COMMENTARY: Thai Deep South: BRN Takes Aim at Peace Talks

Don Pathan
BenarNews

Bangkok

A soldier watches as Thai Muslim men offer prayers during a peace gathering at a hospital in the Deep South where suspected separatist militants launched an ambush two days earlier, March 15, 2016. AFP

As if a spike in violence in the Thai Deep South wasn’t enough to rattle the government, the region’s most prominent separatist insurgent group upped the ante this week with a statement dismissing the current peace process and reiterating its demand for negotiating with Bangkok directly.

Rebel group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) reminded the Thais that a meaningful peace process must be in line with international norms, which means an impartial “mediator” should lead the talks.

“Any peace dialogue must be based on the willingness of the two parties involved in the conflict and voluntarily agreed to find a solution,” BRN said in the statement it issued Monday.

Asked to clarify the reference to “two parties,” a BRN operative replied, “the Thai government and the BRN,” not MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups that have been negotiating with the government since 2015 in informal peace talks facilitated by Malaysia.

BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground, the operative said, and the group insisted that Bangkok deal directly with them and that the international community observe the process.

Crossing a red line

The statement followed a spike in insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s Muslim-majority provinces along the southern border that came in retaliation for the recent shooting deaths of two ethnic Malay Muslims, which were largely unreported by the national media.

Separatist militants on the ground were determined to let the government know there was a price to pay for crossing the red line.

Suspected separatist insurgents Isma-ae Hama, 28, and Aseng Useng, 30 were shot and killed on March 29 by paramilitary rangers who said they fired in self-defense during a car chase.

The 15-year-old niece of one of the suspects said the two were not armed. The two stepped out of the vehicle, as instructed by the security officials who led them away, while she waited in the vehicle as instructed. Moments later, she heard gunshots.

Later that day, a photograph of the two dead men about 50 meters from their vehicle along a back road in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, was posted on websites. Beside them were an M16 rifle and a 9-mm handgun.

At the end of the day, it’s her word against the authorities. As expected, there was no outpouring of sympathy from the general Thai public outside the Malay-speaking Deep South, especially when police said the two might have been linked to the killing of a Buddhist deputy village chief and three members of his family on March 2.

Historically, Thai people have shown that they can be extremely unkind to people who challenge their narrative.

Patani Malay separatist militants wasted little time in showing their displeasure with what they deemed was the crossing of a red line by the government.

The following day, about five insurgents hopped on back of a pickup truck, drove up to the Narathiwat’s Rangae district police station, and commenced firing at group of officers who were lining up in formation for the start of their day. One officer was killed and five injured.

Four days later, about 30 insurgents stormed a security outpost in the Krong Pinang district of Yala province, injuring at least 12 police officers. And shortly after midnight, April 6, insurgents unleashed dozens of explosions and arson attacks, crippling the power grid and causing widespread blackouts throughout the region.

Deeply rooted in community

Rules of engagement established through negotiated text do not exist between the two warring sides of this conflict. In this respect, how one interprets “violation” or “legitimate killing” has been subjective.

Separatist sources said they could live with the fact that their combatants get killed in a gunfight with government security forces in a normal theater of violence, such as a battlefield or in a setting that constitutes a battle ground. But they will not tolerate targeted killing of suspects.

Although the insurgents justify the targeted killings of people who spy for Thai security agencies, they insist the government cannot use the same rationale and logic to summarily and extra judiciously kill anyone they think is associated with separatist militants.

Just about every Malay Muslim in the Deep South knows somebody in the separatist movement, one senior BRN field operative said.

In this respect, accusing someone of being “associated” with insurgency is the easiest thing to claim and impossible to refute. In other words, if Isma-ae and Aseng could be killed, anybody could be killed.

The BRN network has a strong support base from the grassroots Malay community that provides members with logistical supports and serves as its eyes and ears. Thai officials on the ground know this but are unable to say much because policy-makers in Bangkok dominate the narrative on the Deep South.

As for the combatants and security officials on the ground, the challenge is deciding who constitutes a legitimate target. And without a joint clearing house where both sides could work out a proper rules of engagement, perceived “violations” will inevitably go on.

Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.

