One ingredient still missing in Prayut's recipe for peace in South

Without recognition of the insurgents' BRN political wing, the PM's effort to kick-start talks could be doomed from the start

By Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 

Black smoke billows amid a scene of devastation after a bombing in Yala.

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha is expected to introduce General Aksara Kerdphol, the new chief negotiator for the peace talks with separatist groups in Thailand's deep South, during his visit to Malaysia on Monday.

Malaysia was designated as facilitator for the peace talks launched by the previous government of Yingluck Shinawatra, and Bangkok is expected to request that Kuala Lumpur continue in the role.

The visit could be a bit awkward for Prayut given the fact that the Royal Thai Army was never on board the Yingluckpeace initiative. The Army reluctantly played along, all the while looking for ways to covertly sabotage the process. One way was to permit the return of former Bersatu leader Wan Kadir Che Man, to criticise Malaysia and other international mediators working on the conflict.

General Aksara is chairman of the Army's advisory panel and a former Army chief-of-staff. Under the Yingluckgovernment, the job of chief negotiator was given to the National Security Council secretary-general, Paradon Patanatabut. The main driver behind the team back then was Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, then secretary-general of the Southern Border Province Administration Centre. The two men enjoyed a close working relationship with Yingluck's brother, former premier Thaksin Shinawatra. That explains why they were sidelined after the coup in May.

Now that the Army is in the driving seat, the government in Bangkok is thinking hard about how to move the peace initiative forward. It is generally agreed that the talks should be as inclusive as possible. The Thai military is confident that many longstanding separatist groups will send their people to the talks. But the participation of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - the group with the highest number of insurgent combatants - is still uncertain. 

The Thai side is also toying with the idea of "back-channel" meetings with each of these groups in a bid to get a better understanding of their capacity and capability. The one-on-one discussions would centre on militant operations and rules of engagement, while the political issues would be kept separate as part of the official "Track I" process. 

A source from the BRN said that while his group is sitting out of the Track I process, his leaders had not ruled out the idea of joining the back-channel talks. 

But the BRN is concerned with a more immediate goal, which is to strengthen the group's political wing so it can engage the international community and the public on its own terms, rather than be dictated to by Malaysia or Thailand. 

Yet without formal recognition from the state actors, the so-called political wing will remain just another criminal element in the eyes of Bangkok. 

Talking to separatist groups is nothing new for the Thai authorities. But Yingluck was the first to make it official and thus give the general public hope that peace was within sight. 

According to BRN sources, Yingluck's team made a mistake in thinking they could launch a process, place someone with little influence over the insurgents in the person of Hasan Taib at its centre, and that would be enough to generate success. 

Hasan didn't have the mandate of the BRN leadership or the support of the insurgent cells, which explains why the insurgents continue to attack the Thai security forces unabated. 

Unfortunately, the announcement by the Thai military government that it is restarting peace talks has generated little excitement among the general public. But that's not such a bad thing, said a senior military officer, because the government doesn't want to mislead the public or encourage unrealistic expectations, which was the case when Paradon and Thawee were overseeing the process. 

The absence of public fanfare hasn't stopped foreign mediators from looking for a seat at the latest round of peace talks if and when it gets under way.

One group has approached former Indonesian foreign minister Hasan Wirajuda, while another group, with the help of former Thai foreign minister Surakiart Sathirathai, has been talking with Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Surakiart recently stated publicly that Indonesia should be one of the mediators, along with Malaysia, in the deep South peace process. 

Surakiart may have been trying to promote inclusiveness. But if the past 10 years of peace efforts tell us anything it is that the business of mediation is extremely territorial. 

Some of the longstanding separatist movements are also making their moves. A photo of a Japanese representative with the late Patani Malay academic Ahmed Somboon Bualuang, meeting with Patani Malay exiled representatives over coffee in Europe, has been doing the rounds on social media and raising eyebrows among observers and other stakeholders. 

After all, appearances in public made by potential players are often engineered with some degree of calculation. There are no paparazzi in this game, just self-promoting videos and selfies. 

Recent months have also seen the emergence of Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, the head of the Patani Malay Consultative Congress, the onetime legislative branch of the now-defunct Bersatu separatist umbrella organisation. He announced the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland that encompasses the three Malay-speaking provinces in Thailand's far South. 

"Pak Hamad was just testing the water," said a senior Thai military officer, who advised against public reaction to the announcement.

Thailand's idea of inclusiveness would be a wise one if all the players agreed to play ball. But this is the deep South, a landscape of fractured insurgency where nothing comes easy. BRN sources say the longstanding insurgent groups can play all the angles they want, but at the end of the day, without the participation of the BRN, the game won't change. 

The ball is in Thailand's court, they say, because it is up to Bangkok to make the talks "work" by recognising the legitimacy of the BRN's political wing. And that means formal recognition from not just the Thais but also the international community.

