explosives to seal their escape across the Malaysian border has rattled the Thai security establishment, as efforts to reignite peace talks in an area roiled by insurgency continue to fall flat.

Around 20 men working in three teams carried out the October 5 theft from a gold shop in Sungai Kolok, bordering Malaysia’s Kelantan State.

The theft of hundreds of gold ornaments and jewellery valued at over 36.5 million baht (US$1.13 million) came as prices for the precious metal spiked to historic highs of over US$4,200 per 28 grams (one ounce) earlier this month.

Using two stolen getaway trucks, the robbers planted road spikes and explosives to obstruct police pursuit in a heist so well-oiled that Thai authorities immediately attributed it to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN).

FULL ARTICLE

When Separatist Bombs Shake Thailand’s Tourist Shores

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Explosive Ordnance Disposal officers neutralising bombs in Phuket.

IEDs in Tourist Destinations

Actions speak louder than words. In Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, where a two-decade separatist insurgency has claimed over 7,700 lives, the dominant rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), keeps its intentions shrouded in mystery. 

Such tactics have irritated the Thai security apparatus ever since this wave of insurgency returned to the Malay-speaking South over two decades ago. It will continue to be that way as long as the Thai state and other stakeholders, such as Malaysia, do not support BRN in setting up a recognisable and functional political wing that can engage and explain its stance to the world.

The unearthing of 11 improvised explosive devices (IED) in Krabi and Phuket – two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast – sent a shockwave in all directions. This is despite efforts by policymakers in Bangkok to minimise the incident by not linking it to the insurgency in the far south.

The two suspects caught at a police checkpoint in Phang-nga are from Pattani. Their confessions led police to more hidden bombs: one in an abandoned motorcycle near Phuket International Airport, two buried at Patong Beach and one at Promthep Cape.

The Australian and Canadian governments, on 1 July and 4 July 2025, respectively, issued separate updated terrorism warnings to their citizens travelling to Thailand in response to the arrests of two suspects.

One of the two IEDs found in Krabi was planted on a seawall at Ao Nang Beach near the commercial area; the second was discovered beneath a banyan tree at Noppharat Thara Beach.

All IEDs were deactivated by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers using high-power water cannons.

The then Defence Minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the conflict in the far south and urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage to avoid possible chaos. Security officials at the operational level, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.

Policymakers and security officials agreed that the bomb size – which, according to one military intelligence officer, had an explosive radius of about 10 metres – was designed to create psychological impact and discredit the state security apparatus rather than take lives or inflict major physical damage.

The two suspects, while providing information leading to the locations of other IEDs, claimed they were merely hired to drive the vehicle, according to media reports quoting unnamed official sources.

True to form, BRN neither confirms nor denies its involvement, though during military operations its negotiators occasionally issue statements or videos reiterating demands. Insights into the group’s mindset emerged when chief negotiator Anas Abdulrahman spoke to the media briefly after high-level talks with Thai negotiators.

Faltering Peace Process

BRN made no public statement about the IEDs but indicated that in the absence of a formal peace process, increased violence intensity and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable. The attack against the Sungai Kolok district office exemplified this, occurring after secret negotiations over a Ramadhan ceasefire were exhausted, setting the stage for combatant intervention.

The last such press conference followed a February 2024 meeting, where both sides agreed in principle to work on the roadmap for the talks—the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP). Since then, BRN has largely stayed out of the public eye, with sporadic video statements offering only fragmented glimpses into the movement and its demands.

The peace process began unravelling soon after the February meeting when Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, a key advisor to the ruling Pheu Thai Party, publicly criticised the JCPP.

He slammed the Peace Dialogue Panel for failing to curb BRN violence and accused international mediators and donors of neglecting Thailand’s national security. The Panel was badly isolated, and it may not recover, as hardliners pushed through uncompromising recommendations, like classifying BRN as a “terrorist” organisation as a way to pressure Malaysia – the designated mediator/facilitator – to deport the movement’s leaders.

In the second half of 2024, the Thai government was in disarray after the Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for ethics violations in a cabinet appointment. The cabinet’s dissolution left the Peace Dialogue Panel obsolete—a status that persists today, as no new team has been appointed. 

Incoming Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra inherited the southern Thai crisis. Unwilling to burden the political novice, senior officials in the security sector pushed the agenda way down in the list.

