Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
YALA, Thailand __ The junta's refusal to lend official recognition to the separatist umbrella group could mean the latest peace process is stillborn
A press conference last week to introduce key figures of MARA Patani to the world produced few surprises - members of the separatist umbrella group had been talking to the media for some time.
The newly established forum (more like old wine in a new bottle) has for some time been promoting the idea it is a force to be reckoned with.
Speaking to the media, the Majlis Syura (MARA) Patani members chose their words carefully, probably to avoid the misunderstandings that burdened the previous peace initiative, launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013, with unrealistic expectations.
The launch two years ago generated a great deal of hope, as it was the first time in the history of the armed conflict between the Thai state and the Malay Muslims of the far South that a Bangkok government had publicly committed to a political settlement through negotiation. Sitting opposite Bangkok negotiators back then was the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of combatant insurgents.
Exiled separatists and BRN members said the talks were originally initiated by fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who, with Malaysia as facilitator, met with 16 separatist leaders in Kuala Lumpur in March 2012. He asked these leaders to put historic grievances behind them and let bygones be bygones.
The request was wishful thinking on Thaksin's part. The BRN responded with a massive triple car bomb in the heart of Yala, which killed 14 people and injured about 120.
Then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's sister, ignored the BRN's "warning message" and relaunched the peace initiative a year later on February 28, 2013.
Hasan Taib, an Islamic religious teacher who has been with the BRN for decades but never made it into the ruling council, was prodded to take up the post as the "liaison". His job was to bring the BRN ruling council and other movements to the negotiating table.
The problem was that BRN operatives didn't think much of Hasan, even though Thai security and intelligence agencies thought he represented the group's ruling council. It didn't take them long to realise that they were wrong about Hasan's influence over the movement.
Yet although Hasan wasn't able to influence insurgent combatants or the BRN inner circle, the group's leaders nevertheless managed to make use of his presence.
BRN used him to antagonise the Thai side and test Bangkok's will by issuing a much-talked-about five-point demand. This comprised of the release of all imprisoned combatants, official recognition for the BRN and an invitation to the peace talks for a representative of the people of Patani, permitting international observers, and official acknowledgement of the southernmost provinces as the Malay majority's historical homeland.
The BRN also used Hasan to inform the Thai side in July 2013 that the theatre of violence would broaden to include Songkhla's district of Sadao. The separatists lived up to their vow with simultaneous attacks - one car bomb and two motorbike bombs - in December 2013.
Another point that antagonised the Thai side was the separatist propaganda exercise conducted through YouTube. Now, in a bid to avoid a recurrence of online political grandstanding by MARA Patani members, the Thai negotiating team led by General Aksara Kherdphol is not objecting to them being interviewed by Thai and international media.
During the Yingluck initiative, civil society organisations were invited to participate in the public ("Track 1") process. But under the current arrangement, civil society will remain on the sidelines of talks while continuing to be engaged by the government team on the southern conflict.
MARA Patani began life in the so-called Track 1.5 - a side-show to the Yingluck initiative. Trusted retired government officials were asked to carry out this unofficial process through a series of negotiations in neighbouring countries.
Credit should also go to the then secretary-general of the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre, Pol Colonel Thawee Sodsong, who cultivated a working relationship with key exiled figures such as Sukree Hari, a BRN representative from Yala who fled in 2007 after receiving bail.
Transition from Track 1.5 to the official Track 1 wasn't exactly a walk in the park. Efforts to mobilise the support of insurgents and the grass-roots community came to a complete standstill after community leader and MARA Patani representative Ustaz Waesumae Sudden, a cleric from Pattani's Sai Buri district, was shot dead on September 28 last year. Nobody took responsibility for his murder, not even discreetly.
Today, participants of this side-show are sitting at the official Track I talks looking straight at the Thai government negotiators.
But BRN cadres who have command-and-control over the insurgents on the ground are still not interested in joining the peace initiative, prompting serious doubts over their chance of success.
BRN sources say their leaders are still not convinced that now is a good time to endorse any initiative, and doubt whether the ruling junta in Bangkok is serious about peace in the deep South.
Even the name "MARA Patani" must conjure unease for Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, with its connotations of institutionalisation and an internationalised process. To please the junta chief, the term "Party B" is being used to describe MARA Patani while "Party A" refers to the official side.
The terms of reference for the talks are due to be set by the end of this month. But already, both sides are vocalising their demands in public.
