Tuesday, 26 August 2025

Thailand, Myanmar and the Pollution of Thai Waterways

Thai and United Wa State Army soldiers meeting on the border near Mae Hong Son in early 2025. (Credit: Royal Thai Army)

Don Pathan
www.mizzima.com

A ranking member of the Thai Senate, Ms. Angkhana Neelaphaijit, has called for United Nations intervention regarding the pollution of the Kok and Sai rivers, contaminated by Chinese gold and rare earth extraction operations in territories controlled by the Wa militia, located mere kilometers from Thailand’s border with Myanmar.

Angkhana Neelaphaijit
Angkhana referenced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to justify such intervention.

The 2019 Ramon Magsaysay Award winner, who joined the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances in 2022, argued that China bears moral and legal responsibility to address this issue. She suggested Thailand should petition the UN to raise concerns with China, given Myanmar’s inability to control the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-member ethnic armed group maintaining a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s government since 1989.

According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation, while recent media coverage has concentrated on gold extraction along the Kok and Sai rivers near UWSA territory approximately 25 kilometers from Thailand’s border, satellite imagery reveals rare earth mining operations at two sites in Mong Yawn, southern Mong Hsat, roughly 25 kilometers from northern Thailand’s border, facing Mae Ai district in Chiang Mai province.

Recent months have witnessed a series of public protests in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, demanding government action to address the issue with both Myanmar and the UWSA. In early 2025, Thai conservative media sources even advocated military intervention against the Wa, claiming three UWSA outposts had violated Thai territory by 200 meters.

The powerful UWSA controls an autonomous territory along the China-Myanmar frontier. During the late 1990s, the UWSA expanded southward toward the Thai border after collaborating with Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, to eliminate their longtime adversary, Shan opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army (MTA).

Access to UWSA territories remains strictly controlled. Myanmar military personnel and government representatives must surrender weapons and accept escort.

Responding to mounting public pressure regarding river contamination, Thailand and Myanmar took a modest bilateral initiative last week, agreeing during Naypyidaw discussions to establish a joint committee addressing the Kok and Sai river pollution.

Both nations are committed to enhancing river water quality, sharing water management information, and creating a joint technical working group for concrete cooperation on contamination solutions. However, the agreement made no reference to the UWSA or China.

A senior Thai military official from the Third Army Area command said there have been internal discussions about approaching China directly, since negotiations with the UWSA and seeking the Myanmar government's assistance have proven ineffective.

Thailand’s communications with the UWSA have consistently involved the group’s southern command, which invariably defers major decisions to Panghsang, their organization’s headquarters on the Sino-Myanmar border. This includes Thailand’s request for UWSA to move back from at least nine outposts that are situated right on the Thai border; three of these outposts are allegedly positioned 200 meters inside Thai territory. Wa forces maintain that orders must originate from Panghsang and suggest Thailand address border demarcation issues with Myanmar’s government, as they concern state sovereignty.

Other ethnic armed organizations said the UWSA will take no action without receiving concessions from Thailand. Like similar groups, legitimacy and recognition are something that are often desired. However, Thailand refuses to offer concessions to the UWSA, particularly given its drug trafficking history.

Several UWSA leaders face US Federal Court indictments for heroin trafficking and related crime, while their southern commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, carries a US$2 million bounty from American authorities for his conviction as far back as 1993.

Wei and his brothers, originally from Yunnan, arrived in the Burmese Golden Triangle during the 1970s, initially as Kuomintang operatives before entering the profitable heroin trade. When the UWSA formed in 1989 following the Communist Party of Burma’s dissolution, Wei provided financial backing, transforming the organization into Myanmar’s most formidable ethnic armed group. The UWSA granted him access to opium supplies needed for producing premium grade 4 heroin, known as “China White.”

The Tatmadaw quickly established a ceasefire arrangement with the UWSA, and within a decade, the Wa had effectively moved southward, displacing longtime rival Khun Sa’s now-defunct Mong Tai Army (MTA) and occupying territories along the Thailand-Myanmar frontier. Currently, UWSA installations, camps, and strongholds populate newly constructed settlements along Myanmar’s border adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and portions of Mae Hong Son provinces.

Thailand’s requests for Tatmadaw mediation with the UWSA are not unprecedented. In 2014, the Thai Army discussed UWSA border positions with Myanmar leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing during his Thailand visit. As of today, the Tatmadaw possesses limited influence over the UWSA.

But the same cannot be said about China. Last week, the UWSA declared it would terminate all assistance to allied groups battling Myanmar’s military, citing a request from China.

