No progress in deep South unless Thailand drops strongman act

Don Pathan

Special to The Nation 

Bomb squad members inspect the site of a roadside bomb attack on a patrol vehicle carrying soldiers in the Rueso district of Narathiwat Wednesday. AFP PHOTO / Madaree TOHLALA

Dictating terms to the insurgents and demanding a 'ceasefire' are not aiding peace efforts

General Aksara Kerdphol, Thailand’s chief negotiator in the deep South peace efforts, is heading to Malaysia to follow up on the recent visit made by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha.

The chairman of the Thai Army's advisory board is expected to get into the nuts and bolts of a peace process that the central government in Bangkok seems somewhat reluctant to put into action.

Its predecessor, under Yingluck Shinawatra, prematurely launched peace talks knowing that key players such as the Thai Army and the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) inner circle, plus the militants under its network, were not on board.

What the Yingluck initiative did was set the stage for a political circus. It placed the Thai side on the receiving end of a "spitting contest" that centred on a five-point demand from the BRN that was meant to test the water and see how the Thai side would react.

In the end, the Yingluck team was author of its own downfall - a superficial peace process prematurely launched without first resolving serious issues and obstacles. These included immunity for the BRN negotiators and formal recognition of the group's political wing, so that the separatists could surface publicly and engage Bangkok and the world community on their own terms.

Prayut is determined not to make the same "mistakes". In his mind, Thailand has to be the one dictating the terms to the BRN and other separatist organisations, not the other way around. In other words, Thailand can't afford to look weak.

Moreover, the Army never liked the idea of a formal peace process anyway. They preferred discreet meetings that involved a small number of people.

"Even the idea of providing a legislative backing for an agency to ensure continuity for further peace talks regardless of a change in government is not in the minds of the current crop of rulers," said a government source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

During his recent trip to Malaysia, Prayut's message to the separatist groups was that if they wanted to talk peace with the Thais, they would have to do it from a common platform. And there would have to be a "period of peace" before talks could begin. Both demands are virtually impossible to meet at this point in time, given the fact that the group that controls the vast majority of insurgent combatants - the BRN - is not prepared to come to the table.

As for unity among the separatists, there was some progress late last year when the three Patani United Liberation Organisation factions agreed to take part in the Yingluck administration's peace initiative. But then came the Bangkok Shutdown, which put the Yingluck government into survival mode for the next six months until the coup.

BRN sources said its negotiators/political wing need capacity building and a better understanding of international norms and practices before they could surface to meet the Thais and the international community.

Until then, the best Thailand and the world are going to get is a "cut-out" guy like Hasan Taib, who will continue to act as a go-between for the secretive BRN inner circle and the outside world.

Observers say the Thai side is not eager to talk or make any sort of concessions, and the BRN is not prepared to come to the table until its people are prepared. The end result, it seems, is the continuation of violence, and military means to quell the conflict. And while Bangkok has announced a large budget for development in the deep South, MONEY never seems to solve anything in this historically contested region, much less close the trust gap between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state.

The Thai military is banking that violence will continue to drop as they take the fight to the insurgents by stepping up their long-range reconnaissance patrols. That's one of the reasons why the central government is playing up the so-called Tung Yang Daeng model - a shabby effort to outsource security work to villagers, while government soldiers go out and hunt down the militants cell by cell.

The Thai side is also hoping to set up a back-channel dialogue with individual separatist organisations in a bid to get a better assessment of which combatant groups are capable of what.

They would prefer the meetings to be small and secret - just as they were in the 1980s - and small-scale horse trading can be expected. The BRN say they haven't ruled out back-channel talks, while other long-standing separatist groups say they would like to use this forum to show the Thais what they are capable of.

Publicly, the central government is taking credit for the drop in violence in the region. But BRN sources, as well as observers of the conflict, say the drop in the number of incidents comes against an increase in their intensity. It also needs to be emphasised that the nature of this conflict is not conventional warfare. And as long as the insurgents can prove they are "relevant" with sporadic attacks, the southern insurgency will be far from over for Thailand.

Over the past year alone, insurgents have shown an ability to expand their operations to new territories - areas such as Yala's Betong or Songkhla's Sadao district, which had been left untouched for a decade.