MARA Patani is demanding that the conflict be designated by Parliament as a national agenda so as to ensure peace efforts aren't dropped when this government ends. It also wants its 15 members to be granted immunity and the umbrella organisation officially recognised. Moreover, the group has suggested it would be willing to settle for something less than complete independence for the three southernmost provinces - possibly the right to "self-determination".
The Thai side, on the other hand, is asking MARA Patani to work towards creating a safe zone, which probably encompasses a ceasefire; improve livelihoods of the local people; and ensure that all sides have access to justice.
There is also a longstanding question over legitimacy. Thailand doesn't have to deal with this question once the junta hands the mandate back to the people. But the same can't be said for MARA Patani and its members.
There has been talk of setting up a national assembly for the region to serve as a rubberstamp for MARA Patani. But according to security official in the South, Bangkok is likely to object to any move to set up a shadow Parliament for the conflict-affected region.
And given the fact that Premier Prayut can't even stand the name "MARA Patani", the idea of him offering official recognition and legitimacy to this umbrella organisation may be just a pipe dream.
Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Saturday, 5 September 2015
Thursday, 3 September 2015
An ominous silence among insurgents in the deep South
Refusal to disavow involvement in the Erawan Shrine bombing prompts concern that separatists could extend theatre of violence outside the region
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
It was supposed to be a press conference at which members of the MARA Patani, a forum of longstanding separatist groups, emerged in public in order to enhance their bargaining power with the Thai government.
But in the end, it was something that the panellists refused to say that wrenched the nerves of Thai security officials.
The question was whether the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had informed the Thai government that its organisation was not behind the August 17 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people injured over 100.
In spite of its silence, hardly anyone believes the BRN was behind the bombing, as the Bangkok attack was outside the separatist insurgents' traditional theatre of violence, namely the historically contested Malay-speaking southernmost provinces.
However, this doesn't mean that the BRN has never carried out an attack on the scale of the Erawan Shrine bombing. But the BRN will push the violence only up to a point, long-time observers within the Thai security community say. It cannot afford to lose its moral high ground or jeopardise its grass-roots support, they add.
In the early stages of the current wave of insurgency violence, which surfaced in 2001 and went into full swing in January 2004, combatants did push the limits too far, murdering public school teachers and Buddhist monks as well as mutilating corpses of soldiers killed in their attacks. If insurgency is a form of communicative action, then the audience at the time was mainly local communities, as well as military commanders who would naturally be demoralised to see their soldiers decapitated or castrated.
But the insurgents consistently gauged local community sentiment and adjusted their focus accordingly, away from "soft targets" and towards the military and police.
Although there are direct attacks against civilians once in while, these acts are understood to be tit-for-tat killings between the state and the insurgents. One example is the murders of three Buddhist women who were shot at close range in February 2014, their bodies then set on fire. The incident was apparently retaliation for the murder of three young boys in Pattani's Bacho district, reportedly carried out by two paramilitary rangers, who retracted their confession in court a year later.
The vast majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of ambush and roadside bombings against security force patrols, essentially aimed at discrediting the security apparatus.
In May, for example, the city of Yala was rocked by almost 40 explosions in a bombing spree that lasted three successive days. Security planners were left speechless when their hastily implemented measures failed to stop the bombing.
For the record, according to BRN sources, no shrapnel was used in the bombs and only a handful of people suffered injuries, which were minor.
Even when BRN combatants have attacked targets outside the region, like Hat Yai, Phuket and Samui, achieving a high body count has never been part of the plan.
In one such incident, for example, a pick-up truck bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres was parked at the Phuket Police Station on December 2013. BRN sources said the operative left the bomb switch off on purpose, choosing merely to demonstrate their capabilities, as well as their disapproval at the absence of rules of engagement among government troops.
The same operation also saw Songkhla's Sadao district come under simultaneous bomb attacks, fulfilling a vow made earlier by insurgents.
While the Sadao attacks demonstrated the BRN could live up to its word, the Samui attack in May this year was a stern warning against the flouting of rules of engagement and against a so-called peace process in which the separatist organisation's name was being used without their approval and their people harassed to come on board.
BRN sources said the groups' ruling council did not endorse the peace initiative begun under Thaksin Shinawatra's administration and continued under his sister Yingluck's rule, or the current "pre-talks" with MARA Patani aimed at reviving negotiations.
