Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
International best practices are being ignored as stakeholders in the so-called peace process for Thailand’s Muslim-majority far South seek a quick fix instead of addressing the historical root causes of a conflict that has claimed nearly 7,000 lives since January 2004.
Members of Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls virtually all of the militant rebels, say the current peace initiative between Thailand and MARA Patani is a tactic designed to bypass their demands and also the underlying causes of the dispute between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani. BRN members say they are not interested in joining MARA Patani at the negotiating table and suggest that Malaysia, or any other interested parties, review the mandate of talks or risk compromising their future role. “These so-called peace practitioners, domestic and foreign, could be going along with this shrewd strategy of Thailand without realising that they are being played,” one BRN operative said.
They also expressed concern that pressure from Malaysia to get BRN leaders to the table – something the new facilitator, former police chief, Abdul Rahim Noor, appeared eager to do – could be counterproductive for peace efforts in the long run. The BRN operatives remain convinced their leaders will not compromise their long-term strategy with any hasty moves towards negotiations.
Asked about BRN information officer Ustaz Abdulkarim Khalid telling foreign journalists recently that the movement’s leaders are prepared to negotiate with the Thais if certain demands are met, one operative said, “Even if the Thai government agreed to the terms stated by Khalid, surfacing and coming to the table would still be an extraordinary risk.
“In the eyes of Siamese officials, we are all still bandits and criminals,” he added.
Getting any Bangkok government to grant official recognition and legal immunity to any BRN representatives is still a pipe dream, they said.
Underling the challenges facing Malaysia as the designated facilitator, sources said, is that Rahim Noor is having difficulty even securing a meeting with senior members of the BRN’s ruling council, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP).
Moreover, the operatives remained confused about the “safe space” supposedly guaranteed to foster trust on both sides of the peace talks. Is it a vague concept or an actual place, they ask. But if and when a formal peace process takes shape, the operatives said the talks must be mediated by members of the international community, including Malaysia, with experience in conflict resolution.
They expressed concern that Thai officials could pull out an arrest warrant at any moment should negotiations turn against them. When asked about international norms, humanitarian principles and rules of engagement, the BRN men said they were still not sure what to make of them since the concepts were still new to them.
While they don’t reject these “foreign ideas”, instead expressing a desire to learn more about them, the operatives said their conduct was guided by the sentiment of local Muslim residents and Islamic community leaders. Some of these have spoken out against certain forms of insurgent violence, including arson attacks on public schools and Buddhist temples, and the mutilation of government soldiers killed in attacks that took place during the early stage of a wave of insurgency that surfaced in January 2004.
Civil society organisations often cite International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Geneva Convention in attempts to curb with worst excesses of violence during conflicts. “We have been told that these principles will enhance our legitimacy. But we are not exactly sure how this is so,” one operative said. “Some [BRN] people think these could be part of a secret plan to tie their hands or restrict their activities through rules of engagement,” he added.
Nevertheless, the debate on these progressive ideas has garnered some attention among various cells on the ground. For example, last December when a cell attacked a bus in Yala’s Than To district, BRN combatants helped the passengers with their luggage off the bus, moving them to safety before blowing up the vehicle. This was their understanding of IHL.
But when the military responded by rounding up about 50 young men from the district and applied questionable interrogation techniques, a cell in Yala retaliated by setting off a motorbike bomb at a market in Yala that killed three and injured 18. In May 2017, a powerful car bomb went off at the entrance of the Big C Department Store in Pattani.
The debris inflicted minor injuries on scores of people. BRN combatants said they were not seeking to kill civilians, pointing out that they gave prior warnings so the area could be cleared. There are times when insurgents have deliberately attacked “soft” targets, but only as a form of retaliation against Thai security officials deemed to have “crossed a line”.
January’s motorbike bomb at the Yala market was one such retaliatory attack. Another was the October 2016 bombing of an evening food stall in downtown Pattani that killed one person and injured more than 20. This attack came in response to the rounding up of about 1,000 Patani Malay youth in Bangkok following rumors of a car-bomb plot that police subsequently failed to back with evidence.
Rules of engagement in the form of a negotiated text do not exist between BRN combatants and Thai security forces. As such, how one interprets what constitutes a “red line” or “legitimate killing” has always been subjective.
Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Thailand and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion about the insurgency in Thailand’s far South.
