Shinawatra’s End

Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra (Credit: Facebook posting)

Leaked Phone Call

Thailand’s Shinawatra political dynasty faces its gravest crisis yet as Prime Minister Paetongtarn finds herself trapped in a political firestorm that threatens to end her family’s decade-long dominance in Thai politics.

At 38, the inexperienced leader has become the centre of a scandal that exposes not only her political naivety but also the fragile foundations upon which her administration rests.

The crisis erupted when a private phone conversation between Paetongtarn and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen was leaked on social media platforms. In the recording, the Thai prime minister referred to her own military commanders as “opponents” and dismissed the Thai regional commander responsible for northeastern security as someone who “just wanted to look tough”.

She also addressed Hun Sen as “uncle”, a term of endearment that reflects the long-standing friendship between the Shinawatra and Hun families.

What Paetongtarn characterised as a “negotiation tactic” has been condemned by critics as a betrayal of national security and dignity. The leaked conversation has triggered mass protests demanding her resignation and thrown her government into chaos, threatening the fragile coalition that brought her Pheu Thai Party to power.

The phone call centred on resolving escalating tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border, specifically around the disputed Emerald Triangle where Thailand, Cambodia and Laos converge.

The standoff intensified after several provocative incidents: 1) a Thai-built friendship pavilion was burnt down in March 2025; 2) Cambodian forces dug trenches that Thai officials claimed extended 200 metres into the Thai territory and; 3) the shooting incident on 28 May 2025 that resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier, with both sides claiming self-defence.

Despite an agreement reached on 8 June 2025 between border task force commanders to withdraw troops and fill the disputed trenches, implementation stalled. Thailand failed to restore normal operating hours at border checkpoints as promised, prompting Cambodia to reduce its own checkpoint hours in retaliation. The tit-for-tat escalation continued, creating the volatile atmosphere that led to the fateful phone conversation.

Outstanding Dispute

Thai-Cambodian border disputes have been a recurring feature of the bilateral relations since the colonial period, with boundaries drawn by French colonial powers through gunboat diplomacy. The two nations have long used these territorial disagreements as convenient sources of nationalist sentiment when domestic political legitimacy wanes.

The irony is particularly sharp given that both countries share cultural traditions – including martial arts known as Muay Thai in Thailand and Kun Khmer in Cambodia – practised throughout the Theravada Buddhist region.

As French orientalist Ernest Renan observed, nation-building requires people to forget certain things while remembering others. The problem for Thailand and Cambodia is their selective memory focuses on grievances rather than shared heritage.

The 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling awarding the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia continues to rankle Thai nationalists, while discussions of joint maritime resource exploration in the Gulf of Thailand sparked fears about compromising Thai sovereignty over Koh Kood Island. Historical mistrust consistently undermines cooperation efforts between the two nations.

Power Struggle

The leaked call exposed deep rifts between Paetongtarn’s civilian government and the Royal Thai Army. Military leaders withheld information about the Cambodian trenches from the foreign affairs and defence ministries, releasing details to the media only after the 8 June 2025 shooting incident. This breach of the standard operating procedure, which typically requires diplomatic channels to be informed first, suggests a deliberate attempt by the military to achieve political gain.

The army appears to have emerged as the primary beneficiary of this crisis. They avoided scrutiny over their information handling, secured budget allocations from the parliament and positioned themselves as patriotic defenders of national sovereignty.

Even the opposition People’s Party, typically critical of military overreach, has remained notably silent, unwilling to risk being labelled unpatriotic.

The tit-for-tat continued with both refusing to discuss the overlapping dispute bilaterally and making a formal request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the territorial disputes around the Emerald Triangle. On 23 May 2025, for example, Paetongtarn – speaking to the media following a meeting on transnational crime with all of the government’s security bigwigs – called on the international community to join Thailand in cracking down on Cambodia-based scam centres.

Cambodia’s suggestions that the border dispute with Thailand around the Emerald Triangle be brought to the ICJ irked Thailand badly, as it placed Cambodia on a legal and moral high ground. In reality, however, both sides undermined their own narrative of peace as they continuously beat the war drums and spin things unabashedly to round up domestic support.