With no genuine channel of communication between the BRN and Bangkok, Thai authorities have rushed to rule out any connection with the southern insurgency whenever a fresh incident occurs - whether it be the explosives left at a Bangkok street corner in May 2013, the Phuket Police Station truck bomb in December 2013 or the Samui car bomb in April this year.
The only exception was the December 31, 2006 New Year bombings in which three people were killed and 40 injured.
A lengthy investigation implicated the insurgents, yet the military-installed government downplayed the findings and instead suggested it was the work of people who had been ousted from power, ie, the Thaksin camp.
Too often, the authorities' knee-jerk reaction has come back to haunt them when evidence emerges to undermine their claims. It was subsequently revealed that vehicles used to ferry the Phuket and Samui bombs were from Pattani and Yala. Meanwhile the culprits behind the May 2013 Bangkok bombing were said to be part of an organisation seeking to force its way into the Yingluck peace initiative. The irony was not lost on observers.
Although moral high ground is important, it doesn't mean that the BRN would never carry out an attack in the deep South of the size and scale of the Ratchaprasong bombing.
Take, for example, the triple car bombs on Yala's Ruammit Street that killed 14 people and injured about 120 in late March 2012. The attacks were in response to an overture made two weeks earlier by Thaksin Shinawatra towards the 16 leaders of various separatist organisations in a bid to have them join the peace process.
The absence of any attacks on this scale outside the region is another indication that the BRN realises that Bangkok and the international community would not tolerate such a broadening of the theatre of violence.
Failing to heed the warning sent by the Yala attack, the Yingluck government pressed on with the relaunch of peace talks a year later on February 28, 2013.
Today, MARA Patani is a manifestation of that half-baked peace initiative launched under Yingluck's watch, with the junta uncertain of what else to do except to go with the flow. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha must know he cannot afford the publicity disaster that would ensue if he was to ditch the initiative.
Back when the Yingluck initiative was in the pipeline, MARA Patani was treated as a side-show, often referred to as "Track 1.5".
The Ruammit triple car bomb shows that the BRN is willing to use a body count to make a point. The incident received significant media coverage, partly because the scale of the tragedy and partly because of the fact that Hat Yai was also hit. But it quickly became yesterday's news. The prevailing attitude among the Thai public and policymakers is that, as long as the violence is confined to the deep South, people will continue to tolerate it.
For the BRN and other separatist organisations, extending attacks beyond the historically contested region is a way of warning the Thai state of their disapproval of aspects of the peace negotiations and also the culture of impunity among security officials.
But more importantly, the perception of BRN moral high ground must remain intact, especially in the eyes of the local Malay Muslim residents. How long this quid pro quo arrangement will stand, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
It was supposed to be a press conference at which members of the MARA Patani, a forum of longstanding separatist groups, emerged in public in order to enhance their bargaining power with the Thai government.
But in the end, it was something that the panellists refused to say that wrenched the nerves of Thai security officials.
The question was whether the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had informed the Thai government that its organisation was not behind the August 17 bombing in Bangkok that killed 20 people injured over 100.
In spite of its silence, hardly anyone believes the BRN was behind the bombing, as the Bangkok attack was outside the separatist insurgents' traditional theatre of violence, namely the historically contested Malay-speaking southernmost provinces.
However, this doesn't mean that the BRN has never carried out an attack on the scale of the Erawan Shrine bombing. But the BRN will push the violence only up to a point, long-time observers within the Thai security community say. It cannot afford to lose its moral high ground or jeopardise its grass-roots support, they add.
In the early stages of the current wave of insurgency violence, which surfaced in 2001 and went into full swing in January 2004, combatants did push the limits too far, murdering public school teachers and Buddhist monks as well as mutilating corpses of soldiers killed in their attacks. If insurgency is a form of communicative action, then the audience at the time was mainly local communities, as well as military commanders who would naturally be demoralised to see their soldiers decapitated or castrated.
But the insurgents consistently gauged local community sentiment and adjusted their focus accordingly, away from "soft targets" and towards the military and police.
Although there are direct attacks against civilians once in while, these acts are understood to be tit-for-tat killings between the state and the insurgents. One example is the murders of three Buddhist women who were shot at close range in February 2014, their bodies then set on fire. The incident was apparently retaliation for the murder of three young boys in Pattani's Bacho district, reportedly carried out by two paramilitary rangers, who retracted their confession in court a year later.
The vast majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of ambush and roadside bombings against security force patrols, essentially aimed at discrediting the security apparatus.