Bangkok now insists it will only resume talks if the BRN halts violence—a demand the rebels reject, arguing that de-escalation or ceasefire must be negotiated and that international observers must be allowed to monitor any ceasefire on the ground.

Thailand’s refusal to compromise frustrated Malaysia, the designated mediator for the so-called peace process, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the facilitator who has been trying to reached out to the army for serious discussion on how to move the peace process forward. But he would come to learn that the lack of political will applies to everybody in the Thai government, not just the army.

Escalating Violence

Paetongtarn’s political inexperience was exposed last month when Cambodian strongman Hun Sen leaked a recording of her criticising Thailand’s military over the border standoff with Cambodia. The scandal damaged both her credibility and the Shinawatra family’s political standing.

Some observers say this could be the beginning of the end of the family that has been dominating Thai politics for more than two decades.

Meanwhile, violence in the Deep South has escalated over the past six years, with a sharp uptick in March 2025 after Thailand rejected BRN’s counter-proposal for Ramadhan ceasefire. Talks collapsed, and the rebels launched a bold assault on Sungai Kolok’s district office in Narathiwat on 8 March 2025, killing two security personnel and wounding 10 before detonating a car bomb.

These locally hired security officials, known as Defence Volunteers, have been told to quit their jobs and to refrain from acting as spies for the Thai security apparatus, or else they would be considered legitimate targets.

The shooting death of a senior member in the BRN military wing, Abdulroning Lateh, on 18 April 2025, triggered further retaliation, including attacks on monks and civilians—a breach of the group’s usual rules of engagement.

The incident prompted a wide range of condemnation from civil society organisations and direct intervention from The Patani, a political action group who called on the BRN leadership to respect the commitment they made with members of the international community and to respect humanitarian principles, international norms, and civility.

BRN later reaffirmed its policy of avoiding civilian targets in a press statement but made no reference to any particular incident. The message, aimed at reining in fighters, eventually restored attacks to “legitimate” military and government targets. 

Conflict and Political Crisis

Combatants stepping out of line and violating their own rules of engagement is uncommon but does occur, as seen in the targeting of soft targets to avenge Abdulroning’s assassination.

Operations outside the Malay-speaking South have also occurred periodically, usually as a retaliation against Thai security forces for alleged violation of the unwritten ground rule. In August 2019, for example, Bangkok was hit by six small bombs as the city hosted meetings of Southeast Asian foreign ministers and their counterparts from the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and other world powers.

In August 2016, 13 bombing incidents struck Hua Hin and four upper Southern provinces – Phuket, Surat Thani, Trang, and Phang-nga – in a 48-hour span in what then-prime minister Prayut Chan-ocha called “an attempt to create chaos and confusion.”

Today, Thailand has once again found itself in a political crisis, with the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspending Prime Minister Paetongtarn pending an investigation into her conduct over the phone conversation with Hun Sen. The Pheu Thai party is also under pressure from the opposition and the public to call fresh elections or face a vote of no confidence.

Peace talks are expected to resume if and when the People’s Party (PP) takes control of the government. The party has shown willingness to accommodate the demands of BRN and the Malay-speaking region. How far PP is willing to go, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

But if the current coalition survives the ongoing political storm, violence in the far south will continue to rise, as neither side is willing to reconsider their current course of action.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

• 
  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

• 
  

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Not everybody agrees that Malaysia can play an honest broker to facilitate peace in southern Thailand. Credit: Mahendra Putra/Unpslash

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

A fragile truce holds in Thailand's deep south

OPINION

A fragile truce holds in Thailand's deep

south

Peace talks with Malay rebels can resume after insurgents curb campaign of violence

Don Pathan

March 7, 2025 05:05 JST

An armed Thai soldier stands guard as three Thai-Muslim students stroll past the compound of Yala Islamic College in Yala province,

southern Thailand. © AP

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

In December 2024, a leading figure in southern Thailand's biggest rebel group lamented the

Thai government's lack of action on the peace process that was supposed to resume once a

new government came to power after the 2023 general election.In a video statement, Nikmatullah Bin Seri of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -- the one

long-standing Malay Muslim separatist group that controls virtually all of its combatants on

the ground -- said the BRN was prepared to leave the peace process and take back the

group's decision to negotiate under the Thai constitution.