Two Intertwined Families

For years, Thaksin and Hun Sen were courting each other. When Thaksin’s camp was in trouble, Hun Sen extended hospitality to Thaksin’s supporters fleeing arrest after the 2006 coup that ousted him from power.

Their children, Paetongtarn and Manet, also enjoyed cordial relations. Their governments went as far as reviving a two-decade-old MoU on overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand and talked about profit sharing from the exploration of natural resources in the overlapping area.

Today, like Thaksin, Hun Sen is experiencing difficulties in making sure that Prime Minister Hun Manet governs the country without much obstacles and that his family continues to reign over Cambodia for the unforeseeable future. Hun Sen stepped down as the prime minister in August 2023 after four decades of rule, leaving Manet a big shoe to fill.

But unlike Thailand, where a critical press and a rowdy public constantly give Paetongtarn, or any government of the day, a big headache, Cambodia has no such outlets or adequate institutions for its people to express their grievances.

The Cambodian Parliament of 125 MPs has only five lawmakers in the “opposition” bench, and Hun Sen’s children run the country’s media outlets, including the online ones. Speaking out against the family has its consequences.

For Hun Sen, the decision to leak the conversation represents a calculated political maneuver designed to elevate his son, Manet, as a national hero. The ex-leader sought Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s territorial claims over the Emerald Triangle, believing this diplomatic victory would strengthen his son’s position during a challenging transition period.

When it became clear that Thaksin and Paetongtarn would not sacrifice their political survival for Manet’s political ambitions, Hun Sen decided to burn bridges with his long-time allies. The leak served his domestic political needs while demonstrating his assessment that Thaksin’s political usefulness had expired.

Manet – a West Point graduate once described by an American military officer as possessing high integrity – now finds himself defending his father’s social media diplomacy tactics, claiming such methods are common in modern governance. However, few precedents exist for using leaked private conversations.

This crisis strikes at a particularly vulnerable moment for the Shinawatra family. Thaksin returned from exile in August 2023 believing his legal troubles were resolved, only to face continued challenges, including unresolved lese majeste charges and accusations of feigning illness to avoid jail. 

His sister Yingluck, still in exile following the 2014 coup, was ordered in May 2025 to pay THB10 bn in compensation for losses from her administration’s rice-pledging scheme. Her inability to return safely to Thailand represents the family’s unfinished business.

Why is She the Prime Minister?

The Pheu Thai Party’s decision to install Paetongtarn as prime minister – following Srettha Thavisin’s removal – was driven more by loyalty to Thaksin than confidence in her capabilities. Party members acknowledged privately that she lacked the experience for the role, but her appointment made the facilitation of continued deference to her father that much easier.

Moreover, it was not clear why Paetongtarn was not coached by those veteran politicians that she surrounded herself with. Perhaps they were so occupied with the big picture that they forgot that the devil is always in the details. Perhaps they took comfort in the belief that Hun Sen and Thaksin are old friends and assumed that friends do not stab each other in the back.

Of all the people, they should know that nothing lasts forever in Thailand and Cambodia’s cut-throat politics. Perhaps the cross-border aspect of it threw them off.

But the writing was always on the wall. Party members knew full well that Paetongtarn was not cut out for the job, but they insisted that her name be put forth to the parliament to replace Srettha Thavisin, who was removed by the Constitutional Court in August 2024.

The leaked conversation provided a convenient pretext for coalition partners already seeking an exit. Bhumjaithai Party, the coalition’s second-largest member, was about to be kicked out of the coalition due to disputes over cabinet seat allocation. The border controversy gave them a face-saving opportunity to withdraw while claiming to defend national honour.

This defection threatens the stability of Paetongtarn’s government and raises questions about the viability of the Faustian bargain that Thaksin and Pheu Thai struck with conservative political elites to form the current coalition and to exclude the reform-minded Move Forward Party from power.

That arrangement, built on expedience rather than shared vision, was always destined to be temporary.

