Split in Pulo could hurt peace process with Thai government

Don Pathan
The Nation

An ongoing secret peace talk may be facing more obstacles now that one of long standing Malay Muslim separatist groups that have been working the National Security Council (NSC) has split up resulting in more splinter groups.

The NSC has been secretly dealing with the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) since 2006 after the then Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont issued an executive order asking all relevant agencies to look for non-military solutions to the conflict in the deep South where nearly 5,000 people have been died since January 2004 due to insurgency-related violence.

The group was under the leadership of Noor Abdulrahman, also known as Abe Kamae, and vice president, Kasturi Mahkota, who doubled as the group's foreign affairs chief.

As of late October 2011, Abae Kamae and Kasturi went on their own separate way. No explanation was really given as to why the two parted.

In a statement sent to The Nation, Abae Kamae claimed he is still the president of the movement. He was elected at a Pulo Congress held in 2009 in Syria. He named a well-known figure in the exiled Patani Malay community, Lukman Bin Lima, as the deputy president.

Kasturi, on the other hand, accused Abae Kamae and his followers of abuse of power and trying to obstruct a work in progress. Kasturi, a key person behind the dealing with the NSC since 2006, maintained that his legitimacy came from the Pulo Congress, also known as the Majlis Kepimpinan Pulo, or MKP.

He argued that Abae Kamae had decided to abandon the Congress and therefore neither he nor Lukman has the right to the name of the movement. The two factions continue to use the same Pulo logo.

An informed Thai source with working relations with the secret process of the NSC said he was concerned that the split as a set back and could have an adversed affect on the NSC process.

But a source in the Thai Army who has been dealing with Patani Malay separatist movements for decades said the split at this stage should not matter much since the NSC secret process is still in confidence building mode and experimenting on a number of ideas.

Moreover, said the officer, there are other so-called Pulo factions and leaders that the NSC process had overlooked. They include Samsudine Khan, who is also known as Abu Yasir Fikri, who in July 2009 formed an alliance with another separatist group, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) of Jehku Mae Kuteh, also known as Doramae Puteh.

The officer also pointed to Europe-based Rushdie Yi-ngor, also a long-standing leader in the Pulo movement who appeared to have gained some traction after the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) re-entered the scene by organising a talk shop for the long-standing separatist groups in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in October 2010.

OIC urged the leaders to form the United Patani People Council (UPPC) to be an umbrella organisation that could serve as the separatist movement's political wing that would enter into some sort of formal dialogue or peace talks with the Thai state.

The problem with the Thai side, said another military officer, is that there is no unity among all the relevant government agencies on the very idea of talking to the enemies even though there is an understanding that they are willing to settle for something less than independence.

Thai military commanders said they rather deal directly with the insurgents on the ground who are behind the violence rather than the exiled leaders who have no real command and control on the ground.

Thai government continues to employ military approach, coupled with development, to win the hearts and minds of the local residents. The effort has been easy as the armed militants on the ground enjoy a great deal of tremendous support from the local Malay Muslim villagers, not to mention the fact that heavy-handed tactics and culture of impunity among the authorities continue to make it harder for the state to regain its legitimacy among the Malay Muslim residents.

Sources with working knowledge of the militants on the ground said the insurgents would not enter into any direct negotiation with the Thai officials for fear that such effort would be a trap to kill them.

They said the only exit strategy is through the exiled leaders who the armed insurgents said must first unite among themselves before they could enter into formal or informal talks with the Thai state.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Split-in-Pulo-could-hurt-peace-process-with-Thai-g-30170305.html

BURMA: Mekong incident proves that the Golden Triangle is still volatile

Don Pathan
The Nation

In early 2002, when the Chinese authorities were breaking huge boulders to improve the navigational route between China and northern Laos and Thailand on the Mekong River, local residents and environmentalists were half joking when they said they would be

They were opposed to the Chinese-funded project out of concern that it would affect fish stocks and consequently their livelihood. A series of reefs and rapids would be removed, making it possible for 500-tonne cargo vessels to travel further up and down the river.

But while the Chinese engineers were busy dynamiting the rocks and reefs, the authorities conveniently overlooked one glaring security concern – that the stretch of river between the Chinese border and Thailand’s territorial waters is also the domain of opium warlords and drug armies operating out of the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle.

Prior to the coming of the Chinese cargo ships, the notorious United Wa State Army (UWSA) – dubbed the world’s largest armed drug-trafficking outfit by the US State Department – at one time even set up a small port of its own in the northern Burmese border region. Embarrassed by the Wa’s flag flying high, the Burmese government asked its Wa allies to close the port down, or at least not make it so obvious.