Then there was the massive double bomb hidden in the back of a pickup truck stolen from Pattani that was parked behind the police station Phuket in December last year. Thai security officials said the bombs, each with a blast radius of 500 metres, were expertly assembled and the switch left off on purpose. Separatist sources said the twin-bomb was a stern warning to the Thai side of what the insurgents were capable of. The next one, they added, might not be a warning.

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), and a freelance development and security analyst based in Yala, Thailand.

One ingredient still missing in Prayut's recipe for peace in South

Without recognition of the insurgents' BRN political wing, the PM's effort to kick-start talks could be doomed from the start

By Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 

Black smoke billows amid a scene of devastation after a bombing in Yala.

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha is expected to introduce General Aksara Kerdphol, the new chief negotiator for the peace talks with separatist groups in Thailand's deep South, during his visit to Malaysia on Monday.

Malaysia was designated as facilitator for the peace talks launched by the previous government of Yingluck Shinawatra, and Bangkok is expected to request that Kuala Lumpur continue in the role.

The visit could be a bit awkward for Prayut given the fact that the Royal Thai Army was never on board the Yingluckpeace initiative. The Army reluctantly played along, all the while looking for ways to covertly sabotage the process. One way was to permit the return of former Bersatu leader Wan Kadir Che Man, to criticise Malaysia and other international mediators working on the conflict.

General Aksara is chairman of the Army's advisory panel and a former Army chief-of-staff. Under the Yingluckgovernment, the job of chief negotiator was given to the National Security Council secretary-general, Paradon Patanatabut. The main driver behind the team back then was Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, then secretary-general of the Southern Border Province Administration Centre. The two men enjoyed a close working relationship with Yingluck's brother, former premier Thaksin Shinawatra. That explains why they were sidelined after the coup in May.

Now that the Army is in the driving seat, the government in Bangkok is thinking hard about how to move the peace initiative forward. It is generally agreed that the talks should be as inclusive as possible. The Thai military is confident that many longstanding separatist groups will send their people to the talks. But the participation of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - the group with the highest number of insurgent combatants - is still uncertain. 

The Thai side is also toying with the idea of "back-channel" meetings with each of these groups in a bid to get a better understanding of their capacity and capability. The one-on-one discussions would centre on militant operations and rules of engagement, while the political issues would be kept separate as part of the official "Track I" process. 

A source from the BRN said that while his group is sitting out of the Track I process, his leaders had not ruled out the idea of joining the back-channel talks. 

But the BRN is concerned with a more immediate goal, which is to strengthen the group's political wing so it can engage the international community and the public on its own terms, rather than be dictated to by Malaysia or Thailand. 

Yet without formal recognition from the state actors, the so-called political wing will remain just another criminal element in the eyes of Bangkok. 

Talking to separatist groups is nothing new for the Thai authorities. But Yingluck was the first to make it official and thus give the general public hope that peace was within sight. 

According to BRN sources, Yingluck's team made a mistake in thinking they could launch a process, place someone with little influence over the insurgents in the person of Hasan Taib at its centre, and that would be enough to generate success. 

Hasan didn't have the mandate of the BRN leadership or the support of the insurgent cells, which explains why the insurgents continue to attack the Thai security forces unabated. 

Unfortunately, the announcement by the Thai military government that it is restarting peace talks has generated little excitement among the general public. But that's not such a bad thing, said a senior military officer, because the government doesn't want to mislead the public or encourage unrealistic expectations, which was the case when Paradon and Thawee were overseeing the process. 

The absence of public fanfare hasn't stopped foreign mediators from looking for a seat at the latest round of peace talks if and when it gets under way.

One group has approached former Indonesian foreign minister Hasan Wirajuda, while another group, with the help of former Thai foreign minister Surakiart Sathirathai, has been talking with Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Surakiart recently stated publicly that Indonesia should be one of the mediators, along with Malaysia, in the deep South peace process. 

Surakiart may have been trying to promote inclusiveness. But if the past 10 years of peace efforts tell us anything it is that the business of mediation is extremely territorial. 

Some of the longstanding separatist movements are also making their moves. A photo of a Japanese representative with the late Patani Malay academic Ahmed Somboon Bualuang, meeting with Patani Malay exiled representatives over coffee in Europe, has been doing the rounds on social media and raising eyebrows among observers and other stakeholders. 