A dangerous waiting game: Thailand's aspirations for peace

Bangkok demands insurgent groups in the south cease militant operations before any agreement is made

Relatives and mourners perform burial rites during a funeral for a father and his four-year-old daughter killed by a bomb blast in front of a school in the Takbai district of Thailand's restive southern province of Narathiwat on Sept. 6. An anonymous source from the separatist militant group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has admitted responsibility for the deadly bombing. (Photo by AFP)

Don Pathan, Pattani 
Thailand      UCA News

September 8, 2016

UCA News

The peace dialogue between the Thai government and separatist groups under the umbrella of Majlis Syura Patani (MARA Patani) has reached a critical juncture. The main hurdle is that ongoing violence on the ground has placed the government in a very awkward position.

Currently, Bangkok is not letting up with their demands that violence be subsided before they ink any agreement with MARA Patani. The problem is that Thai security officials believe that the group has little or no control over the militants behind a spate of attacks in the country, the most recent being a bombing outside a school in the restive south on Sept. 6. A father and his young daughter were killed in the attack allegedly carried out by insurgents.

A source from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one group that controls the vast majority of combatants on the ground, admitted that its militants were behind the attack but expressed grave remorse at the death of the father and his child.

The target was the police, which BRN said were "legitimate," and that the bomb exploded half an hour after the school had already started, said the operative who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not permitted to speak to the media.

There were also a recent car bomb attack at a major hotel and a powerful blast targeting a train. Both of these incidents were in the province of Pattani, the capital of the Malays' historical homeland.

About two million people reside in this historically contested region where about 85 percent are ethnically Malays who have a long standing mistrust of the Thai state and its policy of assimilation that they feel come at the expense of their cultural and religious identity. These two attacks were likewise carried out by the BRN.

It was BRN's way of letting both the Thai government and MARA Patani know of their disapproval of the ongoing peace initiative that was first launched by the government of Yingluck Shinwatra in February 2013 and continued by the current military government that ousted her in May 2014.

Even with Yingluck's initiative, which was kicked off by her fugitive brother former premier Thaksin one year before the official launch, BRN wasted no time to let Bangkok know that there is no short cut to peace. Two weeks after Thaksin met with 16 exiled leaders to convince them to come on board of a planned peace talk, BRN in late March 2012 set off a simultaneous triple car bomb in the heart of Yala, killing 14 people and injuring a further 130.

'Safety zone'

This year, the BRN demonstrated their displeasure of the peace initiative in March when scores of its combatants took over a hospital in Narathiwat province's Cho Ai Rong, one of the districts that Thailand wanted to be placed within a "safety zone." The hospital was used to stage a massive attack on a Paramilitary Ranger camp next door.

The safety zone initiative was Bangkok's way of determining whether MARA Patani could actually carry out unilateral ceasefire to demonstrate that it actually has command-and-control over the insurgents on the ground.

BRN wasted little time to demonstrate that MARA Patani doesn't have such control.

But the subject of the safety zones didn't go away and came up again in a Sept. 2 meeting between Thai negotiators and MARA Patani leaders. The heads of the umbrella organization had already suffered a great deal of humiliation last April when Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha refused to give into their demands by signing a negotiated terms of reference that would make their dialogue official and a binding process.

Prayut said he was not able to do so because MARA Patani were associated with "criminals," a term he used in reference to the combatants on the ground. But in actuality, he, like other Thai officials, is waiting to see if MARA Patani could actually influence the course of violence on the ground.

Prayut further described the talk with MARA Patani as a burden that was created by the Yingluck government that was unfairly imposed on him.

And so when the topic of safety zone in the context of the public security came up at the Sept. 2 talks, BRN combatants chose the State Railway of Thailand as their target to discredit the peace initiative.

"You can't really get any more public than hitting a passenger train," said Suhaimee Dulasa, a youth activist from Patani Institute, a local civil society organization critical of the conduct of the state security apparatus.

Like previous attacks, BRN has shown some restraints and went for the carrier that wasn't carrying local passengers. One railway worker died from the blast and two other personnel were wounded.

A Thai military intelligence officer said BRN also employed the same practices when they set off a massive car bomb at a Pattani hotel on Aug. 23. The bomb, about 90 kilograms in weight, was meant to destroy the facility but not to rake up the body count.

Investigators pointed to a much smaller one that was set off 45 minutes earlier, about 100 meters away, which was supposed to be a warning to the people to leave the immediate area.

But while BRN said they do not endorse the ongoing talks between MARA Patani and the Thai government, it doesn't mean that they don't want to negotiate with Thailand.