In May, for example, the city of Yala was rocked by almost 40 explosions in a bombing spree that lasted three successive days. Security planners were left speechless when their hastily implemented measures failed to stop the bombing.
For the record, according to BRN sources, no shrapnel was used in the bombs and only a handful of people suffered injuries, which were minor.
Even when BRN combatants have attacked targets outside the region, like Hat Yai, Phuket and Samui, achieving a high body count has never been part of the plan.
In one such incident, for example, a pick-up truck bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres was parked at the Phuket Police Station on December 2013. BRN sources said the operative left the bomb switch off on purpose, choosing merely to demonstrate their capabilities, as well as their disapproval at the absence of rules of engagement among government troops.
The same operation also saw Songkhla's Sadao district come under simultaneous bomb attacks, fulfilling a vow made earlier by insurgents.
While the Sadao attacks demonstrated the BRN could live up to its word, the Samui attack in May this year was a stern warning against the flouting of rules of engagement and against a so-called peace process in which the separatist organisation's name was being used without their approval and their people harassed to come on board.
BRN sources said the groups' ruling council did not endorse the peace initiative begun under Thaksin Shinawatra's administration and continued under his sister Yingluck's rule, or the current "pre-talks" with MARA Patani aimed at reviving negotiations.
With no genuine channel of communication between the BRN and Bangkok, Thai authorities have rushed to rule out any connection with the southern insurgency whenever a fresh incident occurs - whether it be the explosives left at a Bangkok street corner in May 2013, the Phuket Police Station truck bomb in December 2013 or the Samui car bomb in April this year.
The only exception was the December 31, 2006 New Year bombings in which three people were killed and 40 injured.
A lengthy investigation implicated the insurgents, yet the military-installed government downplayed the findings and instead suggested it was the work of people who had been ousted from power, ie, the Thaksin camp.
Too often, the authorities' knee-jerk reaction has come back to haunt them when evidence emerges to undermine their claims. It was subsequently revealed that vehicles used to ferry the Phuket and Samui bombs were from Pattani and Yala. Meanwhile the culprits behind the May 2013 Bangkok bombing were said to be part of an organisation seeking to force its way into the Yingluck peace initiative. The irony was not lost on observers.
Although moral high ground is important, it doesn't mean that the BRN would never carry out an attack in the deep South of the size and scale of the Ratchaprasong bombing.
Take, for example, the triple car bombs on Yala's Ruammit Street that killed 14 people and injured about 120 in late March 2012. The attacks were in response to an overture made two weeks earlier by Thaksin Shinawatra towards the 16 leaders of various separatist organisations in a bid to have them join the peace process.
The absence of any attacks on this scale outside the region is another indication that the BRN realises that Bangkok and the international community would not tolerate such a broadening of the theatre of violence.
Failing to heed the warning sent by the Yala attack, the Yingluck government pressed on with the relaunch of peace talks a year later on February 28, 2013.
Today, MARA Patani is a manifestation of that half-baked peace initiative launched under Yingluck's watch, with the junta uncertain of what else to do except to go with the flow. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha must know he cannot afford the publicity disaster that would ensue if he was to ditch the initiative.
Back when the Yingluck initiative was in the pipeline, MARA Patani was treated as a side-show, often referred to as "Track 1.5".
The Ruammit triple car bomb shows that the BRN is willing to use a body count to make a point. The incident received significant media coverage, partly because the scale of the tragedy and partly because of the fact that Hat Yai was also hit. But it quickly became yesterday's news. The prevailing attitude among the Thai public and policymakers is that, as long as the violence is confined to the deep South, people will continue to tolerate it.
For the BRN and other separatist organisations, extending attacks beyond the historically contested region is a way of warning the Thai state of their disapproval of aspects of the peace negotiations and also the culture of impunity among security officials.
But more importantly, the perception of BRN moral high ground must remain intact, especially in the eyes of the local Malay Muslim residents. How long this quid pro quo arrangement will stand, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and a freelance development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Tuesday, 4 August 2015
Insurgents focus ire on local defence volunteers
Army's 'Thung Yang Daeng Model' is under pressure after militants 'send 'warning'
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Ban Pulea, Yala __Shortly after midnight on Friday, a group of about 30 insurgents attacked a small security outpost run by a local Defence Volunteer (DV) unit in Yala's Yaha district.
Eighteen of the DVs were left injured, six seriously, after nearly 30 minutes of gunfire and grenade attacks.
