Thailand’s High-Stakes Gamble in the South

 Security

May 1, 2026 / 7 minutes of reading

File Photo: A Defence Volunteer miraculously survived an explosion from a bomb hidden under her
vehicle in Pattani, March 17, 2025.

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

End of Status Quo

Approximately two years ago, Thai military generals began discussing the possibility of transferring some security responsibilities – typically handled by regular soldiers – to local civilians working within the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

The target operational areas are the three southernmost border provinces where a two-decade-old separatist insurgency has so far claimed more than 7,700 lives.

The locally recruited Territorial Defence Volunteers (DVs), who primarily serve as security personnel for provincial governors and district chiefs in the Malay-speaking south, were informed that their roles require a willingness to face significant risks as part of their government employment.

In his policy statement to the Parliament on 9 April 2026, incoming Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said work is on the way to strengthen DV’s capacity and that their coordination with the Royal Thai Army will be enhanced.

For much of the past two decades, since the current wave of separatist insurgency resurfaced in this Muslim-majority region, DV survived the conflict by not seeing or saying anything. Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the one long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all the combatants on the ground – left them alone, seeing their basic security duties as non-threatening to their quest for separation from the Thai state.

In contrast to other minority groups living near the country’s borders, the Thai government was unwilling to allow the Patani Malay DV access to weapons or intelligence. This reluctance stems from DV’s shared cultural background with BRN members and local residents whom government continues to face difficulties in winning over. This creates operational risks.

But there was a need to cut military spending due to the conflict in the far south. To save money, the government started gradually replacing regular soldiers in this restive region with Paramilitary Rangers, a light infantry force acting as an auxiliary to the Royal Thai Army. This allowed the security grid to expand to extremely remote areas.

Because of the Rangers’ surge, the total number of violent incidents in the region dropped to just over 800 in 2008, a big drop from 1,400 from the previous years. The figure saw a downward trajectory from then to 2025 where the total number of violent incidents stood at 150.

But the number does not tell us everything about the conflict. Insurgents make up for the drop in overall attacks by being more selective with their targets with the aim of instilling greater psychological impact—the kind that could be felt by the policymakers in Bangkok.

BRN combatants would take their fights to the Thai security outposts and government installations, sometimes using car bombs to get their message across.

Selective Targeting and Psychological Warfare

Thus, two years ago, the idea of putting locally hired MOI’s DV security details on the front line gained traction.

Concern of operation risks is still there. But the generals believe that as long as DVs are not given too much leeway, the army can minimise the risk.

But BRN is not taking this sitting down, however. They have made their point very public. Stern warnings were printed on flyers, posters and spray-painted on paved roads throughout this restive region, calling on DVs to quit their jobs. To back up their demands, over the past two years BRN have carried out several vicious attacks against various MOI installations manned with DV security details.

However, one should not forget that DVs are not trained soldiers—they are lightly armed and do not operate like a military unit. They move around the area with provincial governors and district chiefs or get posted at MOI installations to carry out basic security guard duties. Getting them out on reconnaissance patrol or offensive operation puts them in the line of fire.

But the government is staying the course. Policy statement delivered to the Parliament by Anutin on 9 April 2026 was a testimony of that. How this strategy will play out on the ground, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

The Trend Reverses

The future does not look so good, however.

Since the start of the year, the downward trend observed since 2007 appeared to be reversing. Violence has increased, with a total of 30 bombings and shootings occurring in the first two months of 2026, leading to 22 casualties, including two fatalities.

There were the January 11 arson attacks on 11 petrol stations in response to Thailand’s cold shoulder to BRN’s proposals at the last round of negotiation in Kuala Lumpur.

The surge from mid-February to mid-March was largely attributed to the Ramadhan period. This is a timeframe historically associated with increased insurgent activities to remind the Thais that they have not forgotten about the massacre in 2004 when 85 young Melayu men died at the hands of security officials.

Recently, the Thai army has expanded their counterinsurgency operation to include an alternative narrative aimed at discrediting BRN. Paramilitary Ranger Darun Daroheng, a Muslim from Narathiwat, was fatally shot on 24 March while on leave for the Ramadhan holiday at his residence in Sungai Padi district.

The army referred to Darun as a “shahid” (martyr), and the government plaque on his gravestone similarly described him as such.

To live up to the hype, the local task force commander was eager to hunt down the culprits behind the shooting death of Darun. Helicopter, along with ground troops, was dispatched to hunt them down.  BRN and residents accused soldiers of throwing hand grenades from the helicopter against combatants on the ground, frightening local villagers and forcing them to run for cover.

The army dismissed the allegation, saying the explosions came from the insurgents’ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and that the helicopter was for reconnaissance purposes only.

Over the past two decades, hundreds, if not thousands, of Malay Muslim security officials have been killed, but the state never called them shahid. It was not until the death of Private Mustakeem Machema, a Malay Muslim from Narathiwat, who was killed in a fierce clash with Cambodian troops on the border last December that such a concept was employed.

Mustakeem was praised by the army as a martyr who fought and died for the “Kingdom and for the homeland”. Darun was given the same honour by the army.

But the one incident that attracted a great deal of media attention and kicked off a public storm was the failed attempt on the life of a local politician, Prachachat Party MP Kamonsak Leewamoh, by a highly organised hit team.

Four individuals, including a former Marine, have been arrested. The motive is still very much unclear, but the alleged military involvement is still far from being resolved, as the vehicle used by the hit squad was signed off by an army colonel.