DON PATHAN Senior Program Officer for Regional Security Cooperation at The Asia Foundation
Thursday 25 October 2018
Wednesday 17 October 2018
Thailand Installs Controversial Figure in Deep South Peace Talks
Commentary by Don Pathan
Yala, Thailand
 |
| Melayu Muslims carry the body of a shooting victim for burial near Pattani, a town in Thailand’s insurgency-stricken Deep South, April 14, 2007. (AP) |
Thailand has decided to replace its chief negotiator for southern peace talks with another retired general, former Fourth Army Area commander Udomchai Thammasarorat.
On the surface, it seems Bangkok was reciprocating recent changes in Kuala Lumpur.
Weeks ago, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed replaced Ahmad Zamzamin bin Hashim, the designated facilitator for the Malaysia-brokered talks, with Abdul Rahim Mohd Noor. A former national police chief, he spent a great deal of his career back in the 1980s clamping down on a communist insurgency along the Thai border.
But official Thai sources said Bangkok had many reasons to make the change. Leaders from the military government, they said, were not impressed with Gen. Aksara Kerdpol’s performance over the past three years as the chief Thai negotiator, because he was unable to generate meaningful traction for the talks aimed at ending the separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South.
Aksara was seen as having failed to get the National Revolutionary Front (BRN) – the one rebel group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the field – to endorse Thailand’s peace talks with MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation representing various long-standing Patani Malay separatist movements at the negotiating table.
The participants sitting on MARA’s panel were not endorsed by BRN’s ruling council, sources within the rebel group told me.
This week, a MARA spokesman told BenarNews it had expanded to include three new organizations, but would put off all engagement with Thailand until a new democratically elected Thai government was formed. A general election is expected by May next year at the latest.
Besides not having much to show for, the only card Aksara had in his sleeve was the Safety Zone, a pilot project to designate a ceasefire area, which negotiators hoped could become a model of joint good governance between the state and the rebels.
Moreover, the fact that Aksara had engaged in a lengthy spitting contest with the then-Fourth Army commander, Lt. General Piyawat Nakwanich, did not help his or Thailand’s cause. The two had bickered over their turfs and mandates. It got so nasty that Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha had to step in.
While Thai leaders had many good reasons for removing Gen. Aksara from the picture, Gen. Udomchai has a number of things going for him – at least from the viewpoint of a Thai military mindset.
Notorious past
As a former Fourth Army Area chief, Udomchai is familiar with hunting down and killing insurgents. It didn’t matter to those who nominated him to be the top negotiator that carrying out a peace process is a delicate process, which requires good sense.
Perhaps the most important reason for Udomchai getting the job, according to Thai official sources, is that he also serves as the “advisor” to the Fourth Army Area. In that role, Udomchai is tasked with building and strengthening a constituency in the far south for the pro-military Palang Pracharat Party. The party has vowed to support Prayuth’s bid to return as PM after the next general election.
Being the chief negotiator may not have a direct correlation with strengthening a constituency for an upcoming election. But at least it will be another feather in Udomchai’s cap and a source of legitimacy for him to be in the far South as he hits the ground there.
Besides, no one really expects Udomchai, like other commanders of the Fourth Army Area, to make any meaningful policy changes. Such moves are pretty much decided in Bangkok.
People should also be aware that his past time in the Patani region was full of controversy. When he was a task force unit commander in the region, Udomchai was instrumental in carrying out a controversial initiative, which saw some 400 Patani Malay youths being forced to attend military-run “job-training camps” outside the far South. These were, in effect, “re-education” sessions.
In October 2007, a Thai court ruled that these camps were holding people against their will. The Fourth Army responded by declaring them “persona non-grata” in their home villages in the far south.\
On top of this, local activists still recall the death of Sulaiman Naesa, a young suspected insurgent who was reportedly tortured to death at Ingkhayutthabariharn, a main military base in the region at the time when Udomchai was the regional commander.
Sulaiman’s case and other reports of torture attracted a number of international reporters to the region. But Udomchai held his ground with blanket denials that his soldiers were torturing suspects.
Another case was an incident in January 2012 when Thai soldiers shot dead four people, including an elderly man and a teenager, and injured five others who were crammed up in a truck heading to a relative’s funeral in Pattani province’s Nong Chik district.
In the final analysis, the change to Thailand’s negotiating team was not done for the sake of peace in the Deep South, but to support the political needs of the current junta in Bangkok.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/Don-Pathan-10172018153110.htmlTuesday 9 October 2018
New Malaysian Facilitator Enters Fray of Southern Thai Peace Talks
Commentary by Don Pathan
Former Malaysian police chief Abdul Rahim Noor answers questions about being asked to serve as the new facilitator of Malaysia-brokered peace talks between Thailand’s government and insurgent groups in the Thai Deep South, during an interview in Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 24, 2018.