Local residents said it wasn't much of a fight as the DVs either fled or lay flat on their stomachs in the bamboo hut where they had been sleeping. Bullet holes and damage from the M79 grenades also suggest it was a one-way battle. The militants made off with seven government-issued weapons.
Nevertheless, villagers in the area expressed surprise at the fact that the Malay Muslim insurgents had launched an attack against the DVs.
Their logic was simple: DVs are part of the local community and that should count for something in the eyes of the Malay Muslim insurgents. That logic is backed by the low number of violent confrontations between insurgents and DVs since January 2004.
But Friday's attack signalled a change in that trend, exiled separatist leaders said.
Sources in the separatist community said the idea behind this latest attack was to issue a stern warning to local Malay Muslims not to join up with the security apparatus.
Specifically, Friday's attack was a slap in the face for the Thung Yang Daeng Model, an Army initiative to outsource routine security work to local residents including the DVs, village chiefs and kamnans.
With the initiative, the Thai military is basically telling village-based officials that they no longer have the luxury of "looking the other way", and that if they are going to be on the government's payroll, they have to put their lives on the line for the state security apparatus.
DVs comprise locally recruited security details that come under a chain of command that runs from the Interior Ministry through the provincial government, district chiefs, village heads and kamnans.
The DVs are sometimes called on to provide security for ministry officials, and the insurgents rarely single them out for attack.
The attack on Friday marked the first time that a DV camp had been overrun by insurgents. It also marked the first time since February 2013 that Malay Muslim insurgents had launched an operation on any sort of military-security camp in this restive region, where more than 6,000 people have been killed since January 2004.
The February 2013 operation saw some 50 insurgents charge a Royal Thai Marine camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district. The marines had prior warning of the attack thanks to information found on the body of an insurgent who had been killed two weeks earlier in nearby Sai Buri district.
The incident ended in the death of 16 insurgents but revealed a level of support for their cause among the local residents, many of whom attended funerals at which the attackers were celebrated as martyrs in line with Islamic tradition.
The attack on Friday in Yaha shared features with other insurgent operations. Two roadside bombs were placed to the east of the camp, while on the west side, a huge tree was felled and road spikes laid to slow the arrival of reinforcements. Yaha police station is just four kilometres away.
Besides mobilising the local officers in the Interior Ministry chain of command, the Thung Yang Daeng Model also calls for the recruiting of local Muslims as reconnaissance scouts for Paramilitary Ranger patrols.
The military believes that locally hired Rangers should have a better idea of where the local cells are concealed. Unlike the DVs, the Rangers don't see themselves as sitting ducks for the insurgents.
And with locally recruited young men working as their scouts and directives from the regular Army unit commanders, these Rangers are constantly conducting long-range reconnaissance patrols to hunt down insurgents.
For the time being, their family members are being left alone. Separatist leaders said the militants are not permitted to harass the family members of local Rangers, though the movement considers those who join the paramilitary unit "fair game".
Speaking to reporters at the scene of Friday's attack, Lt-General Prakarn Cholayuth, commander of the 4th Army Region, said the incident was an example of how such security units were at the "receiving end" partly through being exposed and out in the open.
Prakarn said the role of DVs would continue unabated but added that certain adjustments would have to be made in order to strengthen their capacity to counter the militants. He didn't say what sort of adjustment would be made. But from the look of it, all sides - the Army and officials at the village level - will have to do some serious soul searching.
The separatist militants have already let the government know how far they are willing to go to rattle the much-praised Thung Yang Daeng Model. The ball, it seems, is now in the Thai court.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Yala. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Ban Pulea, Yala __Shortly after midnight on Friday, a group of about 30 insurgents attacked a small security outpost run by a local Defence Volunteer (DV) unit in Yala's Yaha district.
Eighteen of the DVs were left injured, six seriously, after nearly 30 minutes of gunfire and grenade attacks.
 |
| DV camp in Yala's Yaha district. Photo by: DON PATHAN |
Nevertheless, villagers in the area expressed surprise at the fact that the Malay Muslim insurgents had launched an attack against the DVs.
Their logic was simple: DVs are part of the local community and that should count for something in the eyes of the Malay Muslim insurgents. That logic is backed by the low number of violent confrontations between insurgents and DVs since January 2004.
But Friday's attack signalled a change in that trend, exiled separatist leaders said.
Sources in the separatist community said the idea behind this latest attack was to issue a stern warning to local Malay Muslims not to join up with the security apparatus.
