Don Pathan
The Nation
Kuala Lumpur
For the past three decades, old man Fadel has met and talked with Thai
security officials about what seems to be a never ending dispute
between the Malay historical homeland of Patani and the Thai state.
Not much has changed over the years. If anything, the situation seems
to be getting worse if one takes into consideration the level of
violence in the southernmost border provinces where more than 3,200
have died since January 2004.
Fadel (not his real name) is a key leader from one of the longstanding
separatist groups that emerged in the late 1960s to carve out a
separate homeland for Malays in Thailand's southernmost border
provinces. Like many Patani exiles, Fadel lives a quiet life in
Malaysia under the watchful eyes of the state security and
intelligence agencies.
Kuala Lumpur has been working quietly with
Bangkok to facilitate some of these meetings that Fadel said hasn't
made much progress. He blamed the lack of sincerity and the absence of
mandate on his Thai counterparts.
Since his last interview to The Nation, early last year, Fadel has
lost a tooth and his hair has greyed more. But his stance remains
unchanged.
Like other leaders of long standing groups – Patani United Liberation
Organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional, Gerekan Mujahidin
Islam Patani (GMIP), Barisan Islam Pembangunan Patani (BIPP) – Fadel
has dropped the demand for an independent Patani.
Echoing other old guards from these long standing groups, Fadel
maintained that before true and lasting peace can be achieved,
Thailand must first recognise the historical fact that the
Malay-speaking region was once an independent sultanate. Moreover, the
use of Malay must be permitted as a "working language" alongside the
"official" Thai.
"This is not about separating Patani from Thailand. It's about the
dignity of the Malays of Patani," explained Fadel.
Thai security officials have said rewriting history and having all
sides come to terms with the past will not go well with conservative
elements who see the current nationstate boundary as something next to
divine revelation. But the demands from the old guards can be met as
long as the will is there from the political leaders, they said.
Like everything else, it seems, the devil is in the details.
In recent months, Fadel has been watching with some discomfort the
various initiatives by key Thai political and regional leaders to
broker a peace deal with groups who claimed to be representing the
people of Patani.
These key Thai political leaders include Chavalit Yongchaiyudh,
Chettha Thanajaro, Surayud Chulanont and last but not the least,
Indonesian Vice President Yusuf Kalla. Malaysian opposition leader
Anwar Ibrahim has also expressed concern and interest in working
towards peace as well.
But good intentions are not necessarily good policy. Many stakeholders
have questioned the true intention of these socalled mediators and the
merit of their action. In fact, some of these recent initiatives were
billed as, at best, bad planning, and at worst, a hoax.
Two months ago Chavalit publicly said an everlasting peace would be
achieved by December 5 this year. He has less than two weeks left.
Before that Chettha announced an end to the century-old resistance.
Kalla, on the other hand, was left high and dry when the Thai
government said it was not aware of his initiative.
While these dialogue tracks continue to attract the attention of the
exiled leaders, there is a growing consensus among concerned parties
that in spite of these talks, Thailand and Patani separatist groups
are as far apart as ever.
"I have got to the point that these discussions, dialogue or
negotiations have become pointless. This is because the Thai side has
always sent men, usually soldiers, who have no real mandate," said
another exiled leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Malaysian officials who helped facilitate some of these meetings
echoed the same sentiment, saying there is no continuity from the Thai
side and the participants see these meetings as an intelligence
gathering exercise rather than as part of an effort to come up with a
sound policy.
This is not to say that the Thai government has never been in
constructive dialogue before. In December 2007, then prime minister
Surayud met secretly with a top PULO official during a stopover in
Bahrain.
But the foundation that Surayud laid was not built on. "Everything at
the official level is more or less at a standstill at the moment,"
said the Malaysian officer.
Well, not exactly. Surayud's effort was replaced by individual
initiatives from various camps, namely Kalla, Chetta and Chavalit. All
reached out to the old guards but so far, nothing meaningful has come
out of their efforts.
While no one doubted the historical role of these old guards, the
biggest question that is eating up the Thai side is what kind of
influence the exiled leaders have over the new generation of militants
operating on the ground.
Old guards said they have regular dialogue with the new generation and
maintain that they can bring them to the negotiating table if and when
a formal negotiation is kicked off.
Others in the exiled community are quietly singling out the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional – Coordinate as the one long standing group that has
any real influence on the new generation operating on the ground.
Locally, the new generation of militants is referred to as the juwae,
which means fighter in local Malay dialect.