Military Solution for Political Problem

Lt Gen Norathip Phoinok, commander of the 4th Army Region responsible for daily operations of the entire region, has come under intense criticism for saying the attempt on Kamonsak’s life was connected to this ongoing turmoil. He identified Islamic educational institutions such as pondok and tadika as primary causes of regional unrest.

This has stoked anger, with leaders of Islamic schools in the region calling on the government to remove Norathip from the command. He has since apologised for the ill-advised remark.

Like all other previous commanding generals of this historically disputed region, Norathip does not seem to understand that for a militarily superior power, any outcome short of total victory is perceived as a failure. Conversely, a weaker insurgent force achieves success simply by avoiding elimination. The result is a stalemate that the army cannot sustain politically.

Thailand has not succeeded in resolving this conflict because the armed forces and the government have treated this conflict as a military problem, while the insurgents have considered it a political struggle. Until a new counterinsurgency strategy is defined, the stalemate and the violence will continue.

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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Government’s quick fix meets complex reality in Thailand’s Deep South

Thai Army's gunship in the far South. (File Photo: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG)

Don Pathan
Prachatai 

The incoming government of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is finding out very quickly that conflict resolution for the Deep South is not so straightforward and that his quick-fix approach will not achieve the intended results, given the complexity of the Deep South.

A proposed border fence between Thailand and Malaysia is an outdated, high-cost solution that ignores the complex, socio-economic and political roots of the Patani conflict, not to mention the disruption of local cross-border livelihoods.

Anutin raised the idea during his brief visit to the Deep South in mid-February after receiving a security briefing about the spike in violence during Ramadan. They didn’t tell him that combatants from the Barisan Revolusi Naisonal Melayu Patani (BRN) tend to step up attacks during the holy month to remind the Thai government that they haven’t forgotten about the Tak Bai massacre, an incident in late 2004 when 85 unarmed young Melayu men died at the hands of security officials – seven shot dead at the protest site and 78 suffocated after they were stacked one on top another on the back military transport trucks. The incident took place during the Ramadan of 2004.

Thai-Malaysian border, Sungai Kolok River (File Photo: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG)

The incident that has generated a great deal of media attention was the March 20 assassination attempt on MP Kamolsak Leewamoh, a prominent human rights lawyer from the Prachachart Party. Kamolsak is known for speaking out against the culture of impunity among security officials in the Deep South and was the central figure in exposing the Khao Kradong land dispute, which involves allegations of public land encroachment by the influential Chidchob family in Buri Ram province.

The hit team included two former Marines, one former paramilitary ranger, a local driver and the owner of a vehicle repair shop accused of dismantling the getaway vehicle to hide evidence after the shooting. One of the marines – a trained former Navy SEAL– is on the run. The motive is still very much unclear. The public is demanding to know why permission to use a government vehicle was signed off by a military colonel at the nearby base.

To make matters worse, Commander of the Fourth Army Area Lt Gen Narathip Phoynork, blamed the Islamic education system in the region as the root cause of the ongoing unrest and suggested that the attempt on Kamolsak’s life needs to be understood in that context.  Reaction from religious and community leaders was swift, forcing an intervention from Anutin and an apology from Lt Gen Narathip.

Nevertheless, a so-called Information Operation (IO) was unleashed by the Army to discredit the institution of Pondok schools, alleging corruption among school owners while inculcating anti-Thailand sentiment.

Narathip’s statement and the IO that followed reflect the long-standing prejudice of Thai society and the security agencies toward the Malays of Patani, observers said.

Private Islamic schools, locally known as Pondok, are one of the most important institutions in this Muslim-majority region as they teach not just Islam but Malay identity and a historical-cultural narrative that sets this region apart from the rest of Thailand.

A prominent scholar, Prof Joseph Chinyong Liow, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, views Pondok as the central institution for preserving a Malay-Muslim identity and cultural heritage in the face of intense "Siamization" and assimilatory pressure from the Thai government.

These schools do not promote separatism per se. But the narrative instilled in these students is enough to remind them that they are different from the rest of Thailand. Moreover, that feeling of being second-class is reinforced by the presence of armed soldiers patrolling the streets, the culture of impunity among security officials, and the usual arrogance of government officials towards the local Malays. In other words, there is a sense that Patani is an occupied territory.

The region is the poorest in the country, but the conflict is not rooted in poverty or development; it is Thailand’s policy of assimilation that comes at the expense of the Malays’ religious identity.

Uprisings in this historically contested region have occurred periodically following Patani's defeat in 1786, which led to its status as a vassal state under Siam. The region came under the direct rule of Siam at the turn of the century when the seven Malay sultans were removed and replaced by governors from Bangkok. The border was established with British Malaya at about the same time.

But a full-blown armed insurgency emerged 50 years later in the 1960s as a reaction against Thailand’s policy of assimilation.

For the Malays of Patani, identity and religion are two sides of the same coin. And so, when the state demanded that they embrace the Thai identity, the Patani Malays responded by taking up arms.

Peace initiatives have come and gone, and the talks have never moved beyond confidence-building measures because no Thai government has been willing to make concessions to the Malays of Patani or the BRN.

In September 2025 when he took up the post of prime minister through a deal with People’s Party, Anutin was quick to set up a negotiation team to resume talks with the BRN even though his time in office was to last only three months. He wanted to show that he meant business.

For close observers of the southern conflict, Anutin’s action was little more than showmanship; he was more interested in differentiating himself from the government of PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who refused to resume peace talks unless the BRN ended all forms of violence. The BRN stated that violence reduction requires negotiation, and any ceasefire should be monitored by international observers in cooperation with local NGOs.

