THAILAND-CAMBODIA BORDER CRISIS

OPINION

The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis

Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction

 

Don Pathan

August 26, 2025 17:05 JST

 

Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.

More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.

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Opinion

The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis

Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction

Don Pathan

August 26, 2025 17:05 JST

20250825 Thai Cambo 1

Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.

More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.

Just this past week, a group of Thai senators called on the government to end scholarships for Cambodian students, accusing them of being "ungrateful." The move followed an earlier decision by acting Defense Minister Gen. Nattapol Nakpanit, who ordered all Cambodians at the National Defence College to pack up and leave the country.

Similarly, Ramkhamhaeng University in Bangkok revoked the honorary doctorate degree it had granted to Hun Sen, the president of the Cambodian Senate. The Cambodian strongman said this measure was unnecessary because he had already flushed the degree down the toilet.

Little consideration is given to the fact that the Thai economy -- particularly industries and factories in the northeastern provinces -- depends heavily on cheap Cambodian labor. More than 1 million Cambodian nationals work in Thailand under a bilateral arrangement.

And while the Thai armed forces are enjoying an outpouring of support, civil-military relations have deteriorated as nobody is talking about reforms for fear of sounding unpatriotic.

The absence of strong political leadership in Thailand has created a free-for-all situation in which just about everybody is pushing their own agenda. Nationalists are talking about collecting donations to purchase drones for military units along the border, while others are suggesting migrant workers from Myanmar should replace the Cambodians -- an off-the-cuff idea that overlooks the fact migrant workers tend to be regular fixtures in border communities.

Such arrangements were achieved through years of negotiations between government agencies and the private sector, who realize that fairness is the best policy when dealing with migrant workers from neighboring countries.

Still, many Thais believe they possess the moral high ground because Thailand provides these foreign workers the means for their livelihood. They ignore the fact that these back-breaking jobs are shunned by Thai nationals who have other options, such as going abroad for higher pay and better working conditions.

To escape constant harassment, many Cambodians have opted to return home. Needless to say, Thailand's private sector is feeling the heat.

Suspended Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra arrives at the Constitutional Court to testify in a high-profile ethics case in Bangkok on Aug. 21, 2025.    © Reuters

If recent history teaches us anything, it is that bilateral ties between Thailand and Cambodia are usually quickly patched up after border clashes. This is because deep down, Thailand and Cambodia know that for the sake of their people, it is better to cooperate than fight. But the lure of the border disputes never fails to attract political leaders looking to enhance their national standing. The two countries don't want war, they want what war can bring: national unity and the opportunity to solidify their credentials.

But nothing comes easy in this bilateral relationship, which comes with annoying pretexts. This time around, Bangkok cited suppression of scam centers in Cambodia as an excuse for extended border restrictions. Hun Sen was furious.

The situation deteriorated quickly when Hun Sen on June 18 leaked a private phone conversation he had with suspended Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, during which she appeared to be kowtowing to the Cambodian leader while criticizing her regional commander's handling of the border dispute.

Disagreements over the border demarcation between the two countries have been an issue since the colonial period and are often exploited by political leaders. The dispute over the world-famous Preah Vihear Temple reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, on two separate occasions. The ICJ ruled in Cambodia's favor both times: first in 1962 concerning the temple's ownership, and again in 2013 regarding the surrounding area. Cambodia has also sought the ICJ's judgment on the current dispute over the Ta Muen Thom temple. However, Thailand insists on using a bilateral mechanism, likely fearing a repeat of history.

And while the Thai government is picking up the pieces shattered by the embarrassing phone conversation, the Thai military is currently enjoying enormous public support because of the border standoff. A survey in early August by the National Institute Development Administration of 1,310 people nationwide revealed that most Thais trust and are satisfied with the military's role in addressing the Thai-Cambodian conflict. They expressed strong dissatisfaction with the government and the foreign ministry.

From the minute the conflict started, both countries began reached out to members of the international community to press their case, trying to convince the world that they weren't the ones who fired the first shot. Yet overseas onlookers were more interested in understanding the nature of the problem and how to resolve it.

While Cambodia constantly pushed for outside mediation and involvement in conflict resolution, Thailand insisted on resolving the conflict bilaterally. Cambodia succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council to convene an emergency meeting in New York, but failed to get the council to forward the case to the ICJ.

According to one government official from an ASEAN member state, the Cambodian diplomats were met by a much better prepared and better staffed delegation from Thailand. "The Thais were sophisticated and technical in their messaging, citing the Geneva Conventions and breaches of anti-mine and anti-cluster munitions obligations," the person said. "By contrast, Cambodia's position was undermined -- fairly or unfairly -- by the incident involving the Thai hospital [and attacks on other civilian targets, such as schools and convenience stores]. ... Regardless of the facts, that episode loomed large in the minds of many in New York."

In situations like these, the truth becomes almost irrelevant because there was no credible third party to verify what actually happened on the ground. In New York, it ultimately comes down to who presented their case more convincingly.

During the five-day standoff, Thailand's superior and more sophisticated firepower allowed its armed forces to focus their attacks on military targets and come across as respectful of the rules of engagement. But the generals need to understand that the world doesn't see the government and its armed forces as two separate entities.

While the "we are the good guy" narrative might go down well for domestic consumption, it does nothing in winning support from the international community, much less addressing the root causes of the border problem with Cambodia.

Clashing Narratives, Colliding Histories

 

Thai and Cambodian army officers shake hands at Chong Bok. Credit: Royal Thai Army
www.stratsea.com 

Introduction

The morning of 24 July 2025 started off with a brief but fierce gunfight between Thai and Cambodian troops dispatched to a poorly demarcated area around a disputed ancient Hindu temple, Prasat Ta Muen Thom, which is accessible by the people of both sides.

As expected, Thailand and Cambodia accused each other of starting the fight. The risk for deadly confrontation was obvious given recent developments and the military buildup in the area. But neither side had the political courage to rethink their strategy for fear of looking weak in the eyes of their constituency. 

Lack of unity between the political leaders in Bangkok and the Thai army made policy coordination that much more difficult. Cambodia, on the other hand, was getting on Thai troops’ last good nerve with the digging of trenches around the disputed area earlier this year.

To recap, armed clashes erupted on 28 May 2025, resulting in the death of one Cambodian soldier. Ten days later, on 8 June 2025, regional commanders from both sides met and agreed to fill up the trenches and withdraw their soldiers from the disputed location. They shook hands and posed for a photo and then retreated to their previous positions before the confrontation in late May.

