Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
There was nothing new in the statement delivered by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) on Monday, but that doesn’t mean the message was without merit or impact.
The significance of the statement, said sources in the BRN movement, was the timing. Similar demands were raised back in early 2013 shortly after the Yingluck Shinawatra government kicked off a peace process. But the intention then was to derail the initiative, which BRN members felt had been forced on them.
The BRN said it knew the Yingluck administration and the Thai Army would make no concessions at talks launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013. Thus the main separatist organisation refused to join the process.
Today, the BRN is suggesting it is ready to talk with Bangkok but adds that it is not under any pressure to do so.
The April 10 statement highlighted the BRN’s terms for talks, which include the participation of foreign governments, and agreement on the terms of reference for negotiations by the two opposing parties – Thailand and the BRN. At present Bangkok prefers negotiating with MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of separatist movements that has been talking to the Thai government for the past two years.
The statement was meant to remind Thailand that the BRN is the organisation that calls the shots on the ground, not MARA Patani.
Tension between the two separatist organisations is high but not beyond repair, said BRN sources, who added that MARA Patani is welcome to join BRN-led talks with the Thais “but only as an individual movement, not an umbrella organisation”.
MARA Patani a ‘Thai creation’
BRN members said they see MARA Patani as a “Thai creation”, pointing to the so-called “Track 1.5” forum that started in 2011. Overseen by the late Jeeraporn Bunnang from the King Prajadhipok’s Institute, the forum brought together exiled leaders from the separatist community to explore peaceful resolutions to this conflict. This quiet initiative would evolve over time and resurfaced in August 2015, when it adopted the name of MARA Patani.
One problem with this forum was that the self-proclaimed BRN members in MARA Patani did not have the endorsement or a mandate from the movement’s ruling council, also known as the Dewan Pimpinan Parti.
Publicly, Thai officials insist they are on the right track and talking to the right people. But lately, some in the Bangkok policy circle are quietly admitting that the so-called “right people”, MARA Patani, do not have command and control over the insurgent combatants.
“It’s a vicious cycle. Whatever we agree with MARA Patani in talks, BRN militants move quickly to discredit it,” said a Thai government source who spoke on condition of anonymity.
But while BRN fighters waste no time discrediting the current peace initiative, the group said it has shut the door to individual MARA Patani members joining it in future talks.
A senior Thai Army officer who has had dealings with Malay separatist leaders since the 1980s said the BRN is reminding Thailand, Malaysia and MARA Patani that it is the one with control over the insurgent militias.
“The BRN wants to show the separatist community that it is fair and open to other possibilities and suggestions from other separatist movements as long as its people are at the head of the table,” said the officer, who also spoke on condition of anonymity.
BRN leaders out of their depth?
But if the Thai government does give in to BRN demands for international mediation of talks, BRN leaders, who have strong religious credentials, “will be in over their heads” because of their lack of understanding of international norms and legal principles, the officer added.
“These babors [elders] know Islam’s holy book. But if and when negotiations between them and Thai officials take off, much of the agenda will be very technical, as it will be based on tangible issues and on secular, humanitarian and legal principles,” said the officer.
“I’m not so sure if these ulema [scholarly Muslims] are ready for it. I’m not even sure if Bangkok is prepared to go that route.”
There is also the question of Malaysia’s role as facilitator if foreign governments are permitted to oversee the talks.
Old methods won’t work
Talking to the separatists is nothing new for the Thai Army. Many like to boast of how their “negotiating skills” brought down the communist insurgency and armed Patani Malay separatist movements. Some think they can repeat that success using the same tactics – tangible incentives in exchange for laying down arms.
But such tactics do nothing to address the historical and cultural narrative that provides the legitimacy for the Malays’ armed struggle. BRN sources said Thailand’s claims of success are exaggerated.
They said the armed struggle waged by various separatist movements went under in the late 1980s because their main backers in the Middle East and North Africa were repositioning themselves for a post-Cold War era.
Today, the BRN’s training and financing is self-sufficient and conducted from within the region.
Combatants are no longer camping out on mountaintops or travelling to Libya for training as happened in the 1980s. Instead they are scattered throughout the region, where villagers provide them with logistical support.
Thailand wrongly assumed that the absence of violence during the 1990s meant peace; in reality the period was merely a lull before another storm. As long as the Thai state rides roughshod over the Patani Malay narrative of cultural and historical difference, a new crop of separatist insurgents will always resurface to take up where the previous generation left off.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based consultant and security analyst. He is also the founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict and insurgency in Thailand’s far South.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/guest_columnist/30312244
DON PATHAN Senior Program Officer for Regional Security Cooperation at The Asia Foundation
Saturday 15 April 2017
Wednesday 12 April 2017
COMMENTARY: Thai Deep South: BRN Takes Aim at Peace Talks
Don Pathan
BenarNews
Bangkok
As if a spike in violence in the Thai Deep South wasn’t enough to rattle the government, the region’s most prominent separatist insurgent group upped the ante this week with a statement dismissing the current peace process and reiterating its demand for negotiating with Bangkok directly.