Specifically, Friday's attack was a slap in the face for the Thung Yang Daeng Model, an Army initiative to outsource routine security work to local residents including the DVs, village chiefs and kamnans.
With the initiative, the Thai military is basically telling village-based officials that they no longer have the luxury of "looking the other way", and that if they are going to be on the government's payroll, they have to put their lives on the line for the state security apparatus.
DVs comprise locally recruited security details that come under a chain of command that runs from the Interior Ministry through the provincial government, district chiefs, village heads and kamnans.
The DVs are sometimes called on to provide security for ministry officials, and the insurgents rarely single them out for attack.
The attack on Friday marked the first time that a DV camp had been overrun by insurgents. It also marked the first time since February 2013 that Malay Muslim insurgents had launched an operation on any sort of military-security camp in this restive region, where more than 6,000 people have been killed since January 2004.
The February 2013 operation saw some 50 insurgents charge a Royal Thai Marine camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district. The marines had prior warning of the attack thanks to information found on the body of an insurgent who had been killed two weeks earlier in nearby Sai Buri district.
The incident ended in the death of 16 insurgents but revealed a level of support for their cause among the local residents, many of whom attended funerals at which the attackers were celebrated as martyrs in line with Islamic tradition.
The attack on Friday in Yaha shared features with other insurgent operations. Two roadside bombs were placed to the east of the camp, while on the west side, a huge tree was felled and road spikes laid to slow the arrival of reinforcements. Yaha police station is just four kilometres away.
Besides mobilising the local officers in the Interior Ministry chain of command, the Thung Yang Daeng Model also calls for the recruiting of local Muslims as reconnaissance scouts for Paramilitary Ranger patrols.
The military believes that locally hired Rangers should have a better idea of where the local cells are concealed. Unlike the DVs, the Rangers don't see themselves as sitting ducks for the insurgents.
And with locally recruited young men working as their scouts and directives from the regular Army unit commanders, these Rangers are constantly conducting long-range reconnaissance patrols to hunt down insurgents.
For the time being, their family members are being left alone. Separatist leaders said the militants are not permitted to harass the family members of local Rangers, though the movement considers those who join the paramilitary unit "fair game".
Speaking to reporters at the scene of Friday's attack, Lt-General Prakarn Cholayuth, commander of the 4th Army Region, said the incident was an example of how such security units were at the "receiving end" partly through being exposed and out in the open.
Prakarn said the role of DVs would continue unabated but added that certain adjustments would have to be made in order to strengthen their capacity to counter the militants. He didn't say what sort of adjustment would be made. But from the look of it, all sides - the Army and officials at the village level - will have to do some serious soul searching.
The separatist militants have already let the government know how far they are willing to go to rattle the much-praised Thung Yang Daeng Model. The ball, it seems, is now in the Thai court.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Yala. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Wednesday, 29 July 2015
A goodwill gesture brutally batted aside by insurgents
A history of mistrust has come back to haunt the latest peace efforts in the South
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
The recent release of a senior Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) member from prison was seen as a goodwill gesture by the Bangkok government, but the group that controls the vast majority of the insurgents in the deep South has demonstrated its campaign of violence in the region will continue unabated.
Last week a bomb attack in Pattani province's Sai Buri district killed a monk and a soldier and left eight people injured.
Members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) separatist umbrella organisation said they welcomed the release of Ma-ae Sa-a, better known to his peers as Sama-ae Thanam, or Ismail Gadaffi. But the move will have no effect on the ongoing peace talks with the separatists, or their struggle for a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the so-called Patani region.
Sama-ae was arrested by Malaysian authorities in 1998 and secretly handed over to the Thai police. Others captured in the same operation were Haji Abdul Rahman Bazo (aka Haji Beudo Betong), Abdul Rahman Haji Yala, and Haji Da'oud Thanam.
Bazo was released in November 2013 after he turned 70. Government sources said the release of Bazo and Sama-ae, as well as the pending release of Da'oud, was in line with Justice Ministry regulations on early parole for good conduct. But in this case the releases also had a political dimension, observers said.
Efforts to get these Pulo leaders released are nothing new. In the aftermath of the day-long stand-off between Thai security forces and Patani Malay insurgents at the Kru Se Mosque on April 28, 2004, exiled separatist leaders quietly suggested to the Thai side that the men should be released so they could serve as go-betweens with the new generation of insurgents, who had gone on the offensive a few months earlier following an arms heist in January.