There is always a sense of nervousness – whenever passing through this no man’s land – among those who observe the Golden Triangle’s opium trade and its related ethnic insurgents. But regional integration cannot wait for Burma’s internal conflict to subside, thus, the decision by China to improve the trade link through this area.

Over the years, the authorities and stakeholders have tolerated the banditry and armed robberies that often take place along this route. But earlier this month their worst fears were realised when a group of bandits hijacked two Chinese-flagged cargo vessels and killed 12 people. A 13th person is still missing.

According to the Thai police, a gang run by Nor Kham, a Shan warlord, is thought to be behind the simultaneous hijack attempt that appears to have gone wrong. The incident took place about 20 kilometres from Thai territory.

Most of the victims had been handcuffed, tied and blindfolded. Nearly one million methamphetamine tablets were found on the two cargo ships.

Major General Prakarn Chonlayuth, commander of the Pa Muang Task Force, reportedly said that authorities believe the gang demands protection money. But if any vessels refuse to pay, they will hijack them and use them to transport drugs into Thailand.

Somehow the Task Force was alerted to this incident and sent its men to go after the two ships after they had entered Thai territory in the Chiang Saen district of Chiang Rai province.

The official explanation as to what had taken place, and why so many drugs were on board, has raised more questions than answers.

The drug gangs in the Golden Triangle produce millions of methamphetamine tablets on a weekly basis and tonnes of opium and heroin on a seasonal basis annually. These illicit drugs are usually smuggled into Thailand via the land route. So why would a drug gang that knows the Thai-Burma border area like the back of its hand opt to use this particular strategy and entry point – a security bottleneck – to enter Thailand with hijacked ships with a massive amount of drugs on board.

Were the drugs already on the ships when they left the Chinese port? This wouldn’t make much sense, since the drug armies and warlords in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle operate somewhat freely without interference from the Burmese authorities.

In 1989 the Burmese junta granted the UWSA autonomous status in an area called Special Region 2. Trying to go “legitimate”, the UWSA announced in October 2005 that it would ban opium cultivation in Wa-controlled areas. But the world, with the exception of a hopeful handful of Chinese intelligence and security officials along the Sino-Burma border, paid them no mind because methamphetamines continue to flood out of the region.

Thailand’s Yong Kha Development Project, a crop substitution scheme, launched in Wa-controlled areas near the Thai border in December 2003, was another laughing stock, as no one fell for it. Shortly after that, the US announced more arrest warrants for Wa leaders. It was a big embarrassment for the then Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who permitted himself to be duped by his Burmese counterpart, General Khin Nyunt. The Yong Kha Project did more to whitewash the UWSA – and strengthen Thai-Burmese relations than address the plight and suffering of Wa peasants, or long-term peace and stability.

In the end, none of the piecemeal projects and initiatives worked.

Today, a cloud of uncertainty continues to hang over Burma’s sector of the Golden Triangle, and the river that runs by it, as warlords and drug armies continue to roam freely. If anything, the murder of the 12 Chinese crew members is a reminder of how things can go awfully wrong when officials overlook obvious security concerns.

Like opium and insurgency, development and stability in this rugged part of the world, where warlords and drug armies play for keeps, go hand in hand. Development and regional integration will always hit a snag if the security issue is not addressed in a comprehensive and meaningful way.

Sapae-ing Basor and the Peace Process

Don Pathan
The Nation

Thai policy-makers have never been fond of the idea of talking to the Malay Muslim separatists in the deep South, unless these encounters are kept off the public radar screen.

The long-standing argument has been that they should not give the enemy much sought-after legitimacy and political capital.

Back in the 1970s and 1980s, such encounters were carried out by the military, in various cities in the Middle East like Cairo, Damascus and so on. No formal mediation was needed. It was not the Thai Army's style to have outsiders sitting in on these discussions.

One senior Malaysian police officer who met these handful Thai military officers joked about how “Every time they come over, they always said they are representative for the Thai government. But when they go back, nothing happens.”

Needless to say, the outcome of these meetings didn't have any impact on policy because they were treated as news and information gathering exercises. The Thai military just wanted to fighting to stop but never really wanted to understand the grievances that motivated these separatists.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the armed wings of these long-standing separatist groups (Pulo, BRN, BIPP, GMIP, etc...) that first surfaced in the late 1960s had gone under. Foot soldiers put down their weapons, returned to their villages and picked up where they had left off. Many of their leaders remained abroad, taking up citizenship of the respective countries where they had been residing at the time of the insurgency downturn.

But since 2004, at a time when a new generation of Malay Muslim separatist groups went into full swing, the leaders of these long-standing separatist groups decided that it was time to reinvent themselves. Some went through foreign NGOs specialised in mediation, while others turned to neighbouring governments and foreign institutions like the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), seeking help in facilitating meetings with the Thai side. A proliferation of "peace processes" emerged and each and everyone of them were territorial.