Rebel group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) reminded the Thais that a meaningful peace process must be in line with international norms, which means an impartial “mediator” should lead the talks.
“Any peace dialogue must be based on the willingness of the two parties involved in the conflict and voluntarily agreed to find a solution,” BRN said in the statement it issued Monday.
Asked to clarify the reference to “two parties,” a BRN operative replied, “the Thai government and the BRN,” not MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups that have been negotiating with the government since 2015 in informal peace talks facilitated by Malaysia.
BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground, the operative said, and the group insisted that Bangkok deal directly with them and that the international community observe the process.
Crossing a red line
The statement followed a spike in insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s Muslim-majority provinces along the southern border that came in retaliation for the recent shooting deaths of two ethnic Malay Muslims, which were largely unreported by the national media.
Separatist militants on the ground were determined to let the government know there was a price to pay for crossing the red line.
Suspected separatist insurgents Isma-ae Hama, 28, and Aseng Useng, 30 were shot and killed on March 29 by paramilitary rangers who said they fired in self-defense during a car chase.
The 15-year-old niece of one of the suspects said the two were not armed. The two stepped out of the vehicle, as instructed by the security officials who led them away, while she waited in the vehicle as instructed. Moments later, she heard gunshots.
Later that day, a photograph of the two dead men about 50 meters from their vehicle along a back road in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, was posted on websites. Beside them were an M16 rifle and a 9-mm handgun.
At the end of the day, it’s her word against the authorities. As expected, there was no outpouring of sympathy from the general Thai public outside the Malay-speaking Deep South, especially when police said the two might have been linked to the killing of a Buddhist deputy village chief and three members of his family on March 2.
Historically, Thai people have shown that they can be extremely unkind to people who challenge their narrative.
Patani Malay separatist militants wasted little time in showing their displeasure with what they deemed was the crossing of a red line by the government.
The following day, about five insurgents hopped on back of a pickup truck, drove up to the Narathiwat’s Rangae district police station, and commenced firing at group of officers who were lining up in formation for the start of their day. One officer was killed and five injured.
Four days later, about 30 insurgents stormed a security outpost in the Krong Pinang district of Yala province, injuring at least 12 police officers. And shortly after midnight, April 6, insurgents unleashed dozens of explosions and arson attacks, crippling the power grid and causing widespread blackouts throughout the region.
Deeply rooted in community
Rules of engagement established through negotiated text do not exist between the two warring sides of this conflict. In this respect, how one interprets “violation” or “legitimate killing” has been subjective.
Separatist sources said they could live with the fact that their combatants get killed in a gunfight with government security forces in a normal theater of violence, such as a battlefield or in a setting that constitutes a battle ground. But they will not tolerate targeted killing of suspects.
Although the insurgents justify the targeted killings of people who spy for Thai security agencies, they insist the government cannot use the same rationale and logic to summarily and extra judiciously kill anyone they think is associated with separatist militants.
Just about every Malay Muslim in the Deep South knows somebody in the separatist movement, one senior BRN field operative said.
In this respect, accusing someone of being “associated” with insurgency is the easiest thing to claim and impossible to refute. In other words, if Isma-ae and Aseng could be killed, anybody could be killed.
The BRN network has a strong support base from the grassroots Malay community that provides members with logistical supports and serves as its eyes and ears. Thai officials on the ground know this but are unable to say much because policy-makers in Bangkok dominate the narrative on the Deep South.
As for the combatants and security officials on the ground, the challenge is deciding who constitutes a legitimate target. And without a joint clearing house where both sides could work out a proper rules of engagement, perceived “violations” will inevitably go on.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
BenarNews
Bangkok
 |
A soldier watches as Thai Muslim men offer prayers during a peace gathering at a hospital in the Deep South where suspected separatist militants launched an ambush two days earlier, March 15, 2016. AFP
|
As if a spike in violence in the Thai Deep South wasn’t enough to rattle the government, the region’s most prominent separatist insurgent group upped the ante this week with a statement dismissing the current peace process and reiterating its demand for negotiating with Bangkok directly.
Rebel group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) reminded the Thais that a meaningful peace process must be in line with international norms, which means an impartial “mediator” should lead the talks.