After all, appearances in public made by potential players are often engineered with some degree of calculation. There are no paparazzi in this game, just self-promoting videos and selfies. 

Recent months have also seen the emergence of Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, the head of the Patani Malay Consultative Congress, the onetime legislative branch of the now-defunct Bersatu separatist umbrella organisation. He announced the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland that encompasses the three Malay-speaking provinces in Thailand's far South. 

"Pak Hamad was just testing the water," said a senior Thai military officer, who advised against public reaction to the announcement.

Thailand's idea of inclusiveness would be a wise one if all the players agreed to play ball. But this is the deep South, a landscape of fractured insurgency where nothing comes easy. BRN sources say the longstanding insurgent groups can play all the angles they want, but at the end of the day, without the participation of the BRN, the game won't change. 

The ball is in Thailand's court, they say, because it is up to Bangkok to make the talks "work" by recognising the legitimacy of the BRN's political wing. And that means formal recognition from not just the Thais but also the international community.

Today, being a member of the BRN organisation can put a person behind bars. Well-known youth activist Muhamadanwan "Anwar" Hayith is a case in point. The predicament of Anwar illustrates the fact that Thai-BRN relations still have a long way to go before mutual respect can be established.

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance development and security consultant based in Yala.

Prayut reaches historic crossroads in the deep South

EDITORIAL

The Nation

The PM must back pledges of an inclusive peace process with action that shows genuine respect toward the cultural differences of the Malay-speaking provinces

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha is going to Malaysia to introduce himself to his counterpart there, Najib Razak. The ongoing insurgency in Thailand's southernmost provinces will be high on their discussion agenda. 

Kuala Lumpur is expected to reiterate its commitment to helping Thailand find a suitable solution to this longstanding conflict, which Prayut himself concedes is more than a century old. 

Keeping Malaysia on board is wise, because it suggests that policymakers in Bangkok realise they are no longer dealing with a bunch of "sparrow bandits", as then-premier Thaksin Shinawatra called the insurgents a decade ago. It also shows that Thailand is willing to use political means to solve the crisis. 

But words must be backed with action. Prayut can't hoodwink the world into believing he is serious about peace merely by saying he wants an inclusive peace process.

He can't talk peace and inclusiveness just to make himself and Thailand look good, and yet say nothing about what kind of concessions the country is willing to make to the Malays of the deep South. 

Yingluck Shinawatra's government employed that shallow tactic throughout its peace initiative, launched on February 28, 2013. She thought that putting together peace talks with the insurgency's most powerful group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), and with Malaysia as facilitator, would be enough to draw other insurgents and stakeholders to the table. 

It didn't take long, though, for observers to see that her effort was something between a hoax and a blind leap of faith. Doing the right thing is fine, but if it's for the wrong reason, it can come back to haunt you. Sure enough, the process came to a standstill when Hasan Taib - the man Bangkok tasked with winning the trust of holdout insurgents - threw in the towel after it became clear that the BRN and the insurgent combatants wouldn't support him.

With the military now in the driver's seat, the buck stops at Prayut's table. Like Yingluck, he will reach out to Malaysia for help facilitating the talks. It's their backyard and they want to be part of the solution. Kuala Lumpur could further aid the process by proposing various ideas and governance models for state-minority relations.

History shows that the Malays in Thailand's three southernmost provinces are willing to live under the Thai state. They did not challenge Siam/Thailand's sovereignty when the area came under Bangkok's direct rule a century ago. 

The central government back then understood the sensitivity of relations with the far South and worked hard to establish a comfort level between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state. But that comfort level quickly evaporated when the state tried to shove "kwam pen Thai", or Thai-ness, down their throats through nationalistic policies that did more harm than good in terms of bridging the historical and cultural gap. 

The strategy might have worked with immigrants to Thailand, but the southernmost provinces are the Malay residents' historical homeland. 

The challenge for Kuala Lumpur and the rest of the international community is to help Bangkok define the terms of its relationship with its Malay-speaking provinces. We can't turn the clock back, but we can explore various models and lessons learned about state-minority relations. 