The following month, Thai Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai called on all relevant

agencies to draft an "actionable solution" for the government's counterinsurgency strategy.

He gave them 30 days.

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Hint of ‘self-determination’ in Thai south rankles

Calls for a referendum gauging support for independence in the Muslim-majority region spark panic

By ASMADEE BUEHENG
Asia Times

A map of Thailand's southernmost border provinces. Image: Wikimedia

PATTANI, Thailand – A recent seminar on rights to self-determination by a newly formed student movement in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south got people running for cover after the Thai Army threatened legal action against a mock vote asking the participants whether they would support a referendum that could pave the way toward a separate state for the Muslim-majority region.

The plebiscite would ask: “Do you agree with the ‘right to self-determination’ as the underlying principle behind a referendum that would allow the voice of the Patani people to be heard so they can vote for independence through legal means?“

The army was offended and is thinking about taking legal action. Most Thai officials equate “right to self-determination” in the Muslim-majority far south to separatism.

More than 7,300 people have died from insurgency-related violence since January 2004 and the end is still nowhere in sight in spite of a series of peace talks that have yet to move beyond confidence-building measures.  

The deputy leader of the Prachachat Party, Worawit Baru, one of the speakers at last week’s seminar, was quick to distance himself from any call for a referendum, saying he was only speaking about such rights in general terms.

Other parties also ran for cover. Particularly disappointing to many participants was the leader of the Fair Party, Pitipong Temcharoen, whose party campaigns heavily in the far south, playing up local identity, freedom of speech, justice and equality for the Malay people and their cultural narrative. 

Instead of supporting free speech and freedom of expression, Pitipong’s first move was to save his own skin. He posted on Facebook that his party does not support separatism and anybody who embraces such ideas or engaged in such activities should face disciplinary action. 

Fair Party deputy secretary general Hakim Pongtigor, an ethnic Malay in the far south and a strong supporter of the right to self-determination who spoke at the event, has been under heavy pressure from his supporters to leave the party because of what Pitipong posted. 

“Declaring Patani an independent state is a crime, but talking about it should not be,” Hakim said. (The term “Patani,” spelled in English without the double “t,” refers to Deep South region of Thailand.)

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani political movement and one of the speakers at the seminar, said the aftermath of the event was a moment of truth for all the so-called pro-democracy political parties currently trying to form a coalition government.

“Instead of standing up to the right-wing media and the government’s information operation as it tries to twist the seminar into some sort of a criminal event, some of these political figures were quick to distance themselves from the event for fear of being labeled as pro-separatist. All the students were asking is whether there should be a referendum for on the right to self-determination. They didn’t call for a separate state,” Artef said.

Seeds of separatist sentiment

Obviously, the student movement that organized the seminar was pushing that line. Given the new political atmosphere in the country, they felt the need to test the waters.

As people who grew up with the constant threat of martial law and emergency decrees, legislation that former prime minister Anand Panyaranchun once called a “license to kill,” these students have observed the changing political landscape in Thailand and believe important issues such as the right to self-determination and referenda should no longer be discussed in the dark.

They also know that declaring independence for any region is a crime under Thai law.

But judging from the reaction from the Fourth Army Area, the command that oversees the day-to-day security situation in the far south, it appeared that the military will not let the new political landscape take over without a fight. 

Indeed, the battle has always been over narratives. On one side, the Malay-speaking far south is an integral part of Thailand. On the other side, the Patani region belongs to the Malays and that the Muslims here have the moral obligation to liberate this historical homeland from the invaders. 

One of the speakers at the event, Associate Professor Mark Tamthai, who spoke via video streaming from Chiang Mai, said both sides have always claimed that the people are with them. But there is no concrete evidence, such as a referendum, to support their claim.

Tamthai was the chief negotiator for the southern peace negotiation during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government.

The recently concluded Thai general election saw democracy and Malay nationalism came up quite prominently in the Patani region. But politicians had their priorities elsewhere; Patani nationalism and talks of a peace process don’t win votes.

But they can dodge the issue for only so long. At a recent press conference, Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader of the Move Forward Party and currently the frontrunner for the prime minister’s post, was put on the spot when asked if a government under his leadership would allow the far south go independent. 