During Anutin’s brief first premiership, his negotiating team held three separate meetings with BRN—starting with an informal introduction, followed by high-level official negotiations, and lastly a technical level meeting where finer details were discussed.

The BRN’s message was clear—the peace process can no longer be a talking shop; it must work towards something tangible and acceptable to both sides. The initiative was a rude awakening for the Anutin government as the BRN explained that the final outcome – what the Thais call the “end state” – must include what the movement calls “self-government”. It denotes an autonomous region where residents can elect their own representatives to a regional assembly that can enact its own laws, chart their own future, and collect taxes.

The most controversial component is the right to secession should Thailand fails to live up to its commitment.

At the technical meeting on January 8-9 in Kuala Lumpur, the Thais told the BRN that the best they could get was a few seats at the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a development agency that deals with pilot projects.

The meeting ended badly. Two days later, on the early morning of January 11, the BRN unleashed a spate of attacks against 11 petrol stations throughout the region, sending a stern warning to the Thai side that nothing comes easy in this restive region. The movement said they didn’t like being treated as a plaything.

Future not looking too great

Violence on the ground has continued unchecked since the beginning of this year. A total of 30 bombing and shooting incidents took place during January and February 2026, resulting in 22 casualties, including two deaths. This includes the January 7 car bomb against the Sala Mai Defence Volunteer outpost in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai district, prompting a brief gunfight.

On January 10, a group of insurgents disguised as paramilitary rangers robbed firearms from village defence volunteers; no injuries were reported. And then there was the attack against the 11 petrol stations in response to Thailand’s cold shoulder to the BRN proposals.

The situation was calm for the next four weeks until on February 8, a roadside bomb in Yala’s Bannang Sata District knocked an armoured vehicle off the road and onto its side. One soldier was rushed to a nearby hospital.

On the evening of February 14 and early morning of February 15, seven coordinated explosions rocked the two Narathiwat districts of Yi-ngo and Ra-ngae.

In Pattani, on March 15, roadworks vehicles were torched by assailants, part of a broader trend of targeting government-linked property, while on March 18, two separate bomb attacks were reported in the same province. Two days later in Pattani’s Thung Yang Daeng District, a convenience store was severely damaged by a hidden explosive that went off at 3:00 am.

On March 26, an army helicopter gunship was reportedly involved in throwing grenades while chasing insurgents. According to the Thai media, the gunfight left residents so intimidated that they avoided working in their fields. Villagers presented video evidence showing the helicopter and damage inflicted on their rubber plantations from the explosions. However, the military refuted these allegations, asserting that improvised explosive devices (IED) belonging to the insurgents were responsible for the blasts and insisting the helicopter was used solely for reconnaissance purposes.

Two separate attacks on April 20 that included the shooting death of one Defence Volunteer in Pattani, while in Yala, seven paramilitary rangers were injured by a roadside IED.

Downsizing and expanding the security grid

A decade ago, the Royal Thai Army started gradually replacing regular soldiers in the Deep South with paramilitary rangers because it was found to be a more cost-effective method of expanding the security network in this troubled region. The rangers were positioned in remote locations to enable rapid responses to insurgent activities. The result was a sharp decline in the overall number of violent incidents. 2008 saw just over 800 incidents, a drop from 1,400 the previous year. The downward trajectory continued steadily to 150 for 2025.

But the separatist combatants didn’t dwindle and disappear. They adapted to the new environment. Gone are the days of roadside IEDs or gunfights in remote areas where nobody sees it or documents incidents. The new strategy is to go after the psychological impact by making each of these attacks count and felt. The BRN would take their fight to the military, often using car bombs in a well-coordinated operations to send a stern message to the Thai side.

While the dramatic drop in the overall violent incidents was welcome, it was not exactly a game changer. Violence continued unabated, as seen the start of 2026 has shown. So it was time to time to start something new.

Outsourcing security work to the MOI’s Defence Volunteers

In his policy statement to the Parliament on 9 April 2026, Anutin said work is on the way to strengthen the Territorial Defence Volunteers’ (DV) capacity and enhance their coordination with the Royal Thai Army. It is part of a plan to get these locally-hired civilians to take up military duties.

The DVs’ primary function is to provide security for provincial governors and district chiefs in the Deep South.  For much of the past two decades, since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in this Muslim-majority region, DVs survived the conflict by not seeing or saying anything. This approach was acceptable to the Thai government, particularly given their civilian status as employees of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

Initially, separatist combatants rarely singled out DVs for attack, although occasionally, they got caught up in crossfire between the rebels and the security forces. But that began to change two years ago when the generals started toying with the idea of bringing the DVs into military operation.

Combatants responded by turning their weapons directly on the DVs. Stern warnings were posted on flyers, posters, and spray-painted messages on paved roads throughout this restive region, calling on DVs to leave their job. To back up their words, the BRN carried out several vicious attacks against various MOI installations stacked with DV security details.

But the government is not backing down. The policy statement delivered to Parliament by Anutin on April 9 was an assertion that the government will stay the course. How this strategy will play out on the ground, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

What Anutin and all the generals assigned to the Deep South don’t seem to understand is that insurgents achieve success simply by avoiding elimination. The rangers brought the number of violent incidents down, but couldn’t finish a job that is political in nature.

For the Thai armed forces, which are superior militarily, any outcome short of total victory will be perceived as a failure. The result is a stalemate that the government and the Army cannot sustain politically.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst and development consultant focusing on conflict in Myanmar and the insurgency in Thailand's far south. 

Myanmar’s New Thailand Pivot

Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow (right) with his Myanmar counterpart U Than Swe in Phuket, Thailand, on 18 February 2026. Credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Introduction

In the wake of a general election widely dismissed by the international community as a sham, Myanmar will once again look to Thailand to serve as its window to the wider world.