For the time being, Bangkok's official position is to deny any
involvement with these "private initiatives" in spite of financing
some of them. The Thai government is also keeping the international
community away from what they have consistently billed as a domestic
issue.
Observers and frustrated officials on the ground say Thai security
agencies have too much to hide – the torture, a culture of impunity,
corruption and the use of government death squad. Certainly, they can
do without the headache from the international community, much less
the debate on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays'
historical homeland.
Unless there is political will from Bangkok to push for real change in
the deep South, said old man Fadel, violence will continue unabated.
"We don't mind being part of Thailand," Fadel said. "But it has to be
on our own terms."
Showing posts with label Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Show all posts
Wednesday, 26 November 2008
Thursday, 25 September 2008
Unofficial talks may fan the flames of insurgency
Don Pathan
SOMETHING is seriously out of tune in diplomatic ties between Bangkok and Jakarta, and the ongoing insurgency in the deep South of Thailand is to blame.
The Thai government was quick to distance itself from so-called secret talks in Bogor between a group of ageing Patani Malay exiles and Thai delegates led by Kwanchart Klaharn, a senior security adviser to the People Power Party.
Indonesian State Secretary Hatta Radjasa said Indonesia was considered an experienced mediator and that the gathering was a "wish that their efforts would end the conflict".
The Bogor meeting was facilitated by Indonesia's Vice President Yussuf Kalla, known to some in diplomatic circles as "Mr Let's Make a Deal".
It appears that the meeting was supposed to be secret in nature. But once the Indonesian media broke the story over the weekend, the people in Kalla's camp wasted no time in milking the situation. Photographs appeared of a majestic-looking Kalla sat between the two warring parties. The man was in his element, indeed. No one seems to care what this will do to Thai-Indonesian relations.
Over the past two years, there have been a number of meetings between self-proclaimed Patani Malay leaders and so-called representative from Thailand, official and semi-official. Most, if not all, of these meetings were secret in nature but some details were leaked to the media, only to be played down by the Thai government.
Because of the absence of a unified position on either the Thai or the exiled separatists' sides, these talks were ad hoc in nature, having no effect on policy change. If anything, the meetings have become intelligence-gathering exercises for the participants. This is not to mention the per diems and free trips abroad.
One only has to look at the fiasco in July when former Army chief General Chetta Thanajaro claimed to have succeeded in getting an unnamed underground separatist group to announce an end to the century-old insurgency.
The public didn't even give the former chief the benefit of the doubt by waiting to see if the violence ended as he stated it would. People immediately called it a hoax. And the violence continues unabated.
Just last weekend, former premier Chavalit Yongchaiyudh also made a similar claim - that the level of violence will begin a sharp decline starting on October 13, and by December 5 it will come to a complete stop.
As with Chetta, no one has given a hoot about this announcement.
But this is not to say that all of the encounters between separatist leaders and Thai authorities have been fruitless.
The Thai government has been in constructive dialogue with leaders of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and Barian Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate over the past two years, and in December 2007 then prime minister Surayud Chulanont met with the two groups in Bahrain.
But this fledging process needs stronger political backing.
Ethnic Malay participants at the Bogor talks called themselves the Consultative Council of the Patani Malay People. The delegates were made up of former members of the now-defunct Bersatu, whose former leader Wan Kadir Che Man is said to have declined an offer to take part in Kalla's dialogue process.
Pulo's foreign affairs chief Kasturi Mahkota said his group had pulled out of Kalla's process, saying it didn't have anything new to offer. "It wasn't serious," Kasturi said.
But given the option between talking and not talking, one would think that a dialogue is better than no dialogue at all," said a Bangkok-based diplomat.
But then again, these dialogues - especially those that organisers tend to milk for public relations purposes - could prove to be damaging.
If anything, they could derail the more meaningful processes, such as the one pushed through by Surayud.
But instead of picking up where Surayud left off, the previous government of Samak Sundaravej didn't want to be bothered at all with the conflict in the deep South - in spite of the fact that more than 3,300 people have been killed since January 2004.
In March this year, Samak delegated his authority as the director of the Internal Security Operation Command to Anupong, effectively making Anupong the security tsar overseeing military and civilian affairs in the restive region. But like others before him, Anupong knows that it is too costly politically to push through any bold initiative, even the one that Surayud had started.
Deep-seated issues such as Patani Malay cultural space and the sticky issue of identity are being discussed in seminars, but that's about it.
It is very unlikely that the outcome from these talks will be a win-win scenario for the two opposing parties as has been suggested by some mediators and facilitators. The bottom line is what kind of concessions the Patani Malays and the Thai state are willing to make.