The April 28, 2004 operation saw well over 100 young men, armed with little more than machetes and knives, charge into a hailstorm of machinegun bullets.
Thai officials and exiled leaders from longstanding separatist groups were shaken by the incident and its ramifications: if so many militants were willing to charge to almost certain death, what were the possibilities?
The old guard, once released from prison, might not be able to convince the new generation of fighters to lay down their arms. But it was suggested that they could broker an understanding, such as over rules of engagement, between the two sides.
But nobody on the Thai side was willing to act on these suggestions.
A closer look at the militant network behind the Kru Se incident, which was under the directive of charismatic religious teacher Ismail Yaralong (aka Ustaz Soh), revealed that the militants were influenced by what some called "folk Islam".
Those who took part in the simultaneous attack on 10 police outposts and one station in Pattani, Songkhla and Yala on April 28, 2004, said they had imbibed holy water, inscribed their machetes with "bismillah" - in the name of God - and gone into trance before launching their operation at the break of dawn.
Copies of a motivational pamphlet "Bir Jihad di Patani" (The Struggle of Patani) were found on some of the insurgents. Though it contained no theology, zealous Thai officials took it upon themselves to call it the "new Koran".
Though Ustaz Soh's network was short-lived for obvious reasons -machetes proved no match for Thai machineguns - their operation inspired great respect among locals. Not only did it instill real fear in the Thai security apparatus, but many locals said they were moved by the fact that these young men gave up their lives for the cause. During the stand-off, one militant used loudspeakers to call on local Muslims to rise up against the "Siamese invaders". General Pallop Pinmanee, the highest ranking military officer in Pattani at the time, ordered an all-out assault on the mosque for fear that the locals would actually rise up against state officials.
The idea of releasing the Pulo leaders has surfaced several times over the years, but no Bangkok government has acted on it for fear of political repercussions.
In fact, both Malaysian and Thai officials failed to see the consequences of arresting the Pulo leaders until then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra decided she wanted to talk peace.
Sama-ae said recently he never thought he would be arrested by the Thai authorities as he had been involved in facilitating secret talks between the two sides.
Sources in the BRN said they didn't want to end up like the Thanam brothers and added that they would never endorse any peace negotiation until properly prepared and that Bangkok would not deceive them the way they did these Pulo leaders.
The extradition of the prisoners reminded leaders of longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups that Kuala Lumpur will always place bilateral ties with Thailand over the wellbeing of their people.
The 1998 arrests of the Pulo leaders violated an unwritten agreement between Thailand and Malaysia that no such action would be taken as long as former combatants and operatives did not make trouble for their host country.
Members of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) have received Thai citizenship, while the Patani Malay exiled leaders were granted Malaysian citizenship or permitted to relocate to a third country.
The armed struggle of the CPM and the Patani Malays surfaced in the mid-1960s but went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The former was a communist insurgency and the latter ethno-nationalist in nature.
But Thai authorities didn't make the distinction between the two and were busy applauding themselves for a job well done. As for the current wave of separatist militants, the 1990s proved to be the lull before the storm - a period when a new generation of combatants were being groomed to take up where their predecessors had left off.
This time around, instead of relying on help from Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, they would become self-sufficient. And as long as the Patani Malay narrative remained alive, the moral and logistical support of local residents was more or less guaranteed.
Today, in spite of the rhetoric concerning peace and the peace process, insurgency violence in Thailand's Malay-speaking South continues unabated and with no end in sight.
Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and security analyst based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
The recent release of a senior Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) member from prison was seen as a goodwill gesture by the Bangkok government, but the group that controls the vast majority of the insurgents in the deep South has demonstrated its campaign of violence in the region will continue unabated.
Last week a bomb attack in Pattani province's Sai Buri district killed a monk and a soldier and left eight people injured.
Members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) separatist umbrella organisation said they welcomed the release of Ma-ae Sa-a, better known to his peers as Sama-ae Thanam, or Ismail Gadaffi. But the move will have no effect on the ongoing peace talks with the separatists, or their struggle for a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the so-called Patani region.
Sama-ae was arrested by Malaysian authorities in 1998 and secretly handed over to the Thai police. Others captured in the same operation were Haji Abdul Rahman Bazo (aka Haji Beudo Betong), Abdul Rahman Haji Yala, and Haji Da'oud Thanam.
