The Nation
Ban Sa-eh, Thailand
The foul smell from five pools of blood was still apparent on a hillside at the remote village of Ban Sa-eh in Krong Pinang subdistrict of Yala, just 20 hours after a gunfight between scores of security officers and about a dozen Malay-Muslim insurgents ended.
Five militants, known locally as juwae, were shot dead, while six fled over the hill after holding their ground for about half an hour.Media and police reports, as expected, painted the security forces as heroic and hard-working, but local residents appear to be more concerned with possible extrajudicial killings, not to mention the culture of impunity of security officers.
Traces of the bullets suggest that weapons were being fired from three different directions. This confirms the story of a local military officer of two teams of security officials creeping up on a group of about 11 insurgents lying low in a cabin on a hill outside this remote village in the early afternoon. A pot full of instant noodles inside the cabin suggested that they were about to have lunch.
One village elder, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that at least 11 young men had been coming in and out of the cabin for the past month.
“I didn’t ask what they were doing and didn’t really want to know. But I told them that a group of people who were hunting wild boars came across their hideout and suggested that they should relocate,” said the villager. “But they didn’t take my warning seriously.”
The government’s strategy is to win the hearts and minds of local Malay-Muslims in order to deny the insurgents possible tactical support. But turning a blind eye could also mean trouble as state officials expect one to display loyalty by tipping them off with information about the insurgents’ activities.
Sitting on the front porch of Bae Riff, a local influential figure who the Army is trying to win over, a Special Force’s colonel admitted that without the support of local residents, “We won’t be able to win this war.” His stated strategy is to reach out to local community leaders and win their trust and friendship.
But people in the three southernmost provinces say arm-twisting is often employed as a tactic, coupled with rewards that come with being well connected to the authorities.
As part of his way of blending in and putting locals at ease, the colonel is dressed in civilian clothing. He lifted up his shirt to show that he was not armed. But just 30 metres from where we sat, a guard armed was armed with a semi-automatic rifle and a handgun tucked in a holster tied to his right thigh. His eyes scanned the road through this remote village where few soldiers or police dare to drive.
The colonel said the key to winning this war is to link up with a person like Bae Riff, once a member of the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C). Bae Riff is considered to be a good resource in the context of southern Thailand; he has “jungle credentials”.
“It’s not really harassment,” said the former BRN-C cadre. “The idea is to use people like me to relay messages to the new generation of militants in the ongoing insurgency.” His job is not to spy on the militants but to serve as a link between the two sides.
The former BRN-C cadre admitted that the local militants are not totally happy with him but allow him to continue as long as he doesn’t provide security officials with intelligence information about their movements and activities.
What motivates Bae Riff to do what he does is the desire to see local Malay-Muslims treated fairly. But if insurgents are executed – as he initially believed after the events of April 19 at Ban Se’a – then the responsible authorities must be brought to justice. There is a long-standing culture of impunity in the security forces but there are enough good and honest officials out there who can make a difference, he said.
It is clear that Bae Riff sympathises with the predicament of ordinary villagers. The previous round in this insurgency, two decades ago, was fought in the jungle between Thai security forces and Patani Malay nationalists from various separatist groups. Today, the theatre of violence has switched into towns and villages. Caught in the middle are innocent civilians.
“It has been very hard for them to position themselves,” Bae Riff said.
But the official government line is that locals who turn a blind eye to the insurgents’ activities are afraid of repercussion from the juwae.
It is clear that if the insurgents suspected that someone has crossed the line by becoming an informant for the state, that person is considered a fair target. But it was also clear that the villager elder who urged the insurgents to relocate from Ban Se’a did so out of concern for their safety.
Since this insurgency re-erupted in early 2004, few Thai officials have been willing to admit that local Malay-Muslims sympathise with the insurgents or share the same sentiments and historical mistrust of the state.
Using villagers to broker talks or negotiations between insurgents and local security units may not be part of government policy. But in this region where more than 5,000 people have been killed since 2004, local security units can’t afford to go strictly by the policy book.
Like the colonel, Army commanders at the company level say they have come to terms with the fact that locally hired village security staff, as well as ordinary villagers, will not make more effort than is expected of them. It is understood that all residents have to turn a blind eye to the presence of insurgents. Then there are those who actively support the separatist ideology embraced by the militants.
Coupled with historical mistrust, the use of vigilantes to kill suspects or to settle scores have hampered Thailand’s effort to close the trust gap between the state and the Malays of the deep South.
Locals here say they have yet to see justice for their neighbours in nearby Ban Kasod when in May 2011 a former paramilitary Ranger and three of his buddies went on a shooting spree from the back of his pickup truck, killing four Muslims and injuring 16 others in three-kilometre stretch. The act was to avenge his brother who was previously killed by suspected insurgents during a hunting trip.
Two years before that, on June 8, 2009, six gunmen walked up to a village mosque in Ai Bayae in Narathiwat’s Joh Ai Rong district and opened fire, killing ten and wounding 12 while they were at evening prayer.
From these two incidents, two paramilitary Rangers were arrested but later released on the ground that there wasn’t enough evidence against them. Legally speaking, that may be so. But for the Malay Muslims, the system is seen as being stacked against them. And as long as this perception prevails, one can be certain that villagers will continue to look the other way when a group of armed militants set up camp in their community.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/aec/30180615