SOMETHING is seriously out of tune in diplomatic ties between Bangkok and Jakarta, and the ongoing insurgency in the deep South of Thailand is to blame.
The Thai government was quick to distance itself from so-called secret talks in Bogor between a group of ageing Patani Malay exiles and Thai delegates led by Kwanchart Klaharn, a senior security adviser to the People Power Party.
Indonesian State Secretary Hatta Radjasa said Indonesia was considered an experienced mediator and that the gathering was a "wish that their efforts would end the conflict".
The Bogor meeting was facilitated by Indonesia's Vice President Yussuf Kalla, known to some in diplomatic circles as "Mr Let's Make a Deal".
It appears that the meeting was supposed to be secret in nature. But once the Indonesian media broke the story over the weekend, the people in Kalla's camp wasted no time in milking the situation. Photographs appeared of a majestic-looking Kalla sat between the two warring parties. The man was in his element, indeed. No one seems to care what this will do to Thai-Indonesian relations.
Over the past two years, there have been a number of meetings between self-proclaimed Patani Malay leaders and so-called representative from Thailand, official and semi-official. Most, if not all, of these meetings were secret in nature but some details were leaked to the media, only to be played down by the Thai government.
Because of the absence of a unified position on either the Thai or the exiled separatists' sides, these talks were ad hoc in nature, having no effect on policy change. If anything, the meetings have become intelligence-gathering exercises for the participants. This is not to mention the per diems and free trips abroad.
One only has to look at the fiasco in July when former Army chief General Chetta Thanajaro claimed to have succeeded in getting an unnamed underground separatist group to announce an end to the century-old insurgency.
The public didn't even give the former chief the benefit of the doubt by waiting to see if the violence ended as he stated it would. People immediately called it a hoax. And the violence continues unabated.
Just last weekend, former premier Chavalit Yongchaiyudh also made a similar claim - that the level of violence will begin a sharp decline starting on October 13, and by December 5 it will come to a complete stop.
As with Chetta, no one has given a hoot about this announcement.
But this is not to say that all of the encounters between separatist leaders and Thai authorities have been fruitless.
The Thai government has been in constructive dialogue with leaders of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and Barian Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate over the past two years, and in December 2007 then prime minister Surayud Chulanont met with the two groups in Bahrain.
But this fledging process needs stronger political backing.
Ethnic Malay participants at the Bogor talks called themselves the Consultative Council of the Patani Malay People. The delegates were made up of former members of the now-defunct Bersatu, whose former leader Wan Kadir Che Man is said to have declined an offer to take part in Kalla's dialogue process.
Pulo's foreign affairs chief Kasturi Mahkota said his group had pulled out of Kalla's process, saying it didn't have anything new to offer. "It wasn't serious," Kasturi said.
But given the option between talking and not talking, one would think that a dialogue is better than no dialogue at all," said a Bangkok-based diplomat.
But then again, these dialogues - especially those that organisers tend to milk for public relations purposes - could prove to be damaging.
If anything, they could derail the more meaningful processes, such as the one pushed through by Surayud.
But instead of picking up where Surayud left off, the previous government of Samak Sundaravej didn't want to be bothered at all with the conflict in the deep South - in spite of the fact that more than 3,300 people have been killed since January 2004.
In March this year, Samak delegated his authority as the director of the Internal Security Operation Command to Anupong, effectively making Anupong the security tsar overseeing military and civilian affairs in the restive region. But like others before him, Anupong knows that it is too costly politically to push through any bold initiative, even the one that Surayud had started.
Deep-seated issues such as Patani Malay cultural space and the sticky issue of identity are being discussed in seminars, but that's about it.
It is very unlikely that the outcome from these talks will be a win-win scenario for the two opposing parties as has been suggested by some mediators and facilitators. The bottom line is what kind of concessions the Patani Malays and the Thai state are willing to make.
Wednesday, 24 September 2008
Is Chavalit fostering false hope in the deep South?
Published on September 23, 2008
By Don Pathan
IN keeping with his character, former prime minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh is being just as ambiguous as ever. But then again, he has his reason for not coming clean. Over the weekend, Chavalit was reported as saying that an end to the ongoing insurgency in the Malay-speaking South is within sight. Starting on October 13, there will be a rapid decline in insurgent attacks in the deep South, and by December 5 violence will come to a complete stop.