Today, being a member of the BRN organisation can put a person behind bars. Well-known youth activist Muhamadanwan "Anwar" Hayith is a case in point. The predicament of Anwar illustrates the fact that Thai-BRN relations still have a long way to go before mutual respect can be established.

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance development and security consultant based in Yala.

Prayut reaches historic crossroads in the deep South

EDITORIAL

The Nation

The PM must back pledges of an inclusive peace process with action that shows genuine respect toward the cultural differences of the Malay-speaking provinces

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha is going to Malaysia to introduce himself to his counterpart there, Najib Razak. The ongoing insurgency in Thailand's southernmost provinces will be high on their discussion agenda. 

Kuala Lumpur is expected to reiterate its commitment to helping Thailand find a suitable solution to this longstanding conflict, which Prayut himself concedes is more than a century old. 

Keeping Malaysia on board is wise, because it suggests that policymakers in Bangkok realise they are no longer dealing with a bunch of "sparrow bandits", as then-premier Thaksin Shinawatra called the insurgents a decade ago. It also shows that Thailand is willing to use political means to solve the crisis. 

But words must be backed with action. Prayut can't hoodwink the world into believing he is serious about peace merely by saying he wants an inclusive peace process.

He can't talk peace and inclusiveness just to make himself and Thailand look good, and yet say nothing about what kind of concessions the country is willing to make to the Malays of the deep South. 

Yingluck Shinawatra's government employed that shallow tactic throughout its peace initiative, launched on February 28, 2013. She thought that putting together peace talks with the insurgency's most powerful group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), and with Malaysia as facilitator, would be enough to draw other insurgents and stakeholders to the table. 

It didn't take long, though, for observers to see that her effort was something between a hoax and a blind leap of faith. Doing the right thing is fine, but if it's for the wrong reason, it can come back to haunt you. Sure enough, the process came to a standstill when Hasan Taib - the man Bangkok tasked with winning the trust of holdout insurgents - threw in the towel after it became clear that the BRN and the insurgent combatants wouldn't support him.

With the military now in the driver's seat, the buck stops at Prayut's table. Like Yingluck, he will reach out to Malaysia for help facilitating the talks. It's their backyard and they want to be part of the solution. Kuala Lumpur could further aid the process by proposing various ideas and governance models for state-minority relations.

History shows that the Malays in Thailand's three southernmost provinces are willing to live under the Thai state. They did not challenge Siam/Thailand's sovereignty when the area came under Bangkok's direct rule a century ago. 

The central government back then understood the sensitivity of relations with the far South and worked hard to establish a comfort level between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state. But that comfort level quickly evaporated when the state tried to shove "kwam pen Thai", or Thai-ness, down their throats through nationalistic policies that did more harm than good in terms of bridging the historical and cultural gap. 

The strategy might have worked with immigrants to Thailand, but the southernmost provinces are the Malay residents' historical homeland. 

The challenge for Kuala Lumpur and the rest of the international community is to help Bangkok define the terms of its relationship with its Malay-speaking provinces. We can't turn the clock back, but we can explore various models and lessons learned about state-minority relations. 

Negotiations with armed insurgent groups and negotiations with the residents of the far South are two different but related processes. Terms like "human dignity", "equality", "justice" and "social mobility" must be part of the vocabulary of the peace process, replacing the declarations of "love and happiness" that usually translate to some quirky campaign and payoffs for mistakes our troops commit in the name of counter-insurgency.

Insurgents in Thailand's deep South 'ruled by heart, not head'

Fresh wave of attacks: insurgency leaders worried emotion has got the better of their fighters

Don PathanSpecial to The Nation - YALA, Thailand

A forensic expert inspects a house after government forces shot and killed suspected insurgents during a raid at the house in southern Pattani province earlier this month. Five suspected insurgents surrendered and two more were shot dead after a raid on h

A hand-written note left at the crime scene where school teacher Issara Chairitchok was shot dead reflects the growing fear among the local population in Thailand's southernmost provinces - that more bad things are coming.

If you "detain indiscriminately", we will "kill indiscriminately", the note read.

Issara became the 179th teacher killed since the current wave of insurgency flared a decade ago. More than 6,000 people, mostly Muslims of Malay ethnicity, have been killed since then.

Issara was shot dead in Pattani's Khok Pho district on November 15, presumably by insurgents who were ticked off over a number of incidents that resulted in the death and wounding of ordinary Malay Muslim villagers, including women and children, at the hands of state security officials.

Beside the shooting death of Issara, November 15 also witnessed a mother and her daughter gunned down at close range on the Than To-Betong road, and a roadside bomb attack that injured two rangers in Narathiwat's Rusoh district.

Publicly, authorities said the shooting death of Issara was a retaliation for the November 14 killing of two suspected insurgents in a gunfight in Pattani's Nong Chik district.