From the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) to retired and active senior Army officers, the National Security Council (NSC), the police, academic institutions, foreign and local NGOs, as well as former Malaysian PM Dr. Mahathir Mohammed and the then Indonesia Vice President Jusuf Kalla, all were looking for separatist groups to talk to. The Patani Malay leaders who came forward put on a brave face, insisting that they can convince the new generation of fighters -- locally referred to as juwae or perjuang in standard Malay -- to the negotiating table as long as the Thais would give them the mandate to do so.

Rivalries among the long-standing groups also emerged as they tried to convince the Thai side to give them the mandate to speak on behalf of the Malays of Patani in spite of the fact that few people in the deep South know the identity of these so-called leaders.

Former foot soldiers who came down from the hills and returned to their villages have decided to stay out of the ongoing insurgency, saying while they still dream about a free Patani, they also acknowledged that there is a generation gap between them and the juwae.

Some admitted that they were concern with the level of violence and the collateral damages stemming from it. But while they are concern with the attack on soft targets, they are equally disapprove of the use of pro-government death squads or vigilante. The tit-for-tat violence often spills into the civilian side, with both Muslims and Buddhists becoming victims as one side tries to teach the other a nasty lesson.

The one key question that everybody is asking is whether these self-proclaimed leaders of Patani liberation movements can influence the juwae on the ground. Most, if not all, insist they can, pointing to their regular dialogue with cell leaders.

But the Thai side is not convinced. In other words, these exiled leaders may have dialogue with the juwae but they don't have shared command (like a military chain of command). In other words, they don't control and can not instruct the juwae as to what to attack or when to carry out attack.

If and when the Thai side is convinced that there is a shared command - assuming that the old guard can unite with one voice - it is very like that the Thai side will start to take them more seriously.

For the time being, "negotiation" is out of the question. Academics and think tanks working secretly with some of these initiatives have come up with the term "peace dialogue" to broaden the participation to include civil society and key community leaders - Buddhists and Muslims - from the three southernmost provinces.

In one peace process that involved the National Security Council (NSC) and a group of Pulo under the leadership of Noor Abulrahman and Kasturi Mahkota, invitees include a woman activist leader to a mayor of a southern city, to a former student activist to village imams.

The idea here is to strengthen the legitimacy and acceptance of the process. How much of a buy-in there is from local leaders, on the other hand, remains to be seen. Some members of the civil society say they are willing to help. Others question the sincerity of the Thai side, saying the stakes are too high to be sticking their necks out. Good intention is not enough. There has to be a guarantee that their participation will not be exploited by one side or the other. Another concern is how the militants will perceive this participation.

But this particular NSC-led process is operating on a shaky ground. Sources in the military said the Army feel they are in better position to lead any peace process. Another problem is that Kasturi and Noor Abdulrahman have split up. Observers of the conflict said the two leaders are likely to remain active looking for ways to remain relevant in working towards peace for the south although they may no longer work together. Beside these two individuals, there are other self-proclaimed Pulo leaders. They include Samsudin Khan and Rushdie Yi-ngor, both of whom also claimed to be the true leader of Pulo.

Another peace process that was being overseen by a senior officer at the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) involved a former mid-ranking Pulo officer (not under the same faction as Kasturi, Samsudin Khan or Rushdie Yi-ngor). This process was working to put together a “staged ceremony” that would show some 170 former Patani Malayu separatist combatants “surrendering” to the Thai State. Sources in the Army and the Police pointed to the “staged” nature of the act, saying the plan does not involve any of the law enforcement agency. It's just a show.

Today, a new government is in place and the SBPAC has got a new chief, Thawee Sodsong, who is not exactly a new face to the region. Thawee was a key person who went after Sapae-ing and other ustaz back in 2005. He was also given the task of tracking down the militants behind the January 4, 2004 arms heists in Narathiwat, an incident that ended in the lives of four soldiers and more than 350 pieces of military weapons being taken from the camp. Thawee rubbed many local Malay Muslims the wrong way as he hunt down ustaz and suspected insurgents in the deep South.

Perhaps the biggest irony here is that for the past four years, all these "peace-makers" and Thai authorities have been looking for one man, Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of a private Islamic school, Thamvithya  Foundation, who was accused by the Thaksin administration of being the overall leader of the new generation of militants. The fact that a number of juwae had graduated from the Thamvitya network private Islamic school that oversees more than 10,000 students made Sapae-ing an easy target.

But today, they want his help.

Exiled separatist leaders, academics, local residents, religious and community leaders said Spae-ing is looked upon as sort of a spiritual leader of the Malays in the deep South. The mystique around him is a topic of much debate. Those who know him say his integrity earned him respect from his people. Because of that respect, they see him as a sort of spiritual leader for the Malays of Patani.

