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| Thai Army's gunship in the far South. (File Photo: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG) |
Don Pathan
Prachatai
The incoming government of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is finding out very quickly that conflict resolution for the Deep South is not so straightforward and that his quick-fix approach will not achieve the intended results, given the complexity of the Deep South.
A proposed border fence between Thailand and Malaysia is an outdated, high-cost solution that ignores the complex, socio-economic and political roots of the Patani conflict, not to mention the disruption of local cross-border livelihoods.
Anutin raised the idea during his brief visit to the Deep South in mid-February after receiving a security briefing about the spike in violence during Ramadan. They didn’t tell him that combatants from the Barisan Revolusi Naisonal Melayu Patani (BRN) tend to step up attacks during the holy month to remind the Thai government that they haven’t forgotten about the Tak Bai massacre, an incident in late 2004 when 85 unarmed young Melayu men died at the hands of security officials – seven shot dead at the protest site and 78 suffocated after they were stacked one on top another on the back military transport trucks. The incident took place during the Ramadan of 2004.
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| Thai-Malaysian border, Sungai Kolok River (File Photo: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG) |
The incident that has generated a great deal of media attention was the March 20 assassination attempt on MP Kamolsak Leewamoh, a prominent human rights lawyer from the Prachachart Party. Kamolsak is known for speaking out against the culture of impunity among security officials in the Deep South and was the central figure in exposing the Khao Kradong land dispute, which involves allegations of public land encroachment by the influential Chidchob family in Buri Ram province.
The hit team included two former Marines, one former paramilitary ranger, a local driver and the owner of a vehicle repair shop accused of dismantling the getaway vehicle to hide evidence after the shooting. One of the marines – a trained former Navy SEAL– is on the run. The motive is still very much unclear. The public is demanding to know why permission to use a government vehicle was signed off by a military colonel at the nearby base.
To make matters worse, Commander of the Fourth Army Area Lt Gen Narathip Phoynork, blamed the Islamic education system in the region as the root cause of the ongoing unrest and suggested that the attempt on Kamolsak’s life needs to be understood in that context. Reaction from religious and community leaders was swift, forcing an intervention from Anutin and an apology from Lt Gen Narathip.
Nevertheless, a so-called Information Operation (IO) was unleashed by the Army to discredit the institution of Pondok schools, alleging corruption among school owners while inculcating anti-Thailand sentiment.
Narathip’s statement and the IO that followed reflect the long-standing prejudice of Thai society and the security agencies toward the Malays of Patani, observers said.
Private Islamic schools, locally known as Pondok, are one of the most important institutions in this Muslim-majority region as they teach not just Islam but Malay identity and a historical-cultural narrative that sets this region apart from the rest of Thailand.
A prominent scholar, Prof Joseph Chinyong Liow, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, views Pondok as the central institution for preserving a Malay-Muslim identity and cultural heritage in the face of intense "Siamization" and assimilatory pressure from the Thai government.
These schools do not promote separatism per se. But the narrative instilled in these students is enough to remind them that they are different from the rest of Thailand. Moreover, that feeling of being second-class is reinforced by the presence of armed soldiers patrolling the streets, the culture of impunity among security officials, and the usual arrogance of government officials towards the local Malays. In other words, there is a sense that Patani is an occupied territory.
The region is the poorest in the country, but the conflict is not rooted in poverty or development; it is Thailand’s policy of assimilation that comes at the expense of the Malays’ religious identity.
Uprisings in this historically contested region have occurred periodically following Patani's defeat in 1786, which led to its status as a vassal state under Siam. The region came under the direct rule of Siam at the turn of the century when the seven Malay sultans were removed and replaced by governors from Bangkok. The border was established with British Malaya at about the same time.
But a full-blown armed insurgency emerged 50 years later in the 1960s as a reaction against Thailand’s policy of assimilation.
For the Malays of Patani, identity and religion are two sides of the same coin. And so, when the state demanded that they embrace the Thai identity, the Patani Malays responded by taking up arms.
Peace initiatives have come and gone, and the talks have never moved beyond confidence-building measures because no Thai government has been willing to make concessions to the Malays of Patani or the BRN.
In September 2025 when he took up the post of prime minister through a deal with People’s Party, Anutin was quick to set up a negotiation team to resume talks with the BRN even though his time in office was to last only three months. He wanted to show that he meant business.
For close observers of the southern conflict, Anutin’s action was little more than showmanship; he was more interested in differentiating himself from the government of PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who refused to resume peace talks unless the BRN ended all forms of violence. The BRN stated that violence reduction requires negotiation, and any ceasefire should be monitored by international observers in cooperation with local NGOs.
During Anutin’s brief first premiership, his negotiating team held three separate meetings with BRN—starting with an informal introduction, followed by high-level official negotiations, and lastly a technical level meeting where finer details were discussed.
The BRN’s message was clear—the peace process can no longer be a talking shop; it must work towards something tangible and acceptable to both sides. The initiative was a rude awakening for the Anutin government as the BRN explained that the final outcome – what the Thais call the “end state” – must include what the movement calls “self-government”. It denotes an autonomous region where residents can elect their own representatives to a regional assembly that can enact its own laws, chart their own future, and collect taxes.