BRN wants Bangkok to deal with them directly but they will come to the negotiating table only if they are properly prepared. This means the members of their political wing need to be more familiar with capacity building and understanding of international norms. These are basic requirements for them be recognized and accepted by Thailand and the international community.

The train blast occurred three weeks after a series of bombing incidents that killed four and wounded dozens in the seven provinces in the upper south, a region popular among foreign visitors and local tourists.

Unlike previous attacks outside of the conflict-affected region in the far south, BRN has been tight lipped about the attacks in the seven provinces and refrained to relay their message through the normal channel of communication to the policy makers in Bangkok.

BRN sources said the organization tends to react to something they don't like rather than issuing specific demands. Their mode of operation, for the time being, is to make the contested region ungovernable, as much as possible, until they are prepared to come to the negotiating table. This means Bangkok would have to permit the international community to recognize and work with BRN in the area of capacity building. Until then, Thailand can expect to see ongoing violence. 

Don Pathan is an associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting, Ltd. and is based in Yala, one of Thailand's three southernmost provinces hit by the current wave of insurgency.

Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy

Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.

The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.

Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.

The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.

Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.

Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.

The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.

The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.

Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.

The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.

This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.

Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.

The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.

Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.

Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.

But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.

Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.

The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.

Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.

The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy

Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.

The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.

Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.

The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.

Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.

Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.

The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.

The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.

Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.

The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.

This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.

Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.

The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.

Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.

Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.

But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.

Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.

The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.

Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.

The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

BRN call for foreign observers at peace talks a key test for Bangkok

Insurgent group says it is willing to negotiate if Thailand follows international norms

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

For an organisation whose leadership is very secretive, Barisan Revolusi Nasional is drifting into uncharted territory as its "Information Department" reaches out to foreign media to make their case about Thailand's questionable effort to secure peace in its southernmost provinces.

Bomb squad inspecting scene in Narathiwat earlier this month following attack.

Reaching out to foreign media may have come out of a desire to remind the world that BRN's leadership has yet to endorse Thailand's current peace initiative.

Nevertheless, it was a step in a more conventional direction - one that could force the Thai government to rethink its own information strategy, according to a Thai government official working on the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

What was interesting, noted the Thai official and Artef Sohko, a youth activist and member of a political action group, the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development (Lempar), was that the BRN Information Department had reached out to Anthony Davis, a veteran writer who has for decades written on security issues and conflicts around Asia for Jane's Defence Weekly and other major publications.

For years, much of the information about the conflict in Thailand's southernmost provinces had been provided by the state, making any reporting lopsided.

But the Thai government will no longer enjoy a monopoly on the flow of information should groups like the BRN, which controls a vast majority of the insurgents on the ground, begin to seriously exercise their communication strategy.

A BRN source said the leadership in the movement, namely the Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, agreed to the interview because they wanted to set the record straight regarding the peace initiative of Thailand, the Malaysian government and MARA Patani, the recently established umbrella organisation.

Whether this was a one-time thing remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it was enough to get Thais to seriously think about what the future holds in the realm of communication strategy.

Besides the recent interview with Davis, BRN's leadership also issued a four-page statement slamming Thailand for deceiving the world with the initiative but not being willing to make any meaningful concession.

BRN said they are willing to negotiate for peace but the process must be carried out along international norms and the talks must be witnessed by foreign states.

As expected, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan rejected the demand that foreign governments observe the peace talks.

Bangkok has never liked the idea of foreign mediation for fear of "internationalising" the conflict, which they feel would give too much legitimacy to the separatists.

BRN sources said the DPP would only endorse the peace talks if their negotiators are properly prepared and their political wings receive the needed immunity.

Earlier last month, just 10 days after the August 27 launch of MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, the DPP reminded the world about their feeling about the Thai state through a statement read out by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of the movement's youth wing who's also part of the BRN Information Department.

In the video statement, he criticised the Thai state for being insincere and lacking legitimacy in Malays' historical homeland, which is today's southern border provinces.

It was hard to dismiss Abdulkarim's statement as irrelevant because he was not an unknown entity. The man was at the negotiating table at the previous round of talks launched by the Yingluck government in February 2013.

Abdulkarim was sent to the talks by the DPP under a very strict mandate. He could not negotiate - as the BRN's DPP did not officially endorse the Yingluck initiative - but would observe and report back to the top leaders.