He insisted this is not a joke and even took a jab at former Army chief General Chetta Thanajaro, who made similar claims that were quickly dismissed as a hoax. Chetta provided video footage of three unidentified ethnic Malays announcing an end to the insurgency in the restive region. They claimed to be spokesmen for 11 unnamed "underground" separatist groups.
The three men wore fake beards and moustaches and spoke under a flag that is unfamiliar to long-standing Patani-Malay separatist groups. Patani Malay exiles, including groups such as the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), were quick to distance themselves from the video. Chetta quickly became a laughing stock. And, as expected, the violence continued unabated with no end in sight.
No one really knows what Chavalit has got up his sleeve this time, but the former premier is known for having strong political connections in the deep South, and he maintains that his effort is no joke.
His announcement came on the same weekend that Indonesian Vice President Yusuf Kalla was meeting with Patani Malay exiles, namely former members of Bersatu. Representing the Thai side was the defence adviser to the People Power Party, Kwanchart Klaharn, who is tipped to be the next defence minister.
The meeting in Indonesia was Kalla's personal initiative to come up with a solution for the southern problem. Indonesian and Malaysian sources said Kuala Lumpur has had nothing to do with Kalla's initiative. But the fact that most, if not all, of the Patani Malay participants are residents of Malaysia will definitely be a source of irritation to Kuala Lumpur.
Meetings between Thai officials and armed southern separatists have been taking place for decades. The problem is that these meetings have never had any real impact on policy change. They were mostly carried out by senior Army intelligence staff and treated as information-collecting exercises. Agreements reached between the Thai side and the separatists were secret in nature and neither side has had the capacity or willingness to see things through.
Today, these long-standing separatist groups have slipped out of the picture in the deep South and been replaced by younger, meaner militants on the ground. Local residents called them "juwae", which basically means "fighter" in the local Malay dialect. According to Patani Malay exiled leaders, only a handful of people from the long-standing separatist groups have any dialogue with the juwae.
"Perhaps the most meaningful dialogue with the juwae is carried out by members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional- Coordinate (BRN-C), which is also an underground organisation like the juwae. I seriously doubt if any of the long-standing groups have any real influence on the juwae," one exiled leader said.
Others see the juwae and BRN-C as gradually coming together. Their secretive nature makes them natural partners. Besides, it was the grassroots activities of the BRN that helped ensure the spirit of Malay independence remained in the hearts and minds of local residents in the 1990s when violence disappeared from the region.
The Thai state, on the other hand, mistakenly thought the absence of violence meant permanent peace. What it didn't see was that a new generation of militants was being groomed under its nose.
Pulo, the only long-standing group with a limited public face, said it can help bring the BRN-C to the dialogue process but that Thais will have to be serious about the process. So far, judging from the various uncoordinated meetings between so-called Thai representatives and exiled groups, Bangkok isn't at all serious about talking to the old guard.
Chavalit, over the weekend, claimed to have the support and assurance of authorities in Malaysia, and added that their credibility was on the line. He didn't say which, if any, of the Malaysian government or non-government agencies had assisted him.
As expected, Chavalit's initiative did not get off to a good start. Pulo's foreign affairs chief Kasturi Mahkota wasted no time in criticising Chavalit's initiative. "On behalf of Pulo, I strongly deny our involvement in this dirty process," said Kasturi in a statement to The Nation.
A senior Army intelligence officer in the deep South said Chavalit has been relying on outdated information and his old connections in the region and in Malaysia to put this together. Thai officials on the ground and Patani Malay exiles think Chavalit's initiative will not amount to anything much except a public relations stunt for the political veteran who has been looking to make a comeback.
Moreover, the said government source in Kuala Lumpur said southern Thailand is off the Kuala Lumpur radar screen because of the current political crisis in Malaysia. However, it will quickly become the centre of attention, especially if Anwar Ibhrahim, the leading opposition figure, becomes the next prime minister.
Speaking at a recent press conference, Anwar outlined his top-10 priorities. Nine of the items were domestic matters, but the one and only foreign affairs matter was the conflict in southern Thailand. According to one of his close associates, Anwar would seek input and assistance from governments in the region, as well as leading figures with knowledge about the historical dispute with the Thai state.
But coming up with a deal to end the bloodshed in southern Thailand once and for all will not be easy. With or without the current domestic political mess, Bangkok has not shown any interest in meaningful dialogue or any fundamental change in its relations with the Malay-speaking region.
No one knows how long the political crisis in Bangkok will last. And even if stability returns, few think the Thai state will make any real concession to a region that contests its rule and questions its legitimacy.
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