S. Mahfuz/BenarNews
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed has appointed a former police chief, Abdul Rahim Noor, to facilitate peace talks between the Thai Government and MARA Patani, an umbrella body made up of various separatist groups from Thailand’s Malay-speaking Deep South.
The straight talking, no-nonsense Abdul Rahim is well familiar with security challenges along the Thai-Malaysian border. His claim to fame was bringing down the now-defunct Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) through a peace agreement in 1989.
Dr. Mahathir is no stranger either to the separatist conflict in Thailand’s far south. Back in 2005, after he had stepped down from his first stint as PM, Mahathir enlisted the help of former Malaysian police chief Norian Mai and businessman Shazryl Eskay Abdullah to assist him in the so-called Langkawi peace process, a forum that brought top Thai security officials to the island for which the initiative was named.
Representatives from the Thai National Security Council and Armed Forces National Security Center met with aging exiled Patani Malay separatist leaders, who had no control over a new generation of militants on the ground.
But like other initiatives before and after, the Langkawi process did not generate traction and it wasn’t long before it disappeared from the conversation of stakeholders of this conflict.
The appointment of Abdul Rahim as the new facilitator was met with some resistance from inside Malaysia. Lawmaker Nurul Izzah, the daughter of Anwar Ibrahim, reminded the public of the infamous “black eye” given to her father when, as police chief, Abdul Rahim punched him in the face 20 years ago.
Conversations in the Deep South about Abdul Rahim often touched on the Thanam brothers, key separatist leaders from the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) who were deported to Thailand in early 1998 under his watch as police chief.
The move left a permanent scar between the Patani Malay separatist community and the government of Malaysia.
While the political context for the insurgency in Thailand’s far south hasn’t changed – as it’s still very much an ethno-nationalist struggle – a new generation of shadowy combatants under the leadership of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebel group is roaming the region nowadays, hitting the Thai security forces almost at will.
The extent of Abdul Rahim’s grasp of BRN’s motivation and ideology is still not clear. After all, back in the days when he was calling the shots along the border, it was PULO that dominated the theatre of violence. Today, it is BRN.
Thai military intelligence officials say they are not writing PULO off; the group’s network and support base in the region is growing steadily and could pose a problem for Thailand in the future.
But the main task right now, according to Thai officials, is to get the BRN leadership to join MARA Patani at the negotiations table.
Thai officials believe that the aging Abdul Rahim will apply pressure on the BRN leaders to get them to the table and that he and Dr. Mahathir have less than two years to do so before the prime minister’s job is handed to Anwar.
‘Can’t force peace’
How Abdul Rahim’s dealing with the BRN leaders will play out is anybody’s guess.
But senior sources in the BRN said the movement “was not ready to come face to face with the Thais, regardless of who the facilitating the process.”
Some Thai officials said that they understood why the BRN leaders had balked at entering the talks, saying Thailand’s approach was very “illiberal” as it was based on a simple assumption that the talks with MARA Patani would eventually attract the participation of the BRN.
“You can’t really force peace on people,” said one Thai security official who works on the far south. “BRN leaders have to feel confident enough to come to the table and that that they have to believe that they are getting something out of the talks.”
Besides the changes in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok is also contemplating its own changes.
There is ongoing talk about replacing Gen. Aksara Kerdpol, the head of the Thai military government’s negotiating team in the peace talks. The Thai army is looking for somebody who “can handle” Abdul Rahim.
One name that has been floated is Gen. Akanit Muensawas, a retired army officer who worked on border security in the 1980s, during the same time as Abdul Rahim.
Both men crossed paths during those years when they were tasked with ending the insurgency along the Thai-Malaysian border.
Abdul Rahim eventually brought an end to the CPM struggle while Akanit slowly disappeared from the scene in the far south as Patani Malay rebels put down their arms following a blanket amnesty program.
Some combatants returned to their respective villages. Others were granted asylum in northern European countries, Malaysia and Indonesia.
But a decade later, as Thaksin Shinawatra was about to become Thailand’s prime minister, a new generation of Patani Malay separatists surfaced on the scene, picking up where the previous generation of separatist militants had left off.