But the absence of clashes does not spell peace. Cambodia was determined to take this case, along with other disputed territories on the border, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the Thai government rejected the idea, saying it is committed to bilateral negotiations through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and will not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction.

Things went downhill quickly on 18 June 2025 after Cambodia’s President of the Senate Hun Sen leaked a private phone conversation he had with the then Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra three days earlier.

Besides the appearance of kowtowing to Cambodia, Paetongtarn made a critical remark about one of her senior military commanders, referring to him as an “opponent” who just “wanted to look tough.”

Street protests erupted in Bangkok as demonstrators called for her resignation.

Colonial Legacy Complicates Resolution

Asking Thailand and Cambodia leaders to think constructively about border affairs may be unrealistic given that the disputes are rooted in the colonial past—a legacy from which Thailand has struggled to move forward.

Thailand’s refusal to accept its colonial legacy goes beyond simply lamenting past losses. Consider Siam’s “lost” territories to British Malaya: the surrender of what are now northern Malaysian states – Kedah and Kelantan – continues to shape the Thai national psyche. “It was ours, and we gave it to the British for peace’s sake,” goes the common refrain.

The Thai state does not make a big issue of these “losses”, partly because Malaysia does not politicise the issue or rub it in Thailand’s face. Demarcation along the Thai-Malaysian political border is conducted by technical officials from both sides without incident, although separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South serves as a reminder that post-colonial nation-state construction is never without challenges.

Nonetheless, Thailand is not alone in dealing with historical hangups. In 2003, deep-rooted resentment in Cambodia resulted in an anti-Thai riot that ended in an arson attack against the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was reported to have said Angkor Wat, one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, belongs to Thailand.

Instead of making the hard choice between explaining to their respective citizens about the injustice of the colonial past and the need to come to terms with it, Thai and Cambodian political leaders took the easy way out by exploiting this resentment for quick political gains. 

International Arena Becomes Battlefield

The competition extends beyond the battlefield as military actions coincided with intense diplomatic outreach, with both Thailand and Cambodia attempting to control the narrative. Both countries have turned to ASEAN, the United Nations and members of the international community to present their respective cases.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to an urgent meeting “to stop Thailand’s aggression” but fail to get the Council to issue a resolution to call for an immediate ceasefire.

Thailand, in turn, has accused Cambodia of committing war crimes for targeting civilians and of violating a major international convention, the Ottawa Treaty, for planting fresh mines around Prasat Ta Muen Thom. Cambodia denied the allegations and added that the blast site was well within Cambodian territory.

Thailand fell short of calling on the treaty’s secretariat to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident. The blast site is part of a larger minefield, known as the K5 Belt, where the Thailand/China-backed Khmer Rouge fought the Vietnam-supported People’s Republic of Kampuchea throughout the 1980s. Both sides had flooded the area with landmines that, 50 years later, have yet to be fully removed. Neither Thailand nor Cambodia is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Thailand is unable to convince members of the international community of its justification to reject Cambodia’s proposal to allow ICJ to rule on the overlapping claims of the Ta Muen Thom Temple. The country has not been able to move on from the 1962 ICJ ruling that, based on the French map, gave the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia. Thailand reluctantly accepted the ruling but continued to dispute the area surrounding the temple.

Pursuing the road towards ICJ may put Cambodia in a positive light in the eyes of the international community, but – as one Bangkok-based diplomat noted – this path was undermined when Cambodian rockets landed on Thai public schools, hospitals and a convenience store.

Taking the Moral High Ground

With a high number of displaced people and damaged properties, both sides appeared to have exercised some degree of restraint and confined the fighting to the border provinces. No major infrastructure or commercial assets in the border region have come under attack.

Footage of Thai villagers and school children running for cover prompted Thai citizens, particularly the conservative nationalists, to inflict more punishment on Cambodia. Their past public campaign forced previous Thai governments to go against Cambodia’s effort to obtain the United Nations World Heritage Site status for the Preah Vihear temple, which was granted in 2008.

Thailand’s deployment of F-16 fighter jets demonstrated the country’s superior military power. By limiting air and artillery attacks to military targets, Thailand appeared to be seeking international respect for embracing international norms.

Thailand’s race to the moral high ground may not be an easy climb, however. The Cambodian government was quick to point out that Thai airstrikes and artillery fire had damaged the Preah Vihear temple, not to mention the use of internationally prohibited cluster munitions.

In a statement dated 25 July 2025, the Thai army said cluster munitions were used for military targets only. The problem with cluster bombs is that a significant percentage of submunitions fail to detonate upon impact, leaving behind unexploded ordnance, turning the area into de facto landmines.

In the past, the aftermath of border gunfights followed a similar pattern: Thai and Cambodian troops would sit together the next day, eating lunch with their bare hands in a traditional style, showing the world that both countries have patched things up and moved on. This time, however, the fallout will be more costly in many ways. Lives have been lost, and raw emotions have poured out on social media, creating narratives beyond the control of any state agency’s public relations machines. Anyone with a mobile phone can now report on developments as they see fit.

Mediation in Kuala Lumpur

With Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim mediating the negotiation, Thailand and Cambodia came face-to-face in Malaysia as representatives from the United States and China observed the talks. Cambodia got the ceasefire that they wanted, starting on the midnight of 28 July 2025. The two sides vowed to meet regularly with Malaysia, while fellow ASEAN Member States (AMS) will serve as observers.

The mediation process in Kuala Lumpur. Credit: Reuters Photo

In the coming days, Thailand is expected to tell the world that its military might had forced the Cambodians to stand down. Domestically, the Thai army will use this opportunity to strengthen its institution and remain politically assertive amid a growing call for reform, which, in Thailand’s context, means armed forces should stay out of politics.

For Cambodia, the narrative is likely to centre on how a small nation stood up to a neighbour, one that failed to diminish Cambodia’s fighting spirit despite its superior firepower. Cambodia will use this crisis to solidify Prime Minister Hun Manet’s nationalist credentials. But given Cambodians’ restlessness due to economic downturn, this will not be easy.

The transition of power from strongman Hun Sen to his son, Manet, has been difficult, as the young leader has yet to convince his countrymen that he can lead them to a better future.