That initiative ended in late 2013 when the designated "BRN liaison", Hasan Taib, threw in the towel and went incommunicado. Street protests in Bangkok also sent the Yingluck government into survival mode until her administration was ousted in May of last year by a military coup.

Seven months after the putsch, the junta decided to pick up where the Yingluck team had left off, but with conditions. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha demanded that the separatist leaders develop a common platform and implement "a period of peace".

Thai officials said "the period of peace", or ceasefire, was to demonstrate that MARA Patani members had adequate command-and-control over the militants on the ground.

Bangkok did not get their "period of peace" but the separatists did form the MARA Patani, a platform for their common strategy and for dealing with the Thais collectively.

Prayut rejected the idea of granting MARA Patani formal recognition and legal immunity but said talks could continue - in an unofficial capacity.

MARA Patani was a sideshow, or Track 1.5, to the Yingluck official Track 1 initiative that has Malaysia as designated facilitator.

Today, with Hasan and Abdulkarim abandoning the initiative, the sideshow was elevated to a formal Track 1. But being on Track 1 does not guarantee MARA Patani members formal or meaningful recognition as Bangkok does not want to give away too much too soon to the Patani Malay groups.

But if MARA Patani could secure a buy-in from the DPP, Bangkok just might take them more seriously and grant them the recognition they want, security officials said.

For the time being, MARA Patani, Thailand's dialogue panel (negotiators) and the Malaysian facilitators are pinning their hopes on a small group of young BRN members who broke ranks and joined the peace talks.

Two of these individuals - Sukree Hari and Ahmad Chuwo - were paraded to the press in Kuala Lumpur with other MARA Patani representatives. They still called themselves "BRN" but combatants on the ground said, "Who cares?" What matters, in today's context, is who has command-and-control on the ground.

The Thai negotiators, MARA Patani and Kuala Lumpur were hoping that these former teachers from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala could bridge the gap between them and the BRN ruling council.

But the recently released four-page statement, along with Abdulkarim's statement on YouTube, not to mention the interview with Davis, was BRN's way of telling all stakeholders that there is no shortcut to peace.

Thai officials have quietly acknowledged that parading the pair to the media in late August along with the MARA Patani may have been a premature move.

Perhaps all sides should have waited until they are certain that these former teachers have secured the needed endorsement from the BRN's ruling council, he said.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

Bangkok lacks THE WILL to make peace in deep South

A LONG-STANDING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AMONG SECURITY FORCES IS PREVENTING THE LATEST PUSH FOR PEACE FROM GAINING TRACTION

DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION

More than a year after seizing power, our latest crop of junta officials have come face to face with separatist leaders in what are being billed as "pre-talks" - a stepping stone to formal peace negotiations in the far South.

Senior leaders from the self-styled MARA Patani umbrella organisation - which comprises several long-standing separatist groups, including the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP) plus a handful of people who claim to be members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - met with the Thai chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara Kherdphol and his team in Malaysia on June 8. The two sides had met previously for a "pre-talks" session in April.

A young cadre from the BRN, Sukri Hari, was present at the first meeting, but sources said his participation in no way constitutes BRN endorsement for the peace initiative with the Thais.

Sources in the movement said Sukri believes he can help locate common ground between MARA Patani and the BRN, which has so far ruled out any direct talks with the current government. The BRN controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, thus making their participation vital if any peace initiative is to win success.

As for Team Thailand, courting Sukri could pay off in the long run if he can succeed where MARA Patani failed - by convincing the genuine BRN leadership to join the peace process.

In other words, Sukri's participation could be much more important than the participation of self-proclaimed BRN leaders such as Awang Jabat and Tok Imam Haleng, both of whom are prominent members in the MARA Patani forum but were conspicuously absent from the June 8 meeting.

Sukri cannot be allowed to shine too brightly, however. The former teacher is a fugitive facing arrest warrants on charges of treason. He fled Thailand in 2007 along with seven of his colleagues from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala after they were granted bail under the then-government of Surayud Chulanont.

Unless the charges against him are dropped, putting Sukri on a pedestal could prove to be a legal and diplomatic disaster. And there is no guarantee that this young member can change the mindset of the BRN old guard.

Though the June 8 pre-talks were not formal negotiations, and not all of the MARA Patani groups were present, the Thai side did ask the separatist leaders at the meeting if they could get the combatants to curb their activities during the month of Ramadan.

