Friday, 22 May 2026

Negotiating Peace in the Far South, Anutin Style

sECURITY

High-Level Meeting between Thai and BRN negotiators in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Jan. 2026.

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

The Kissinger Conundrum

Thailand’s new negotiating team for the far south – formed under the new government – moved quickly by inviting senior military officers from the Philippines and Indonesia to Bangkok to share lessons from the Mindanao and Aceh peace processes with the Thai army.


The new Thai team is led by a civilian, Thanut Suvarnananda, the country’s chief of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which has been central to the efforts in resolving this long-running conflict between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state.


Thanut Suvarnanada

Progress has not come easily. As a key stakeholder, the army has never accepted the idea of engaging separatists on equal terms.The military continues to believe the insurgency can be defeated through force alone. It has also spoken of winning the hearts and minds of local Malays, but that goal has remained out of reach.


Henry Kissinger once observed that military forces can clear an area, but without a political plan, insurgent networks simply reconstitute themselves once the troops withdraw. 


The new team’s most pressing challenge is persuading the Thai military to abandon this all-or-nothing approach.


Part of the problem is a fundamental mismatch in how each side frames the conflict. The military treats the insurgency as a security matter, while the insurgents view their struggle as political. Without a revised counterinsurgency strategy that addresses this gap, the stalemate and violence will continue.


Why Bangkok Refuses to “Negotiate”


But even if the Thai army abandons its zero-sum mindset, the question of concessions remains. Thailand has shown little willingness to give ground. In fact, all previous chief representatives, with the exception of Dr Mark Thamthai, refused to use the word “negotiation” in reference to the peace talks, fearing it would grant the Melayu rebels too much recognition and legitimacy.


One advantage the Mindanao and Aceh peace initiatives had that Thailand lacks is the direct involvement of the international community. The Malaysian mediator at the time, Tengku Datu Abdul Ghafar Tengku Mohamad, was backed by the International Contact Group (ICG), a body comprising states and international NGOs that played a direct and decisive role in steering the Mindanao peace process toward final peace agreement. The Aceh process had similar support and arrangement.


The Thai initiative once included five international observers, a concession to Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN). This long-standing separatist movement commands nearly all the combatants on the ground. However, the process failed to make effective use of their expertise, as their role was kept narrowly limited.


A further advantage the Mindanao and Aceh processes shared was genuine political will—a commitment from their respective governments to make concessions. Thailand’s peace process, formally launched on 28 February 2013, has never progressed beyond the confidence-building measure (CBM) stage to address substantive issues.

The Thai process ground to a halt under Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s administration, which refused to resume talks unless the BRN first ended all forms of violence. BRN countered that any reduction in violence – or ceasefire – would itself need to be negotiated, and that an international monitoring team working alongside local CSOs would have to be permitted to observe the process.

Both sides held firm until Paetongtarn was removed from office on ethical grounds in August 2025, paving the way for Anutin Charnvirakul’s first government – a three-month caretaker administration – that established a new negotiating team.


Buzzwords vs Autonomy


BRN viewed Anutin’s initiative as a hollow gesture, given that his government would only be in office for three months. Nevertheless, the two sides met three times during that brief window.


Their final meeting took place on 8-9 January 2026 in Malaysia, which unfortunately did not go well. Two days later, BRN blew up 11 petrol stations, along with the attached convenience stores, across the Malay-speaking south. The signal was unmistakable: BRN would not be treated as a prop. The rebels resented being exploited to bolster Anutin’s political image.


A BRN officer dismissed Anutin’s decision to form a peace negotiation team as “pretentious.” Critics argue the move was a public relations stunt to portray Anutin as a man of action during his brief three-month government. In contrast, his predecessor, Paetongtarn, sent no representatives to the negotiating table.


The Thai delegation introduced the buzzword “end state” during three meetings but failed to define any concrete government concessions. While Anutin’s faction heavily promoted the phrase, BRN interprets “end state” strictly as “self-governance”.


For BRN, this requires a regional assembly that grants the Patani people self-determination, local tax collection rights and a formal power-sharing mechanism with Thailand’s central government.


A second message carried comparable importance: BRN has expressed dissatisfaction with ongoing discussions that lack a substantive and actionable agenda. To BRN, the talks should progress beyond CBM and address concrete issues. Topics such as self-governance, power-sharing, and the establishment of a regional assembly must be included in the dialogue.


Before that can happen, BRN must consult its constituency – the people of Patani – to determine whether its demands align with the community’s aspirations.


This process, known as public consultation, is one of three core agenda items that have been on the negotiating table for some time. The other two are cessation of violence and a political solution to the conflict. All three were enshrined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP), the agreed roadmap for the peace process.