Negotiations with armed insurgent groups and negotiations with the residents of the far South are two different but related processes. Terms like "human dignity", "equality", "justice" and "social mobility" must be part of the vocabulary of the peace process, replacing the declarations of "love and happiness" that usually translate to some quirky campaign and payoffs for mistakes our troops commit in the name of counter-insurgency.

Insurgents in Thailand's deep South 'ruled by heart, not head'

Fresh wave of attacks: insurgency leaders worried emotion has got the better of their fighters

Don PathanSpecial to The Nation - YALA, Thailand

A forensic expert inspects a house after government forces shot and killed suspected insurgents during a raid at the house in southern Pattani province earlier this month. Five suspected insurgents surrendered and two more were shot dead after a raid on h

A hand-written note left at the crime scene where school teacher Issara Chairitchok was shot dead reflects the growing fear among the local population in Thailand's southernmost provinces - that more bad things are coming.

If you "detain indiscriminately", we will "kill indiscriminately", the note read.

Issara became the 179th teacher killed since the current wave of insurgency flared a decade ago. More than 6,000 people, mostly Muslims of Malay ethnicity, have been killed since then.

Issara was shot dead in Pattani's Khok Pho district on November 15, presumably by insurgents who were ticked off over a number of incidents that resulted in the death and wounding of ordinary Malay Muslim villagers, including women and children, at the hands of state security officials.

Beside the shooting death of Issara, November 15 also witnessed a mother and her daughter gunned down at close range on the Than To-Betong road, and a roadside bomb attack that injured two rangers in Narathiwat's Rusoh district.

Publicly, authorities said the shooting death of Issara was a retaliation for the November 14 killing of two suspected insurgents in a gunfight in Pattani's Nong Chik district.

But an exiled separatist source dismissed the claim. He said although the two insurgents were outnumbered and outgunned, the movement could accept the outcome as they deemed the fight a fair one.

Unlike other sub-national conflicts elsewhere, the insurgency in Thailand's deep South does not have an officially designated clearing house or a coherent dialogue process where both sides can confirm or deny their activities.

And without a guarantee of immunity or a recognisable political wing to state their case, there is no reason any of the separatist groups would admit publicly or privately to any of the attacks. Leaflets and banners to remind the authorities of the retaliation is good enough for now.

Besides notes left at the scene of attacks, officials often turn to exiled separatist leaders to help clear things up.

As for the current "spikes", one has to go back to the October 12 arson attacks on five public schools in Pattani's Thung Yang Daeng and one in Ma-Yor district. Police said the arson attacks were a retaliation to the arrest of top insurgent leaders.

But a separatist source said the attacks were in response to officials mistreating eight suspects that had been rounded up in Thung Yang Daeng following a vicious attack on the police outpost in the district in mid-July.

Separatist sources said insurgents operate on a need-to-know basis and the militants behind the July attack are long gone. There was no way the eight detainees would have any prior knowledge of the attack.

Another example of officials "overstepping the line" was the shooting death of a 10-year-old Muslim girl in Narathiwat's Bacho district after the vehicle she was travelling in did not stop when a Marine on the side of the road flashed a flashlight at them.

Her mother, father and older sister survived gunshot wounds. A senior Marines commander in the area expressed regret and provided the family with Bt500,000.

Insurgents hit back a week later on November 1 by attacking a group of Buddhist men drinking in front of a shophouse in Songkhla's Thepha district, killing three and wounding four.

The killers left a sarcastic note that read: "Sorry for the unintentional killings. Just like when you shot at the Malay people in [Hutae] Yalor village [in Bacho]."

The following day, gunmen shot at close range a 20-year-old Buddhist university student in Narathiwat's Tambon. The assassin's gun jammed as he tried to shoot the victim's two friends who were riding pillion on the same motorbike. Police said the victim's father was killed in similar fashion two years ago.

The same day also saw a gangland style attack by men travelling on a pick-up truck who opened fire at a house Tambon Nanak in Tak Bai district. One person died on the spot and three others were wounded. All were Buddhists.

The following day in Pattani's Tambon Taluboh, gunmen in a pickup truck attacked a truck full of local Malay Muslim residents, killing three, all of whom were officials from Tambon Krong Maning in Pattani. Two others suffered bullet wounds.

