A changing balance of power along the Thai-Burma border has forced Thailand to re-think its buffer zone policy.
By Don Pathan
The Irrawaddy
As long as anybody can remember, Burma's armed ethnic groups operating along the Thai-Burmese border have always provided a buffer between the two nagging neighbors.
First, it was the Karen rebels who had taken the fight to the outskirts of Rangoon a half century ago following independence. This has been followed by the Burmese students' exodus by the thousands to the Thai border following a bloody crackdown in 1988. Then, the Mon rebels were crushed to pieces half a decade ago to make way for a lucrative gas pipeline running from Burma's Yadana gas field to Thailand. Now, only a handful of Shan and Karen groups, some of whom have surrendered in return for amnesty, function as the buffer zone between the Thai and Burmese armies.
Over the past decade, the tides have turned in Rangoon's favor. Internal conflict within some rebel outfits have created splinter groups, altering the security arrangement and tremendously enhancing Burma's leverage in dealing with Thailand over border politics.
The Karen National Union (KNU), once a major challenge to Rangoon, have been forced to switch from conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics since losing their Manerplaw and Kawmoorah strongholds in 1995. The group's Fourth Brigade, which operates in areas opposite Thailand's Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi provinces, has been severely weakened.
Local Karens who had once looked to Thailand for protection were forced to take up arms to defend themselves. One of the outfits that emerged following the fall of the Fourth Brigade was the God's Army, a rag-tag outfit that gained the world's attention because of its teenage twin leaders, believed to posses mystical powers.
Shortly after the KNU's fall from grace, opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army (MTA) surrendered to the junta in return for a generous amnesty in early 1996. This left MTA territories in Shan State that had traditionally served as a buffer up for grabs as Thai, Burmese, and Wa troops rushed in to hoist their flags. Khun Sa's stronghold in Ho Mong, opposite Mae Hong Son, was given to one of his former commanders, Col Maha Ja, who entered a ceasefire agreement with Rangoon in return for control over the area's natural resources.
Maha Ja has since tried desperately to brush off Ho Mong's old stigma, maintaining that his area is drug-free. He has challenged the international community to come and verify this for themselves while reaching out to Thailand to do business with him.
As these anti-Rangoon groups wither, the pro-Rangoon United Wa State Army (UWSA) has emerged as a key player in cross-border security arrangements.
The UWSA formally came into being shortly after the Communist Party of Burma fell apart over a decade ago. A ceasefire agreement orchestrated by Burma's security chief Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt was reached soon afterwards in 1989. The aim was to neutralize the 20,000-strong Wa army, equipped with enough weapons to pose a serious challenge to Rangoon's rule. Rangoon wanted to prevent these weapons, most of which came from mainland Communist China, from falling into the hands of other rebel groups.
For the Wa, the ceasefire provided an opportunity to expand their heroin empire from their stronghold in Panghsang on the Chinese border to a new frontier along the Thai-Burmese border.
This expansion meant that war between the UWSA and their main rival and business competitor, the MTA, was inevitable. Unable to cope with a two-front war, as well as bickering among different MTA factions, Khun Sa eventually surrendered to Rangoon.
Once the dust settled following Khun Sa's capitulation, coupled with other ethnic groups entering into the "legal fold", Rangoon felt it could be more assertive. The generals in Rangoon had ordered the UWSA to move back to Panghsang, issuing two ultimatums without specifying the consequences. The order was ignored, however, proving to the junta and the international community that the UWSA was nobody's lapdog. Once the junta realized that the Wa were no pushover, they decided to work with the UWSA. Today, the Wa have become one of the most important cards in Rangoon's hand when negotiating Thai-Burmese relations.
Initially, things appeared to be going as planned. Well over 1,000 Thai construction workers were invited across the border to help build roads, schools, clinics, small hydroelectric dams and other buildings in Wa-controlled areas. Twice a week, Thai merchants lined up with everything from meat and vegetables to petroleum and construction materials waiting to enter the Wa-controlled area opposite Chiang Mai's Mae Ai and Fang districts.
This development allowed the Wa army to significantly strengthen their southern military commands and tighten their grip over the area through forced relocations. Thousands of ethnic Wa, Shan and Chinese from the northern border were forced to relocate to newly created towns along the Thai border adjacent to Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. This did not sit well with the Thai Army, whose uneasiness was growing daily as peasants from northern Burma arrived at their doorstep by the truckloads.
A turning point came in early 1999, when the corpses of nine Thai nationals showed up along the northern border in Fang district; a drug deal gone bad according to authorities who suggested that all fingers pointed to the Wa.
Soon afterwards, border checkpoints leading to the UWSA-controlled Mong Yawn were ordered closed, and the Thai workers and construction companies were ordered to return home. The UWSA became public enemy number one and have since been a thorn in relations between the two countries.
Until the current administration took power early last year, Thailand played hardball with Rangoon, demanding that the junta be held accountable for the Wa's illicit activities. There were suggestions that the only way to end the drug problem was to take out the 20,000-strong UWSA through military means.
But Rangoon made it clear that using military force was out of the question, saying that Thailand's drug habit was not Burma's problem and that this habit should not interfere with Rangoon's hard-won ceasefire agreement.
In May of this year, the Thai Army decided to teach the Wa an important lesson. Their swift "retaliations" against the drug army were meant to demonstrate that Thailand would no longer tolerate the Wa's activities.
The stern action caught everybody off guard, including the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which was left in the dark about what was happening along the border.
While Thai soldiers were slugging it out with the Wa, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) took advantage of the situation and launched their own offensive against the Burmese causing the entire border to go up in smoke and sending Thai-Burmese ties into a tailspin.
Rangoon responded angrily, accusing the Thai army of supporting the SSA-S and lashing out at Bangkok for being "insincere" and "bare-faced liars".
Indeed, the Thai Army's swift response to the Wa not only irked Rangoon, but Thaksin as well. Thaksin came into office vowing to patch things up with Rangoon. However, he overlooked the intricacies and long history of Thai-Burmese border politics.
While trying desperately to convince Rangoon of his sincerity, the premier inadvertently neglected domestic sentiments. The local press and academics came down hard on Thaksin after he accused his own army of overreacting and ordered troops to pull back from the border.
The premier again shot himself in the foot when he said the army would end its tacit policy of using Burmese insurgent groups as a "buffer". He also said that aid organizations tending to over 100,000 refugees displaced by decades of fighting would have to scale down their operations. He accused them of interfering with Thailand's effort to normalize ties with Burma.
Thai security planners are split over how to deal with Burma. Critics say Thaksin is too quick to appease Rangoon, and warn that his policy could damage Thailand's international standing for coddling one of the world's most condemned regimes.
For now, Thaksin is stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea—convinced that his brand of "personal diplomacy" with Burma will eventually prevail, but not sure how to get his armed forces to jump on the bandwagon. All eyes will be on Thai army chief, General Surayud Chulanont, to see whether this popular commander will retain his current post or be transferred to sit out the last year of his distinguished career watching bilateral developments from the sidelines.
Observers say Surayud's professional fate means everything. Currently, Thailand is caught between standing firm with Rangoon—by holding the junta accountable for the spillover caused by its ethnic conflicts—and offering an olive branch to the Burmese junta, placing development and economic cooperation above all else, as the current administration is practicing. If the latter stance prevails, many will wonder how much Thailand will have to give in before the Burmese generals feel comfortable enough to show Thai leaders the cards they hold in their hands.
