DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
More than a year after seizing power, our latest crop of junta officials have come face to face with separatist leaders in what are being billed as "pre-talks" - a stepping stone to formal peace negotiations in the far South.
Senior leaders from the self-styled MARA Patani umbrella organisation - which comprises several long-standing separatist groups, including the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP) plus a handful of people who claim to be members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - met with the Thai chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara Kherdphol and his team in Malaysia on June 8. The two sides had met previously for a "pre-talks" session in April.
A young cadre from the BRN, Sukri Hari, was present at the first meeting, but sources said his participation in no way constitutes BRN endorsement for the peace initiative with the Thais.
Sources in the movement said Sukri believes he can help locate common ground between MARA Patani and the BRN, which has so far ruled out any direct talks with the current government. The BRN controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, thus making their participation vital if any peace initiative is to win success.
As for Team Thailand, courting Sukri could pay off in the long run if he can succeed where MARA Patani failed - by convincing the genuine BRN leadership to join the peace process.
In other words, Sukri's participation could be much more important than the participation of self-proclaimed BRN leaders such as Awang Jabat and Tok Imam Haleng, both of whom are prominent members in the MARA Patani forum but were conspicuously absent from the June 8 meeting.
Sukri cannot be allowed to shine too brightly, however. The former teacher is a fugitive facing arrest warrants on charges of treason. He fled Thailand in 2007 along with seven of his colleagues from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala after they were granted bail under the then-government of Surayud Chulanont.
Unless the charges against him are dropped, putting Sukri on a pedestal could prove to be a legal and diplomatic disaster. And there is no guarantee that this young member can change the mindset of the BRN old guard.
Though the June 8 pre-talks were not formal negotiations, and not all of the MARA Patani groups were present, the Thai side did ask the separatist leaders at the meeting if they could get the combatants to curb their activities during the month of Ramadan.
The separatist leaders did not commit themselves, saying it was too early to be making deals, according to a Thai intelligence officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
However, a BRN operative said there would be no escalation of attacks or straying beyond the usual targets of security officials as long as the Thai side did not violate the rules of engagement - by, for example, targeting religious leaders.
The participants at the June 8 meeting couldn't accede to such a request even if they wanted to, because they don't control the combatants, the BRN source added.
Similar discrepancies also exist on the Thai side, between policymakers and the security agencies on the ground.
BRN operatives often point to the target killing of Imam Abdullateh Todir - a member of the Yala Islamic Committee and an imam in Yala's Yaha district - as a prime example of the disunity among the Thai security agencies.
Abdullateh was shot dead by a pro-government death squad in November 2012. An attempt on his life earlier that year failed but cost his daughter her life.
After the failed assassination, Thai Special Forces provided him with a security detail. The Army saw him as a potential go-between for the authorities and the insurgent fighters.
But another agency didn't see it that way, believing instead that he was too close to the insurgents. And when the Special Forces became complacent, a couple of gunmen pounced.
Abdullateh lived in Tambon Patae, an extremely "red" area in Yaha district. His killing triggered an unprecedented spike in violence that lasted six weeks.
A few months later the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) failed to get the provincial Islamic committees to endorse peace negotiations launched on February 28, 2013. Clerics refused to endorse the initiative, having witnessed one of their own gunned down by what they said was a pro-government death squad.
The BRN says Thai security agencies' old attitudes and standard operating procedures haven't changed. The culture of impunity among the officials makes it difficult for them to take anything from Bangkok seriously, they say.
Nevertheless, the BRN has not ruled out talking to the Thai side, but will do so only on its own terms and when it is ready.
For the time being, it doesn't see any real commitment or seriousness from the current Bangkok government and believes that "peace process" is an empty phrase designed for domestic and international consumption.
The culture of impunity aside, the current structure of the Thai negotiating and policy team for the South is also problematic.
On the surface, many ministries and agencies are represented at the policy level and on the dialogue panel.
Top officials from the Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry, Internal Security Operation Command, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Army sit on the policy forum, and their subordinates are represented on the dialogue panel, which is headed by chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara.
But judging from the meeting in mid-May between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and top bureaucrats from these ministries and agencies, it appears that these representatives are more interested in protecting their constituencies than in exploring creative ideas to support peace and negotiations.
Prayut is averse to the idea of MARA Patani because, in the view of the Foreign Ministry, it could lead to an internationalising of the deep South conflict.
Thai officials are often reminded how the now-defunct separatist umbrella group Bersatu helped garner political and financial support from Muslim countries in the Middle East.
Besides the worry over "internationalising" the conflict, there are concerns that the draft constitution doesn't permit the Kingdom to be divided.
PM Prayut may not like the idea of MARA Patani, but the real issue is whether this separatist forum can evolve into something meaningful that attracts support and legitimacy from the Malays of Patani and the international community.
Moreover, no government wants to debate with a foreign entity on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays' historical homeland, much less the culture of impunity and the human rights violations committed against local Muslims over the past few decades.
When the previous wave of separatist militants went under in the 1990s, Bangkok governments stepped up their diplomacy to cut off their support from Arab and Muslim countries.
The Chuan Leekpai government even secured permanent observer status for Thailand at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in order to block these separatist movements from obtaining a seat in the forum and consequently diplomatic support.
Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - friendly Muslim countries in Southeast Asia - endorsed Thailand's quest, which Bangkok took as a stamp of approval for how Thailand treats its Muslim minority.
Today, a stamp of approval seems the last thing on Thai authorities' mind, with anti-Muslim sentiment in and around the country continuing unabated, especially in Nan province where residents are campaigning against a plan to build a local mosque. They claim that an Islamic place of worship could turn their community into another conflict zone like the Patani region.
But separatist movements, particularly the BRN, say it's a different kind of fight nowadays. Combatants on the ground no longer depend on foreign donors since local villagers now provide intelligence, logistical support and supplies to sustain militant cells.
Thai officials often pay lip service to the idea of winning hearts and minds in deep-South communities but seem to have little insight on how to achieve this task.
If anybody has sway over the combatants' rules of engagement, said one BRN operative, it is the local villagers.
He said the militants' decision to end the practice of mutilating Thai soldiers' corpses, as well as ceasing attacks on public schools, was influenced by the villagers.
For the time being, the immediate challenge for the self-proclaimed MARA Patani is convincing the BRN that there is merit in coming to the table to talk, Thai officials said.
But like everything else in this conflict, that's easier said than done, especially when Bangkok is not willing to make any concessions.
DON PATHAN is a security analyst and development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