On November 8, a Sungai Padi Muslim resident was shot dead while four rangers and a civilian were wounded by two separate roadside bombings in Pattani on November 11. An imam was shot dead by hooded men in Yala's Betong district on November 12 and then there was the aforementioned gunfight in Pattani's Nong Chik on November 14 that resulted in the deaths of the two insurgents who refused to surrender.

The third week of November saw several banners erected in various locations that read: "As long as the policy of 'Returning Happiness to the People' is still about aiming gun barrels at religious leaders, communities, Muslim clerics, and innocent Malay brothers and sisters, Buddhist civilians, bureaucrats, and teachers can be certain that they will be the last dead bodies."

Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the recent wave of attacks were the simultaneous attacks on four karaoke bars in remote areas on the outskirts of the Pattani provincial capital on October 31. According to a separatist source, the idea was to teach these establishments, as well as the Muslim clients, a nasty lesson.

There was a suggestion that the insurgents had considered waiting until a Muslim walked into one of these establishment before setting off the explosive. But that would of meant compromising their own security and possibly giving their location away. In the end it was decided that it was best to set off the blasts simultaneously and leave the scene immediately.

However, the attacks against the karaoke bars are not the start of a moral crusade. If anything, it was meant to discredit the state and send a stern warning of their disapproval of Muslims indulging in these outlets.

Among the intelligence and security community, all sorts of explanations were given to explain what appears to be a spike in violence recently. But sources in the separatist movements said making the area ungovernable as much as possible continued to be the aim for the time being.

The recent attacks on soft targets, they said, were part of retaliation against specific actions of security officials.

The fact that these attacks are driven by emotion rather than being part of a strategic calculation has become a point of concern the insurgency leaders.

But this is the nature of the insurgency in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, where the separatist movement's chain of command is very fluid and the command and control is untested. In real terms, this means insurgents on the ground continue to decide who they target, while at the same time keeping in mind the need for self-restraint and staying within the loose guidelines provided by the leaders in exile.

Attacking "soft" targets may humiliate security agencies, but separatist leaders have acknowledged that such tactics play into the hands of the authorities.

Moreover, the fact that the authorities make no serious effort to look into the conduct of their security personnel suggests that they can still tolerate the humiliation of being on the receiving end.

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum 
(www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance development and security consultant based in Yala.

EDITORIAL: When security forces can't be trusted

The Nation

A spike in violence in the deep South can be traced directly to the Army's rough reactions to events

The Army’s so-called “Tung Yang Daeng model” – an effort to integrate the operation of the military, villagers and local security into one cohesive unit – is facing a severe test in that Pattani district after back-to-back incidents that illustrated the vulnerability of security units in remote areas.

The first incident came in mid-July, with some 40 insurgents surrounding a police substation and sparking an intense exchange of gunfire. 

Road spikes, felled trees and a roadside bomb stalled the reinforcements and an Army helicopter had to be dispatched to the scene. The attack left two soldiers seriously wounded and several more with severe burns after the station was set aflame and razed.

In a routine response, a group of young men from nearby Islamic boarding schools were rounded up and interrogated. Locals said the way they were mistreated set the stage for the second attack, in which insurgents burned down six public schools on October 12, apparently to demonstrate their disapproval of the authorities’ tactics.

The Army billed the arson attacks as a response to its recent arrest of key figures in the insurgency, though no names were mentioned.

In a bid for damage control, “the Tung Yang Daeng model” was conjured up. How this differs from previous attempts to outsource security work to local residents – or try to get villagers involved in security details – is anybody’s guess. It has strong echoes of the so-called “Pentagon II initiative” concocted after a truckload of insurgents killed four soldiers patrolling on motorbikes in Pattani’s Ma-Yor district in July 2012.

That incident was caught on CCTV and broadcast all over the social media. The government of Yingluck Shinawatra had to give the impression that it was in control of the situation, and so units, agencies and people were shifted around to create Pentagon II. And yes, the policymakers said more or less the same thing about how they were going to step up coordination among the security agencies.

This time around, the Army is counting on village protection units as part of the line-up. But the military has tried handing off security duties to the villagers before and knows the results can be disastrous.

Witness, for example, the protest in Tak Bai in October 2004 that led to what many now call a massacre. The protesters were calling for the release of a group of village-defence volunteers who had been accused of handing their weapons to insurgents. The volunteers had said they surrendered the weapons to avoid being slaughtered by a superior force. The military opened fire on the demonstrators and then stacked the survivors in trucks, resulting in 85 deaths, mainly from suffocation.