The vote was held amid widespread armed conflict and limited territorial control. The result, nonetheless, helped the government and further consolidated its power.

Far from easing the political crisis, it bolstered the Tatmadaw position even as violence, displacement and illicit economic activity persist. With over 3.5 million people internally displaced, an end to the conflict is not in sight.

This escalation in Myanmar is fuelling growing concern in Thailand that its neighbour’s instability could harm its own interests and security. Officials at the planning and operational levels indicate that Bangkok must recalibrate its strategy towards Naypyitaw and take up a more active approach.

The complex challenges spilling over from Myanmar include increased border security risks, volatile cross-border trade, a surge in transnational crime – especially online scams – and environmental threats like air pollution as well as water contamination from mining activities near the frontier.

Evidently, these issues have imposed a mounting humanitarian and public health burden.

“Myanmar poses a systemic risk to Thailand’s security, economy and social stability, not merely a foreign policy concern,” said Supalak Ganjanakhundee, a Thailand-based security and political analyst. “But Thailand’s response is still reactive, fragmented and inadequate for the ongoing challenge.”

Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that ASEAN’s collective mechanisms – namely the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) – have made no meaningful progress on any of its five points: cessation of violence, constructive dialogue, mediation, humanitarian access and appointment of a special envoy. Though Thailand will not abandon ASEAN, it will assume a more active unilateral role in Myanmar.

New Diplomatic Tone

International relations expert Kavi Chongkittavorn thinks Thailand’s Myanmar policy will become more solid; the overwhelming electoral mandate has given to the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul enough confidence to break from the past.  Moreover, the support from Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, a career diplomat adept at articulating Thai narratives, will come in handy.

“Notice how friendlier Myanmar has become since the two foreign ministers met?” remarked Kavi, in reference to their 18 February 2026 meeting in Phuket.

Just over two years ago, BJT was a medium-sized regional outfit, primarily known for its pro-cannabis stance. However, the border conflict with Cambodia gave the party a renewed direction and purpose, which it leveraged effectively. Nationalist sentiment significantly influenced the electoral outcome, propelling BJT to 193 seats in the 500-seat parliament.

For decades, Thailand has handled its Myanmar border using practical tolerance, quick decision-making and strategic vagueness. The country has responded to waves of displaced people, dealt with armed groups, maintained refugee camps, processed migrant workers and kept up relations with various Myanmar governments.

However, it has never developed a unified national strategy that ties these efforts together.

This flexible approach worked well after 1988: costs stayed reasonable, crises were occasional and international donors who supported humanitarian needs lessened Bangkok’s financial burden from managing the border.

Historically, on the government-to-government level, Thailand was generally helpful—lending a hand to the Myanmar government by ending the international isolation after the Burmese junta killed some 3,000 of the student-led protestors in 1988.

Drugs, Mining, Arsenic and Scam Centres

Relationship soured briefly in the late 1990s as the Tatmadaw permitted the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – a 30,000-strong ethnic armed organisation – to expand their home turf on the Chinese border down to the northern border of Thailand, stretching from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai to Mae Hong Son provinces. The US State Department called the UWSA one of the most powerful non-state armed groups and the primary driver of the Southeast Asian drug trade.

Kavi believes the new Thai government will not rule out military action against the UWSA. Others believe Thailand has too much to lose to pick a fight with a battle-hardened outfit like the Wa. Bangkok has sought help from the Tatmadaw, but there was nothing Myanmar could do as they, too, are not permitted to enter UWSA territory without an armed escort and permission.

Thai generals said they do not want to turn the clock back and use military means against the UWSA. But no one is taking the initiative to establish a serious discussion with the Wa about what kind of trade-offs they are looking for in exchange for cleaning up the pollution and moving back some of its outposts.

Indeed, the water contamination from unregulated mining by Chinese companies (with concessions from the Wa authorities) in Shan State – about 39 kilometres from the Thai border – has complicated the UWSA issue even further. The extraction of gold has surged since the 2021 coup, and rare earth mining has also rapidly expanded in the UWSA-controlled area. Elevated arsenic levels have been found at the Kok and Sai Rivers that flow from these mines.

Thailand takes pride in its ability to contain the Myanmar crisis within Myanmar’s borders, preventing direct spillover onto Thai soil. However, internal issues in Myanmar continue to impact Thailand, including the influx of refugees that places strain on Thai resources – particularly the public health system – and the transit of illicit drugs through Thailand en route to major international cities.

Additionally, some areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border, guarded by 7,000-strong pro-Myanmar Karen Border Guard Forces, have become hotspots for cyber scams targeting individuals worldwide. These scam complexes along the Myanmar border are notorious for trafficking victims under horrific working conditions, which involve constant surveillance, threats of physical punishment and beatings.

The scam crisis shows how crimes connected to Myanmar negatively impact Thailand’s economy, mainly investment and tourism. After the trafficking incident involving Chinese celebrity Wang Xing, Chinese tourist arrivals fell by 33%, causing a major economic hit. Thai officials are particularly worried about Chinese tourism, which remains below pre-pandemic numbers but is crucial to Thailand’s slow-moving economy.

Peace Corridors

Regarding Myanmar’s international standing, a group of technocrats from Naypyidaw working on de-escalation said the incoming government will ask Thailand to go beyond “calibrated re-engagement” and act as a “bridge” for Myanmar’s return to ASEAN.

Myanmar will be turning to Thailand to help with the peace corridor initiatives to facilitate humanitarian initiatives with the hope that this will lead to peace talks between the government and the resistance forces.