Thailand wrongly assumed that the absence of violence meant peace. The narrative about Patani being a historical Malay homeland invaded by the Siamese never went away.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Dr. Mahathir is no stranger either to the separatist conflict in Thailand’s far south. Back in 2005, after he had stepped down from his first stint as PM, Mahathir enlisted the help of former Malaysian police chief Norian Mai and businessman Shazryl Eskay Abdullah to assist him in the so-called Langkawi peace process, a forum that brought top Thai security officials to the island for which the initiative was named.
Representatives from the Thai National Security Council and Armed Forces National Security Center met with aging exiled Patani Malay separatist leaders, who had no control over a new generation of militants on the ground.
But like other initiatives before and after, the Langkawi process did not generate traction and it wasn’t long before it disappeared from the conversation of stakeholders of this conflict.
The appointment of Abdul Rahim as the new facilitator was met with some resistance from inside Malaysia. Lawmaker Nurul Izzah, the daughter of Anwar Ibrahim, reminded the public of the infamous “black eye” given to her father when, as police chief, Abdul Rahim punched him in the face 20 years ago.
Conversations in the Deep South about Abdul Rahim often touched on the Thanam brothers, key separatist leaders from the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) who were deported to Thailand in early 1998 under his watch as police chief.
The move left a permanent scar between the Patani Malay separatist community and the government of Malaysia.
While the political context for the insurgency in Thailand’s far south hasn’t changed – as it’s still very much an ethno-nationalist struggle – a new generation of shadowy combatants under the leadership of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebel group is roaming the region nowadays, hitting the Thai security forces almost at will.
The extent of Abdul Rahim’s grasp of BRN’s motivation and ideology is still not clear. After all, back in the days when he was calling the shots along the border, it was PULO that dominated the theatre of violence. Today, it is BRN.
Thai military intelligence officials say they are not writing PULO off; the group’s network and support base in the region is growing steadily and could pose a problem for Thailand in the future.
But the main task right now, according to Thai officials, is to get the BRN leadership to join MARA Patani at the negotiations table.
Thai officials believe that the aging Abdul Rahim will apply pressure on the BRN leaders to get them to the table and that he and Dr. Mahathir have less than two years to do so before the prime minister’s job is handed to Anwar.
‘Can’t force peace’
How Abdul Rahim’s dealing with the BRN leaders will play out is anybody’s guess.
But senior sources in the BRN said the movement “was not ready to come face to face with the Thais, regardless of who the facilitating the process.”
Some Thai officials said that they understood why the BRN leaders had balked at entering the talks, saying Thailand’s approach was very “illiberal” as it was based on a simple assumption that the talks with MARA Patani would eventually attract the participation of the BRN.
“You can’t really force peace on people,” said one Thai security official who works on the far south. “BRN leaders have to feel confident enough to come to the table and that that they have to believe that they are getting something out of the talks.”
Besides the changes in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok is also contemplating its own changes.
There is ongoing talk about replacing Gen. Aksara Kerdpol, the head of the Thai military government’s negotiating team in the peace talks. The Thai army is looking for somebody who “can handle” Abdul Rahim.
One name that has been floated is Gen. Akanit Muensawas, a retired army officer who worked on border security in the 1980s, during the same time as Abdul Rahim.
Both men crossed paths during those years when they were tasked with ending the insurgency along the Thai-Malaysian border.
Abdul Rahim eventually brought an end to the CPM struggle while Akanit slowly disappeared from the scene in the far south as Patani Malay rebels put down their arms following a blanket amnesty program.
Some combatants returned to their respective villages. Others were granted asylum in northern European countries, Malaysia and Indonesia.
But a decade later, as Thaksin Shinawatra was about to become Thailand’s prime minister, a new generation of Patani Malay separatists surfaced on the scene, picking up where the previous generation of separatist militants had left off.
Thailand wrongly assumed that the absence of violence meant peace. The narrative about Patani being a historical Malay homeland invaded by the Siamese never went away.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Monday 8 October 2018
New commander, but still no counter-insurgency strategy
Lt-General Pornsak Poonsawas has an opportunity to steer deep South toward peace – but he must first change Army policy
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Yala, Thailand
The Thai Army has a new chief in the South and it seems he’s bent on charting a different course from his predecessor, the just-retired Lt-General Piyawat Nakwanich.
Lt-General Pornsak Poonsawas began his new role by paying a visit to the Shaykhul Islam of Thailand, the Chularatchamontri Aziz Pitakkumphol, to introduce himself two days before officially assuming his post as commander of the trouble-plagued Fourth Army Region.