For some reason the Army continues to believe that residents in the Muslim-majority deep South are obligated to put their lives on the line for the nation, despite the fact that authorities often fail to respect their cultural difference and address their historical grievances.
Perhaps the military needs to look closer to home when it comes to accountability and responsibility for security.

The killing of a Malay Muslim child, 14-year-old Muhammad-Azuwan Sohoh, by a paramilitary Ranger in Narathiwat’s Sri Sakorn district on August 21 is a case in point.
Muhammad-Azuwan’s case deserves attention because investigators discovered that the Ranger involved, Aekapot Samansuan, had shot the boy and then placed a pistol in the victim’s hand to disguise him as an insurgent.

Then, just a week ago, Marines opened fire on a pickup truck at a checkpoint in Hutaeyulo in Narathiwat’s Bacho district, killing 10-year-old Hizula Taemoh and wounding her mother and younger sister. The family was heading to market to sell coconuts.
Once again, the military unit involved tried to portray the victims as insurgents. But this time around, eyewitnesses spoke out and revealed the truth.

Human Rights Watch called on the government to “wake up to the fact that attempts to cover up misconduct of its security units and protect them from criminal responsibility fan the flames of violent reprisals”.

“Insurgents have repeatedly used the impunity of government forces to
justify brutal attacks on civilians,” it said.

Thai security forces in the South must clean up their own house before they can expect others to join in efforts to keep the peace.

http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/confronting-ghosts-thailands-shapeless-southern-insurgency


In this Lowy Institute Paper, Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan examine the ongoing violence in the majority Muslim Malay provinces of Thailand’s south. Through unprecedented fieldwork, the authors provide the deepest and most up-to-date analysis of the insurgency and problems the Thai Government faces in dealing with it. 

Joseph Chinyong Liow is the Associate Dean at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Don Pathan is a senior reporter at The Nation newspaper in Bangkok.

The Lowy Institute is an independent, nonpartisan international policy think tank located in Sydney, Australia.  Ranked as Australia's leading think tank, it provides high - quality research and distinctive perspectives on the international trends shaping Australia and the world.  

New approach to peace efforts offers hope in deep South

By Don Pathan

Special to The Nation

Bystanders watch as a hotel is engulfed in flames after being hit by a car bomb in downtown Yala on July 25.

Bangkok's move to verify militant groups' involvement through back-channel talks could create inclusive process so far lacking

The Thai government is assembling a peace-negotiating team to revive talks with Patani Malay separatist leaders, and this time around, Bangkok wants it to be as inclusive as possible. 

Because there are many groups claiming to have command-and-control over the militants, the Thai side would like to meet each of them individually to better assess their involvement in the insurgency.

Some of the longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups welcome face-to-face talks with the Thai military, as these would give them the opportunity to show what they are capable of. Some are prepared to claim responsibility for violent attacks, as well as outline their plans for future action. 

Militants say the idea of this "secret track" in negotiations sounds interesting because it opens a way for horse trading, including asking for the release of their members from prison as part of exchanges to be discussed at the table. 

One senior official said the idea of individual separatist groups wanting to be credited with their respective activities is understandable and that it's a part of the natural progress of any insurgency towards peace.

Of course, these back-channel meetings will be strictly off the public radar. And for this to work the two sides will have to keep the number of participants very small, with the understanding that there will be virtually no room for bluffing. 

Ideally, participants in the backdoor meetings must have some degree of command-and-control over combatants so that they can deliver what is agreed upon. Items on the table may include rules of engagement, establishing a demilitarised zone for certain routes and/or ceasefires for certain areas or occasions.

One member of a longstanding separatist group said his cadres were turned off by the fact that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), an umbrella organisation of separatist combatants, is credited with carrying out virtually all insurgent violence. The back channel, he said, would allow the Thai side to see what his network is capable of. 

Others say they are wary of the divide-and-rule nature of this approach. But since there is no real unity among the established separatist groups as they compete among themselves for legitimacy and recognition, such a concern is not that big a deal.

The Army is hoping that the back channel can deliver tangible progress in the deep South, since the current crop of coup-makers needs to show the public quantifiable results.