“Beginning immediately, Wa State will not provide weapons, military transit, or economic assistance to other organizations under any circumstances, at any time or location,” announced Zhao Guoan, Wa Vice Chairman and Foreign Relations Minister, informing representatives from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) during an August 20, 2025 high-level meeting in Panghsang.

The Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) reported that Zhao attributed this reluctant decision to intense Beijing pressure. Chinese authorities had frozen billions in Wa State institutional, corporate, and individual assets, implemented comprehensive border restrictions, and threatened severe measures unless the Wa ceased supporting armed groups in active conflict, according to SHAN, citing Wa News Land, the UWSA’s media outlet, as saying.

Since the Brotherhood Alliance’s late 2023 offensive began, China has served as a peace broker between Myanmar and ethnic armed organizations. Beijing's position gradually shifted toward supporting the Burmese junta, demanding that certain groups, particularly the TNLA and MNDAA, return territories captured from Myanmar’s military. Analysts believe China views Myanmar’s military government as the sole entity capable of maintaining national unity, with current support aimed at ensuring the upcoming December 2025 and January 2026 General Elections proceed smoothly enough to legitimize the new administration. Ultimately, this concerns risk mitigation for Chinese investments, trade routes, and strategic interests rather than power-sharing arrangements between the Myanmar military government and the ethnic armed organizations.

UWSA: An Uncomfortable Neighbor

Surprisingly, there were periods when Thai soldiers and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops engaged in friendly volleyball matches along the northern border.

These games represented friendly overtures from new neighbors whose presence deeply concerned the Thai Army for multiple reasons. The UWSA’s notorious drug trafficking reputation and their regional commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, certainly didn’t help matters.

Furthermore, Thailand and the UWSA never developed the necessary comfort level for peaceful coexistence. Typically, ethnic armed organizations maintaining ceasefires with the Tatmadaw are perceived as threats to Thailand, while those fighting Myanmar for self-governance or independence are considered allies and sometimes serve as buffers or proxies for Thai military forces.

After securing their southern command along the Thai border, the UWSA forcibly relocated over 100,000 Wa villagers from their China-Myanmar border stronghold to the southern command area.

However, the UWSA failed to convince Thai military leadership they posed no national threat. The massive population movement from the north, Wa drug operations and illicit regional investments, and the general perception that ceasefire-holding ethnic armed organizations threaten Thailand’s security—all contributed to maintaining this suspicious outlook.

Undoubtedly, historical distrust between Thailand and Burma shaped this threat perception, which traditionally views Myanmar’s friends and allies as dangers to Thailand.

Nevertheless, Thailand-Myanmar bilateral relations have not always been straightforward. Despite mistrust, various Thai governments since decolonization have served as Myanmar’s bridge to the international community, seeking to isolate the regime for its severe human rights abuses. Thailand was the first to enter Burma following the 1988 bloody crackdown against the pro-democracy uprising. Thaksin Shinawatra, shortly after assuming power in 2001, made extraordinary efforts to strengthen bilateral economic relations with the country. His assistance to Myanmar included whitewashing the UWSA through the Yongka Project development initiative, which never materialized due to a lack of international funding.

Over time, Wa-Thai military clashes gradually ceased, but tensions persisted. Thai security officials report the UWSA has not forgotten the “Surisri 143” incident—allegedly a Thai Army training exercise in May 2002 that saw Thai forces cross the border in tracked vehicles, supported by mortars and artillery, conducting a 24-hour operation eliminating several Wa positions. Some outposts were jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin later claimed the Army had “overreacted.”

While the UWSA sought to avoid war with Thailand and desired peace, they were unlikely to easily forget the May 2002 violence. Although both sides no longer engage in border gunfights, that two-decade-old hostility continues influencing Wa attitudes toward Thailand.

Unlike the early 2000s when Wa troops regularly exchanged gunfire with Thai soldiers, UWSA leaders would grant interviews and permit foreign media access to their China-Burma border territory. Today, statements are released through media platforms. Most posts showcase military strength through parades, troop movements, and daily training activities.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.


THAILAND-CAMBODIA BORDER CRISIS

OPINION

The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis

Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction

 



Don Pathan

August 26, 2025 17:05 JST



 


Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.

More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.

CONTiNUE READING


-----------------------------------

Opinion

The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis

Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction

Don Pathan

August 26, 2025 17:05 JST

20250825 Thai Cambo 1

Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.

More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.

Just this past week, a group of Thai senators called on the government to end scholarships for Cambodian students, accusing them of being "ungrateful." The move followed an earlier decision by acting Defense Minister Gen. Nattapol Nakpanit, who ordered all Cambodians at the National Defence College to pack up and leave the country.