The Dynasty in Crisis

The current crisis may indeed mark the beginning of the end for the Shinawatra dynasty in Thai politics. Paetongtarn’s inexperience, combined with her father’s diminished influence and mounting legal challenges, has left the family politically isolated and vulnerable.

Sources in the Thai army suggest they could work with the opposition People’s Party, indicating that cooperation with the Thaksin camp has become untenable. However, how the so-called Orange Shirts (People’s Party supporters) and the military could coexist remains unclear, and many observers caution against counting Thaksin out entirely, given his history of political comebacks.

The tragedy of this crisis lies not only in its immediate political casualties but also in its demonstration of how quickly personal relationships and private conversations can escalate into matters of national security and international relations. For a political dynasty built on populist appeal, this episode exposes fundamental weaknesses that may prove insurmountable. As Thailand navigates this political turbulence, the broader question remains whether the country’s democratic institutions can emerge stronger from this crisis or whether it will deepen the cycle of instability that has plagued Thai politics for decades. The answer may well determine not just the fate of the Shinawatra family but the trajectory of Thai democracy itself.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Funeral procession in the Patani, one of the few moments where Melayu can vent their anger towards the state. (File Photo: CHAROON THONGNUAL)

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Funeral procession for Thai soldiers in Pattani. (CHAIWAT PUPUANG)

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Thailand: Of Uyghur Deportations and Backlash

Don Pathan
(www.stratsea.com)

Uyghur protesters in front of the Thai Embassy in Washington, DC, following the deportation of 40 detainees.

Introdduction

In late October 2024, rumours circulated in Bangkok’s diplomatic circle that Thailand would hand over the remaining 48 Uyghurs in a Thai prison and Immigration Detention Centers to China in February 2025. Despite strong objections from the international community and human rights groups, this was seen as a “gift” from Thailand to China to commemorate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was the brain behind this idea. As the father of the current prime minister and the nominal head of a powerful political machine dominating Thailand’s political scene for more than two decades, nobody stood in his way. Reasons as to why the previous government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha did not deport the Uyghurs did not seem to matter.

If anything, Prayuth was in a better position to do so. Being the chief of the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, from power, his government was at first isolated by the West, particularly the United States. The isolation pushed Thailand closer to China, leading to, among others, an important submarine deal.

What Happened to the Detainees?

The Prayut administration did not know what they were waiting for, but they played that waiting game and kept the Uyghurs in Thai detention centres. They knew that a deportation would invite the wrath of the international community, potentially isolating Thailand further.

Adding to the drama was a jailbreak (some said it was assisted by officials) at the Songkhla detention centre in November 2017, where 25 Uyghurs escaped to make their way to Malaysia. The Malaysian government later resettled them in Turkey. Beijing raised a stink, but bilateral ties normalised quickly because China needed Malaysia’s support for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, no Malaysian leader was about to compromise his standing in the Muslim world.

Thailand, on the other hand, was not exactly a champion of anything.

The 40 Uyghur who were sent back to China on 27 February 2024 by the Thai government were part of some 220 men, women and children who were caught on the Thailand-Malaysia border in March 2014 as they were about to cross into Malaysia (scores of others were arrested in separate occasions around the same time period).

Shortly afterwards, about 170 women and children were resettled in Turkey, but around 100 men were transferred to the Chinese authorities a week later.

Worse, the following month (17 August 2015) saw suspected Uyghur terrorists bomb the Erawan Shrine in the heart of Bangkok, killing 20 and injuring 125. The shrine is popular among Chinese visitors, who make up the majority of the dead and wounded.

The remaining 50 or so Uyghurs were charged with illegal entry and served their jail time; afterward, they remained in Thailand’s detention centres under no clear justification other than the lack of political will to take decisive action on the leaders’ part. Some had passed away due to illness, while five were serving prison time for attacking security guards as they were escaping detention.

China never let up with its demand for Thailand to deport the rest. To avoid further headaches, Thai law enforcement was told not to detain any Uyghur coming through the country. They were told to direct any incoming Uyghurs to Malaysia.