The separatist leaders did not commit themselves, saying it was too early to be making deals, according to a Thai intelligence officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

However, a BRN operative said there would be no escalation of attacks or straying beyond the usual targets of security officials as long as the Thai side did not violate the rules of engagement - by, for example, targeting religious leaders.

The participants at the June 8 meeting couldn't accede to such a request even if they wanted to, because they don't control the combatants, the BRN source added.

Similar discrepancies also exist on the Thai side, between policymakers and the security agencies on the ground.

BRN operatives often point to the target killing of Imam Abdullateh Todir - a member of the Yala Islamic Committee and an imam in Yala's Yaha district - as a prime example of the disunity among the Thai security agencies.

Abdullateh was shot dead by a pro-government death squad in November 2012. An attempt on his life earlier that year failed but cost his daughter her life.

After the failed assassination, Thai Special Forces provided him with a security detail. The Army saw him as a potential go-between for the authorities and the insurgent fighters.

But another agency didn't see it that way, believing instead that he was too close to the insurgents. And when the Special Forces became complacent, a couple of gunmen pounced.

Abdullateh lived in Tambon Patae, an extremely "red" area in Yaha district. His killing triggered an unprecedented spike in violence that lasted six weeks.

A few months later the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) failed to get the provincial Islamic committees to endorse peace negotiations launched on February 28, 2013. Clerics refused to endorse the initiative, having witnessed one of their own gunned down by what they said was a pro-government death squad.

The BRN says Thai security agencies' old attitudes and standard operating procedures haven't changed. The culture of impunity among the officials makes it difficult for them to take anything from Bangkok seriously, they say.

Nevertheless, the BRN has not ruled out talking to the Thai side, but will do so only on its own terms and when it is ready.

For the time being, it doesn't see any real commitment or seriousness from the current Bangkok government and believes that "peace process" is an empty phrase designed for domestic and international consumption.

The culture of impunity aside, the current structure of the Thai negotiating and policy team for the South is also problematic.

On the surface, many ministries and agencies are represented at the policy level and on the dialogue panel.

Top officials from the Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry, Internal Security Operation Command, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Army sit on the policy forum, and their subordinates are represented on the dialogue panel, which is headed by chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara.

But judging from the meeting in mid-May between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and top bureaucrats from these ministries and agencies, it appears that these representatives are more interested in protecting their constituencies than in exploring creative ideas to support peace and negotiations.

Prayut is averse to the idea of MARA Patani because, in the view of the Foreign Ministry, it could lead to an internationalising of the deep South conflict.

Thai officials are often reminded how the now-defunct separatist umbrella group Bersatu helped garner political and financial support from Muslim countries in the Middle East.

Besides the worry over "internationalising" the conflict, there are concerns that the draft constitution doesn't permit the Kingdom to be divided.

PM Prayut may not like the idea of MARA Patani, but the real issue is whether this separatist forum can evolve into something meaningful that attracts support and legitimacy from the Malays of Patani and the international community.

Moreover, no government wants to debate with a foreign entity on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays' historical homeland, much less the culture of impunity and the human rights violations committed against local Muslims over the past few decades.

When the previous wave of separatist militants went under in the 1990s, Bangkok governments stepped up their diplomacy to cut off their support from Arab and Muslim countries.

The Chuan Leekpai government even secured permanent observer status for Thailand at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in order to block these separatist movements from obtaining a seat in the forum and consequently diplomatic support.

Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - friendly Muslim countries in Southeast Asia - endorsed Thailand's quest, which Bangkok took as a stamp of approval for how Thailand treats its Muslim minority.

Today, a stamp of approval seems the last thing on Thai authorities' mind, with anti-Muslim sentiment in and around the country continuing unabated, especially in Nan province where residents are campaigning against a plan to build a local mosque. They claim that an Islamic place of worship could turn their community into another conflict zone like the Patani region.

But separatist movements, particularly the BRN, say it's a different kind of fight nowadays. Combatants on the ground no longer depend on foreign donors since local villagers now provide intelligence, logistical support and supplies to sustain militant cells.

Thai officials often pay lip service to the idea of winning hearts and minds in deep-South communities but seem to have little insight on how to achieve this task.

If anybody has sway over the combatants' rules of engagement, said one BRN operative, it is the local villagers.