Achieving such status come with a price, as well as enemies, especially when one is a symbol of an identity and historical and cultural narrative that is different from the one constructed by the state.

As of late, more and more government officials are coming to admit that the December 2004 charges against Sapae-ing will not hold water in the court of law. These officers said if he was to stand trial today, he would beat the charges easily.

But after hiding for six years, it is very unlikely that the aging principle will give the Thai legal system the benefit of the doubt. This explains why the former school principle has stayed outside any peace process.

“Sapae-ing sees these peace process as somewhat of a joke,” said a member of an exiled group who has been trying to start up a peace process.

There is little evidence that separatism or radicalism is taught in the school, however. In fact,

The historical and cultural narrative that challenges the legitimacy of the Thai state is widespread and there is nothing to support the claim that private Islamic schools are used to indoctrinate the juwae. Security officials said about 90 per cent of villages in this restive region have a militant cell. And from the look of it, the juwae enjoy a great deal of sympathy and support from villagers.

Because the Patani Malay historical and cultural narrative is so widespread, the movement doesn't have to rely on Islamic schools to tell them that the Thai security forces are illegitimate occupier. The presence of some 60,000 armed security personnel - half of whom have been dispatched to the region since 2004 - reinforces such notion and perception that the deep South is an occupied territory.

Sapae-ing's support is deemed important because these peace initiatives need a person who the Malays of Patani can relate to.

“We don't know any of these exiled leaders that you mentioned,” said a group of young men at a  teashop in a remote village Narathiwat's Rusoh district.

There have been suggestions among government officials that the charges against Sapae-ing be pushed through the due process so that his legal status can be concluded once and for all. But there is no guarantee that he is going to stick his neck and help any one of these peace process, however.

There is a growing understanding among senior Thai officials that the conflict in the deep South is ethnic-nationalist in nature. Therefore, it makes sense to talk to a spiritual leader such as Sapae-ing.

However, the mode of operation for the time being is a combination of search-and-destroy and winning hearts and minds through development runs by military and government officials. But after nearly eight years of this strategy, many officers are saying a new approach for the south is needed.

Asking Sapae-ing for help is one way. But the fact that the Thai state had ruined his life and forced him to go on the run, don't be surprise if he decided to sit out these peace process that often appeared to be more about the people who are behind it rather then the people of Patani.

OFFICIAL INTRANSIGENCE LEADS TO STALEMATE IN DEEP SOUTH

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

SOLDIERS and police inspect the scence of a roadside bomb attack on a passing police vehicle in Pattani's Yarang district.