The visit was a largely symbolic gesture of goodwill towards the senior-most Islamic figure in the country. Pornsak discussed his determination to tackle illicit drug use in the region, one of the few problems the Thai state and local residents agree upon.
Like those before him, Pornsak’s core task is to quell separatist violence in the majority Malay-Muslim provinces in Thailand’s far South. In theory, counter-insurgency strategy calls for a combination of military and non-military means to end the violence and identify its root cause.
But Piyawat hasn’t left Pornsak much to work with. If anything, Piyawat’s tough-talking, shoot-from-the-hip style drove a bigger wedge between the Thai state and local Malay Muslims.
Just weeks before his mandatory retirement, Piyawat dispatched about 1,000 soldiers and police to lockdown two tambons in Pattani’s Nong Chik district in the wake of a September 11 gunfight that left two soldiers dead and four injured.
Permitted under the emergency and martial laws, his “additional measure” amounted to collective punishment of the local residents who he suggested had turned a blind eye to insurgent activities in the area.
The two tambons were proclaimed a “Controlled Area” and locals were ordered to report to the Army with registration documents for their boats and vehicles as well as the permits for their weapons.
Most were too scared to leave their homes, not even to attend prayers at the village mosque, for fear of being arrested arbitrarily.
The battle is for hearts and minds
Counter-insurgency strategy takes for granted that local residents are not on the side of the state, but of the non-state actor. This, in the case of Thailand’s far South, is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all of the insurgent combatants.
However, Thai military leaders have yet to come to terms with the fact that local Malay Muslims support the insurgents.
So instead of strategising to win hearts and minds, the military prefers strong-arm tactics that penalise local residents for siding with the insurgents.
According to one military intelligence officer, it goes without saying that both emergency law and martial law permit the arrest of people who harbour armed insurgents. But Piyawat chose to proclaim this point loudly, reminding local residents exactly who has the power in this historically contested region.
State representatives reminding the Patani Malays that they are a defeated people is nothing new.
Piyawat’s callous treatment of locals in Nong Chik gave local political activists, namely the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS), an opportunity to hit back at the government.
PerMAS, a student network advocating for the right to self-determination in this region, condemned Piyawat’s security measures on humanitarian grounds and called for an end to the use of the emergency law and martial law.
Thailand’s emergency law permits the detention of suspects for up to 30 days without formal charges or legal representation. It also grants blanket amnesty to officials working in the region, while the burden of proof falls on the victim who must show that the official acted with malice. Former prime minister Anand Panyarachun called these extraordinary measures “a licence to kill”.
In retaliation against PerMAS and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (Kor Por Sor), Piyawat arranged a protest in front of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani to denounce the university for producing “problematic students”.
Protesters also filed a police complaint accusing PerMAS activists of obstructing justice when they dispatched scores of people to Nong Chik district to meet with the local residents.
PerMAS members noted that the protesters had brought along a token presence of Muslims to give their rally a multicultural veneer.
Military personnel don’t take kindly to political activists, who they see as an extension of the BRN. Army officers say the right to self-determination demanded by PerMAS amounts to a call for independence, rather than just more autonomy, for the Malays in Thailand’s far South. Pornsak has an opportunity to change this zero-sum mentality. The Army’s lack of a counter-insurgency strategy worthy of the name is preventing any progress towards peace in the far South.
Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Thailand and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion about the insurgency in Thailand’s far South.
New commander, but still no counter-insurgency strategy
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Yala, Thailand
Lt-General Pornsak Poonsawas began his new role by paying a visit to the Shaykhul Islam of Thailand, the Chularatchamontri Aziz Pitakkumphol, to introduce himself two days before officially assuming his post as commander of the trouble-plagued Fourth Army Region.
The visit was a largely symbolic gesture of goodwill towards the senior-most Islamic figure in the country. Pornsak discussed his determination to tackle illicit drug use in the region, one of the few problems the Thai state and local residents agree upon.
Like those before him, Pornsak’s core task is to quell separatist violence in the majority Malay-Muslim provinces in Thailand’s far South.
In theory, counter-insurgency strategy calls for a combination of military and non-military means to end the violence and identify its root cause. But Piyawat hasn’t left Pornsak much to work with. If anything, Piyawat’s tough-talking, shoot-from-the-hip style drove a bigger wedge between the Thai state and local Malay Muslims.