“Any peace dialogue must be based on the willingness of the two parties involved in the conflict and voluntarily agreed to find a solution,” BRN said in the statement it issued Monday.
Asked to clarify the reference to “two parties,” a BRN operative replied, “the Thai government and the BRN,” not MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups that have been negotiating with the government since 2015 in informal peace talks facilitated by Malaysia.
BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground, the operative said, and the group insisted that Bangkok deal directly with them and that the international community observe the process.
Crossing a red line
The statement followed a spike in insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s Muslim-majority provinces along the southern border that came in retaliation for the recent shooting deaths of two ethnic Malay Muslims, which were largely unreported by the national media.
Separatist militants on the ground were determined to let the government know there was a price to pay for crossing the red line.
Suspected separatist insurgents Isma-ae Hama, 28, and Aseng Useng, 30 were shot and killed on March 29 by paramilitary rangers who said they fired in self-defense during a car chase.
The 15-year-old niece of one of the suspects said the two were not armed. The two stepped out of the vehicle, as instructed by the security officials who led them away, while she waited in the vehicle as instructed. Moments later, she heard gunshots.
Later that day, a photograph of the two dead men about 50 meters from their vehicle along a back road in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, was posted on websites. Beside them were an M16 rifle and a 9-mm handgun.
At the end of the day, it’s her word against the authorities. As expected, there was no outpouring of sympathy from the general Thai public outside the Malay-speaking Deep South, especially when police said the two might have been linked to the killing of a Buddhist deputy village chief and three members of his family on March 2.
Historically, Thai people have shown that they can be extremely unkind to people who challenge their narrative.
Patani Malay separatist militants wasted little time in showing their displeasure with what they deemed was the crossing of a red line by the government.
The following day, about five insurgents hopped on back of a pickup truck, drove up to the Narathiwat’s Rangae district police station, and commenced firing at group of officers who were lining up in formation for the start of their day. One officer was killed and five injured.
Four days later, about 30 insurgents stormed a security outpost in the Krong Pinang district of Yala province, injuring at least 12 police officers. And shortly after midnight, April 6, insurgents unleashed dozens of explosions and arson attacks, crippling the power grid and causing widespread blackouts throughout the region.
Deeply rooted in community
Rules of engagement established through negotiated text do not exist between the two warring sides of this conflict. In this respect, how one interprets “violation” or “legitimate killing” has been subjective.
Separatist sources said they could live with the fact that their combatants get killed in a gunfight with government security forces in a normal theater of violence, such as a battlefield or in a setting that constitutes a battle ground. But they will not tolerate targeted killing of suspects.
Although the insurgents justify the targeted killings of people who spy for Thai security agencies, they insist the government cannot use the same rationale and logic to summarily and extra judiciously kill anyone they think is associated with separatist militants.
Just about every Malay Muslim in the Deep South knows somebody in the separatist movement, one senior BRN field operative said.
In this respect, accusing someone of being “associated” with insurgency is the easiest thing to claim and impossible to refute. In other words, if Isma-ae and Aseng could be killed, anybody could be killed.
The BRN network has a strong support base from the grassroots Malay community that provides members with logistical supports and serves as its eyes and ears. Thai officials on the ground know this but are unable to say much because policy-makers in Bangkok dominate the narrative on the Deep South.
As for the combatants and security officials on the ground, the challenge is deciding who constitutes a legitimate target. And without a joint clearing house where both sides could work out a proper rules of engagement, perceived “violations” will inevitably go on.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Thursday 6 April 2017
EDITORIAL Army chiefs forever handcuffed in the South
THE NATION
Lt-General Piyawat finds fresh ways to offend as he tries to ‘do his best’ under such restricted circumstances
Every general assigned to command the Fourth Army jurisdiction tries while overseeing day-to-day operations to make the best of the keen media attention directed that way, knowing his time in the contested southern region will last only until he’s promoted to the inner circle in Bangkok, as has proved inevitable in modern times. Bangkok is the prize and any regional command is a temporary posting, a stepping stone to the ultimate goal. Those handed the far South, as troublesome as it can be for the officials in charge, are under little pressure to find a way to end the conflict. The past 13 years suggest that such an accomplishment is an impossible dream anyway.
Instead, each new commander makes a grand show of introducing a fresh strategy that will achieve the impossible. It is human nature, after all, to wish to seem better than one’s predecessor. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the commanders merely pass along the exact same objective to their successors – to remove as many ethnic Malay insurgents from the field as possible, through kills, capture or coercion. Only the means to complete this mission vary.