BESIDES the criminalisation of the MalayMuslim insurgent movement in Thailand’s deep South, there is also the problem of ongoing brutality by both sides that undermines mediation efforts by the old guard of Malay separatists. It’s not easy claiming to have command and control of the new generation of militants and then have to face up to the kind of violence that takes place on the ground, exiled leaders say.
With regard to the lack of unity among the long-standing separatist groups, the same can be said of the Thai side. No official agency can really claim a sole mandate to carry out a peace process, not even the Army, because a significant number of hardliners in the military do not like the idea of talking to the enemy.
During the Surayud administration, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, as well as European countries were asked to help. They were seen as credible partners and were asked to take a direct role in facilitating meetings with the separatists. Surayud thought it made sense to work with the international community, especially countries where many of the old guard were exiled.
The Abhisit government retreated from Surayud’s hands-on approach and told the rest of the world that the deep South was an internal matter. The idea of negotiating peace was just too controversial and the government needed what one officer at the PM’s Office called “deniability”.
That doesn’t mean that Abhisit Vejjajiva wasn’t aware that various security and intelligence agencies were talking to the separatist groups. The PM just couldn’t be seen as sanctioning these initiatives because it was too sensitive politically.
Surayud, on the other hand, headed a military-appointed government that didn’t have opposition in Parliament to contend with. Unfortunately, the vision Surayud put forth never materialised as mediators and the exiled groups became territorial. Then the following administrations – from Samak Sundaravej to Abhisit – pushed foreign governments and international bodies away.
Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya may have publicly thanked Kuala Lumpur for supposedly informing Thailand about the Organisation of Islamic Conference’s (OIC) initiatives on Thailand’s deep South, after news about their meeting with the old guard went public late last year. But no one who followed the issue closely believed what he said. They saw his statement as a face-saving measure. This is because the Thai government does not want outsiders to get involved in the deep South.
Like others, Kuala Lumpur is concerned that the violence could either spill over to its side of the border or lure Malaysian citizens into the conflict. After all, the Thai-Malaysian border is as artificial as any other. Today, what concerns the international community is the idea that the political context of the conflict will change – from a Patani Malay nationalist cause to a global jihadist cause where the fight becomes one for Islam.
There is nothing to suggest that the conflict is moving in that direction, however. One of the reasons is that the new militants, locally referred to as juwae, or “fighters” in the local Malay dialect, see themselves as winning, as they are able to attack anyone, any place, at any time. The juwae share the same resentment toward the Thai state as local Malay villagers. This explains why so few people help Thai security officials with their investigations.
Thailand will be hard pressed by the OIC members to explain the culture of impunity among its officials in the deep South. Thailand’s unwillingness to crack down on pro-government death squads or its own people accused of torturing suspects continues to drive a deeper wedge between the Malays in the deep South and the state. The June 2009 Ai Bayae massacre in Narathiwat and a May 2011 shooting spree in Bannang Sata in Yala are just two incidents that come to mind. Both incidents were carried out by former paramilitary rangers with an axe to grind with local insurgents but decided to take it out on ordinary villagers. And the fact that the Bannang Sata shooting took place just 200 metres from an Army outpost, and that none of the soldiers bothered to come to check the five locations that gunmen hit, reinforced the perception that the Army turns a blind eye or that soldiers had colluded with Buddhist gunmen. Warrants were issued and the suspects sent home after turning themselves in. If the Ai Bayae massacre is any indication, the suspects are likely to walk free.
Still, the Army is convinced it is the most suitable negotiator and determined to be at the head of any negotiations with the insurgents. The Army believes that with help from Indonesia and Malaysia, the old guard will come to the table – assuming they can get over their grudges – and that will serve as an entry point to the new militants. It is not clear what kind of concession the Army could make to the old guard to gain the attention of the insurgents who, seeing themselves as winning, don’t seem to be interested in talking.
Another thing that is unclear is why the Army is assured that it has the right to engineer any peace process given the fact that it talked to the old guard in the 1970s and 80s but failed to achieve any breakthrough. A retired senior officer in the Malaysian government who helped facilitate some of the meetings in the 1980s said the Thai Army was never serious about moving talks beyond an informal setting.
In the coming months, it is likely that Thai soldiers and the Patani Malay old guard will come face to face again for a round of talks. Meanwhile violence continues and there doesn’t seem to be much anybody can do to stop it. Some people believe that sooner or later the militants will get tired of fighting and look for a way out. But this end game the old guard hope for might not materialise.
The problem with the new generation of militants is that there will always be a new crop of young fighters to replace them. Judging from the recent past, especially the conduct of the post-Tak Bai generation, the replacements will be just as vicious and brutal, if not more so.

Confusion over confession by suspect

While Suthep says ex-ranger had admitted to his crime, Army official at crime scene denies development

By Don Pathan
The Nation

Confusion over whether a man suspected of a killing spree in Yala on Tuesday had confessed continued yesterday as Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban told reporters in Bangkok that a former paramilitary ranger had admitted to the crime. Authorities on the ground said interrogation of the suspect had yet to reach any conclusion.

Suthep was quoting Panu Uthairat, the director of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre.

Fourth Army chief LtGeneral Udomchai Thammasarotrat, meanwhile, said that the suspect was still being interrogated and that the authorities had yet to obtain a confession.

Udomchai said the use of martial law had been approved against the suspect, Bannang Sata resident Pirapan Pandam, 27, because the area where the killing spree had been carried out was an extremely restive one.

"It doesn't matter if the suspect is a Buddhist or a Muslim. I am here to uphold the law," Udomchai told The Nation in a telephone interview.

In Bangkok, Suthep was quick to distance the government from the case. He told reporters that the incident that caused the deaths of four people and injuries to 21 was not the work of government security officials. Neither was it the work of Malay Muslim separatists, whom authorities accuse of being behind most of the violence in the deep South, he said.

A senior government official in the region said Pirapan, along with three other alleged culprits, may have been motivated by the fact that his older brother, Sombat, 32, was shot and killed while on a hunting trip in the outback of Bannang Sata district on April 27.

According to the government official, Pirapan is being held at a ranger unit in Raman district in Yala.

Authorities had to act quickly for fear that the incident would prompt serious retaliation from insurgents, the source said.

Efforts are being carried out to convince militant cells in Bannang Sata not to retaliate against what was billed as an isolated incident, he added.

Sombat was killed along with his dog while reportedly on a hunting trip. A village elder living near where the killing took place said the victim was out to hunt for pangolin, an endangered anteater that is trafficked for illegal meat and medicine markets.

Sombat had been warned repeatedly that there were insurgents in the area but insisted on carrying on with his hunting trip, the elder said.

Local and international human rights organisations said progovernment death squads had been employed in the past to settle scores, but officials insisted that target killings of suspects were not government policy.

