Monday 15 November 2010

Massive refugee influx a worry in all-out conflict

By Don Pathan
The Nation

November 15, 2010

The writing was already on the wall, and so when armed clashes erupted on the Thai-Burmese border, just everybody was saying, “I told you so”.

But few thought the first crack of gunfire would have erupted in Myawaddi, a Burmese border town adjacent to Mae Sot district in Tak province.

Myawaddi fell temporarily under the hand of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), itself a splinter group that broke away from the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1995. But all sides knew that such occupation was symbolic as the rag-tag Karen outfit could not hold onto the seized area.

Fighting between government troops and rebel soldiers also erupted elsewhere. Militia from the Shan State Army-North engaged in sporadic gunfights with government troops in northern Shan state. A similar engagement between the junta and the rebel KNU also took place in areas adjacent to Kanchanaburi.

For months all eyes were on the Sino-Burmese border, where the 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA) were doing everything it could to avoid going to war with the Burmese junta. An all out fight between the Wa and the junta would devastate the entire border arrangement, but it appeared that the Burmese would have liked to “save the best for last”, said a Thai intelligence officer. He added that the junta may have preferred to take out smaller outfits before moving up to challenge the bigger fish.

The Burmese have yet to make their first move and for the time being there is no sign of mobilisation of troops against the Wa stronghold in Panghsang, said a UWSA official on condition of anonymity. He was speaking from the Wa stronghold on the Sino-Burmese border.

Ever since the ouster of former security tsar General Khin Nyunt in October 2004, the relationship between the Burmese government and groups with which it had a ceasefire has taken a turn for the worse.

None of these groups had worked with any other Burmese leader except Khin Nyunt. And with the security tsar removed from the top military line-up six years ago, the ethnic armies had no choice but to deal directly with the junta. But such a task would prove to be virtually impossible as General Muang Aye and Burmese supreme leader General Than Shwe weren’t interested in making any concessions, much less giving the groups an exit strategy.

The ruling State Peace and Development Council’s demand was that these ethnic armies lay down their weapons and transform themselves into the country’s border guards under the direct command of the Tatmadaw.

Some of the small groups had no choice but to swallow their pride, surrender their weapons and take up the border-guards position. But major groups such as the Wa and other major outfits decided they were not going to be a walkover.

These leaders were determined to protect their investments, business interests and their armed outfits all of which they had spent decades putting together. Some of these so-called investments stemmed from, among other things, heroin and opium cultivation, smuggling, logging, gems and fisheries.

Last year’s attack against the Kokang did not only catch Beijing off guard but it was also wake-up call for China. In the past Beijing pretty much allowed the Yunnan government a free hand to deal with the ethnic armies along the Sino-Burmese border. Many of these groups have historical and personal ties with the Chinese authorities dating back to the days of the communist insurgency. UWSA troops, for example, were once foot soldiers of the now defunct Communist Party of Burma.

But that strategic leverage was pretty much shattered when the Burmese junta turned their guns on the Kokang Chinese in August 2009, forcing more than 30,000 refugees to flee across the border. Besides sending a stern message to other ethnic armies, the attack was also a way of telling the Chinese leadership that their friendship with their so-called proxies would not come at Burma’s expense.

China responded by dispatching intelligence officers from Beijing, as well as beefing up border security. Yunnan’s border management and economic interests would have to take a backseat to Beijing’s overall concern, which is centered on Burma’s increasingly important role in its energy security.

China has also tried to mediate between the ethnic armies and the Burmese junta, but all Beijing’s mediation efforts have failed to produce any concrete results. The junta has never seen the Chinese as honest brokers because of the latter’s historical ties with the ethnic armies, which could feel abandoned if Beijing is unable to strike a balance between its needs and the security concern of the rebel outfits.

Besides expanding rapidly into Burma’s hydropower sector, China also has major oil and gas pipelines tapping into the country’s rich gas reserves. Beijing is certainly looking to shorten the transport time of its crude imports from the Middle East and Africa.

Today, a more immediate concern is the possible influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Burma into the Thailand and China if the sporadic gunfights between Burmese soldiers and the ethnic armies turn into an all-out conflict.

Surrendering their command to the junta would mean an end to whatever dream of autonomy they may have, not to mention the lucrative business deals these outfits have along the border. But from where things stand at this point in time, it appeares that these groups are not going down without a fight.

Beijing, meanwhile, is forced to sit back and watch its strategic leverage being shredded to pieces as its proxies dig deeper into the trenches to prepare for a big Burmese offensive.

“The Wa soldiers are doing push-ups every day,” said a Chinese security official monitoring the rugged Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, where opium warlords and ethnic militias play for keeps. “They want to be ready when the fighting breaks out,” he added.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2010/11/15/opinion/Massive-refugee-influx-a-worry-in-all-out-conflict-30142242.html


Monday 1 November 2010

OIC to take up issue of militancy in South

56-country organisation has meetings with Patani Malay separatist groups 

Don Pathan
The Nation

The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) is poised to delve into the issue of insurgency in Thailand's Muslim-majority South to look for a political solution to the ongoing conflict that has claimed more than 4,200 lives since January 2004.

According to diplomatic sources and leaders of the long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups, the OIC had organised simultaneous meetings with these exiled leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on September 30-October 1.

OIC secretary-general Prof Dr Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu chaired the meeting in Jeddah, while Talal A Daous, the organisation's director for the Muslim Minorities and Communities group, chaired the gathering in Kuala Lumpur.

GROUPS THAT HAD TALKS

Participants of the recent gathering at the two cities included two factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisations (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP) and others senior leaders from the exiled community.

The leaders were urged to combine their efforts to form a political front, while the OIC vowed to help facilitate a dialogue process with the Thai government. The Malaysian government helped facilitate the meeting in Kuala Lumpur and it was understood that Malaysia would work closely with the OIC on this initiative.

According to one diplomat, the OIC urged these longstanding separatist groups to combine efforts and form the United Patani People Council (UPPC). Once the front was created, the Patani People Congress (PCC) would be in the pipeline. The idea behind the PCC is to obtain some sort of mandate from the Muslims of Patani, a Malay historical homeland that came under Bangkok's direct rule just over a century ago when the vassal state was annexed by Siam.

A participant at the meetings quoted OIC officials as having said their organisation was the "most suitable" to take up the initiative, citing religious affiliation and a long history of interest in the conflict in Thailand's deep South.

CAUTION

The move by the 56-member OIC was welcomed by the exiled Patani Malay leaders and it was the most concrete action yet. However, almost all interviewed by The Nation cautioned against any great expectation, saying similar initiatives by the OIC as well as other so-called peace processes in the recent past have failed to take off or translate into formal peace.

"The OIC has expressed interest in seeing peace in Patani but the most they have done was issue statements criticising the treatment of Malay Muslims by the Thai state," said one exiled leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

One Pulo source said his faction was taking a "wait and see" approach, saying it was "too early to make any conclusion as to how this initiative will evolve".

Another Pulo leader from a different faction said for any initiative to gain real traction, it would be up to "the Thais themselves as to whom they thought suitable to be a mediator or facilitator".