Just weeks before his mandatory retirement, Piyawat dispatched about 1,000 soldiers and police to lockdown two tambons in Pattani’s Nong Chik district in the wake of a September 11 gunfight that left two soldiers dead and four injured. Permitted under the emergency and martial laws, his “additional measure” amounted to collective punishment of the local residents who he suggested had turned a blind eye to insurgent activities in the area.
The two tambons were proclaimed a “Controlled Area” and locals were ordered to report to the Army with registration documents for their boats and vehicles as well as the permits for their weapons. Most were too scared to leave their homes, not even to attend prayers at the village mosque, for fear of being arrested arbitrarily.
The battle is for hearts and minds Counter-insurgency strategy takes for granted that local residents are not on the side of the state, but of the non-state actor. This, in the case of Thailand’s far South, is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all of the insurgent combatants. However, Thai military leaders have yet to come to terms with the fact that local Malay Muslims support the insurgents. So instead of strategising to win hearts and minds, the military prefers strong-arm tactics that penalise local residents for siding with the insurgents.
According to one military intelligence officer, it goes without saying that both the emergency law and martial law permit the arrest of people who harbour armed insurgents. But Piyawat chose to proclaim this point loudly, reminding local residents exactly who has the power in this historically contested region.
State representatives reminding the Patani Malays that they are a defeated people is nothing new. Piyawat’s callous treatment of locals in Nong Chik gave local political activists, namely the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS), an opportunity to hit back at the government. PerMAS, a student network advocating for the right to self-determination in this region, condemned Piyawat’s security measures on humanitarian grounds and called for an end to the use of the emergency law and martial law.
Thailand’s emergency law permits the detention of suspects for up to 30 days without formal charges or legal representation. It also grants blanket amnesty to officials working in the region, while the burden of proof falls on the victim who must show that the official acted with malice. Former prime minister Anand Panyarachun called these extraordinary measures “a licence to kill”.
In retaliation against PerMAS and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (Kor Por Sor), a pro-Piyawat group arranged a protest in front of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani to denounce the university for producing “problematic students”.
Protesters also filed a police complaint accusing PerMAS activists of obstructing justice when they dispatched scores of people to Nong Chik district to meet with the local residents. PerMAS members noted that the protesters had brought along a token presence of Muslims to give their rally a multicultural veneer.
Military personnel don’t take kindly to political activists, who they see as an extension of the BRN. Army officers say the right to self-determination demanded by PerMAS amounts to a call for independence, rather than just more autonomy, for the Malays in Thailand’s far South. Pornsak has an opportunity to change this zero-sum mentality.
The Army’s lack of a counter-insurgency strategy worthy of the name is preventing any progress towards peace in the far South.
Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Thailand and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion about the insurgency in Thailand’s far South.
Special to The Nation
Yala, Thailand
Lt-General Pornsak Poonsawas has an opportunity to steer deep South towards peace – but he must first change Army policy
The Thai Army has a new chief in the South and it seems he’s bent on charting a different course from his predecessor, the just-retired Lt-General Piyawat Nakwanich.Lt-General Pornsak Poonsawas began his new role by paying a visit to the Shaykhul Islam of Thailand, the Chularatchamontri Aziz Pitakkumphol, to introduce himself two days before officially assuming his post as commander of the trouble-plagued Fourth Army Region.
The visit was a largely symbolic gesture of goodwill towards the senior-most Islamic figure in the country. Pornsak discussed his determination to tackle illicit drug use in the region, one of the few problems the Thai state and local residents agree upon.
Like those before him, Pornsak’s core task is to quell separatist violence in the majority Malay-Muslim provinces in Thailand’s far South.
In theory, counter-insurgency strategy calls for a combination of military and non-military means to end the violence and identify its root cause. But Piyawat hasn’t left Pornsak much to work with. If anything, Piyawat’s tough-talking, shoot-from-the-hip style drove a bigger wedge between the Thai state and local Malay Muslims.
Just weeks before his mandatory retirement, Piyawat dispatched about 1,000 soldiers and police to lockdown two tambons in Pattani’s Nong Chik district in the wake of a September 11 gunfight that left two soldiers dead and four injured. Permitted under the emergency and martial laws, his “additional measure” amounted to collective punishment of the local residents who he suggested had turned a blind eye to insurgent activities in the area.
The two tambons were proclaimed a “Controlled Area” and locals were ordered to report to the Army with registration documents for their boats and vehicles as well as the permits for their weapons. Most were too scared to leave their homes, not even to attend prayers at the village mosque, for fear of being arrested arbitrarily.