Martial law permits detention of a suspect for 10 days without formal charges.

Pirapan and three others on a pickup truck were accused of carrying out the killing spree. The suspects, all in hoods, used AK47 and M16 automatic rifles to attack a teashop, their first target, less than 200 metres from an army outpost.

The four gunmen hit five more targets, including a village grocery store, two young men sitting on a motorbike in front of a local Islamic school, and other passers by on the street.

Eyewitnesses who survived the teashop attack said the four culprits were all hooded and did not say a word to each other.

They also added that the fact that it took about an hour before the authorities showed up at the scene raised questions over their seriousness about tracking down the gunmen.

No consensus for peace dialogue in the deep South

Talking to the enemy is nothing new in Thailand's dealing with the insurgency in the Malay-speaking South - as long as it is done outside of the public sphere and does not enhance the legitimacy of the militants.

Don Pathan
The Nation

For the past three decades or so, the Thai Army has dispatched mid-ranking to senior officers to meet with the separatists. The meetings were carried out secretly in Middle-Eastern capitals at times when a number of Arab governments were providing the Malay-Muslim separatists from the deep South with money and training.

These encounters were treated mainly as intelligence-gathering exercises and didn't have much impact on policy. The missions came to a pause during much the 1990s after the militants halted military activities and returned to their villages. Thailand attributed the success to the "Tai Rom Yen" amnesty programme. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was on its way out. The movement was already in disarray when then prime minister Prem Tinsulanonda signed the famous Executive Order 66/2523 paving the way for non-military means to end the ideological conflict. Integration wasn't difficult because CPT members didn't have any identity problem.

They just didn't embrace the state-constructed identity of what Thai-ness and Thailand should be. The Malay separatists, on the other hand, are part of an ethno-nationlaist movement. Unlike the CPT, which wanted to take over the state, the Malays just want their homeland back.And while Thai security planners were busy patting themselves on the back, a new generation of Malay-Muslim separatists was already in the making. Unfortunately for Thaksin Shinawatra, this new generation took up arms just as he entered the premiership. He didn't want to recognise them and called them "sparrow bandits". But when separatists raided an Army camp in Narathiwat on January 4, 2004 and made off with 400 weapons, Thailand could no longer deny the political underpinning of the attacks. Since then, violence has become an everyday reality.

More than 4,600 people, mostly Malay-Muslims, have died in insurgency-related violence. While the government responds with massive troop mobilisation, the idea of talking to the enemy is back on the drawing board. Unable to find an identifiable enemy to talk to on the ground, security officials have turned to the leaders of the long-standing separatist groups who they met in previous decades. In 2005, former Malaysian prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed was asked to help facilitate meetings with the old guard in the hope they could talk sense to the new generation of militants, known as juwae, or fighters, in the Malay dialect. The then Armed Forces' Security Centre chief Lt-General Vaipot Srinuan and General Winai Pathiyakul of the National Security Council represented the Thai side in the Langkawi meetings. Former prime minister Anand Panyarachun received the set of recommendations. But Thaksin, the next prime minister, was in no mood to listen to any of it.

In September 2006, the Army ousted Thaksin. The junta appointed a member of the Privy Council, General Surayud Chulanont, as the country's interim prime minister. Besides restoring Thailand's tarnished image, reconciling with the Malays in the deep South was also on his agenda. Besides issuing a formal apology for the Tak Bai massacre and for other atrocities committed against the Malays by the Thai state, Surayud also reached out to neighbouring countries and foreign experts to help jump start a peace process with the separatists. Executive Order 206/2523 permits Thai officials to explore ways to carry out dialogue with the separatists. During a visit to Yala in May 2007, and two months later in an address to the nation, Surayud thanked the international community, including the UN and Malaysian government, for their assistance in facilitating dialogue with the separatists. But the foundation he laid was never carried forward by subsequent administrations, at least not in a meaningful way.In September 2008, more than two years after the Langkawi Process, then vice-president of Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla, had a crack at organising a similar forum.

Kwanchart Klaharn, a former Fourth Army commander, represented the Thai side in Bogor, Indonesia. The process immediately hit a snag when news of the event became public. Bangkok quickly distanced itself from the meeting for fear of political backlash. Former Thai Army chiefs, including Chavalit Yongchaiyud and General Chettha Thanajaro also tried their luck, but neither had much political capital to give their initiative any meaning. Last but not least, the Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC) has also come into the picture, and since late last year has held meetings with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups. The same old guard that has been meeting with Thai representatives over the past three decades was called up to take part in meetings with OIC secretary-general Dr Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who chaired a gathering in Jeddah, while Talal A Daous, the organisation's director for minority affairs, chaired one in Kuala Lumpur.