After leading Cambodia for four decades, his father left him with big shoes to fill. The world watched Hun Sen as he went through wars and genocide, emerging politically powerful and financially wealthy. The same cannot be said for Cambodia’s people, who are currently struggling to make ends meet.

Ordinary Cambodians are frustrated with the current conditions, but they are without outlets to voice their complaints. Indeed, the Hun family members control all media platforms, both online and offline. The National Assembly has 125 seats with Hun Sen as the president of the ruling Cambodia People’s Party; five seats are occupied by friendly oppositions.

Cambodia is turning to Vietnam and China while shutting down economic ties with Thailand. Whether this will offset the loss of income from one million Cambodian migrant workers who depend on Thailand for employment, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

The Pheu Thai-led government had initially clashed with the army over how to handle border affairs with Cambodia—specifically whether to close checkpoints as punishment or keep them open while pursuing diplomatic solutions. However, the Pheu Thai Party-led administration has been effectively sidelined after Hun Sen leaked the phone conversation, forcing the government to run for cover.

Following a petition from a group of senators, the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspended Paetongtarn from her post pending an ethics investigation. Since then, the Thai government has been on the defensive as the public calls for either a fresh election or the prime minister’s resignation.

Few expect the government to survive beyond the first quarter of next year. The army, since then, has been pretty much calling the shots on the border affairs.

It is not clear why Hun Sen chose to turn on the Shinawatra, a long-time family friend. Many theories have been floated, but the one that made the most sense was Thaksin’s refusal to push through the offshore gas deal in the Gulf of Thailand.

The 27,000-square-km of gas-rich area is claimed by both countries. Talk of a win-win arrangement between the two governments kicked off a storm of criticism in Thailand against the Shinawatra family, whom the public accused of standing to gain from the deal. According to one estimate, the disputed area is believed to hold at least US$300bn worth of reserves.

The clashes that erupted last Thursday claimed the lives of more than 38 people on both sides and displaced more than 300,000. In Kuala Lumpur, the two leaders agreed to meet regularly, starting with their regional military commanders. They also agreed on direct communications between the leaders and their defence ministers.

But there is nothing really new about this, as the two countries have gone through this before. The solution to the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia may not necessarily lie in the bilateral mechanism but in the internal politics of Thailand and Cambodia. Considering the internal crisis that the two countries are going through, mustering the needed political courage to make peace with one another may not be high on the agenda of either country.

Tags: Feature Thailand

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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When Separatist Bombs Shake Thailand’s Tourist Shores

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Explosive Ordnance Disposal officers neutralising bombs in Phuket.

IEDs in Tourist Destinations

Actions speak louder than words. In Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, where a two-decade separatist insurgency has claimed over 7,700 lives, the dominant rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), keeps its intentions shrouded in mystery. 

Such tactics have irritated the Thai security apparatus ever since this wave of insurgency returned to the Malay-speaking South over two decades ago. It will continue to be that way as long as the Thai state and other stakeholders, such as Malaysia, do not support BRN in setting up a recognisable and functional political wing that can engage and explain its stance to the world.

The unearthing of 11 improvised explosive devices (IED) in Krabi and Phuket – two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast – sent a shockwave in all directions. This is despite efforts by policymakers in Bangkok to minimise the incident by not linking it to the insurgency in the far south.

The two suspects caught at a police checkpoint in Phang-nga are from Pattani. Their confessions led police to more hidden bombs: one in an abandoned motorcycle near Phuket International Airport, two buried at Patong Beach and one at Promthep Cape.

The Australian and Canadian governments, on 1 July and 4 July 2025, respectively, issued separate updated terrorism warnings to their citizens travelling to Thailand in response to the arrests of two suspects.

One of the two IEDs found in Krabi was planted on a seawall at Ao Nang Beach near the commercial area; the second was discovered beneath a banyan tree at Noppharat Thara Beach.

All IEDs were deactivated by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers using high-power water cannons.

The then Defence Minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the conflict in the far south and urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage to avoid possible chaos. Security officials at the operational level, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.

Policymakers and security officials agreed that the bomb size – which, according to one military intelligence officer, had an explosive radius of about 10 metres – was designed to create psychological impact and discredit the state security apparatus rather than take lives or inflict major physical damage.

The two suspects, while providing information leading to the locations of other IEDs, claimed they were merely hired to drive the vehicle, according to media reports quoting unnamed official sources.

True to form, BRN neither confirms nor denies its involvement, though during military operations its negotiators occasionally issue statements or videos reiterating demands. Insights into the group’s mindset emerged when chief negotiator Anas Abdulrahman spoke to the media briefly after high-level talks with Thai negotiators.

Faltering Peace Process

BRN made no public statement about the IEDs but indicated that in the absence of a formal peace process, increased violence intensity and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable. The attack against the Sungai Kolok district office exemplified this, occurring after secret negotiations over a Ramadhan ceasefire were exhausted, setting the stage for combatant intervention.

The last such press conference followed a February 2024 meeting, where both sides agreed in principle to work on the roadmap for the talks—the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP). Since then, BRN has largely stayed out of the public eye, with sporadic video statements offering only fragmented glimpses into the movement and its demands.

The peace process began unravelling soon after the February meeting when Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, a key advisor to the ruling Pheu Thai Party, publicly criticised the JCPP.

He slammed the Peace Dialogue Panel for failing to curb BRN violence and accused international mediators and donors of neglecting Thailand’s national security. The Panel was badly isolated, and it may not recover, as hardliners pushed through uncompromising recommendations, like classifying BRN as a “terrorist” organisation as a way to pressure Malaysia – the designated mediator/facilitator – to deport the movement’s leaders.

In the second half of 2024, the Thai government was in disarray after the Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for ethics violations in a cabinet appointment. The cabinet’s dissolution left the Peace Dialogue Panel obsolete—a status that persists today, as no new team has been appointed. 

Incoming Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra inherited the southern Thai crisis. Unwilling to burden the political novice, senior officials in the security sector pushed the agenda way down in the list.

Bangkok now insists it will only resume talks if the BRN halts violence—a demand the rebels reject, arguing that de-escalation or ceasefire must be negotiated and that international observers must be allowed to monitor any ceasefire on the ground.

Thailand’s refusal to compromise frustrated Malaysia, the designated mediator for the so-called peace process, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the facilitator who has been trying to reached out to the army for serious discussion on how to move the peace process forward. But he would come to learn that the lack of political will applies to everybody in the Thai government, not just the army.