Since Anutin took office in August 2025, the JCPP has been rebranded as the Peace Dialogue Plan Implementation Framework (PDPIF), signalling a rhetorical shift from “planning” to “implementation”.


Information Operations


There has been a discussion among the Thai defense planners about using Thai CSOs to replace the five international observers. How far their involvement would extend remains unclear, but the most credible CSOs – those with strong ties to the Malay community and the respect of BRN – will likely refuse to participate.


The military and local CSOs have long been at odds, locked in a battle over control of the conflict’s narrative. The CSOs have faced persistent harassment through legal proceedings and disinformation campaigns on social media platforms, orchestrated by military actors who regard CSO criticism as a security threat.


Several CSO leaders face criminal charges simply for using terms such as Bangsa Patani (the Patani nation) or advocating the right to self-determination for the people of this historically disputed region. Groups like The Patani and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (CAP) are among those affected, alongside human rights defenders who face ongoing death threats because of toxic nationalism and coordinated attacks by pro-government accounts operating across social media and through information operations (IO).


BRN, however, has stated it will continue to insist on international community participation as observers of any official talks.


While the number of violent incidents has fallen sharply – from 1,400 in 2007 to 150 in 2025 – the outlook for the new negotiating team is not encouraging. The first four months of 2026 alone saw a surge in violence to 258 incidents.


Squeezing the Narrative as Violence Escalates


The decline in incidents from 2007 to 2025 was driven by an expanded security presence with Paramilitary Rangers deployed to remote areas, which significantly reduced response times to insurgent activity.


But the statistics alone do not capture the full picture. Insurgents have compensated for fewer attacks by maximising psychological impact. The era of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that went largely unnoticed is over.


Today’s attacks are designed to be seen, heard, and felt – above all by policymakers in Bangkok. Besides the attacks on the 11 petrol stations, in July 2025, the government bomb squad unearthed 11 EIDs in Krabi and Phuket—two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast.


The then defence minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the insurgency in the far south, even though the arrested culprits were from the region. He urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage. Security officials, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.


Another high-profile incident is the 9 March 2025 attack on the Sungai Kolok district office by a 10-strong BRN unit, killing two Defence Volunteers (DVs) and injuring eight others. The assault ended with a car bomb that ripped through the compound moments after the combatants retreated.


As things stand, the Thai army opposes any formal commitments—no MoUs, no ceasefire agreements. Any suggestion of granting BRN a degree of legitimacy, or even acknowledging the political dimension of its activities, is likely to be rejected. Many Thai military officials continue to regard the BRN simply as criminals.


As for the so-called peace talks, many observers regard Thailand’s participation as insincere. The prevailing view is that Bangkok’s sole objective is to reduce violence to a manageable level. There is no genuine appetite to make concessions to BRN or the Malays of Patani, or to explore a framework for peaceful coexistence between the far south and the rest of the country.


This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit to the authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.


Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far south.

Friday, 1 May 2026

Thailand’s High-Stakes Gamble in the South

 Security

May 1, 2026 7 minutes of reading

File Photo: A Defence Volunteer miraculously survived an explosion from a bomb hidden under her
vehicle in Pattani, March 17, 2025.

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

End of Status Quo

Approximately two years ago, Thai military generals began discussing the possibility of transferring some security responsibilities – typically handled by regular soldiers – to local civilians working within the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

The target operational areas are the three southernmost border provinces where a two-decade-old separatist insurgency has so far claimed more than 7,700 lives.

The locally recruited Territorial Defence Volunteers (DVs), who primarily serve as security personnel for provincial governors and district chiefs in the Malay-speaking south, were informed that their roles require a willingness to face significant risks as part of their government employment.

In his policy statement to the Parliament on 9 April 2026, incoming Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said work is on the way to strengthen DV’s capacity and that their coordination with the Royal Thai Army will be enhanced.

For much of the past two decades, since the current wave of separatist insurgency resurfaced in this Muslim-majority region, DV survived the conflict by not seeing or saying anything. Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the one long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all the combatants on the ground – left them alone, seeing their basic security duties as non-threatening to their quest for separation from the Thai state.

In contrast to other minority groups living near the country’s borders, the Thai government was unwilling to allow the Patani Malay DV access to weapons or intelligence. This reluctance stems from DV’s shared cultural background with BRN members and local residents whom government continues to face difficulties in winning over. This creates operational risks.

But there was a need to cut military spending due to the conflict in the far south. To save money, the government started gradually replacing regular soldiers in this restive region with Paramilitary Rangers, a light infantry force acting as an auxiliary to the Royal Thai Army. This allowed the security grid to expand to extremely remote areas.