Some in the security sector said Thailand is willing to consider taking up the role of a mediator, but this would mean Thai government agencies could no longer work in silos when it comes to Myanmar. This is in line with Bangkok’s desire to continue with the humanitarian corridor. The initiative, supported by ASEAN, was carried out by then Vice Minister Sihasak in early 2024.

On paper, Myanmar is transitioning from one-man dictatorial rule to governance under a constitution, with the Tatmadaw – in theory at least – subordinate to the government. The president will have to work on political agreements once the state of emergency ends.

Engagement with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) will be high on the new government’s agenda, and talks of negotiations and concessions could reach the Parliament floor by October 2026, said the Myanmar technocrats from Naypyidaw.

Moreover, the new political reality in Myanmar will see more rigorous feedback from the regional commanders to the central government. In the past, these commanders’ recommendations were often diluted before reaching the policy level, they said.

Also according to them: expect positive feedback from these local commanders who are on friendly terms with their Thai counterparts.

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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Myanmar’s Drone War: An Escalation

A Myanmar passenger plane was hit in a drone strike at the Kachin State capital on Feb. 20, 2026. (Credit: Myanmar Government)

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Targeting the Northern Hub

Myanmar resistance forces are pushing the line with the latest drone attack against a civilian aircraft that was about to take off for Mandalay from Kachin State’s Myitkyina Airport. On 20 February 2026, a suicide drone struck a Myanmar National Airlines (MNA) ATR-72-600 aircraft, causing damage to its nose, fuselage, and tail.

As expected, nobody claimed responsibility, given the likelihood of blowback from the international community—much of which is cheering for the rebels, not the military-backed Myanmar government. The latter recently concluded a general election that is neither accepted nor endorsed by much of the world, including ASEAN Member States (AMS).

According to one theory, the drone was targeting the adjacent Northern Command headquarters but was shot down by airport security, causing it to crash into the passenger plane. The military headquarters shares the same border fence with the airport.

Nevertheless, it was too close for comfort by any measure. The attack marked a significant step up in escalation, given that rebel forces have generally left civilian targets – much less commercial passenger aircraft – alone.

Myitkyina Airport serves as a critical air transport hub for the northern Kachin State, facilitating the movement of people and goods to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Attacks on such infrastructure are intended to undermine governance and disrupt regional stability.

While the airport remained operational, 2025 saw resistance forces successfully using FPV drones against other high-value military targets in the region. For example, in May 2025, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) used a drone to down a military Mi-17 transport helicopter in nearby Shwegu.

The 12 February 2026 FPV drone strike on the airport was intercepted, resulting in no damage to infrastructure, though it did cause flight cancellations.

Resistance forces in the region had already been using similar drone technology in other operations, such as the 8 February strike that destroyed a radar station at the nearby Nant Paung Air Base.

The lack of direct hits on Kachin airport in 2025 suggests that the more recent attacks in February 2026 – including the FPV drone strike on 12 February – represent a “significant escalation” in the resistance’s ability to penetrate the capital’s high-security airspace.

This highlights a shift toward precision-guided, low-cost technology that is difficult for traditional security to detect.

The Rise of the “Autonomous” PDF

Attacking a heavily fortified site guarded by approximately 20 junta troops at every entrance and protected by Air Defence Operation Commands requires a level of coordination.

The Myanmar government immediately accused the KIA and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the latter of which is officially the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in response to the 2021 military coup.

But over the years, the term PDF has become a catch-all for newly emerged militia groups taking up arms against the junta. Not all PDF units fall under the NUG’s command and control.

A report released in May 2025 states that while the “Integrated” and the “Allied” PDFs are part of the NUG’s formalised military structure, the “Autonomous” and “Localized” PDFs operate without direct oversight from the NUG. These last two categories each have their own networks and generate their own funding through donations as well as small-scale business activities.

For the long-standing resistance forces, such as the KIA and the NUG, both of whom seek global support against the military-backed government of Myanmar, civility and international norms must be respected. But when it comes to the actions of autonomous and localised PDFs, these long-standing organisations enjoy plausible deniability.

As Myanmar reaches a new threshold, such as the recently concluded general election, fighting on the ground will have to be understood in a post-election context. While the 20 February attack was widely seen as an escalation, no one can predict where this leads.

The “Lone Wolf” Threat to Chinese Interests

Some in the resistance community are not ruling out attacks on the Chinese pipeline that runs from the Rakhine State to Kunming in Yunnan province. While China has an agreement with the Myanmar government and long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) such as the Arakan Army (AA) to provide protection for the pipeline, independently organised PDF units who do not report to any long-standing groups could become that “lone wolf” behind such an attack.

In May last year, the PDFs’ highly coordinated offensive – Operation 9/A Nyar Myae – overran four Mandalay townships, forcing government troops to abandon a key off-take station for the Chinese gas and oil pipelines.

Approximately 50 government troops were killed during this one-day coordinated offensive targeting 12 government positions in the Mandalay region. The operation involved around 12 distinct resistance groups operating within the region. In response, government forces launched several days of intermittent clashes and conducted retaliatory airstrikes.

Beijing’s Heavy Hand: Relinquishing the Gains

By late 2025, Myanmar troops retook most positions; Chinese intervention played a key role in the resistance's surrendering territory.

During the campaign to recover previously lost territories, there was no evidence indicating that the PDFs were utilising the pipeline as collateral. This demonstrates a shared recognition by both resistance forces and government troops of the strategic significance of the Chinese pipeline. Furthermore, any direct intervention by China could result in adverse consequences for all parties involved.