Escalating Violence

Paetongtarn’s political inexperience was exposed last month when Cambodian strongman Hun Sen leaked a recording of her criticising Thailand’s military over the border standoff with Cambodia. The scandal damaged both her credibility and the Shinawatra family’s political standing.

Some observers say this could be the beginning of the end of the family that has been dominating Thai politics for more than two decades.

Meanwhile, violence in the Deep South has escalated over the past six years, with a sharp uptick in March 2025 after Thailand rejected BRN’s counter-proposal for Ramadhan ceasefire. Talks collapsed, and the rebels launched a bold assault on Sungai Kolok’s district office in Narathiwat on 8 March 2025, killing two security personnel and wounding 10 before detonating a car bomb.

These locally hired security officials, known as Defence Volunteers, have been told to quit their jobs and to refrain from acting as spies for the Thai security apparatus, or else they would be considered legitimate targets.

The shooting death of a senior member in the BRN military wing, Abdulroning Lateh, on 18 April 2025, triggered further retaliation, including attacks on monks and civilians—a breach of the group’s usual rules of engagement.

The incident prompted a wide range of condemnation from civil society organisations and direct intervention from The Patani, a political action group who called on the BRN leadership to respect the commitment they made with members of the international community and to respect humanitarian principles, international norms, and civility.

BRN later reaffirmed its policy of avoiding civilian targets in a press statement but made no reference to any particular incident. The message, aimed at reining in fighters, eventually restored attacks to “legitimate” military and government targets. 

Conflict and Political Crisis

Combatants stepping out of line and violating their own rules of engagement is uncommon but does occur, as seen in the targeting of soft targets to avenge Abdulroning’s assassination.

Operations outside the Malay-speaking South have also occurred periodically, usually as a retaliation against Thai security forces for alleged violation of the unwritten ground rule. In August 2019, for example, Bangkok was hit by six small bombs as the city hosted meetings of Southeast Asian foreign ministers and their counterparts from the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and other world powers.

In August 2016, 13 bombing incidents struck Hua Hin and four upper Southern provinces – Phuket, Surat Thani, Trang, and Phang-nga – in a 48-hour span in what then-prime minister Prayut Chan-ocha called “an attempt to create chaos and confusion.”

Today, Thailand has once again found itself in a political crisis, with the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspending Prime Minister Paetongtarn pending an investigation into her conduct over the phone conversation with Hun Sen. The Pheu Thai party is also under pressure from the opposition and the public to call fresh elections or face a vote of no confidence.

Peace talks are expected to resume if and when the People’s Party (PP) takes control of the government. The party has shown willingness to accommodate the demands of BRN and the Malay-speaking region. How far PP is willing to go, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

But if the current coalition survives the ongoing political storm, violence in the far south will continue to rise, as neither side is willing to reconsider their current course of action.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

• 
  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

• 
  

Shinawatra’s End

Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra (Credit: Facebook posting)

Leaked Phone Call

Thailand’s Shinawatra political dynasty faces its gravest crisis yet as Prime Minister Paetongtarn finds herself trapped in a political firestorm that threatens to end her family’s decade-long dominance in Thai politics.

At 38, the inexperienced leader has become the centre of a scandal that exposes not only her political naivety but also the fragile foundations upon which her administration rests.

The crisis erupted when a private phone conversation between Paetongtarn and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen was leaked on social media platforms. In the recording, the Thai prime minister referred to her own military commanders as “opponents” and dismissed the Thai regional commander responsible for northeastern security as someone who “just wanted to look tough”.

She also addressed Hun Sen as “uncle”, a term of endearment that reflects the long-standing friendship between the Shinawatra and Hun families.

What Paetongtarn characterised as a “negotiation tactic” has been condemned by critics as a betrayal of national security and dignity. The leaked conversation has triggered mass protests demanding her resignation and thrown her government into chaos, threatening the fragile coalition that brought her Pheu Thai Party to power.

The phone call centred on resolving escalating tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border, specifically around the disputed Emerald Triangle where Thailand, Cambodia and Laos converge.

The standoff intensified after several provocative incidents: 1) a Thai-built friendship pavilion was burnt down in March 2025; 2) Cambodian forces dug trenches that Thai officials claimed extended 200 metres into the Thai territory and; 3) the shooting incident on 28 May 2025 that resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier, with both sides claiming self-defence.

Despite an agreement reached on 8 June 2025 between border task force commanders to withdraw troops and fill the disputed trenches, implementation stalled. Thailand failed to restore normal operating hours at border checkpoints as promised, prompting Cambodia to reduce its own checkpoint hours in retaliation. The tit-for-tat escalation continued, creating the volatile atmosphere that led to the fateful phone conversation.

Outstanding Dispute

Thai-Cambodian border disputes have been a recurring feature of the bilateral relations since the colonial period, with boundaries drawn by French colonial powers through gunboat diplomacy. The two nations have long used these territorial disagreements as convenient sources of nationalist sentiment when domestic political legitimacy wanes.

The irony is particularly sharp given that both countries share cultural traditions – including martial arts known as Muay Thai in Thailand and Kun Khmer in Cambodia – practised throughout the Theravada Buddhist region.

As French orientalist Ernest Renan observed, nation-building requires people to forget certain things while remembering others. The problem for Thailand and Cambodia is their selective memory focuses on grievances rather than shared heritage.

The 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling awarding the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia continues to rankle Thai nationalists, while discussions of joint maritime resource exploration in the Gulf of Thailand sparked fears about compromising Thai sovereignty over Koh Kood Island. Historical mistrust consistently undermines cooperation efforts between the two nations.

Power Struggle

The leaked call exposed deep rifts between Paetongtarn’s civilian government and the Royal Thai Army. Military leaders withheld information about the Cambodian trenches from the foreign affairs and defence ministries, releasing details to the media only after the 8 June 2025 shooting incident. This breach of the standard operating procedure, which typically requires diplomatic channels to be informed first, suggests a deliberate attempt by the military to achieve political gain.

The army appears to have emerged as the primary beneficiary of this crisis. They avoided scrutiny over their information handling, secured budget allocations from the parliament and positioned themselves as patriotic defenders of national sovereignty.

Even the opposition People’s Party, typically critical of military overreach, has remained notably silent, unwilling to risk being labelled unpatriotic.