The simultaneous meetings were held on September 30-October 1, 2011. A source in the separatist BRN-Coordinate was blunt about the OIC's credibility gap: "The OIC granted Thailand the permanent observer status knowing that such status should have gone to the Malays," he said. "How do you expect the OIC or any other so-called mediator to understand the needs of a non-state actor like us?"At a gathering last week at Thammasat University, academics dug up Surayud's Executive Order 206/2523 and called on the authorities to explore the concept of "peace dialogue". They went to length to explain that "peace dialogue" is not in any way a formal negotiation, possibly out of concern that a more formal process would be dismissed outright by the government or security planners, many of whom don't like the idea of talking to the enemy for fear that it would legitimise their movement. Citing foreign examples, academic Mark Tamthai said a "peace dialogue" could help build momentum that could attract more hardline groups if and when they see benefits generated by the process itself.

Fearing that they would be kept out of the loop as the idea of a "peace dialogue" gains momentum in some quarters, the Army has gone back to the drawing board."The Army must be in the driver's seat, not the passenger seat, if a peace process is to have any chance of success. We can deliver on the separatists' request and guarantee continuity, but civilians can't," said one officer.For three decades, the so-called Thai representatives have been meeting with the same leaders from various separatist groups. This time, there is a new generation of militants and they don't always take orders from the old guard, said a senior Army officer working on the conflict in the deep South.

The most important thing, said the officer, is to be able to deliver on whatever request the separatists toss out in order to generate confidence."And if you cannot deliver on their request, you can forget about the militants coming on board any peace process, or dialogue, or whatever you want to call it."


Part II

Can the old guard get peace talks going in the South?

Like the interim Surayud Chulanont administration, the Thai Army plans to consult with Malaysia and Indonesia on the insurgency in the deep South of Thailand because many of the old guard Malay-Muslim separatisits now live there.

Like former Malaysian prime minister Dr Mahathir's Langkawi Process, the idea is to get the old guard to convince the juwae, the new generation of separatists, that there is an end game to the violence that has rages since 2004."It's embarrassing to go the Malaysians and the Indonesians right now to ask for help knowing that we don't have unity among ourselves or a real commitment to this idea of talking to the enemy, much less a guarantee of continuity, especially when we go from one administration to another," said one unnamed Army officer. "Moreover, there is no political stability in our country," he added.

The way things stand, the juwae don't seem to be eager to talk peace either. The past four months have been extremely bloody and brutal, forcing intelligence agencies to come up with all sorts of conclusions, including one that said the juwae wants to attract the attention of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) to legitimise themselves. But then again, they have been saying that for decades.Such an argument coincides with the concern of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who has been urging the international community not to "legitimise" the militants on the ground.Officials say Abhisit should worry less about what the foreigners think and more about the support and sympathy that local Malay-Mulsims have for the juwae.

But admitting that the government is not winning the battle for hearts and minds, especially after billions of baht have been spent on development projects, is tantamount to committing political suicide.A source in the BRN-Coordinate - one of long-standing separatist groups with the strongest working relationship with the militants on the ground - said the juwae are extremely sceptical about any peace or dialogue process because they think it's part of a ploy to get them to surface so they can be killed.Indeed, target killings carried out by pro-government death squads have been extensively documented in the deep South.

There is no indiction that such a tactic has improved the situation or created the kind of atmosphere that could lead to peaceful dialogue.Beside the lack of unity among the old guard, said the BRN-Coordinate source, their dialogue with the juwae has taken on a sour note. "We are concerned with the collateral damage and the deaths of civilians. Many of the cells appear to be indifferent to the fact that their activities on the ground undermine what we are trying to do abroad. We talk to them but we still lack shared command to truly influence them," the BRN-Coordinate cadre said.

Thai intelligence agencies sometimes paint a neat-and-clean organisational chart of the shadowy movement, but security and civilian officials in the deep South, as well as sources in the separatist movements, say there is a considerable gap between the current generation and the old guard."I have interrogated hundreds of juwae and recall only a couple identifying themselves with the long -standing separatist groups," said a police officer working in the deep South since 2004.

Given the organic nature of today's movement, as well as the alarming trend of younger juwae selling their skills to crime syndicates, getting anybody on board a meaningful peace process will be extremely difficult, said another civilian officer. Nevertheless, all parties on both sides of the fence pretty much agree that the only exit strategy is through the old guard, simply because the new generation of juwae will not surface to talk.Nobody understands this more than the old guard.

That's why since 2004 many have been trying to reinvent themselves, reaching out to foreign mediators to raise their profile and present themselves as the representatives of Malays in the deep South.A senior government officer at Government House joked about the proliferation of foreign and local NGOs wanting to do mediation work, saying, "We need a mediator for the mediators."