Pita tried to play it safe and suggested that the conflict was rooted in the region’s livelihood, public health, and economy. His party’s anti-military stance blinded him from reaching a thorough and deeper understanding of this century-old conflict that continues to surface generation after generation.

The fact that Pita doesn’t have any Melayu (ethnic Malays) in any key position working on conflict resolution in Patani suggested that he doesn’t understand the sentiment of the people here. In this respect, Move Forward is not much different from other parties. 

The army’s critics like to point to the mistakes and atrocities committed by the state to explain the reasons for armed rebellion. But a new generation of fighters were being groomed in the 1990s when the situation was quite calm. They would surface in mid-2001 but were dismissed by the government of Thaksin Shinawatra as “sparrow bandits.”

An arms heist on January 4, 2004, from which combatants from the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) made off with more than 350 weapons, forced the government in Bangkok to acknowledge their presence. 

In fact, the narrative that ethnic Malays have a moral obligation to liberate their homeland from the invading Siamese has never died. 

The new crop of incoming Thai political leaders should know that their good intentions will not end the conflict or get the Malays to stop dreaming about Merdeka. They can be as benevolent they want. But a benevolent colonial master is still a colonial master.

While Pita’s off-the-wall statement could be excused because he is not familiar with the conflict and its complexity, Fair Party secretary general Kannavee Suebsang jolted a lot of people with his statement about the need to replace Malaysia with Indonesia as the mediator for the peace talks with BRN, the group that controls the combatants on the ground.

Textbooks on conflict studies may suggest that Malaysia is not qualified as an honest broker because its geographical proximity to Thailand’s Patani region. But nobody in Southeast Asia cares much about what the textbooks say, do they?

There is no honest broker anywhere in Southeast Asia, a region where states are fraught with overlapping claims and territorial disputes – a legacy of the colonial powers.

Whoever comes into the next Thai government should ask the people of Patani, regardless of ethnicity and race, what they really want. If they opt for independence, then the state will know that it has to work that much harder to win them over.

Who knows, the right to self-determination could be that missing term of endearment needed for peaceful co-existence. Indeed, nobody ever said governing was easy. 

An artist takes part in a graffiti event as part of the Saiburi Street Xhibit in Pattani - one of Thailand's southernmost Muslim majority provinces hit by a deadly insurgency - on February 28, 2016. Photo: AFP/Madree Tohlala 

Asmadee Bueheng is a freelance writer based in the Patani region of southern Thailand. He is the author of Rawang Thang Satta (“Along the Road of Faith”), published in March 2023.

What to make of Thailand’s Ramadan-time ‘truce’ offer to BRN rebels

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand

Tan Sri Gen. Zulkifli Zainal Abidin (right), Malaysia’s new facilitator for peace talks in Thailand's far South, shakes hands with Thailand's chief negotiator, Gen. Wanlop Raksanoh, in Bangkok, Thailand, during his visit on March 3, 2023. (Credit: Fourth Army Area Command, Public Relations Department)

The Thai government, in an apparent peace overture in late March, urged Barisan Revolusi Nasional separatist rebels to stand down from hostilities during Ramadan in the far south.

In a statement that seemed to offer BRN the olive branch of a truce, Thailand’s negotiating team in Malaysia-brokered peace talks with the insurgents expressed its “intention of having a good atmosphere and without violence throughout the month of Ramadan so that our brothers and sisters can observe Ramadan safely.”

Meanwhile, sources on both sides told this observer that the negotiating team representing the rebel group has now decided to sit out meetings with the Thais at all levels until after next month’s general election in Thailand.

Because Islam’s holy month of fasting overlaps this year with another auspicious religious observance, the Buddhist New Year of Songkran, the Thai side in its March 24 statement invited BRN “to help create a positive and non-violent atmosphere” in Thailand’s southern border region, where Muslims are the majority.

On the surface, the idea sounded pleasant to the casual observer and general public. But to people who observe this conflict closely, politicizing holidays, regardless of religion, doesn’t help the situation. 

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group that promotes the right to self-determination for the people of this historically contested region, “The pretentiousness behind Thailand’s suggestion is so unnecessary.” 

“If they really wanted to carry out a ceasefire, they need to do it right, like accepting suggestions from the BRN that terms of reference (TOR) be jointly drafted to allow the participation of an international monitoring team,” Artef said. 