The tit-for-tat continued with both refusing to discuss the overlapping dispute bilaterally and making a formal request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the territorial disputes around the Emerald Triangle. On 23 May 2025, for example, Paetongtarn – speaking to the media following a meeting on transnational crime with all of the government’s security bigwigs – called on the international community to join Thailand in cracking down on Cambodia-based scam centres.

Cambodia’s suggestions that the border dispute with Thailand around the Emerald Triangle be brought to the ICJ irked Thailand badly, as it placed Cambodia on a legal and moral high ground. In reality, however, both sides undermined their own narrative of peace as they continuously beat the war drums and spin things unabashedly to round up domestic support.

Two Intertwined Families

For years, Thaksin and Hun Sen were courting each other. When Thaksin’s camp was in trouble, Hun Sen extended hospitality to Thaksin’s supporters fleeing arrest after the 2006 coup that ousted him from power.

Their children, Paetongtarn and Manet, also enjoyed cordial relations. Their governments went as far as reviving a two-decade-old MoU on overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand and talked about profit sharing from the exploration of natural resources in the overlapping area.

Today, like Thaksin, Hun Sen is experiencing difficulties in making sure that Prime Minister Hun Manet governs the country without much obstacles and that his family continues to reign over Cambodia for the unforeseeable future. Hun Sen stepped down as the prime minister in August 2023 after four decades of rule, leaving Manet a big shoe to fill.

But unlike Thailand, where a critical press and a rowdy public constantly give Paetongtarn, or any government of the day, a big headache, Cambodia has no such outlets or adequate institutions for its people to express their grievances.

The Cambodian Parliament of 125 MPs has only five lawmakers in the “opposition” bench, and Hun Sen’s children run the country’s media outlets, including the online ones. Speaking out against the family has its consequences.

For Hun Sen, the decision to leak the conversation represents a calculated political maneuver designed to elevate his son, Manet, as a national hero. The ex-leader sought Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s territorial claims over the Emerald Triangle, believing this diplomatic victory would strengthen his son’s position during a challenging transition period.

When it became clear that Thaksin and Paetongtarn would not sacrifice their political survival for Manet’s political ambitions, Hun Sen decided to burn bridges with his long-time allies. The leak served his domestic political needs while demonstrating his assessment that Thaksin’s political usefulness had expired.

Manet – a West Point graduate once described by an American military officer as possessing high integrity – now finds himself defending his father’s social media diplomacy tactics, claiming such methods are common in modern governance. However, few precedents exist for using leaked private conversations.

This crisis strikes at a particularly vulnerable moment for the Shinawatra family. Thaksin returned from exile in August 2023 believing his legal troubles were resolved, only to face continued challenges, including unresolved lese majeste charges and accusations of feigning illness to avoid jail. 

His sister Yingluck, still in exile following the 2014 coup, was ordered in May 2025 to pay THB10 bn in compensation for losses from her administration’s rice-pledging scheme. Her inability to return safely to Thailand represents the family’s unfinished business.

Why is She the Prime Minister?

The Pheu Thai Party’s decision to install Paetongtarn as prime minister – following Srettha Thavisin’s removal – was driven more by loyalty to Thaksin than confidence in her capabilities. Party members acknowledged privately that she lacked the experience for the role, but her appointment made the facilitation of continued deference to her father that much easier.

Moreover, it was not clear why Paetongtarn was not coached by those veteran politicians that she surrounded herself with. Perhaps they were so occupied with the big picture that they forgot that the devil is always in the details. Perhaps they took comfort in the belief that Hun Sen and Thaksin are old friends and assumed that friends do not stab each other in the back.

Of all the people, they should know that nothing lasts forever in Thailand and Cambodia’s cut-throat politics. Perhaps the cross-border aspect of it threw them off.

But the writing was always on the wall. Party members knew full well that Paetongtarn was not cut out for the job, but they insisted that her name be put forth to the parliament to replace Srettha Thavisin, who was removed by the Constitutional Court in August 2024.

The leaked conversation provided a convenient pretext for coalition partners already seeking an exit. Bhumjaithai Party, the coalition’s second-largest member, was about to be kicked out of the coalition due to disputes over cabinet seat allocation. The border controversy gave them a face-saving opportunity to withdraw while claiming to defend national honour.

This defection threatens the stability of Paetongtarn’s government and raises questions about the viability of the Faustian bargain that Thaksin and Pheu Thai struck with conservative political elites to form the current coalition and to exclude the reform-minded Move Forward Party from power.

That arrangement, built on expedience rather than shared vision, was always destined to be temporary.

The Dynasty in Crisis

The current crisis may indeed mark the beginning of the end for the Shinawatra dynasty in Thai politics. Paetongtarn’s inexperience, combined with her father’s diminished influence and mounting legal challenges, has left the family politically isolated and vulnerable.

Sources in the Thai army suggest they could work with the opposition People’s Party, indicating that cooperation with the Thaksin camp has become untenable. However, how the so-called Orange Shirts (People’s Party supporters) and the military could coexist remains unclear, and many observers caution against counting Thaksin out entirely, given his history of political comebacks.

The tragedy of this crisis lies not only in its immediate political casualties but also in its demonstration of how quickly personal relationships and private conversations can escalate into matters of national security and international relations. For a political dynasty built on populist appeal, this episode exposes fundamental weaknesses that may prove insurmountable. As Thailand navigates this political turbulence, the broader question remains whether the country’s democratic institutions can emerge stronger from this crisis or whether it will deepen the cycle of instability that has plagued Thai politics for decades. The answer may well determine not just the fate of the Shinawatra family but the trajectory of Thai democracy itself.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

Thailand and the UWSA: A Complex Border Challenge

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

Happier times. UWSA chairman Bao Yu-xiang (left) and the then Third Army Area commander, Lt. General Picharnmate Muangmanee, with the then commander of Burma's Triangle Area, Brig. General Khin Zaw, celebrate the opening of a Thai-funded school and development project in a Wa-controlled area near the Thai border in 2003.

One of the first items on the agenda for then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra when he came to power in 2001 was to declare war on drugs. He singled out the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-strong militia with its own sphere of influence along the China-Myanmar border and areas near the Thai frontier.