But an exiled separatist source dismissed the claim. He said although the two insurgents were outnumbered and outgunned, the movement could accept the outcome as they deemed the fight a fair one.

Unlike other sub-national conflicts elsewhere, the insurgency in Thailand's deep South does not have an officially designated clearing house or a coherent dialogue process where both sides can confirm or deny their activities.

And without a guarantee of immunity or a recognisable political wing to state their case, there is no reason any of the separatist groups would admit publicly or privately to any of the attacks. Leaflets and banners to remind the authorities of the retaliation is good enough for now.

Besides notes left at the scene of attacks, officials often turn to exiled separatist leaders to help clear things up.

As for the current "spikes", one has to go back to the October 12 arson attacks on five public schools in Pattani's Thung Yang Daeng and one in Ma-Yor district. Police said the arson attacks were a retaliation to the arrest of top insurgent leaders.

But a separatist source said the attacks were in response to officials mistreating eight suspects that had been rounded up in Thung Yang Daeng following a vicious attack on the police outpost in the district in mid-July.

Separatist sources said insurgents operate on a need-to-know basis and the militants behind the July attack are long gone. There was no way the eight detainees would have any prior knowledge of the attack.

Another example of officials "overstepping the line" was the shooting death of a 10-year-old Muslim girl in Narathiwat's Bacho district after the vehicle she was travelling in did not stop when a Marine on the side of the road flashed a flashlight at them.

Her mother, father and older sister survived gunshot wounds. A senior Marines commander in the area expressed regret and provided the family with Bt500,000.

Insurgents hit back a week later on November 1 by attacking a group of Buddhist men drinking in front of a shophouse in Songkhla's Thepha district, killing three and wounding four.

The killers left a sarcastic note that read: "Sorry for the unintentional killings. Just like when you shot at the Malay people in [Hutae] Yalor village [in Bacho]."

The following day, gunmen shot at close range a 20-year-old Buddhist university student in Narathiwat's Tambon. The assassin's gun jammed as he tried to shoot the victim's two friends who were riding pillion on the same motorbike. Police said the victim's father was killed in similar fashion two years ago.

The same day also saw a gangland style attack by men travelling on a pick-up truck who opened fire at a house Tambon Nanak in Tak Bai district. One person died on the spot and three others were wounded. All were Buddhists.

The following day in Pattani's Tambon Taluboh, gunmen in a pickup truck attacked a truck full of local Malay Muslim residents, killing three, all of whom were officials from Tambon Krong Maning in Pattani. Two others suffered bullet wounds.

On November 8, a Sungai Padi Muslim resident was shot dead while four rangers and a civilian were wounded by two separate roadside bombings in Pattani on November 11. An imam was shot dead by hooded men in Yala's Betong district on November 12 and then there was the aforementioned gunfight in Pattani's Nong Chik on November 14 that resulted in the deaths of the two insurgents who refused to surrender.

The third week of November saw several banners erected in various locations that read: "As long as the policy of 'Returning Happiness to the People' is still about aiming gun barrels at religious leaders, communities, Muslim clerics, and innocent Malay brothers and sisters, Buddhist civilians, bureaucrats, and teachers can be certain that they will be the last dead bodies."

Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the recent wave of attacks were the simultaneous attacks on four karaoke bars in remote areas on the outskirts of the Pattani provincial capital on October 31. According to a separatist source, the idea was to teach these establishments, as well as the Muslim clients, a nasty lesson.

There was a suggestion that the insurgents had considered waiting until a Muslim walked into one of these establishment before setting off the explosive. But that would of meant compromising their own security and possibly giving their location away. In the end it was decided that it was best to set off the blasts simultaneously and leave the scene immediately.

However, the attacks against the karaoke bars are not the start of a moral crusade. If anything, it was meant to discredit the state and send a stern warning of their disapproval of Muslims indulging in these outlets.

Among the intelligence and security community, all sorts of explanations were given to explain what appears to be a spike in violence recently. But sources in the separatist movements said making the area ungovernable as much as possible continued to be the aim for the time being.

The recent attacks on soft targets, they said, were part of retaliation against specific actions of security officials.

The fact that these attacks are driven by emotion rather than being part of a strategic calculation has become a point of concern the insurgency leaders.

But this is the nature of the insurgency in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, where the separatist movement's chain of command is very fluid and the command and control is untested. In real terms, this means insurgents on the ground continue to decide who they target, while at the same time keeping in mind the need for self-restraint and staying within the loose guidelines provided by the leaders in exile.

Attacking "soft" targets may humiliate security agencies, but separatist leaders have acknowledged that such tactics play into the hands of the authorities.

Moreover, the fact that the authorities make no serious effort to look into the conduct of their security personnel suggests that they can still tolerate the humiliation of being on the receiving end.

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum 
(www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance development and security consultant based in Yala.