“Thailand is a very strong US partner, a strong historical ally,” Rubio said during his Senate hearing on 15 January 2025. “That is an area where I think diplomacy could really achieve results because of how important that relationship is and how close it is.” Or so he thought.

Rubio, a leading critic of Beijing, co-sponsored the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang unless free of forced labour. His stance on human rights in China has subjected him to Chinese sanctions since 2020.

It appeared that the Thailand government did not care about what Rubio had to say. Even if they did, it probably would not matter, as Thaksin was already set on his effort to please the Chinese.

On 14 March 2025, Rubio hit back and announced “visa restrictions on current and former officials from the Government of Thailand responsible for, or complicit in, the forced return of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand on February 27.”

One day before the US order on visa restrictions, the European Parliament condemned the deportation and “urges Thailand to halt any further forced returns to countries where people’s lives are at risk.”

The resolution also urged Thailand to reform its lèse majesté law (Article 112) and called on the European Commission to “leverage free trade agreement negotiations to press Thailand to reform the country’s lese-majesty law, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees, and to ratify all core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.”

China was quick to hit back but directed its comment to Washington. “On the one hand, the US engages in indiscriminate deportations of illegal immigrants, yet, on the other, it points fingers at and smears other countries’ legitimate law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and pressures others,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, describing the United States’ actions as “typical bullying”.

While the fear among human rights activists that the remaining Uyghurs would be deported to China did not subside, it was not until January 2025 that everybody sensed something was not right; a group of Thai government officials visited the Uyghur detainees and politely asked them if they would like to return to China voluntarily. They were asked to sign the deportation paper, which they rejected outright.

Words of the meeting got out and the activists as well as opposition parties responded in full force, demanding an explanation from the government. Some of the detainees staged a hunger strike to protest what they saw as a ploy to get them to agree on the deportation.

The situation had gone quiet and the Uyghurs ended their hunger strike. Then, on 27 February 2025, it was rumoured that the Immigration Police were preparing to deport the Uyghur detainees. Reporters and activists went to the detention centre in Bangkok where they were held, but as the vehicles pulled out of the station, reporters were blocked. The rest was history.

Dumbstruck by Rubio’s harsh responses, Thailand insisted that the deportation was voluntary despite evidence to the contrary.

Raised Questions

A trip was organised for a group of journalists to tag along with Thai ministers to Xinjiang to visit the returnees. Observers said it was a sham, but the government insisted that it was not.

According to photos released by the government, the deportees were united with their relatives, but their immediate family members were sent to Turkey by Thai authorities over a decade ago.

Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai and Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong display photos showing that the Uyghurs returned by Thailand arrived safely in Xinjiang and were reunited with their waiting relatives on Feb. 27, 2025.

Critics and activists came out in full force, particularly the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces who had looked up to Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong and considered him to be one of their own, especially as one of the leaders of a political party from the region. They had hoped that he would stand up against the deportation of the Uyghur detainees.

Asmadee Bueheng, a writer from Pattani, said that for Thai and Malay activists, deportation was about human rights. However, for local Islamic leaders, it was about Muslims being mistreated.

Moreover, many Thais wrongly assumed that the government, being democratically elected, would be more sympathetic to the voices of human rights activists. They felt let down, especially those who had given the government the benefit of the doubt for changing their words on military and constitutional reforms.

Concluding Thoughts

For the time being, officials in Bangkok are putting on a brave face, playing down Washington’s sanctions on government officials. However, it was nothing less than a major embarrassment, considering the fact that the two countries are treaty allies. This is not to mention the fact that Washington was quick to point out to Bangkok the repeated offers to resettle the Uyghur.

The United States has in the past imposed sanctions on Thailand, suspending military aid after coups. This marked the first time that the sanction targeted government officials, although the United States has not identified these individuals. How this will affect the bilateral ties between these so-called longstanding allies, on the other hand, remains to be seen. However, there is no indication that the sanction will slow down Thaksin and his quest to steer Thailand in the direction that serves his personal and political ambitions.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.