Wa leaders have been indicted by the US Federal Court as far back as 1993 on heroin trafficking charges. At least one commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, who leads all southern Wa units along the Thai border, has a $2 million bounty on his head. Methamphetamines from Wa-controlled laboratories reach far beyond Southeast Asian cities, extending to Amsterdam’s red-light district, where African dealers whisper to passing tourists, “Hey, mister! Thai pills!”

Wa and Thai soldiers on the border, Dec 2024 (Credit: Royal Thai Army) 

Origins and Expansion

Founded in 1989 after the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegrated, the UWSA initially comprised ethnic Wa soldiers who mutinied against their CPB leaders. They established their organization and reached a verbal ceasefire with Myanmar, cementing their role as a strong Chinese ally. Over time, the UWSA expanded its influence and now supports various ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Chinese), Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army, and the Shan State Army-North. 

The UWSA strengthened its foothold along the Thailand-Myanmar border after ousting its longtime rival, the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of late opium warlord Khun Sa, in the late 1990s. Ignoring instructions from the Myanmar government to return to the China-Myanmar border, the UWSA forcibly mobilized approximately 100,000 people from the north to newly built towns and cities near the Thai border, including areas once occupied by the MTA.

UWSA mass relocation to the Thai border.

The UWSA is no ordinary ethnic armed organization. From a marginalized group in mainland Southeast Asia known for headhunting, the ethnic Wa became the most significant component of the now-defunct CPB. When the organization collapsed along ethnic lines in 1989, the Wa retained enough weapons to last another decade.

The Confrontations

Known for their battlefield ferocity, the Wa faction in the CPB established the UWSA in 1989. A verbal ceasefire agreement was immediately established with the then-Myanmar’s security chief, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, allowing the UWSA to govern Special Region 2 and cultivate whatever crops they deemed appropriate. Opium became the natural choice in these rugged hills where warlords and freedom fighters operated.

Besides several strongholds deep inside Shan State along Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and Mae Hong Son borders, the UWSA established nine outposts directly on the still-undemarcated border.

Initially, there were even volleyball games between troops from both sides. However, everyone knew the good times wouldn’t last. The turning point came one morning in February 1999, when authorities discovered nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death with their hands tied behind their backs. A local official said the victims were on a hunting trip but encountered a drug caravan transporting methamphetamines and had to be eliminated. Burmese language learning software

All fingers pointed to the Wa militia. This incident prompted Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai’s government to close the border leading to Mong Yawn, a UWSA southern stronghold where Thai developers had been working to build towns and cities to accommodate Wa expansion into the southern command.

The low point came in May 2002, during what was officially billed as a field training exercise. Surasri 143, Thai soldiers, with mortar and artillery support, crossed into Myanmar territory and attacked UWSA positions, some jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin claimed the Army had “overreacted.”

The following year, in February 2003, Thaksin turned his counter-narcotic efforts inward and launched his ‘war on drugs,’ ostensibly aimed at suppressing drug traffickers. In the campaign’s first three months, approximately 2,800 extrajudicial killings occurred. A 2007 official investigation found that more than half of those killed had no connection to drugs whatsoever.

Thaksin’s Strategy and Miscalculations

When Thaksin assumed power in 2001, he wasted no time demonizing the UWSA, referred to as the “Red Wa” by the Thais, vowing to capture Wei Hsueh-kang “dead or alive.” For Thaksin, the UWSA seemed like a low-hanging fruit—or so he thought. However, he would learn that everything carries a political price. The UWSA had powerful allies: besides old comrades in China, the Wa maintained ties with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military.

Wei Hsueh-kang (file photo)

Thaksin believed he could improve bilateral relations and stability with Myanmar by strengthening economic ties while ignoring ground realities. Ultimately, he was outsmarted by Khin Nyunt, as Myanmar generals historically do with their Thai counterparts. The Myanmar intelligence chief succeeded in getting Thaksin to co-sponsor the Yongkha Project, a massive development and crop substitution initiative in a UWSA-controlled area near the Thai border. Burmese language learning software

The Thai government invested 20 million baht in seed money, hoping others in the international community would follow. However, nobody wanted involvement in a project that seemed more focused on whitewashing the UWSA—dubbed the world’s largest armed drug trafficking army by the US State Department—than enhancing Myanmar villagers’ livelihoods.

The opening ceremony featured the bizarre sight of Third Army Area commander Lt-Gen Picharnmate Muangmanee walking hand-in-hand with UWSA Chairman Bao Yu-xiang, with Myanmar’s Triangle Commander Brig. General Khin Zaw between them. These were strange bedfellows indeed, considering that just a year earlier, Wa and Thai soldiers had engaged in regular gunfights along their common border.

Contemporary Challenges

The situation was never meant to be smooth sailing, but the return of coup-toppled, criminally convicted Thaksin—the de facto leader of Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai Party— from self-imposed exile in August 2023. His role in Thai politics has drawn criticism from the media and conservative military-royalist circles who never trusted him to begin with.

The Faustian bargain he helped orchestrate between Pheu Thai and their former political foes—the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted his sister Yingluck—was never meant to last. Critics now attack him and his daughter Paetongtarn, the current prime minister, over various issues, from the friendly deals with Cambodia over the overlapping territorial claims in the Gulf of Thailand to the three UWSA outposts that allegedly encroach about 200 meters into Thailand, according to Google Maps (since no official demarcation exists). He also tried to present himself as a peace broker between resistance forces and the junta in Myanmar. They all rejected him.

Thai soldiers in the northern command have held meetings with Wa leaders in the southern command area. Wa soldiers claim willingness to retreat, but orders must come from Panghsang, the UWSA headquarters on the Chinese border. According to informed sources, Panghsang has suggested that Thailand raise this issue with Myanmar’s central government as a sovereignty matter. Interestingly, Myanmar officials cannot enter UWSA territory unless disarmed and under escort.

Thailand raised this issue with Tatmadaw leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as early as 2014, to no avail. According to Myanmar resistance forces, the UWSA will not make any moves without meaningful concessions in return.

Environmental and Political Pressures

Today, as Thaksin faces criticism from right-wing media and much of the public, including former supporters alienated by the Faustian deal that created the current shaky coalition, he has returned to demonizing the Wa. He has even suggested Thailand could take matters into its own hands if Myanmar’s government proves unable to act. The problem is that the Thai Army has no desire to return to the old days of border clashes. However, with Thaksin shaping current discourse on the issue, finding common ground with the UWSA becomes increasingly difficult.