Similarly, Ramkhamhaeng University in Bangkok revoked the honorary doctorate degree it had granted to Hun Sen, the president of the Cambodian Senate. The Cambodian strongman said this measure was unnecessary because he had already flushed the degree down the toilet.

Little consideration is given to the fact that the Thai economy -- particularly industries and factories in the northeastern provinces -- depends heavily on cheap Cambodian labor. More than 1 million Cambodian nationals work in Thailand under a bilateral arrangement.

And while the Thai armed forces are enjoying an outpouring of support, civil-military relations have deteriorated as nobody is talking about reforms for fear of sounding unpatriotic.

The absence of strong political leadership in Thailand has created a free-for-all situation in which just about everybody is pushing their own agenda. Nationalists are talking about collecting donations to purchase drones for military units along the border, while others are suggesting migrant workers from Myanmar should replace the Cambodians -- an off-the-cuff idea that overlooks the fact migrant workers tend to be regular fixtures in border communities.

Such arrangements were achieved through years of negotiations between government agencies and the private sector, who realize that fairness is the best policy when dealing with migrant workers from neighboring countries.

Still, many Thais believe they possess the moral high ground because Thailand provides these foreign workers the means for their livelihood. They ignore the fact that these back-breaking jobs are shunned by Thai nationals who have other options, such as going abroad for higher pay and better working conditions.

To escape constant harassment, many Cambodians have opted to return home. Needless to say, Thailand's private sector is feeling the heat.

Suspended Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra arrives at the Constitutional Court to testify in a high-profile ethics case in Bangkok on Aug. 21, 2025.    © Reuters

If recent history teaches us anything, it is that bilateral ties between Thailand and Cambodia are usually quickly patched up after border clashes. This is because deep down, Thailand and Cambodia know that for the sake of their people, it is better to cooperate than fight. But the lure of the border disputes never fails to attract political leaders looking to enhance their national standing. The two countries don't want war, they want what war can bring: national unity and the opportunity to solidify their credentials.

But nothing comes easy in this bilateral relationship, which comes with annoying pretexts. This time around, Bangkok cited suppression of scam centers in Cambodia as an excuse for extended border restrictions. Hun Sen was furious.

The situation deteriorated quickly when Hun Sen on June 18 leaked a private phone conversation he had with suspended Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, during which she appeared to be kowtowing to the Cambodian leader while criticizing her regional commander's handling of the border dispute.

Disagreements over the border demarcation between the two countries have been an issue since the colonial period and are often exploited by political leaders. The dispute over the world-famous Preah Vihear Temple reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, on two separate occasions. The ICJ ruled in Cambodia's favor both times: first in 1962 concerning the temple's ownership, and again in 2013 regarding the surrounding area. Cambodia has also sought the ICJ's judgment on the current dispute over the Ta Muen Thom temple. However, Thailand insists on using a bilateral mechanism, likely fearing a repeat of history.

And while the Thai government is picking up the pieces shattered by the embarrassing phone conversation, the Thai military is currently enjoying enormous public support because of the border standoff. A survey in early August by the National Institute Development Administration of 1,310 people nationwide revealed that most Thais trust and are satisfied with the military's role in addressing the Thai-Cambodian conflict. They expressed strong dissatisfaction with the government and the foreign ministry.

From the minute the conflict started, both countries began reached out to members of the international community to press their case, trying to convince the world that they weren't the ones who fired the first shot. Yet overseas onlookers were more interested in understanding the nature of the problem and how to resolve it.

While Cambodia constantly pushed for outside mediation and involvement in conflict resolution, Thailand insisted on resolving the conflict bilaterally. Cambodia succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council to convene an emergency meeting in New York, but failed to get the council to forward the case to the ICJ.

According to one government official from an ASEAN member state, the Cambodian diplomats were met by a much better prepared and better staffed delegation from Thailand. "The Thais were sophisticated and technical in their messaging, citing the Geneva Conventions and breaches of anti-mine and anti-cluster munitions obligations," the person said. "By contrast, Cambodia's position was undermined -- fairly or unfairly -- by the incident involving the Thai hospital [and attacks on other civilian targets, such as schools and convenience stores]. ... Regardless of the facts, that episode loomed large in the minds of many in New York."

In situations like these, the truth becomes almost irrelevant because there was no credible third party to verify what actually happened on the ground. In New York, it ultimately comes down to who presented their case more convincingly.

During the five-day standoff, Thailand's superior and more sophisticated firepower allowed its armed forces to focus their attacks on military targets and come across as respectful of the rules of engagement. But the generals need to understand that the world doesn't see the government and its armed forces as two separate entities.

While the "we are the good guy" narrative might go down well for domestic consumption, it does nothing in winning support from the international community, much less addressing the root causes of the border problem with Cambodia.