However, the idea of conducting secret talks with the separatist movements is easier said than done, and both sides say there are obstacles that they will have to overcome for this initiative to succeed. These challenges include getting all the Thai security agencies to agree to a common agenda. In other words, no more turning a blind eye to rogue security units taking matters into their own hands. 

As for the separatist side, the problem is a lack of unity, especially among the established groups and their exiled leaders. Like the Thais, they are plagued with longstanding rivalries. And even if the groups unanimously agreed to the idea of a secret track of negotiations, there are plenty of spoilers - drug dealers, smugglers, crime syndicates - with an axe to grind with the security agencies.

As for the official track, Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr has said Malaysia will continue to be the facilitator. The process was launched on February 28, 2013 in Kuala Lumpur with Hasan Taib, a member of the BRN-C, designated as the "liaison".

Hasan threw in the towel late last year after he realised that he could not achieve the task that Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok had set for him, which was to generate enough traction for the process and bring other groups on board. 

BRN-C sources and combatants said his role was doomed from the beginning because Hasan never had the support or endorsement of the group's leaders or those actually doing the fighting. A similar lack of cohesion plagued peace efforts by the Yingluck Shinawatra government, which failed to get the Army on board before launching the February 28, 2013 initiative. 

The BRN-C source also admitted that the inclusiveness of this new phase adds tremendous pressure for the group to participate in the talks one way or another.

This is not to say that the BRN-C does not want to talk; it just wants to be sure about what it is getting into, because it maintains it has far more to lose than other groups. 

Its claims have been echoed by Thai military sources, who said the BRN-C's participation in the process is crucial because the vast majority of the separatist combatants fall under its network.

Meanwhile, Bangkok is in the process of putting a team of negotiators together. This team will report to a policy body made up of various ministries and agencies, with the Army chief as head. 

The jury is still out on who will get the job of chief negotiator for the Thai side, though local media point to retired General Akanit Muansawat, a long-time friend of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, as favourite for the position. Akanit has spent much of his career working on the insurgency in the Malay-speaking South.

Rumours of Akanit's possible appointment have generated a great deal of discussion, much of it in the form of criticism, as reflected in recent media reports that quote unnamed exiled separatist sources explaining why Akanit should not get the job. Others have come out in his defence, saying the retired general is a capable person and familiar with the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

"We still have a long way to go before the government appoints a negotiating team and a policy body, not to mention the fact that a sound policy and strategy has yet to be worked out," said a senior Thai Army source.

In what was billed by the Thai military as an attempt to "test the water", Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, head of the longstanding separatist organisation Patani Malay Consultative Congress (MPRMP), recently issued a statement via YouTube announcing the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. 

Wae Hamad, in 2008, led a delegation to Bogor, Indonesia to meet with a representative from Bangkok sent by then-prime minister Samak Sundaravej. Mediated by Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla, the event quickly fell apart after it became public knowledge.

So far, only Akanit's name has been made public as a potential chief negotiator for the Thai side. That it has generated so much heated debate reflects the enthusiasm of the stakeholders and the people who want to be at the negotiating table. 

But from the perspective of one BRN-C cadre, "These so-called stakeholders and want-to-be players can debate all they want. If we [the BRN-C] are not part of the process, it will be just a bunch of old men griping about this and that."

Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance security consultant based in Yala.

Time to switch tracks in deep South peace process

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 

Members of a bomb squad inspect damaged vehicles after a car bomb exploded outside a hotel in Yala

Direct talks between Thai security forces and the separatist leaders controlling combatant insurgents may be the only way to build trust

The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) is having a difficult time explaining to the Malaysian government that there will be a serious adjustment to the role Kuala Lumpur had been playing in peace talks launched under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra.

The NCPO is hoping that Malaysia will understand that it has other priorities and that the peace talks with the so-called Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) and others, an initiative that was launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28 last year, will progress according to a new course. 

The military has not followed the example of the 2006 coup-makers, who ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, by citing the government's handling of the unrest in the southernmost provinces as one of their reasons for seizing power. This time around, the military pointed to the political deadlock to justify their ouster of the Pheu Thai government.

Moreover, the Army was not exactly "on board" with the February 28 initiative, which was the work of a few trusted bureaucrats along with the Pheu Thai's Wadah politicians closely aligned with Thaksin and his sister. 