Don Pathan in Panghsang, 2003. (Courtesy of UWSA)

Conclusion

The situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border has always been fraught with tension, and Thailand’s internal political dynamics further complicate matters as off-the-cuff statements from political leaders like Thaksin create additional challenges.

The Thai government faces the complex task of managing relations with Myanmar’s UWSA, navigating domestic political opposition, and balancing its role in broader regional power struggles involving China, Myanmar, and various ethnic groups. How Thailand responds to these challenges in the coming months could significantly influence both its political landscape and its role in regional geopolitics. Burmese language learning software

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The views expressed here in this commentary do not necessarily reflect the views of Mizzima Media.

Thailand’s Conflict: Guns, Bombs and Assassinations

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Sungai Kolok district office was hit by a car bomb set off by BRN combatants on March 8, 2025.(Photo Credit: Narathiwat Public Relations Office)

Messages

For the past seven months or so, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), one of the long-standing separatist movements that control most insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces, has been stepping up its pressure on locally hired Defence Volunteer (DV), security guards for the Ministry of Interior. The objective was to force the latter to quit working for the “Siamese State”.

It employs messages, often in the form of graffiti sprayed on the backroads and leaflets. These are in response to the Internal Security Operation Command – Region 4’s (ISOC4) effort to replace regular soldiers with DVs.

The idea is to have local Melayu DV officers to look after Melayu affairs in the region, explained one Thai army intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. But BRN did not see it that way and has shown they have no problem taking the fight to the DVs, regardless of their ethnicity.

DVs are locally hired security details who fall under the Ministry of Interior’s chain of command. Their functions involved manning checkpoints along the roads and at entrances of government installations.

For much of the past two decades – since the current wave of separatist insurgency resurfaced in this Malay historical homeland –DVs have been largely unchallenged by the insurgents as long as they do not engage in intelligence-gathering activities for the government or become part of military operations.

This changed 10 years ago, when ISOC4 was toying with the so-called Tung Yang Daeng model, named after a district in Pattani province where a fierce gunfight between BRN combatants and government troops jolted the nerves of the security apparatus and forced them to the drawing board.

The idea then was to assign the Ministry’s people — village chiefs, tambon staff and DVs — more onerous security duties, such as patrolling violence-prone areas alongside regular army soldiers and Paramilitary Rangers.

Naturally, it would place them in the line of fire of insurgents. It was a bigger plan to gradually pull out troops from other regional commands and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers.

The Thai army had reasons to be optimistic at the time. The number of violent incidents was declining, from just under 2,400 in 2007 to 850 in 2015, according to Deep South Watch’s statistics. Deep down, however, there was an understanding that as long as insurgency exists, Thailand can never declare victory.

The absence of violence – or, in this case, the reduction –  does not mean peace, not as long as the narrative that equates separatism to a moral obligation is still alive and well.

Trying to win hearts and minds. File photo; credit: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG 

Thailand went through a decade of relative calm in the 1990s, thinking that the conflict in the far south had ended. Combatants of the various movements may have put down their weapons, returned to their village and their leaders took up residency in foreign countries abroad. But the narrative of the Patani Malay – one that sees Patani as the Malays’ historical homeland worth liberating – never went away.

Like many other initiatives in Thailand that did not materialise, the Tung Yang Daeng model disappeared from the memories and the discussions of security planners.

Escalation

Worse, violence has increased steadily over the past five years in the far south. Gone are the guerrilla tactics that usually involve roadside bombings followed by a brief two-to-three minutes gunfight before they retreat to the woods.

These days, attacks are much more coordinated, with gunfights sometimes lasting up to half an hour. More importantly, these attacks must be heard, meaning they have to create a psychological impact in the minds of the security apparatus.

The 9 March 2025 attack on the Sungai Kolok district office by a 10-strong BRN unit – resulting in the death of two DVs and the injury of eight others – was an example of this. The assault ended with a car bomb that ripped through the compound moments after the combatants retreated.

The incident came just days after it was clear that the Thai government had rejected BRN’s counter-proposals for a ceasefire during Ramadhan this year.

Two weeks before the start of Ramadhan, the National Security Council (NSC) suggested that the two sides observe a unilateral ceasefire during the holy month. BRN agreed in principle but had demands of their own. These include reducing the number of days from 30 to 15, releasing an unspecified number of prisoners, permitting monitoring of the ceasefire by international and local observers, and requiring the government to appoint a negotiating team to restart peace talks.

When it became clear that Bangkok was not interested in any of these counterproposals, BRN combatants took over the course of direction on the ground, starting with the 9 March 2025 raid of the Sungai Kolok district office. That was the first spike of violence that unnerved the security agencies – especially the DVs throughout the region – as it became clear that they are now deemed to be legitimate targets by BRN.

The same evening also saw a double-tap operation in Pattani’s San Buri district in which a smaller bomb drew a group of ordinance officers to the scene just to be hit by a much bigger explosive. One officer died, and two were wounded.

The already tense situation became even deadlier after the shooting of Abdulroning Lateh, 60, on 18 April 2025. Abdulroning was a senior figure in the military wing of BRN who spent the past two decades as a mentor for the new generation of combatants. As expected, the Thai Army blamed BRN for his killing.

His death sparked a series of seemingly revenge attacks by combatants who ignored unwritten rules of engagement. They hit soft targets, including the shooting of a Buddhist novice on 22 April 2025 in the Saya Yoi district of Songkhla. A senior monk and another novice were wounded from the same attack.

Two days earlier in Narathiwat’s Khok Khan sub-district, an 80kg explosive exploded near a police flat as officers lined up in formation for their daily routine. A passenger vehicle full of Islamic religious students was approaching at the time the explosive detonated. Nine people, including seven children aged between 7 and 15, were wounded by the shrapnel.

On 28 April 2025, two separate attacks in Yala province resulted in the death of a DV whose vehicle was set on fire in the Banang Sata district and a border patrol police officer who was killed after a roadside bomb went off, flipping his armoured vehicle into an upside-down wreck and wounding two other colleagues inside.

Separately, on 30 April 2025, a sniper wounded a police officer as he was about to set up a checkpoint in the backroad of Yala’s Pron subdistrict.

A new low came on 2 May 2025, when gunmen killed four – including a 9-year-old girl and a 76-year-old blind woman – in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai and Chanae districts. The elderly woman was riding a motorbike with her son, who suffered a bullet wound, while the young girl and two other residents were killed by a group of six gunmen on three motorbikes who fired multiple rounds into a house.