Because of the Rangers’ surge, the total number of violent incidents in the region dropped to just over 800 in 2008, a big drop from 1,400 from the previous years. The figure saw a downward trajectory from then to 2025 where the total number of violent incidents stood at 150.

But the number does not tell us everything about the conflict. Insurgents make up for the drop in overall attacks by being more selective with their targets with the aim of instilling greater psychological impact—the kind that could be felt by the policymakers in Bangkok.

BRN combatants would take their fights to the Thai security outposts and government installations, sometimes using car bombs to get their message across.

Selective Targeting and Psychological Warfare

Thus, two years ago, the idea of putting locally hired MOI’s DV security details on the front line gained traction.

Concern of operation risks is still there. But the generals believe that as long as DVs are not given too much leeway, the army can minimise the risk.

But BRN is not taking this sitting down, however. They have made their point very public. Stern warnings were printed on flyers, posters and spray-painted on paved roads throughout this restive region, calling on DVs to quit their jobs. To back up their demands, over the past two years BRN have carried out several vicious attacks against various MOI installations manned with DV security details.

However, one should not forget that DVs are not trained soldiers—they are lightly armed and do not operate like a military unit. They move around the area with provincial governors and district chiefs or get posted at MOI installations to carry out basic security guard duties. Getting them out on reconnaissance patrol or offensive operation puts them in the line of fire.

But the government is staying the course. Policy statement delivered to the Parliament by Anutin on 9 April 2026 was a testimony of that. How this strategy will play out on the ground, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

The Trend Reverses

The future does not look so good, however.

Since the start of the year, the downward trend observed since 2007 appeared to be reversing. Violence has increased, with a total of 30 bombings and shootings occurring in the first two months of 2026, leading to 22 casualties, including two fatalities.

There were the January 11 arson attacks on 11 petrol stations in response to Thailand’s cold shoulder to BRN’s proposals at the last round of negotiation in Kuala Lumpur.

The surge from mid-February to mid-March was largely attributed to the Ramadhan period. This is a timeframe historically associated with increased insurgent activities to remind the Thais that they have not forgotten about the massacre in 2004 when 85 young Melayu men died at the hands of security officials.

Recently, the Thai army has expanded their counterinsurgency operation to include an alternative narrative aimed at discrediting BRN. Paramilitary Ranger Darun Daroheng, a Muslim from Narathiwat, was fatally shot on 24 March while on leave for the Ramadhan holiday at his residence in Sungai Padi district.

The army referred to Darun as a “shahid” (martyr), and the government plaque on his gravestone similarly described him as such.

To live up to the hype, the local task force commander was eager to hunt down the culprits behind the shooting death of Darun. Helicopter, along with ground troops, was dispatched to hunt them down.  BRN and residents accused soldiers of throwing hand grenades from the helicopter against combatants on the ground, frightening local villagers and forcing them to run for cover.

The army dismissed the allegation, saying the explosions came from the insurgents’ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and that the helicopter was for reconnaissance purposes only.

Over the past two decades, hundreds, if not thousands, of Malay Muslim security officials have been killed, but the state never called them shahid. It was not until the death of Private Mustakeem Machema, a Malay Muslim from Narathiwat, who was killed in a fierce clash with Cambodian troops on the border last December that such a concept was employed.

Mustakeem was praised by the army as a martyr who fought and died for the “Kingdom and for the homeland”. Darun was given the same honour by the army.

But the one incident that attracted a great deal of media attention and kicked off a public storm was the failed attempt on the life of a local politician, Prachachat Party MP Kamonsak Leewamoh, by a highly organised hit team.

Four individuals, including a former Marine, have been arrested. The motive is still very much unclear, but the alleged military involvement is still far from being resolved, as the vehicle used by the hit squad was signed off by an army colonel.

Military Solution for Political Problem

Lt Gen Norathip Phoinok, commander of the 4th Army Region responsible for daily operations of the entire region, has come under intense criticism for saying the attempt on Kamonsak’s life was connected to this ongoing turmoil. He identified Islamic educational institutions such as pondok and tadika as primary causes of regional unrest.

This has stoked anger, with leaders of Islamic schools in the region calling on the government to remove Norathip from the command. He has since apologised for the ill-advised remark.

Like all other previous commanding generals of this historically disputed region, Norathip does not seem to understand that for a militarily superior power, any outcome short of total victory is perceived as a failure. Conversely, a weaker insurgent force achieves success simply by avoiding elimination. The result is a stalemate that the army cannot sustain politically.

Thailand has not succeeded in resolving this conflict because the armed forces and the government have treated this conflict as a military problem, while the insurgents have considered it a political struggle. Until a new counterinsurgency strategy is defined, the stalemate and the violence will continue.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

  • Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.