According to one government source, the authorities have been permitted to explore ways to carry out dialogue with people who are "one-step removed from the insurgency" as a way to establish a channel of communication with the militants. The ambiguous language is necessary here, according to the source, because there is no executive order or legislation to support direct talks with anybody who identifies themselves as separatist.Academics and members of the civil society, especially those advocating peaceful means, have been consulted by Thai security planners and officials as well. Some of their concepts have been debated publicly but it is not very clear as to how much influence these ideas will have on government policy."

In spite of what these peace-loving academics and NGO people say or try to do, there is a danger in bringing any of the so-called dialogue into the public spotlight. You unnecessarily up the ante by doing it," said a former member of the now-defunct Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), which used to run with the BRN-Coordinate decades ago."For one thing, how will the government explain to victims' family members, both Muslim and Buddhist, when they ask about justice," he added."

Moreover, it was [former premier] Prem's 'non-military approach', not 'peace dialogue', that helped paved the end for the communists and permit us to reintegrate into society," said the former CPT member.In his executive order, Surayud Chulanont pointed to the ethno-nationalist nature of the conflict between the Malays and the Thai state. But policy -makers didn't really know how to follow up on the order or his public apology for past atroccities, and so they turn to development projects, hoping that this will win hearts and minds.

No one wants to admit that the problem is rooted in Thailand's nation-state construct that leaves virtually no room for the Malay narrative."We will never see peace if Thailand is more concerned about state consolidation, as opposed to national unity. There has to be an arrangement that permits Malay identity, ethnicity, culture, narrative and way of life to flourish and co-exist peacefully with the rest of the country," said the former CPT cadre. "Can the state do this for the Malays?""It won't be easy," said the Army officer, "but there is a growing number of people in the military who are willing to explore other non-military ideas, such as greater cultural space for the Malays. It's about their dignity. Essentially, all these killings are political in nature. And somewhere in there is an end game to it all."

Daring attack on South army post

Militants charge through front gate, killing at least 6 soldiers, wounding 6

By Don Pathan
The Nation

Suspected separatist militants attacked an Army task-force unit in Narathiwat's Rangae district last night, killing six soldiers and wounding six others just days after Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva talked about lifting the state of emergency in more districts of the troubled deep South.

This attack was considered one of the boldest moves by the separatists in a long time.

The militants charged through the front gate - the only entry into the Task Force 38 camp - and started firing, catching the troops off guard, a senior officer recounted. Lt-Colonel Thanit Saengchan estimated that at least 20 armed men were behind the attack.

Task Force 38 comes under the 15th Infantry Division of the Fourth Army Area, though the Narathiwat province comes under the command of the Second Army Area, which also has the Northeast region under its jurisdiction.

Details about the gunfight, the extent of the damage and if anything was stolen remained sketchy as of press time. Task Force 38 is about a kilometre from an Army battalion that was raided on January 4, 2004, by scores of Malay-Muslim separatists who made off with about 350 pieces of weapons.

The highest-ranking officer who died in the shootout was identified as Captain Krit Kampirayan, who was the company's commander.

The wounded were rushed to the Yala Central Hospital, a regional medical centre with better facilities. The attack came as Army commander-in-chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha and Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, who is in charge of security affairs, were visiting the region to provide moral support to the troops and officials.

Abhisit returned from the region two days ago after discussing ways of strengthening the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre with civilian officials.

Insurgent attacks have become almost an every day occurrence in the three Malay-speaking southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, as well as in the four Malay-speaking districts of Songkhla.

The attack in Rangae was a "slap in the face" and "a tremendous setback" for the policy-makers, said a senior officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, as the Royal Thai Army in Bangkok plans to hand the entire deep South region back to the Fourth Army. The idea is to pull out the units from the Second Army Area and Third Army Area and send them back to the Northeast and the North, respectively. It is not immediately clear if this latest incident will affect this plan, which is supposed to kick off in October.

Last night's attack also came as the authorities in Bangkok boasted about improved security in the restive region where more than 4,300 people have been killed since 2004. Almost 500 of the victims were soldiers and police.

Claiming success in the curbing of violence, the government recently lifted the emergency decree in Pattani's Mae Lan district. Observers said this claim was far too premature because the movements of the militants were far too fluid. Some said the idea of marking areas as "green" or "red" zones was misleading because this generation of insurgents did not care about controlling geographical space, but were more interested in controlling the mindset of the local population.

Sympathy for the insurgents among the Malay-Muslim populace remains high and the number of people coming out to name suspected insurgents remains low, despite the government's claim that it was succeeding in winning the hearts and minds of the local residents.

More than 64,000 security officers are working in the deep South and the government has spent billions on trying to maintain order in the restive region, where the violence is nowhere in sight.