The rebels were hoping the issue would make it to the high-level negotiation during the last round of peace talks, held in Malaysia in late February. But the Thais had other things in mind.

Thailand’s appetite for members of the international community to get involved in conflict resolution in the far south has always been low. There is a general understanding that any foreign participation has to be done on Thailand’s terms.

The extension of the olive branch struck many as something created for public consumption, as was the case with a recent statement from the head of the Thai panel in the talks, Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, who expressed the hope that the long-running conflict could be settled in two years’ time. Anything to suggest progress is being made is welcome, especially in the middle of an electoral campaign season.

Seeing no point in talking to a government that is totally focused on the upcoming general election, BRN has since indicated that it would not be meeting again with the Thai side at any level until a new administration is formed in Bangkok.

By the look of it, Thailand’s veiled invitation for a ceasefire was ripped from BRN’s playbook.

In April 2020, when Thailand and other Southeast Asian nations were in the early throes of the  COVID-19 pandemic, BRN announced a unilateral ceasefire on humanitarian grounds across the Deep South, saying that health workers shouldn’t have to worry about being caught up in the crossfire between the combatants in the long-running conflict.

In spite of an appeal from local activists for the military to stand down and reciprocate BRN’s goodwill gesture, the army at the time unleashed its troops to hunt down BRN combatants staying in remote villages. BRN said these cells weren’t part of any ongoing operation and their fighters were merely laying low while observing the unilateral ceasefire. 

However, during the first 24 months of BRN’s unilateral ceasefire – from April 2020 to April 2022 – Thai troops killed scores of suspected BRN fighters in a series of standoffs, where government security forces, who heavily outnumbered and outarmed the insurgents, surrounded them as they hid out in villages. 

As many as 64 suspected BRN insurgents were killed by Thai forces in such standoffs during BRN’s unilateral ceasefire, and only one rebel surrendered. Many of those who were holed up  fought to their deaths knowing that the odds of escaping alive were slim to none. 

So far, the Deep South has not been free of violence during this year’s Ramadan.

Thai authorities have reported at least four suspected attacks by insurgents, including a fatal one and a flurry of attacks this past weekend:

On March 29, a deputy village headman was shot and injured in Pattani province.

On April 7, two defense volunteers were injured by a roadside bombing in Pattani.

On Saturday evening, suspected rebels shot dead a village defense volunteer as he was leaving a mosque and walking home after prayers in Tak Bai, a district in neighboring Narathiwat province.

And early Sunday morning, suspected insurgents attacked a military outpost in Yala province, but no one was injured.

BRN in polls waiting mode

BRN’s move lately to push the pause button on any more meetings until a new Thai government is formed will give all the sides some time to go back to the drawing board. 

In the past, there was a problem with continuity; a new government in Bangkok used to mean a new team of negotiators. It remains to be seen if the current team of Thai negotiators – officially known as the Peace Dialogue Panel – will remain in place when the next government comes to power. 

Still, much work still lies ahead because the peace process has reached a critical juncture as Thailand, Malaysia, and the BRN struggle to identify common ground on how to push the talks along. The list of issues that need to be pinned down in the negotiations includes public consultations, reduction of violence, and political solutions for bringing this conflict to an end. 

Of late, inclusivity has also emerged as an issue to put on the table; Thailand wants other insurgent groups in the far south to join the talks but BRN thinks it’s too early to include them in high-level negotiations. However, BRN is willing to consider the participation of these groups at the technical level where in-depth discussions on the aforementioned three items usually take place, according to one informed rebel source. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/peace-talks-ramadan-04092023232102.html
(ไทย)  https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-my-deepsouth-pathan-04102023015327.html

 

Bangkok battles to bridge trust gap with insurgency’s controlle

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

YALA, Thailand

Barisan Revolusi Nasional remains wary of peace talks after years of Thai military-backed ‘trickery’

Talk of another Bt50 million grant to bridge the trust gap between local civil society organisations (CSOs) in the far South and state agencies, namely the Army, has been in the air for some time. But if it’s anything like the first grant delivered earlier this year, the money will not be worth the hassle.

The fund created bitter division among the local CSOs, some of whom now see the grant aid as a Trojan horse, pitting friends against friends in arguments over the very idea of receiving money from the military, especially when strings are attached.