The most controversial component is the right to secession should Thailand fails to live up to its commitment.
At the technical meeting on January 8-9 in Kuala Lumpur, the Thais told the BRN that the best they could get was a few seats at the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a development agency that deals with pilot projects.
The meeting ended badly. Two days later, on the early morning of January 11, the BRN unleashed a spate of attacks against 11 petrol stations throughout the region, sending a stern warning to the Thai side that nothing comes easy in this restive region. The movement said they didn’t like being treated as a plaything.
Future not looking too great
Violence on the ground has continued unchecked since the beginning of this year. A total of 30 bombing and shooting incidents took place during January and February 2026, resulting in 22 casualties, including two deaths. This includes the January 7 car bomb against the Sala Mai Defence Volunteer outpost in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai district, prompting a brief gunfight.
On January 10, a group of insurgents disguised as paramilitary rangers robbed firearms from village defence volunteers; no injuries were reported. And then there was the attack against the 11 petrol stations in response to Thailand’s cold shoulder to the BRN proposals.
The situation was calm for the next four weeks until on February 8, a roadside bomb in Yala’s Bannang Sata District knocked an armoured vehicle off the road and onto its side. One soldier was rushed to a nearby hospital.
On the evening of February 14 and early morning of February 15, seven coordinated explosions rocked the two Narathiwat districts of Yi-ngo and Ra-ngae.
In Pattani, on March 15, roadworks vehicles were torched by assailants, part of a broader trend of targeting government-linked property, while on March 18, two separate bomb attacks were reported in the same province. Two days later in Pattani’s Thung Yang Daeng District, a convenience store was severely damaged by a hidden explosive that went off at 3:00 am.
On March 26, an army helicopter gunship was reportedly involved in throwing grenades while chasing insurgents. According to the Thai media, the gunfight left residents so intimidated that they avoided working in their fields. Villagers presented video evidence showing the helicopter and damage inflicted on their rubber plantations from the explosions. However, the military refuted these allegations, asserting that improvised explosive devices (IED) belonging to the insurgents were responsible for the blasts and insisting the helicopter was used solely for reconnaissance purposes.
Two separate attacks on April 20 that included the shooting death of one Defence Volunteer in Pattani, while in Yala, seven paramilitary rangers were injured by a roadside IED.
Downsizing and expanding the security grid
A decade ago, the Royal Thai Army started gradually replacing regular soldiers in the Deep South with paramilitary rangers because it was found to be a more cost-effective method of expanding the security network in this troubled region. The rangers were positioned in remote locations to enable rapid responses to insurgent activities. The result was a sharp decline in the overall number of violent incidents. 2008 saw just over 800 incidents, a drop from 1,400 the previous year. The downward trajectory continued steadily to 150 for 2025.
But the separatist combatants didn’t dwindle and disappear. They adapted to the new environment. Gone are the days of roadside IEDs or gunfights in remote areas where nobody sees it or documents incidents. The new strategy is to go after the psychological impact by making each of these attacks count and felt. The BRN would take their fight to the military, often using car bombs in a well-coordinated operations to send a stern message to the Thai side.
While the dramatic drop in the overall violent incidents was welcome, it was not exactly a game changer. Violence continued unabated, as seen the start of 2026 has shown. So it was time to time to start something new.
Outsourcing security work to the MOI’s Defence Volunteers
In his policy statement to the Parliament on 9 April 2026, Anutin said work is on the way to strengthen the Territorial Defence Volunteers’ (DV) capacity and enhance their coordination with the Royal Thai Army. It is part of a plan to get these locally-hired civilians to take up military duties.
The DVs’ primary function is to provide security for provincial governors and district chiefs in the Deep South. For much of the past two decades, since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in this Muslim-majority region, DVs survived the conflict by not seeing or saying anything. This approach was acceptable to the Thai government, particularly given their civilian status as employees of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).
Initially, separatist combatants rarely singled out DVs for attack, although occasionally, they got caught up in crossfire between the rebels and the security forces. But that began to change two years ago when the generals started toying with the idea of bringing the DVs into military operation.
Combatants responded by turning their weapons directly on the DVs. Stern warnings were posted on flyers, posters, and spray-painted messages on paved roads throughout this restive region, calling on DVs to leave their job. To back up their words, the BRN carried out several vicious attacks against various MOI installations stacked with DV security details.
But the government is not backing down. The policy statement delivered to Parliament by Anutin on April 9 was an assertion that the government will stay the course. How this strategy will play out on the ground, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
What Anutin and all the generals assigned to the Deep South don’t seem to understand is that insurgents achieve success simply by avoiding elimination. The rangers brought the number of violent incidents down, but couldn’t finish a job that is political in nature.
For the Thai armed forces, which are superior militarily, any outcome short of total victory will be perceived as a failure. The result is a stalemate that the government and the Army cannot sustain politically.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst and development consultant focusing on conflict in Myanmar and the insurgency in Thailand's far south.
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