Lieutenant General Piyawat Nakwanich, the man in charge since late last year, is no different from his predecessors despite earnest efforts to seem so. His personal touch has been demonstrating the utmost accessibility – when visiting conflict areas, he likes to shout out his phone number and invite any insurgents who might be listening to call him and discuss the terms of their surrender. He guarantees them fair treatment under the law and offers to helicopter into their jungle hideouts to ferry them out. Does it work? A few weeks ago, Piyawat rode a chopper into the middle of field to pick up a young man apparently ready to surrender. But the event was so obviously staged that security officials in Bangkok were shaking their heads in embarrassment.
Another ploy the commander has tried is called “Bring People Back Home”, a campaign that encourages parents (especially dear old mums) to persuade their renegade sons to quit the movement and surrender in exchange for fair treatment. Doing so ensures them that their name will be expunged from a government “black list”, but the local people are all too aware that, once on any of the several varieties of black lists, there’s no getting off.
When one media outlet reported recently that the insurgents are aiming to recruit a million new combatants over the next 15 years, General Piyawat demonstrated arrogance in lieu of professionalism and appalling shallowness in his understanding of the insurrection. He told reporters not to worry, since the deep South 15 years hence will be fully developed, with good roads and high-speed train service. There will no longer be a reason for anyone to take up arms against the state, he said.
Ignoring the insurgents’ fundamental grievance – that the Thai state denies the southern Malay-Muslim majority the basic dignities it is due – Piywat seeks to lecture them and other members of their community that they should swallow their pride, stop biting the hand that feeds them and behave like good citizens. He evidently does not understand why so many young people took up arms in the first place.
To be fair, none of the military men placed in charge of the region has been given a mandate to guide policy based on his own observations, much less set policy. The bloodshed in the South will continue as long as its political, administrative and military management remains centralised. If the situation is ever to improve, the government and Army must give the regional commander far greater authority.
Lt-General Piyawat finds fresh ways to offend as he tries to ‘do his best’ under such restricted circumstances
Every general assigned to command the Fourth Army jurisdiction tries while overseeing day-to-day operations to make the best of the keen media attention directed that way, knowing his time in the contested southern region will last only until he’s promoted to the inner circle in Bangkok, as has proved inevitable in modern times. Bangkok is the prize and any regional command is a temporary posting, a stepping stone to the ultimate goal. Those handed the far South, as troublesome as it can be for the officials in charge, are under little pressure to find a way to end the conflict. The past 13 years suggest that such an accomplishment is an impossible dream anyway.
Instead, each new commander makes a grand show of introducing a fresh strategy that will achieve the impossible. It is human nature, after all, to wish to seem better than one’s predecessor. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the commanders merely pass along the exact same objective to their successors – to remove as many ethnic Malay insurgents from the field as possible, through kills, capture or coercion. Only the means to complete this mission vary.
Lieutenant General Piyawat Nakwanich, the man in charge since late last year, is no different from his predecessors despite earnest efforts to seem so. His personal touch has been demonstrating the utmost accessibility – when visiting conflict areas, he likes to shout out his phone number and invite any insurgents who might be listening to call him and discuss the terms of their surrender. He guarantees them fair treatment under the law and offers to helicopter into their jungle hideouts to ferry them out. Does it work? A few weeks ago, Piyawat rode a chopper into the middle of field to pick up a young man apparently ready to surrender. But the event was so obviously staged that security officials in Bangkok were shaking their heads in embarrassment.
Another ploy the commander has tried is called “Bring People Back Home”, a campaign that encourages parents (especially dear old mums) to persuade their renegade sons to quit the movement and surrender in exchange for fair treatment. Doing so ensures them that their name will be expunged from a government “black list”, but the local people are all too aware that, once on any of the several varieties of black lists, there’s no getting off.
When one media outlet reported recently that the insurgents are aiming to recruit a million new combatants over the next 15 years, General Piyawat demonstrated arrogance in lieu of professionalism and appalling shallowness in his understanding of the insurrection. He told reporters not to worry, since the deep South 15 years hence will be fully developed, with good roads and high-speed train service. There will no longer be a reason for anyone to take up arms against the state, he said.
Ignoring the insurgents’ fundamental grievance – that the Thai state denies the southern Malay-Muslim majority the basic dignities it is due – Piywat seeks to lecture them and other members of their community that they should swallow their pride, stop biting the hand that feeds them and behave like good citizens. He evidently does not understand why so many young people took up arms in the first place.
To be fair, none of the military men placed in charge of the region has been given a mandate to guide policy based on his own observations, much less set policy. The bloodshed in the South will continue as long as its political, administrative and military management remains centralised. If the situation is ever to improve, the government and Army must give the regional commander far greater authority.
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