Why the Safety Zone concept has failed to secure peace in South

PART I

By Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 

Part one of a two-part series

Deep down inside, all sides knew that the “Safety Zone” pilot project in Thailand’s South wasn’t much to brag about.

But since neither side has nothing to show after talking to one another for nearly three years, the pilot project all of a sudden became important.

For the current junta, the Safety Zone would be their legacy, a shaky foundation for the next government to continue its work to resolve the conflict and insurgency in the Muslim-majority, 
Malay-speaking South. The two sides – MARA Patani and the Dialogue Panel – spent a great deal of time polishing and fine-tuning the Safety Zone idea, but forgot the big picture – one that talked about how the Malays of Patani can reconcile their differences with the predominantly Buddhist Thai state.

Soldier on foot patrol passing by school children in Pattani. Photo by Chaiwat Pumpuang

Political leaders were so eager to reduce or end insurgency violence in this historically contested region, they thought it best to focus their energy on reducing the attacks (and not much else). So far, the number of violent incidents has gone down dramatically. Naturally, the military has no qualms about taking credit for that.

Instead of examining the historical grievances of the Malays of Patani, Thai policymakers focus their energy on getting the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) to join MARA Patani at the negotiating table.

Many are pinning their hopes on Malaysia, the designated facilitator, to obtain BRN endorsement for the talks. But there is no indication that the BRN – the long-standing separatist movement that surfaced in the 1960s, will join the official track and sit with MARA Patani. Today, BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground.

Members said the leadership is not in a hurry to come to the negotiating table. BRN will only do so if their negotiators are properly trained and that the process is mediated by members of the international community, preferably countries with a strong record in conflict resolution.

Thailand and MARA Patani, meanwhile, are still bogged down with their own creation, Safety Zone, a pilot project where a ceasefire is supposed to be observed in a designated district.

Since MARA Patani doesn’t control the insurgents, the facilitator, Malaysia, had to ask BRN to observe the situation as well. After several rounds of discussions, technical officials on the two sides agreed on Joh I Rong district in Narathiwat.

MARA Patani was expecting to see a formal launch and signing ceremony of the “agreement” designating the zone. But the Thai technical officials said there was no need to ink anything because the process was still a “confidence-building measure”.

Work together

In a public statement dated May 23, MARA Patani’s spokesman insisted that signing the agreement was necessary because “it involves certain sensitive issues like legal, security and safety protection for its members who will participate in the SZ exercise”.

“Without signing the document there is no guarantee for them,” said Abu Hafez Al-Hakim.  

There was also the transfer of three prisoners to a holding centre in the vicinity of the Safe House, a co-working space where representatives from both sides will work together to observe the pilot project.

The refusal to ink the negotiated text was not the only reason that irked MARA Patani. Members of the umbrella organisation felt humiliated when Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan stole their thunder when they stated casually, without any fanfare, what was supposed to be a breakthrough in the dialogue process. It was not exactly what MARA Patani had in mind.

MARA Patani was hoping for a more formal announcement to reflect the importance of what it considered a breakthrough of sorts.

Already furious at the treatment from the Thai prime minister and his security tsar, MARA Patani came to the April 25 meeting determined to salvage its dignity by demanding that the Thai side sign the agreement. And when the Thai delegation refused, everything came to a halt.

“In my opinion, the much-awaited implementation of the Safety Zones will have to wait, at least for two reasons: First, until both parties can agree on the dispute over the document-signing issue, the implementation of the SZ will be put on hold. Secondly, the facilitator, Mr Zamzamin (Dato Ahmad Zamzamin bin Hashim), was exclusively appointed by (Prime Minister) Najib Razak on a contract basis that expires in February 2019,” Abu Hafez said.

PART II

Will electoral earthquakes free blocked peace in South?  

June 9, 2018
By Don Pathan

Special to The Nation

In a gesture to MARA Patani that all is not lost, Army Commander-in-chief General Chalermchai Sitthisart visited security checkpoints in Joh I Rong district on June 1. He was there to provide moral support to troops responsible for implementing the Safety Zone, Thai military officials said.

In spite of hiccups plaguing the pilot project, Thailand is still committed to this peace initiative – at least that was the message Chalermchai was sending out to MARA Patani and the world.

Thai officials at the policy level say they have been informed by the Malaysian facilitator that leaders of the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) have agreed to respect the Safety Zone ceasefire if and when the district is officially designated. No timeline was agreed upon, however.

Bangkok sees this as a gesture of goodwill from senior members of the BRN ruling council to the facilitator Dato Ahmad Zamzamin bin Hashim. The assurance is said to have been made last year at a meeting in which Zamzamin tried to convince BRN representatives to join the peace initiative being led by MARA Patani. Needless to say, the BRN declined the invitation.

Given the fluidity of the BRN chain-of-command, not to mention that their command-and-control from the very top to the cell level is untested, such an agreement will be difficult to manage, says a Thai military official working on the region.

The BRN is extremely bottom-heavy, with decisions to launch attacks made mainly at the local level.

For the combatants, it is a matter of grasping opportunity as it comes, usually employing roadside bombs to attack security units patrolling on foot or vehicles, followed by a brief gunfight. The strategic aim is for a “clean hit” without collateral damage. Government security officials are more or less sitting ducks, waiting to return fire.

As for the talks with MARA Patani, it is not clear how long Bangkok will continue on a course that some officials describe as a “vicious cycle”. So far, whenever Thai negotiators and MARA Patani have hailed “progress”, BRN operatives on the ground have carried out attacks to discredit the claims.

The BRN say the Safety Zone project will not change their strategy, which is to make the area ungovernable by attacking and discrediting government security apparatus.

The bombing blitz in the far South that hit more than 20 ATM machines on May 20 was a reminder to Thai authorities that the BRN is still a force to be reckoned with. The bombs were shrapnel-free devices detonated in almost deserted streets half an hour after people had broken their Ramadan fast. All the bombings were carried out in the heart of cities and, in most cases, just metres away from security checkpoints.

Local opinion was that the simultaneous attacks came in response to a dispute between teachers and a group of Muslim parents at the Anuban Pattani School over the banning of the Islamic headscarf for Muslim students.

But rebel sources deny this. They point out that traditionally at least one high-profile attack is conducted during the month of Ramadan, to remind the Thai government that the 2004 Tak Bai massacre of 78 unarmed Malay Muslim demonstrators – who suffocated after being stacked one atop the other in the back of military transport tracks – has not been forgotten. Seven were also shot dead at the protest site. 

Less than a week prior to the blitz, exactly one day before the start of Ramadan, separatist militants attacked four military outposts and a police station in Yala province’s Krong Pinang and Yaha districts. 

The overall number of attacks may have dropped over the past decade, but the militants continue to send a message that they are willing an able to carry on the fight with the same intensity as when this wave of insurgency surfaced 14 years ago.

Stakeholders in this peace initiative are now waiting anxiously to see Kuala Lumpur’s next move. Many observers believe Malaysia’s Zamzamin, the designated facilitator, will be replaced as he is deemed too close to former prime minister Najib Razak.

For the BRN, it doesn’t matter whether Zamzamin stays or goes. They see themselves as the most important players because they control the course of insurgency violence and thus any peace negotiations will have to be with them. The unfortunate part for Thai authorities is that the BRN is not in a hurry to come to the negotiating table.

How long Thailand will ride this roller-coaster with MARA Patani remains unclear. But a growing number of Thai officials believe the upcoming election in Thailand, which could be as early as February, along with major changes in Malaysia’s political landscape, means serious soul-searching is in order for the peace initiative for the far South. Whether that means internationalising the process, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict in Thailand’s far South.

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