The battle is for hearts and minds Counter-insurgency strategy takes for granted that local residents are not on the side of the state, but of the non-state actor. This, in the case of Thailand’s far South, is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all of the insurgent combatants. However, Thai military leaders have yet to come to terms with the fact that local Malay Muslims support the insurgents. So instead of strategising to win hearts and minds, the military prefers strong-arm tactics that penalise local residents for siding with the insurgents.
According to one military intelligence officer, it goes without saying that both the emergency law and martial law permit the arrest of people who harbour armed insurgents. But Piyawat chose to proclaim this point loudly, reminding local residents exactly who has the power in this historically contested region.
State representatives reminding the Patani Malays that they are a defeated people is nothing new. Piyawat’s callous treatment of locals in Nong Chik gave local political activists, namely the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS), an opportunity to hit back at the government. PerMAS, a student network advocating for the right to self-determination in this region, condemned Piyawat’s security measures on humanitarian grounds and called for an end to the use of the emergency law and martial law.
Thailand’s emergency law permits the detention of suspects for up to 30 days without formal charges or legal representation. It also grants blanket amnesty to officials working in the region, while the burden of proof falls on the victim who must show that the official acted with malice. Former prime minister Anand Panyarachun called these extraordinary measures “a licence to kill”.
In retaliation against PerMAS and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (Kor Por Sor), a pro-Piyawat group arranged a protest in front of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani to denounce the university for producing “problematic students”.
Protesters also filed a police complaint accusing PerMAS activists of obstructing justice when they dispatched scores of people to Nong Chik district to meet with the local residents. PerMAS members noted that the protesters had brought along a token presence of Muslims to give their rally a multicultural veneer.
Military personnel don’t take kindly to political activists, who they see as an extension of the BRN. Army officers say the right to self-determination demanded by PerMAS amounts to a call for independence, rather than just more autonomy, for the Malays in Thailand’s far South. Pornsak has an opportunity to change this zero-sum mentality.
The Army’s lack of a counter-insurgency strategy worthy of the name is preventing any progress towards peace in the far South.
Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Thailand and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion about the insurgency in Thailand’s far South.
Wednesday 3 October 2018
Work Cut Out for Incoming Military Commander in Thai South
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
Lt. Gen. Pornsak Poonsawas, the newly appointed commander of the Fourth Army Region, paid a courtesy visit to the Sheikhul Islam to formally introduce himself before taking up the post as he seeks to quell insurgencies in the Malay provinces in Thailand’s Deep South.
While separatist conflict is largely confined to the Muslim-majority Deep South, Pornsak’s visit to the senior-most Islamic figure of the country was largely symbolic and nothing less than a gesture of goodwill.
His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanich, did not leave Pornsak much to work with. In fact, Pornsak will have to pick up the pieces and clean up the mess that Piyawat left behind.
Many observers, including men under his command, saw Piyawat’s tough-talking, shoot-from-the-hip style as counter-productive for Thailand's counter-insurgency strategy in this historically contested region where about 7,000 people, mostly Muslims, have been killed since January 2004.
Piyawat did not seem to care that his approach drove a bigger wedge between the Thai state and the local Malay Muslims, especially the young political activists and human rights advocates who consistently called him out over controversial security measures and exaggeration.
In the days leading up to his mandatory retirement, Piyawat unleashed about 1,000 combined forces of police and soldiers to carry out a dragnet operation on two tambons (village clusters) in Nong Chik district of Pattani, after a patrolling unit was ambushed on Sept. 11. Two soldiers were killed and four wounded as morale sank to a new low among the soldiers.
Piyawat placed these villages under “Controlled Area” which permits the soldiers and police to search homes and detain anyone they see fit. It went on for days, nearly a week.
He also toyed with the idea of bringing charges against family members of suspected insurgents if troops found they had been harboring these insurgents.
While the country’s controversial Emergency Law gave him the power to take up additional measures, the move against the two tambons in Nong Chik district was a major disaster, politically speaking, one that will burden his replacement, namely Pornsak.
The Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS) hit back by dispatching scores of young activists to the Nong Chik district as part of an outreach exercise to local residents, many of whom said they were too afraid to leave their homes, even to attend prayers at the village mosque, for fear of being arbitrarily arrested.
PerMAS, a student political network advocating for the right to self-determination in this restive region, issued a statement condemning Piyawat's security measures on humanitarian grounds, and called for an end to use of the Emergency Law.