The next day, a bomb went off in Narathiwat’s Rueso district, not far from a public event where the Deputy Minister of Interior Sabeeda Thaised was about to open. Nobody was injured, but the explosion was close enough to rattle the nerves of the participants and the country’s security apparatus.

In a rare public statement, dated 5 May 2025, BRN condemned the violence against soft targets and reiterated its long-standing policy of not targeting civilians. The statement did not address the spike or the soft targets. It was understood that the statement was not just for public consumption but for the combatants who had gone off the rules of engagement.

Condemnation against the soft targets poured in relentlessly. There was a direct intervention from a local political actor who met with BRN representatives to call for the return of civility and reminded the BRN leaders of the commitment their organisation made with members of the international community about rules of engagement and respect for humanitarian norms. Since the visit and the statement, civilian targets have gone off the hit list. The only exception was the shooting of a Malay Muslim couple, 46 and 48, on 17 May 2025 in Raman district of Yala province. This time around, nobody is pointing their fingers at BRN.

Generally, BRN still sees itself as an underground movement, although public statements are issued to mark certain anniversaries and critical issues. Some observers said the group lacks a proper communication strategy, which is only possible if there is an identifiable political wing to speak publicly on their behalf.

Thailand’s and Malaysia’s refusal to officially acknowledge the presence of BRN’s political wing and allow it to operate independently is an obstacle to the movement’s move to engage the global community and its own constituency.

While condemnation against the killing of the novice poured in, sympathy for Abdulroning, on the other hand, was whispered as any public outcry would invite the wrath of Thai security officials, whose homemade narrative always put the blame on BRN. Mistrust of the state apparatus is still high, and no government has ever succeeded in convincing local Muslims that they are the good guys, much less winning the latter’s hearts and minds.

International engagement with BRN tends to be discreet and focus on political outcomes and not enough on capacity building. Overall, however, respect for humanitarian norms and principles has improved over the years; that is why the alleged attacks on the monk and novices irked a great deal of people, including local political activists like The Patani who advocate peaceful and political means to resolve the conflict.

But that is easier said than done. The Thai military is not open to discussion on sensitive issues, such as rights to self-determination for this historically contested region. Reference to the combatants as “shahid” – Arabic for martyr – could land one in jail.

Standstill

Meanwhile, the peace talks here have come to a complete standstill because the government refuses to appoint a negotiating team until BRN ends their campaign of violence, although Bangkok has softened its position by suggesting the talks can resume if BRN stops hitting soft targets.

Chulalongkorn University’s military expert, Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, said BRN must guarantee that there be a cessation of violence and that civilians would be protected. BRN countered by stating that even a reduction of violence must be negotiated.

Incidentally, for much of the past two decades of on-and-off peace initiatives, Thailand has never wanted to engage in any formal arrangement or ink anything unless it is the final peace agreement, if and when there is ever one.

Speaking to the media, Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai tried hard to convince the public why the peace talks had to be halted. He said the past talks were failures because representatives from BRN at the negotiating table were not key decision-makers. He added that the spike in violence suggests that BRN representatives do not have influence in the movement and added that Malaysia will be working with Thailand to bring key BRN leaders to the negotiating table.

Thai security officials and BRN representatives rejected his claim, saying the movement has, time and again, publicly and secretly, demonstrated to the Thai officials that they have command and control over the combatants on the ground. The 45-day ceasefire during Ramadhan in 2022 was a case in point, not to mention the 24 months unilateral ceasefire during the COVID-19 outbreak. There were also secret dealings, a clearinghouse of sort, between the two sides to go over the incidents on the ground to prove to the Thai government that they were dealing with the right organisation.

Local activists said the gap between political representation and the armed forces is more of a Thai problem, pointing to the unwillingness of the hardliners to allow the peace process to move beyond a talk shop, which participants at the table referred to as confidence-building measures (CBM).

Up to now, however, the two sides have never discussed anything concrete. The Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called roadmap for peace, put together by Thailand and BRN, with the help of foreign NGOs and the Malaysian government working in separate and often competing tracks, spent the past three years going back and forth on the negotiated text.

The best they could do was identify three items to be on the negotiating table: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to the conflict. Specific details are to be negotiated in the next phase of the talk.

However, JCPP could be scrapped, as the current Thai government is likely to dismiss foreign participation, thus putting all the mediation and conflict resolution work on Malaysia. Surachart also suggested that JCPP should be ditched, saying the framework puts Thailand at a disadvantage.

If anything, Phumtham sounded like a broken record – playing up the “meager BRN negotiators” rhetoric when in fact there is no political will from Bangkok to come to the table and make any concessions to BRN or the people of Patani.

BRN insisted that the Thai side does not get to decide who or which individual leader they can talk to; Bangkok will have to talk to whoever the movement sends. But the Thai government has always wanted to deal with the BRN military leaders, believing in their ability to sweet-talk them out of the conflict, or at least reduce the violence.

Political activists like Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, said Thai governments’ interest in the peace process has always centred on public relations stunts, not the root causes or the wellbeing of the people of this region.

Besides not having anything to offer, Thailand’s disregard for negotiation protocol reflects poorly on the government’s leaders and security planners. Many in the BRN movement, on the other hand, think Thailand’s peace initiatives are aimed at getting them to surface so they can be eliminated at a later date when talks produce no concrete result.

A government source who works on the conflict sayid Phumtham is afraid that restarting the peace talks amid the spike in violence would make Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra look weak. She is already at the receiving end of many criticisms for just about every policy initiative.

Her father, Thaksin, on the other hand, appeared to want to start his own initiative, reaching out to Malaysian authorities to facilitate a meeting with BRN top leaders, preferably in Phuket. Legal charges against the former prime minister prohibit him from traveling abroad. A senior Malaysian officer said Thaksin just wanted “a photo op” for his public relations purposes.

BRN said they are willing to meet with Thaksin or official Thai representatives, but protocol must be respected. A peace process has many stakeholders and components, from the negotiators themselves to the policy-research-technical committees, as well as independent observers.

A BRN representative said their negotiators are mandated by their organisation; the negotiators are not just anybody, and no one individual can make a decision for the entire group. Thai officials at the negotiating table, on the other hand, said Artef, have difficulties convincing its own military to follow the political path set by the policymakers.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
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