Beyond the PDFs in Mandalay, approximately 245km east, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was compelled to return Lashio, which is the junta’s main defensive position in northern Shan State.

About the same time, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) was pressured to relinquish recently secured territories, including Mogok, a world-famous ruby mining centre, back to the junta.

The return of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw allowed Myanmar to reopen the critical trade highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border. These handovers were made possible through China-mediated negotiations in October 2025, during which Beijing abandoned any pretence of acting as an impartial mediator.

The resistance forces’ setbacks at the hands of China were a stark reminder that nothing comes easy in Myanmar’s rugged conflict zones, where EAOs, PDFs, and regime forces all play for keeps. The PDFs likely felt jaded after retreating from the Mandalay positions they had seized in May 2025. They were also frustrated with the TNLA, which had ordered them to do so. Hard feelings aside, one thing the resistance can agree on is that they cannot withstand Chinese pressure.

But has China crossed the line—no one in the resistance forces would say. There is little choice but to absorb the blow, regroup, and continue fighting even if the playing field is an uneven one.

So why seize territory only to return it to the junta under Chinese influence? Groups like the MNDAA, the TNLA, and the PDFs may not be willing to confront China directly about their objection. These groups understand fully the diplomatic and strategic costs if they choose to upset China. But the autonomous PDFs operate under no such constraint. For them, it becomes a matter of timing and opportunity, not principle.

Resistance forces in Myanmar have shown their objections in actions such as attacks on Chinese interests in Myanmar in response to the 2021 coup. Chinese-owned factories in Yangon’s industrial zones were burnt, as protesters accused Beijing of backing the coup. Frustration exists, indeed; the question is whether and through whom it finds an outlet.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

• 
  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Anutin’s Thailand-Malaysia wall won’t solve Southern conflict

A PTT petrol station in Thailand’s far South was set on fire on 11 January 2026. (Photo from Royal Thai Army)

Don Pathan
Prachatai

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, after chairing a security meeting in Songkhla on 17 February 2026, could not get his head around the fact that each year around Ramadan, separatist militants in the far South would step up their attacks in this historically contested region.

The visit occurred two days after suspected insurgents bombed seven sites in Narathiwat’s Rueso and Yi-ngo districts on 14-15 February. Earlier, arson attacks targeted 11 PTT petrol stations on 11 January.

A briefing from the security forces does not provide comprehensive insight into the conflict, nor will it address its underlying causes. Officials from the Fourth Army advised the PM that the surge during Ramadan was intended as a “symbolic” gesture, though they did not clarify the reasoning behind the insurgents' decision to utilize this sacred month for delivering a strong message.

For casual observers of the conflict, there is a tendency to link the spike to the religion of Islam. For local Muslims and for the combatants, the reason is all too clear – the 2004 Tak Bai massacre in which 85 unarmed young Malay Muslim men died at the hands of security officials – 75 from suffocation after they were stacked on the back of military transport trucks, and the other seven shot dead at the protest site. The incident took place during Ramadan.

Shortly before the 20-year statute of limitations expired in October 2024, a Narathiwat court indicted 14 former officials on charges including murder, but none were apprehended, resulting in the permanent dismissal of all charges.

Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra apologised for the Tak Bai massacre on 24 October 2024, just before the 20-year statute of limitations expired. The incident took place in 2004 during the administration of her father Thaksin Shinawatra.

Mistreatment of Patani Malay

Speaking to reporters after the security briefing in Songkhla, it was obvious that Anutin was ignorant of the tit-for-tat nature of the conflict. He said violence in the far south, regardless of the occasion, was to him “terrorism”.

He also echoed what he had just been told – that combatants crossed over from Malaysia to carry out attacks and retreated back before reinforcements could arrive. Anutin said he will ask Malaysia not to support the militants.

He went on to say that a Thai-Malaysian border fence, modelled on the Cambodian frontier barrier, is in the pipeline but details about specific locations will have to be worked out with regional officials.

When it comes to the conflict in Thailand’s far South, blaming Malaysia for the violence in the Muslim-majority southernmost border provinces is nothing new. The two sides went into a brief spitting match back when Thaksin Shinawatra was prime minister and quickly backed down once both sides recognised that the spitting contest was not helpful.

The problem with Thailand is that it doesn’t want to make any concessions to the Malays of Patani, much less the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), the one longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all of the militants on the ground.

Moreover, Thailand’s counter-insurgency (COIN) approach is no different from a typical military operation. It pays lip service to the idea of winning local hearts and minds. But in reality, mistrust between the two sides is as high as ever.

In fairness to Anutin, it should be noted that even Pita Limjaroenrat, the former leader of the progressive Move Forward Party, made an inaccurate statement during what was intended to be his victory address following the 2023 General Election. He asserted that the conflict in the far South was related to economic conditions and claimed that the military-led approach had exacerbated the situation. He was only partially right.

Many critics of the Thai military believe that violence stems from mistreatment of Patani Malays by Thai security officials.

The issue is not solely related to ill treatment of the Patani Malays by the Thai state, but rather centres on their aspirations for independence. Many perceive the Thai security forces as an occupying presence, which contributes to local support for BRN fighters. This support has been a significant factor in the ongoing persistence of the insurgency.

Villagers can engage and negotiate with the BRN in ways that outsiders cannot. When they feel the BRN has crossed the line, village elders, including civil society organisations (CSOs), can step in and remind the combatants of the need to embrace civility.

