May 1, 2026 / 7 minutes of reading
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| File Photo: A Defence Volunteer miraculously survived an explosion from a bomb hidden under her vehicle in Pattani, March 17, 2025. |
Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com
End of Status Quo
Approximately two years ago, Thai military generals began discussing the possibility of transferring some security responsibilities – typically handled by regular soldiers – to local civilians working within the Ministry of Interior (MOI).
The target operational areas are the three southernmost border provinces where a two-decade-old separatist insurgency has so far claimed more than 7,700 lives.
The locally recruited Territorial Defence Volunteers (DVs), who primarily serve as security personnel for provincial governors and district chiefs in the Malay-speaking south, were informed that their roles require a willingness to face significant risks as part of their government employment.
In his policy statement to the Parliament on 9 April 2026, incoming Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said work is on the way to strengthen DV’s capacity and that their coordination with the Royal Thai Army will be enhanced.
For much of the past two decades, since the current wave of separatist insurgency resurfaced in this Muslim-majority region, DV survived the conflict by not seeing or saying anything. Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the one long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all the combatants on the ground – left them alone, seeing their basic security duties as non-threatening to their quest for separation from the Thai state.
In contrast to other minority groups living near the country’s borders, the Thai government was unwilling to allow the Patani Malay DV access to weapons or intelligence. This reluctance stems from DV’s shared cultural background with BRN members and local residents whom government continues to face difficulties in winning over. This creates operational risks.
But there was a need to cut military spending due to the conflict in the far south. To save money, the government started gradually replacing regular soldiers in this restive region with Paramilitary Rangers, a light infantry force acting as an auxiliary to the Royal Thai Army. This allowed the security grid to expand to extremely remote areas.
Because of the Rangers’ surge, the total number of violent incidents in the region dropped to just over 800 in 2008, a big drop from 1,400 from the previous years. The figure saw a downward trajectory from then to 2025 where the total number of violent incidents stood at 150.
But the number does not tell us everything about the conflict. Insurgents make up for the drop in overall attacks by being more selective with their targets with the aim of instilling greater psychological impact—the kind that could be felt by the policymakers in Bangkok.
BRN combatants would take their fights to the Thai security outposts and government installations, sometimes using car bombs to get their message across.
Selective Targeting and Psychological Warfare
Thus, two years ago, the idea of putting locally hired MOI’s DV security details on the front line gained traction.
Concern of operation risks is still there. But the generals believe that as long as DVs are not given too much leeway, the army can minimise the risk.
But BRN is not taking this sitting down, however. They have made their point very public. Stern warnings were printed on flyers, posters and spray-painted on paved roads throughout this restive region, calling on DVs to quit their jobs. To back up their demands, over the past two years BRN have carried out several vicious attacks against various MOI installations manned with DV security details.
However, one should not forget that DVs are not trained soldiers—they are lightly armed and do not operate like a military unit. They move around the area with provincial governors and district chiefs or get posted at MOI installations to carry out basic security guard duties. Getting them out on reconnaissance patrol or offensive operation puts them in the line of fire.
But the government is staying the course. Policy statement delivered to the Parliament by Anutin on 9 April 2026 was a testimony of that. How this strategy will play out on the ground, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
The Trend Reverses
The future does not look so good, however.
Since the start of the year, the downward trend observed since 2007 appeared to be reversing. Violence has increased, with a total of 30 bombings and shootings occurring in the first two months of 2026, leading to 22 casualties, including two fatalities.
There were the January 11 arson attacks on 11 petrol stations in response to Thailand’s cold shoulder to BRN’s proposals at the last round of negotiation in Kuala Lumpur.
The surge from mid-February to mid-March was largely attributed to the Ramadhan period. This is a timeframe historically associated with increased insurgent activities to remind the Thais that they have not forgotten about the massacre in 2004 when 85 young Melayu men died at the hands of security officials.
Recently, the Thai army has expanded their counterinsurgency operation to include an alternative narrative aimed at discrediting BRN. Paramilitary Ranger Darun Daroheng, a Muslim from Narathiwat, was fatally shot on 24 March while on leave for the Ramadhan holiday at his residence in Sungai Padi district.
The army referred to Darun as a “shahid” (martyr), and the government plaque on his gravestone similarly described him as such.
To live up to the hype, the local task force commander was eager to hunt down the culprits behind the shooting death of Darun. Helicopter, along with ground troops, was dispatched to hunt them down. BRN and residents accused soldiers of throwing hand grenades from the helicopter against combatants on the ground, frightening local villagers and forcing them to run for cover.
The army dismissed the allegation, saying the explosions came from the insurgents’ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and that the helicopter was for reconnaissance purposes only.
Over the past two decades, hundreds, if not thousands, of Malay Muslim security officials have been killed, but the state never called them shahid. It was not until the death of Private Mustakeem Machema, a Malay Muslim from Narathiwat, who was killed in a fierce clash with Cambodian troops on the border last December that such a concept was employed.
Mustakeem was praised by the army as a martyr who fought and died for the “Kingdom and for the homeland”. Darun was given the same honour by the army.
But the one incident that attracted a great deal of media attention and kicked off a public storm was the failed attempt on the life of a local politician, Prachachat Party MP Kamonsak Leewamoh, by a highly organised hit team.
Four individuals, including a former Marine, have been arrested. The motive is still very much unclear, but the alleged military involvement is still far from being resolved, as the vehicle used by the hit squad was signed off by an army colonel.
Military Solution for Political Problem
Lt Gen Norathip Phoinok, commander of the 4th Army Region responsible for daily operations of the entire region, has come under intense criticism for saying the attempt on Kamonsak’s life was connected to this ongoing turmoil. He identified Islamic educational institutions such as pondok and tadika as primary causes of regional unrest.
This has stoked anger, with leaders of Islamic schools in the region calling on the government to remove Norathip from the command. He has since apologised for the ill-advised remark.
Like all other previous commanding generals of this historically disputed region, Norathip does not seem to understand that for a militarily superior power, any outcome short of total victory is perceived as a failure. Conversely, a weaker insurgent force achieves success simply by avoiding elimination. The result is a stalemate that the army cannot sustain politically.
Thailand has not succeeded in resolving this conflict because the armed forces and the government have treated this conflict as a military problem, while the insurgents have considered it a political struggle. Until a new counterinsurgency strategy is defined, the stalemate and the violence will continue.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
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