The Army said driving a wedge among CSOs was not its intention and suggested more money was on its way. They insisted it was meant to help boost the capacity of local CSOs and instil progressive ideas among groups like the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS) and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (Kor Por Sor). As expected, these organisations rejected the offer.

Promoting rules of engagement 

There is also talk of asking international non-government organisations (INGOs) to do more work with local CSOs and, if possible, with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the separatist group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the decades-old insurgency.

The idea is to promote concepts such as International Humanitarian Law, and the Geneva Convention. Privately, Thai officials hope these ideas will cause a split between the more progressive faction and the hardliners in the BRN.

Yet it’s not entirely clear where the Army is going with the idea of strengthening the capacity of civil society. General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the new chief negotiator for the peace initiative, said he would like to see southern CSOs come together to mediate relations between the government and the BRN. That could be a forlorn hope, given that local CSOs are split over issues like peace talks.

BRN sources said getting the CSOs to play a mediation role is a pipe dream and, worse, a cynical strategy aimed at pitting civil society against the BRN movement. BRN operatives argue that, in many ways, they are closer to the people than the CSOs can ever be. They claim to have cells in just about every tambon, with eyes and ears constantly testing the mood of their constituency.

Combatants say they always listen to the concerns of villagers, especially over how the war is fought. The arson attacks on Buddhist temples and schools and the mutilating of Thai soldiers’ bodies that were frequent in 2006 have since given way to “legitimate” attacks on security apparatus, while restraint is being shown when “soft” targets are occasionally chosen.

The brutality in 2006 came to a halt after local residents, including religious leaders, protested it violated Islamic principles. The conflict with the Thais is still very much ethno-nationalist in nature, but the voices of local Muslims at the grassroots had to be respected, BRN operatives conceded.

By contrast, locals remain somewhat indifferent on the subject of negotiations with the state, said BRN operatives. For what it’s worth, chief Thai negotiator Udomchai has been saying all the right things, telling the Malaysian government and the CSOs that he does not believe in forcing BRN leaders to come to the table. While Thailand’s negotiators would like nothing more than to talk with the BRN ruling council, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP), they are reluctant to support harsher measures promoted by Malaysia that might force BRN leaders further underground.

If they did go to ground, BRN chiefs would disappear from everybody’s radar, making it more difficult to construct a channel of communication with the insurgency’s controllers. Udomchai also ditched plans for a Safety Zone and the ceasefire that came with it, suggesting the scheme was dead.

BRN sources meanwhile said negotiations with the Thais were not on their priority list. The fact that MARA Patani is already at the table doesn’t help. MARA Patani is an umbrella group of long-standing separatist movements that no long control militants in the insurgency zone. BRN sources said they would like to reach a better understanding of international norms and strengthen their capacity before they even begin to consider negotiating with Bangkok.

The movement sees the various peace initiatives over the years as part of a shrewd strategy to trick their leaders into surfacing and then forcing an agreement without addressing the historical grievances of their people. Raising the bar to peace even higher is that more and more BRN operatives now see full independence for the far South as a moral obligation.

Nevertheless, Thai officials are trying hard to establish a channel of communication with the DPP, either through Malaysia or friends and relatives of the leaders.

Artef Sohko, The Patani

“Already, Thai authorities have been leaning on friends and family of known DPP figures, trying to use them as intermediaries,” said Artef Sohko, a political activist from The Patani, a local CSO aimed at promoting rights to self-determination for the people in this region.

Patani Malay activists are now being approached by Bangkok to act as go-betweens. But these individuals said they are concerned they may become targets for violence by “spoilers” in the peace process or those with different agendas.

They point to the shooting death of Pattani Islamic cleric Ustaz Waesumae Suden, in September 2014, and the murder of Yala Imam Abdullateh Todir, in November 2012, as examples of what can happen to civilians who get too involved in the peace initiative.

Sadly, just about every senior Thai figure assigned to the far South, either as a commander or negotiator, has believed they had a trick up their sleeve that would magically break the deadlock. Needless to say, none of their plans has worked, each falling victim to their over-eagerness to get things done on their watch.

They refuse to see the conflict in generational terms, and each and everyone has gone home empty-handed by the end of their mission.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based freelance security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.