In the course of the off-and-on peace talks over the past two decades, the BRN has agreed to lower the bar and accept Thailand’s sovereignty and negotiate peace under the Thai Constitution in exchange for a form of “self-government” in which the local people can elect their own representatives to a regional parliament so they can pass their own laws, collect their own taxes and chart their own destiny.

At the high-level official meeting on 8 December 2025, the term “End State” was raised in the chairman’s statement. At the 6-8 January 2026, meeting of technical representatives, BRN equated “End State” to a “self-government” that consisted of a regional assembly mandated to draft its own laws and manage local affairs, including taxation, education, and power-sharing with the central government — and most controversially, the right to secede from the Thai state.

The Thai side, on the other hand, told the BRN that the most the government can give is a few seats at the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a multi-agency organization behind a number of pilot projects in this restive region. Needless to say, the meeting ended badly.

Two days later, BRN combatants carried out simultaneous attacks on 11 PTT petrol stations and their attached convenience stores across the region.

Anutin's Thailand-Malaysia wall won't work well

Anutin is not known for his intellect or for deep strategic thinking. He is riding high on the outcome of the recent general election in which his party won nearly 200 seats in a 500-strong Parliament.

His tough stance against Cambodia and his talk of building a wall along the Thailand-Cambodia border won him the 2026 general election. But the far South is different. For one thing, Thailand and Malaysia are on good terms. But Anutin’s hardline security policy could end up stalling the peace talks, deepening the conflict, and putting bilateral relations with Malaysia at risk.

"Anutin is essentially handing border management and security over to the military. The military mindset addresses problems tactically, but in terms of long-term strategy, building a wall means destroying the economic and cultural foundations of ordinary people on both sides of the border who share a common way of life," said Asmadee Bueheng, a Pattani-based writer and member of The Patani, a local civil society organization that often acts as an interlocutor between government security officials and the separatist militants.

“From the look of it, "Anutin is not seeking a political solution. He is seeking popularity from war and border conflicts on both fronts — Cambodia and Malaysia," Asmadee said.

The far South straddles a porous border, and the communities on both sides are Muslims who identify as Malay or Melayu. In many respects, it is one community divided by a political boundary. While the Malays on the Malaysian side have come to terms with their membership in Malaysia’s nation-state construct, the Malays on the Thai side are still negotiating their space. Insurgency violence is a form of negotiation, or more to the point, communicative action.

Most Thai security officials do not use the term “terrorism”, given how politically charged the word has become worldwide. But at the same time, most do not want to call it a conflict either, fearing that would legitimise the insurgency. And so the so-called peace talks have never evolved beyond a talking shop, refusing to engage with the substantive issues at the heart of the conflict.

Instead of blaming Malaysia, Thailand might consider the failure of its assimilation policies — which have been violently rejected by all of the Patani Malay separatist movements — and address the root causes of the conflict.

If Anutin is troubled by violence during Ramadan, he might consider finding a way to bring closure to the Tak Bai massacre. It doesn’t have to go through the court of law; it could be a political gesture.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst specializing in the Myanmar/Burma conflict and the insurgency in Thailand's Malay-speaking South.

Thailand’s 2026 Election: The Shift in Power

 Politics

Bhumjaithai Party’s election victory press conference. Credit: Sakchai Lalit/AP

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

The Three-Month Government and the Technocrat Façade

Thailand, the sick man of Asia, roared back to life at the recent general election that delivered an overwhelming mandate to a pro-establishment party.

This is the same party that just a little over two years ago was no more than a medium-sized regional outfit not known for much other than a pro-cannabis platform.

The Bhumjaithai Party’s (BJT) victory, with 193 seats in the 500-member Parliament – up by 122 from the 2023 general election – allows incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul to continue in his role.

Late last year, Anutin was asked to assume the premiership for three months by the reformist People’s Party (PP), which had the most seats in Parliament at the time, in exchange for BJT's support for constitutional reform. He accepted the offer but reneged on the deal, refusing to reduce the legal power of the 200-strong Senate, which is, according to observers, stacked with BJT allies.

When the PP was about to file a no-confidence motion, Anutin immediately dissolved Parliament to escape the brutal grilling.

But he made something of those three months in power by bringing in technocrats to fill key cabinet posts – foreign affairs, commerce, and finance – and allowing others to fight over the remaining seats.

The move played well with voter,s as BJT members are not known for possessing any kind of expertise. Images of these technocrats were plastered on posters all around the country, with Anutin at the centre.

The result of the February 2026 general election was welcomed, as expected, by the country’s private sector, citing continuity and stability.

The Legacy of the King Cobra

BJT was founded by veteran politician Newin Chidchob in January 2009 after leading a high-profile defection from the Thaksin Shinawatra-aligned People’s Power Party (PPP) to support the rival Democrat Party in forming a new government and making Abhisit Vejjajiva the prime minister.

Newin is the namesake for the political term “cobra”, used in Thailand to describe those who betray their allies. The defection in January 2009 essentially made him a king cobra. A cable from the US Embassy in Bangkok described him as an “infamous dirty trickster” known for his “abrasive personality”. BJT’s power base is centred in the Khmer-speaking Buri Ram province, the Chidchob family’s long-standing political stronghold.

Today, BJT, the party that Newin created and continues to influence, has become the ultimate case study in Thai money politics.

Coming in second at the polls was the progressive-leaning PP with 118 seats (10 million votes at the national level), a drop from 151 (14 million votes) from the 2023 general election, making them the largest party in the Parliament at the time.

Before the recent election, PP stated that they would not join a coalition with BJT as the lead. PP insiders said the decision was made on principle, citing the fact that BJT had gone back on its promise to push through constitutional reform.

