Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com
Explosive Ordnance Disposal officers neutralising bombs in Phuket.
IEDs in Tourist Destinations
Actions speak louder than words. In Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, where a two-decade separatist insurgency has claimed over 7,700 lives, the dominant rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), keeps its intentions shrouded in mystery.
Such tactics have irritated the Thai security apparatus ever since this wave of insurgency returned to the Malay-speaking South over two decades ago. It will continue to be that way as long as the Thai state and other stakeholders, such as Malaysia, do not support BRN in setting up a recognisable and functional political wing that can engage and explain its stance to the world.
The unearthing of 11 improvised explosive devices (IED) in Krabi and Phuket – two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast – sent a shockwave in all directions. This is despite efforts by policymakers in Bangkok to minimise the incident by not linking it to the insurgency in the far south.
The two suspects caught at a police checkpoint in Phang-nga are from Pattani. Their confessions led police to more hidden bombs: one in an abandoned motorcycle near Phuket International Airport, two buried at Patong Beach and one at Promthep Cape.
The Australian and Canadian governments, on 1 July and 4 July 2025, respectively, issued separate updated terrorism warnings to their citizens travelling to Thailand in response to the arrests of two suspects.
One of the two IEDs found in Krabi was planted on a seawall at Ao Nang Beach near the commercial area; the second was discovered beneath a banyan tree at Noppharat Thara Beach.
All IEDs were deactivated by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers using high-power water cannons.
The then Defence Minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the conflict in the far south and urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage to avoid possible chaos. Security officials at the operational level, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.
Policymakers and security officials agreed that the bomb size – which, according to one military intelligence officer, had an explosive radius of about 10 metres – was designed to create psychological impact and discredit the state security apparatus rather than take lives or inflict major physical damage.
The two suspects, while providing information leading to the locations of other IEDs, claimed they were merely hired to drive the vehicle, according to media reports quoting unnamed official sources.
True to form, BRN neither confirms nor denies its involvement, though during military operations its negotiators occasionally issue statements or videos reiterating demands. Insights into the group’s mindset emerged when chief negotiator Anas Abdulrahman spoke to the media briefly after high-level talks with Thai negotiators.
Faltering Peace Process
BRN made no public statement about the IEDs but indicated that in the absence of a formal peace process, increased violence intensity and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable. The attack against the Sungai Kolok district office exemplified this, occurring after secret negotiations over a Ramadhan ceasefire were exhausted, setting the stage for combatant intervention.
The last such press conference followed a February 2024 meeting, where both sides agreed in principle to work on the roadmap for the talks—the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP). Since then, BRN has largely stayed out of the public eye, with sporadic video statements offering only fragmented glimpses into the movement and its demands.
The peace process began unravelling soon after the February meeting when Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, a key advisor to the ruling Pheu Thai Party, publicly criticised the JCPP.
He slammed the Peace Dialogue Panel for failing to curb BRN violence and accused international mediators and donors of neglecting Thailand’s national security. The Panel was badly isolated, and it may not recover, as hardliners pushed through uncompromising recommendations, like classifying BRN as a “terrorist” organisation as a way to pressure Malaysia – the designated mediator/facilitator – to deport the movement’s leaders.
In the second half of 2024, the Thai government was in disarray after the Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for ethics violations in a cabinet appointment. The cabinet’s dissolution left the Peace Dialogue Panel obsolete—a status that persists today, as no new team has been appointed.
Incoming Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra inherited the southern Thai crisis. Unwilling to burden the political novice, senior officials in the security sector pushed the agenda way down in the list.
Bangkok now insists it will only resume talks if the BRN halts violence—a demand the rebels reject, arguing that de-escalation or ceasefire must be negotiated and that international observers must be allowed to monitor any ceasefire on the ground.
Thailand’s refusal to compromise frustrated Malaysia, the designated mediator for the so-called peace process, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the facilitator who has been trying to reached out to the army for serious discussion on how to move the peace process forward. But he would come to learn that the lack of political will applies to everybody in the Thai government, not just the army.
Escalating Violence
Paetongtarn’s political inexperience was exposed last month when Cambodian strongman Hun Sen leaked a recording of her criticising Thailand’s military over the border standoff with Cambodia. The scandal damaged both her credibility and the Shinawatra family’s political standing.
Some observers say this could be the beginning of the end of the family that has been dominating Thai politics for more than two decades.
Meanwhile, violence in the Deep South has escalated over the past six years, with a sharp uptick in March 2025 after Thailand rejected BRN’s counter-proposal for Ramadhan ceasefire. Talks collapsed, and the rebels launched a bold assault on Sungai Kolok’s district office in Narathiwat on 8 March 2025, killing two security personnel and wounding 10 before detonating a car bomb.
These locally hired security officials, known as Defence Volunteers, have been told to quit their jobs and to refrain from acting as spies for the Thai security apparatus, or else they would be considered legitimate targets.
The shooting death of a senior member in the BRN military wing, Abdulroning Lateh, on 18 April 2025, triggered further retaliation, including attacks on monks and civilians—a breach of the group’s usual rules of engagement.
The incident prompted a wide range of condemnation from civil society organisations and direct intervention from The Patani, a political action group who called on the BRN leadership to respect the commitment they made with members of the international community and to respect humanitarian principles, international norms, and civility.
BRN later reaffirmed its policy of avoiding civilian targets in a press statement but made no reference to any particular incident. The message, aimed at reining in fighters, eventually restored attacks to “legitimate” military and government targets.
Conflict and Political Crisis
Combatants stepping out of line and violating their own rules of engagement is uncommon but does occur, as seen in the targeting of soft targets to avenge Abdulroning’s assassination.
Operations outside the Malay-speaking South have also occurred periodically, usually as a retaliation against Thai security forces for alleged violation of the unwritten ground rule. In August 2019, for example, Bangkok was hit by six small bombs as the city hosted meetings of Southeast Asian foreign ministers and their counterparts from the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and other world powers.
In August 2016, 13 bombing incidents struck Hua Hin and four upper Southern provinces – Phuket, Surat Thani, Trang, and Phang-nga – in a 48-hour span in what then-prime minister Prayut Chan-ocha called “an attempt to create chaos and confusion.”
Today, Thailand has once again found itself in a political crisis, with the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspending Prime Minister Paetongtarn pending an investigation into her conduct over the phone conversation with Hun Sen. The Pheu Thai party is also under pressure from the opposition and the public to call fresh elections or face a vote of no confidence.
Peace talks are expected to resume if and when the People’s Party (PP) takes control of the government. The party has shown willingness to accommodate the demands of BRN and the Malay-speaking region. How far PP is willing to go, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
But if the current coalition survives the ongoing political storm, violence in the far south will continue to rise, as neither side is willing to reconsider their current course of action.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
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