Thailand’s Emergency Law permits detention up to 30 days without formal charges or legal representation. It also grants blanket amnesty to officials working in the region as the burden of proof falls on the victim who will have to show the official acted with malice.
Piyawat’s supporters showed up with signs displaying vulgar statements against the youth activists and attacking the local Prince of Songkhla University for producing problematic students.
The signs asked why PerMAS were defending “criminals.” The supporters also filed a complaint with the local police accusing these activists of obstructing justice.
PerMAS members said they were not losing sleep over a handful of Buddhist nationalists with a twisted agenda.
To make their 90-minute protest seem multicultural, the organizers brought along a handful of Muslims protesters, PerMAS members joked.
The university responded with an open letter rebutting the ultra-nationalist group whose leaders were behind a recent campaign to ban Islamic headscarf in public schools.
Similarly, a group of Buddhist nationalists is trying to get the regional hospital in Yala to set up a separate Buddhist kitchen in additional to the existing Halal. They cited equality and justice and expressed the fear that Muslims are chipping away at their culture and identity space.
Soldiers say that Pornsak’s term will be one of reconciliation, or at least a step toward that direction, between the state and the Malays.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNew
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
Lt. Gen. Pornsak Poonsawas, the newly appointed commander of the Fourth Army Region, paid a courtesy visit to the Sheikhul Islam to formally introduce himself before taking up the post as he seeks to quell insurgencies in the Malay provinces in Thailand’s Deep South.
While separatist conflict is largely confined to the Muslim-majority Deep South, Pornsak’s visit to the senior-most Islamic figure of the country was largely symbolic and nothing less than a gesture of goodwill.
His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanich, did not leave Pornsak much to work with. In fact, Pornsak will have to pick up the pieces and clean up the mess that Piyawat left behind.
Many observers, including men under his command, saw Piyawat’s tough-talking, shoot-from-the-hip style as counter-productive for Thailand's counter-insurgency strategy in this historically contested region where about 7,000 people, mostly Muslims, have been killed since January 2004.
Piyawat did not seem to care that his approach drove a bigger wedge between the Thai state and the local Malay Muslims, especially the young political activists and human rights advocates who consistently called him out over controversial security measures and exaggeration.
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Lt. Gen Pornsak Poonsawas, 4th Army Region commander, visits Aziz Phitakumpon, the Shaykul Islam of Thailand, on Sept. 30, 2018. Mariam Ahmadi/BenarNews.
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Piyawat placed these villages under “Controlled Area” which permits the soldiers and police to search homes and detain anyone they see fit. It went on for days, nearly a week.
He also toyed with the idea of bringing charges against family members of suspected insurgents if troops found they had been harboring these insurgents.
While the country’s controversial Emergency Law gave him the power to take up additional measures, the move against the two tambons in Nong Chik district was a major disaster, politically speaking, one that will burden his replacement, namely Pornsak.
The Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS) hit back by dispatching scores of young activists to the Nong Chik district as part of an outreach exercise to local residents, many of whom said they were too afraid to leave their homes, even to attend prayers at the village mosque, for fear of being arbitrarily arrested.
PerMAS, a student political network advocating for the right to self-determination in this restive region, issued a statement condemning Piyawat's security measures on humanitarian grounds, and called for an end to use of the Emergency Law.
Thailand’s Emergency Law permits detention up to 30 days without formal charges or legal representation. It also grants blanket amnesty to officials working in the region as the burden of proof falls on the victim who will have to show the official acted with malice.
Piyawat’s supporters showed up with signs displaying vulgar statements against the youth activists and attacking the local Prince of Songkhla University for producing problematic students.
The signs asked why PerMAS were defending “criminals.” The supporters also filed a complaint with the local police accusing these activists of obstructing justice.
PerMAS members said they were not losing sleep over a handful of Buddhist nationalists with a twisted agenda.
To make their 90-minute protest seem multicultural, the organizers brought along a handful of Muslims protesters, PerMAS members joked.
The university responded with an open letter rebutting the ultra-nationalist group whose leaders were behind a recent campaign to ban Islamic headscarf in public schools.
Similarly, a group of Buddhist nationalists is trying to get the regional hospital in Yala to set up a separate Buddhist kitchen in additional to the existing Halal. They cited equality and justice and expressed the fear that Muslims are chipping away at their culture and identity space.
Soldiers say that Pornsak’s term will be one of reconciliation, or at least a step toward that direction, between the state and the Malays.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNew
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