Still, PP supporters felt let down by the decision to allow BJT to take the top post, but PP leaders would not go so far as to admit mistakes were made.

Poor and regrettable decision aside, PP has been constantly tested from the moment it surfaced as Future Forward eight years ago. The party has been dissolved twice, and a number of its leaders have been banned from politics. Worse, its most popular candidate, Rukchanok “Ice” Srinork, could be going to prison on lese-majesté charges.

At the moment, 44 of their leading members face bans from politics by the Supreme Court for supporting a proposal to soften the punishments under the lese-majesté law.

PP’s predecessor, the Move Forward Party, came in first in the 2023 election but was denied the fruits of victory by the junta-appointed Senate. However, this was no sweat off Pheu Thai’s (PT) back, and PT wasted little time in putting together a ruling coalition.

During its two years in power, PT went through two prime ministers—both were removed by the Constitutional Court on ethical grounds.

The Fragility of the Reformist Front

Much of the support for PP was concentrated in urban areas, while BJT invested in local power brokers, locally known as “Big Houses”. BJT also moved to put family members of these Big Houses on its party ticket to ensure they are part of the party’s long game.

Another big factor that helped BJT was the downfall of PT and the jailing of its nominal leader, Thaksin, who made a Faustian deal with the conservative elites to secure his return from 15 years of exile in exchange – at least he thought so – for his safe return to Thailand.

The move alienated his supporters, particularly those at the grassroots level. PT was hoping their populous policy would win them back, but the digital wallet scheme faced significant resistance and implementation challenges. Thailand’s economy grew only 2.5% for the full year of 2024.

This time around, to form a government, BJT has decided to form a coalition with PT. This is awkward indeed, as it seems like yesterday when BJT abandoned PT following the leaking of a private conversation between Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen.

BJT’s departure in July 2025 left the PT-led government hanging by a thread with a slim majority. The Constitutional Court later ruled that Paetongtarn had committed gross ethical violations and removed her from office.

Where Are the Democrats?

Following in PP’s footsteps towards the opposition bench was the Democrat Party of former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who announced before this election that his party would not join any government that has the Khla Tham Party (KT) in the coalition.

The Democrats cited concerns about corruption and unethical business practices among KT members. Incidentally, KT performed rather well with 58 seats, while the Democrats won only 22.

The deeper meaning of the Democrat Party’s position on KT, said political observers, is to signal that the party is prepared to sit on the opposition bench with the PP.

KT’s nominal leader, Capt Thamanat Prompao, was convicted of conspiring to import heroin to Australia, with the ruling handed down on 31 March 1994, sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment. A plea bargain with Australian authorities got him released after four years.

During Anutin’s three-month administration, Thamanat expressed interest in the defence ministry portfolio but was not appointed. He may pursue this position again; however, Anutin could also seek the role, as he aims to enhance his collaboration with the military.

Both PP and the Democrats are expected to use their time in opposition to reassess and refine their positions, as there is widespread scepticism regarding the longevity of the BJT-led coalition, which many believe will not endure beyond two years.

The specific manner in which this coalition might dissolve remains uncertain. While retaliation from PT is conceivable, BJT currently maintains strong momentum, whereas Thaksin’s party has reached its lowest point in years, compounded by the incarceration of its leader.

At present, political survival appears to be the foremost concern, superseding any ambitions for retribution.

Poll after poll leading up to the 2026 general election had PT, BJT and PP neck-and-neck in a three-way race. But in the final analysis, toxic nationalism won the day.

The Border Wall

During his short stint in office, Anutin also gave the army a blank cheque on Thailand’s handling of the Cambodia border conflict. Building a wall along the Thai-Cambodian border was the centrepiece of his election campaign. At the time when the two sides reached a ceasefire agreement in late December 2025, Thai troops were sitting on top of strategic hills and border localities previously used as Cambodian military positions.

Talk of military reform, which in the Thai context means removing the armed forces from national politics, forced PP to put the issue on the back burner as the public cried out for a stronger and bigger army that can “cripple” Cambodia’s military capabilities to ensure they would not pose a threat for many years to come.

The Thai public was angry about Cambodia laying fresh mines along the disputed areas on the border. But no one asked the Thai military commanders why they kept sending troops on foot patrol to these areas when all sorts of technologies are available to monitor the areas.

It did not seem to matter to the policymakers and defence planners that much of the area along the border is disputed and has yet to be demarcated. With physical barriers and troop reinforcement, short-term political gain, not sustainable solutions, is good enough for Anutin.

It remains to be seen how his administration will deal with the border issue. Were the rhetorics about the border something politicians say during campaigns, or will Anutin continue to give the military full power to do whatever they want on the border once his government is formed?

Anutin also vowed to clamp down on online scammers. He will not be able to do it without the support of Cambodian law enforcement, which is not going to work with their Thai counterparts if Thai politicians continue to conflate the border conflict with Cambodian leaders being in bed with cybercriminals.

Some Considerations

The fact that Anutin does not seem to be as ambitious as Thaksin, whose every move was seen as challenging the status quo, works in his favour. Anutin seems very satisfied with the vote count. But of course, time will tell if this election result has planted crazy ambitions in Anutin’s head the same way it did with Thaksin two decades ago.

If recent Thai political history teaches us anything, it is that when here-today, gone-tomorrow politicians get aspirations and try to be more than what they can be, only disasters will follow. The toxic nationalism that Anutin has been riding will die down once tension along the Cambodian border subsides. The people’s attention will turn to Thailand’s “sick man of Asia” status as critical topics like salary and job security, as well as pocketbook issues, hit Anutin like a freight train.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

• 
  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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