While giving the impression it was going along with the government, the military at the same time looked for ways to hamper the Kuala Lumpur-backed peace talks, a job that had historically been under its purview. 

One way to rock the boat was to permit the return to Thailand of Wan Kadir Che Man, the former leader of the now-defunct Bersatu separatist umbrella group and the founder of long-standing separatist movement, Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP). The Thai Army knew that Wan Kadir was not in favour of having a third party, especially Malaysia, at the negotiating table. He had been suggesting all along at private meetings with the Thai side that any talks at this point should be strictly between the Thai side and the separatist movements. 

During his three visits to Thailand between December 2013 and January, Wan Kadir didn't mince words in his disapproval of Malaysia, or Western NGOs for that matter, as mediators for the talks. 

Then came the first anniversary of the February 28 initiative and a declaration by designated facilitator Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, former spy chief of Malaysia, that all three factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and the BIPP would be joining the peace talks.

Wan Kadir, who no longer runs the BIPP, was dismissive of the claim that the group he had helped create was the same one now joining the talks, saying people could call themselves anything nowadays. The reality, he said, was that people with command and control over the insurgents on the ground had yet to surface because the atmosphere was not conducive to them going public.

The claim of progress in talks had some in the international community scratching their heads when, two months later, in April this year, foreign embassies in Bangkok issued travel warnings, citing new information indicating that insurgents might be targeting Westerners. 

Although the warnings did not name the separatist organisations suspected of targeting foreigners - something that has never happened before in the history of the deep South insurgency - a source said that Thai authorities had singled out one of the groups set to be joining the peace talks. 

Leaders in the separatist community, including BRN cadres, are dismissive of the claim that insurgents could be targeting Westerners. They believe the information was part of counter-intelligence issued to discredit the "progress" towards peace being claimed by the Pheu Thai government.

But with the change of power brought by the coup, the ball is now in the Army's court. It's one thing to sit on the sidelines criticising a (Pheu Thai) government peace initiative and rocking the boat. It's another thing to be in sole control of the country's governance, with no critics or real opposition to contend with. 

The junta thought that announcing the continuation of peace talks, with secretary-general of the National Security Council Thawil Pliensri in charge, would ease the concerns of other stakeholders about the future of the peace process.

But Kuala Lumpur, which traditionally sees Thailand's Malay-speaking South as its own backyard, would like to see a firmer commitment from Bangkok. In contrast, Thawil comes across to many observers as a "lame duck" looking forward to a retirement which is just months away. 

According to one Malaysian source, what Kuala Lumpur would like to see is a statement from the NCPO saying that it will respect the memorandum of understanding signed on February 28, 2013 by the three parties. 

But what Kuala Lumpur wants and what Kuala Lumpur gets may be two different things, Thai officials say.

It took the junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha nearly two months following the coup to say anything in public about the conflict in the deep South. That goes to show that he has other priorities and that the insurgency is not exactly high on his list. 

Moreover, the designated BRN "liaison", Hassan Taib, has managed to wriggle his way out of having to represent a movement that never gave him the necessary mandate or moral support to play the role that Kuala Lumpur and theYingluck government had designed for him.

One way out of this fiasco is to proceed along two tracks. Track One would be an inclusive, official process for international and public consumption, which would save Malaysia's face and "keep them happy", said a Thai security official.

The second track, on the other hand, would be talks between Thai security forces and mid-ranking separatist leaders who have direct command over the combatant insurgents. 

The idea with the latter track is to go after issues within reach, such as rules of engagement - which could evolve into more tangible issues, such as declaring demilitarised zones on certain roads and in certain communities. 

Thai soldiers in the South have said that addressing non-political issues at this level is the only way for the two sides to build any trust and traction that could eventually lead to a more meaningful peace process. 

A BRN cadre said that the top-down approach employed by the Yingluck government could only work if there was a strong chain of command within the separatist movements. But the reality is that the separatists' command-and-control chain is fluid and has never been tested. 

In other words, if the leaders of the BRN or any other separatist organisations cut a deal with the Thai state, there is no guarantee that the separatists actually doing the fighting will follow through with what the exiled leaders have agreed upon in peace talks. 

Don Pathan is a security consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).