He said the militants' decision to end the practice of mutilating Thai soldiers' corpses, as well as ceasing attacks on public schools, was influenced by the villagers.

For the time being, the immediate challenge for the self-proclaimed MARA Patani is convincing the BRN that there is merit in coming to the table to talk, Thai officials said.

But like everything else in this conflict, that's easier said than done, especially when Bangkok is not willing to make any concessions.

DON PATHAN is a security analyst and development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Lost in FOG of conflict, peace talks must go back to basics

Don Pathan
Special to the Nation

To make progress in deep south, negotiations must first focus on verifying separatist groups' credentials

The so-called peace process launched just two years ago by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra is having problems getting back on its feet after languishing for more than a year without progress.

The initiative, launched on February 28, 2013, struggled almost from the very beginning. It hit a snag in late 2013 when the designated liaison with the separatists, Hasan Taib, called it quits. And then came the infamous Bangkok Shutdown that sent the Yingluck government into survival mode, until the May 2014 coup put the final nail in her political coffin.

Our latest junta leadership pledged to continue the peace talks, but on condition that the separatists established a common platform and brought about a "period of peace". For some, this means a ceasefire. For decision-makers in Bangkok, it means assurance that whoever comes to the negotiating table has a significant degree of command-and-control over the separatist combatants.

Observers, stakeholders and separatist leaders themselves agree that the one longstanding group that controls the vast majority of combatants is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).

So far, unlike other groups, the BRN has been camera shy. It frowns on members who have surfaced to take part in any discussion or forum, closed-door or not. Senior BRN members, both in exile and at home, have been kicked out of the movement for violating this ground rule.

Even individual BRN members who have jumped on the bandwagon of the Majlis Amanah Rakyat Patani (MARA Patani), an initiative to create a regional assembly in Thailand's Malay-speaking South to rubber stamp the ongoing peace initiative, have been asked to leave the movement.

Combatants on the ground and leaders living in exile, as well as Thai intelligence officers, see MARA Patani as a desperate attempt to give the process some credibility after more than a year of stalling. But the plan is not generating any traction, which means key actors in the peace process must now go back to the drawing board and rethink the entire thing.

Latest 'short cut' has failed

The BRN has given MARA Patani the cold shoulder on grounds that it is "artificial and instant", when there is in fact no short cut to peace. The group said they want to talk peace with Thailand but will come to the negotiating table only after a number issues are resolved. These include proper training for their negotiators, official recognition and immunity for members of their political wing.

The BRN said they would like to work with the international community on capacity building but Bangkok is still contemplating the idea of giving the green light to international NGOs or foreign governments to work with the group.

One of the problems, said a Thai political insider, is that the Thai side has never been sure which group is capable of what, or who are the real BRN.

For the past decade or so, just about every potential facilitator and mediator, local and foreign, has claimed to speak for the BRN or to have the group's endorsement. But none has succeeded in generating any traction that leads to meaningful progress towards peace.

No go-between with separatists

Even the credentials of Hasan Taib, the designated BRN liaison for the peace initiative under the Yingluck administration, were misrepresented to the public. Hasan, who did not have the endorsement of the BRN leadership when he surfaced on February 28, 2013, didn't have the audacity to call himself BRN leader. And so the label "liaison" was applied.

The debate over whether Hasan had any influence with the combatants on the ground or support from the BRN leadership nagged the Thai government throughout the process, until November 2013 when he quit in a YouTube video statement. He later went incommunicado for a few weeks.

Now, the participants in the current process are unable to find a replacement to come to the table. Ideally, Bangkok wants a person who is a known figure among the Malays of Patani. Without BRN endorsement, the negotiations will be nothing more than a talking shop. Others believe that a bad process is better than no process at all.

With virtually no leg to stand on, it appears that MARA Patani is about to crumble even before the first meeting begins.

Without calling it "Plan B", Thai officials are saying there has to be a contingency plan or something to keep the talks going if MARA Patan is ditched.

Some officials suggest peace efforts should go back to basics, with confidence-building measures between the two warring sides to repair decades of confusion.

In sub-national conflicts elsewhere, insurgents either give prior warning of an attack through a go-between, such as the media, or leave some sort of signature at the scene as a way of claiming responsibility. This is not the case in southern Thailand, at least not yet anyway, said officials.

Official sources in Bangkok said Thailand might be willing to go down the confidence-building route, as it would help the government obtain a better understanding of the capability of the various Patani movements and factions.

Since recognition is what the movements are after, some sort of a "clearing house" where both sides could get together - directly or through an interlocutor - and compare notes to verify responsibility for attacks could well be the place to begin the much-needed confidence building activities.

DON PATHAN is a freelance security analyst and a consultant based in Yala. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Unofficial talks may fan the flames of insurgency

Don Pathan

SOMETHING is seriously out of tune in diplomatic ties between Bangkok and Jakarta, and the ongoing insurgency in the deep South of Thailand is to blame.

The Thai government was quick to distance itself from so-called secret talks in Bogor between a group of ageing Patani Malay exiles and Thai delegates led by Kwanchart Klaharn, a senior security adviser to the People Power Party.

Indonesian State Secretary Hatta Radjasa said Indonesia was considered an experienced mediator and that the gathering was a "wish that their efforts would end the conflict".

The Bogor meeting was facilitated by Indonesia's Vice President Yussuf Kalla, known to some in diplomatic circles as "Mr Let's Make a Deal".

It appears that the meeting was supposed to be secret in nature. But once the Indonesian media broke the story over the weekend, the people in Kalla's camp wasted no time in milking the situation. Photographs appeared of a majestic-looking Kalla sat between the two warring parties. The man was in his element, indeed. No one seems to care what this will do to Thai-Indonesian relations.

Over the past two years, there have been a number of meetings between self-proclaimed Patani Malay leaders and so-called representative from Thailand, official and semi-official. Most, if not all, of these meetings were secret in nature but some details were leaked to the media, only to be played down by the Thai government.

Because of the absence of a unified position on either the Thai or the exiled separatists' sides, these talks were ad hoc in nature, having no effect on policy change. If anything, the meetings have become intelligence-gathering exercises for the participants. This is not to mention the per diems and free trips abroad.

One only has to look at the fiasco in July when former Army chief General Chetta Thanajaro claimed to have succeeded in getting an unnamed underground separatist group to announce an end to the century-old insurgency.

The public didn't even give the former chief the benefit of the doubt by waiting to see if the violence ended as he stated it would. People immediately called it a hoax. And the violence continues unabated.

Just last weekend, former premier Chavalit Yongchaiyudh also made a similar claim - that the level of violence will begin a sharp decline starting on October 13, and by December 5 it will come to a complete stop.

As with Chetta, no one has given a hoot about this announcement.

But this is not to say that all of the encounters between separatist leaders and Thai authorities have been fruitless.

The Thai government has been in constructive dialogue with leaders of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and Barian Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate over the past two years, and in December 2007 then prime minister Surayud Chulanont met with the two groups in Bahrain.

But this fledging process needs stronger political backing.

Ethnic Malay participants at the Bogor talks called themselves the Consultative Council of the Patani Malay People. The delegates were made up of former members of the now-defunct Bersatu, whose former leader Wan Kadir Che Man is said to have declined an offer to take part in Kalla's dialogue process.

Pulo's foreign affairs chief Kasturi Mahkota said his group had pulled out of Kalla's process, saying it didn't have anything new to offer. "It wasn't serious," Kasturi said.

But given the option between talking and not talking, one would think that a dialogue is better than no dialogue at all," said a Bangkok-based diplomat.

But then again, these dialogues - especially those that organisers tend to milk for public relations purposes - could prove to be damaging.

If anything, they could derail the more meaningful processes, such as the one pushed through by Surayud.

But instead of picking up where Surayud left off, the previous government of Samak Sundaravej didn't want to be bothered at all with the conflict in the deep South - in spite of the fact that more than 3,300 people have been killed since January 2004.

In March this year, Samak delegated his authority as the director of the Internal Security Operation Command to Anupong, effectively making Anupong the security tsar overseeing military and civilian affairs in the restive region. But like others before him, Anupong knows that it is too costly politically to push through any bold initiative, even the one that Surayud had started.

Deep-seated issues such as Patani Malay cultural space and the sticky issue of identity are being discussed in seminars, but that's about it.

It is very unlikely that the outcome from these talks will be a win-win scenario for the two opposing parties as has been suggested by some mediators and facilitators. The bottom line is what kind of concessions the Patani Malays and the Thai state are willing to make.