Bazo was released in November 2013 after he turned 70. Government sources said the release of Bazo and Sama-ae, as well as the pending release of Da'oud, was in line with Justice Ministry regulations on early parole for good conduct. But in this case the releases also had a political dimension, observers said.
Efforts to get these Pulo leaders released are nothing new. In the aftermath of the day-long stand-off between Thai security forces and Patani Malay insurgents at the Kru Se Mosque on April 28, 2004, exiled separatist leaders quietly suggested to the Thai side that the men should be released so they could serve as go-betweens with the new generation of insurgents, who had gone on the offensive a few months earlier following an arms heist in January.
The April 28, 2004 operation saw well over 100 young men, armed with little more than machetes and knives, charge into a hailstorm of machinegun bullets.
Thai officials and exiled leaders from longstanding separatist groups were shaken by the incident and its ramifications: if so many militants were willing to charge to almost certain death, what were the possibilities?
The old guard, once released from prison, might not be able to convince the new generation of fighters to lay down their arms. But it was suggested that they could broker an understanding, such as over rules of engagement, between the two sides.
But nobody on the Thai side was willing to act on these suggestions.
A closer look at the militant network behind the Kru Se incident, which was under the directive of charismatic religious teacher Ismail Yaralong (aka Ustaz Soh), revealed that the militants were influenced by what some called "folk Islam".
Those who took part in the simultaneous attack on 10 police outposts and one station in Pattani, Songkhla and Yala on April 28, 2004, said they had imbibed holy water, inscribed their machetes with "bismillah" - in the name of God - and gone into trance before launching their operation at the break of dawn.
Copies of a motivational pamphlet "Bir Jihad di Patani" (The Struggle of Patani) were found on some of the insurgents. Though it contained no theology, zealous Thai officials took it upon themselves to call it the "new Koran".
Though Ustaz Soh's network was short-lived for obvious reasons -machetes proved no match for Thai machineguns - their operation inspired great respect among locals. Not only did it instill real fear in the Thai security apparatus, but many locals said they were moved by the fact that these young men gave up their lives for the cause. During the stand-off, one militant used loudspeakers to call on local Muslims to rise up against the "Siamese invaders". General Pallop Pinmanee, the highest ranking military officer in Pattani at the time, ordered an all-out assault on the mosque for fear that the locals would actually rise up against state officials.
The idea of releasing the Pulo leaders has surfaced several times over the years, but no Bangkok government has acted on it for fear of political repercussions.
In fact, both Malaysian and Thai officials failed to see the consequences of arresting the Pulo leaders until then-prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra decided she wanted to talk peace.
Sama-ae said recently he never thought he would be arrested by the Thai authorities as he had been involved in facilitating secret talks between the two sides.
Sources in the BRN said they didn't want to end up like the Thanam brothers and added that they would never endorse any peace negotiation until properly prepared and that Bangkok would not deceive them the way they did these Pulo leaders.
The extradition of the prisoners reminded leaders of longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups that Kuala Lumpur will always place bilateral ties with Thailand over the wellbeing of their people.
The 1998 arrests of the Pulo leaders violated an unwritten agreement between Thailand and Malaysia that no such action would be taken as long as former combatants and operatives did not make trouble for their host country.
Members of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) have received Thai citizenship, while the Patani Malay exiled leaders were granted Malaysian citizenship or permitted to relocate to a third country.
The armed struggle of the CPM and the Patani Malays surfaced in the mid-1960s but went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The former was a communist insurgency and the latter ethno-nationalist in nature.
But Thai authorities didn't make the distinction between the two and were busy applauding themselves for a job well done. As for the current wave of separatist militants, the 1990s proved to be the lull before the storm - a period when a new generation of combatants were being groomed to take up where their predecessors had left off.
This time around, instead of relying on help from Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, they would become self-sufficient. And as long as the Patani Malay narrative remained alive, the moral and logistical support of local residents was more or less guaranteed.
Today, in spite of the rhetoric concerning peace and the peace process, insurgency violence in Thailand's Malay-speaking South continues unabated and with no end in sight.
Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and security analyst based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Sunday, 5 July 2015
EDITORIAL: Southern youth activists taking to the streets
The Nation
Their involvement in anti-coup protest in Bangkok is actually good for country
An interesting development over the past few months that has been overlooked by the public is the participation of ethnic Malay Muslim students from Thailand's southernmost provinces in the protest against the current government.
A significant number of students and youth leaders have been coming to Bangkok and elsewhere to take part in the various demonstrations and speaking engagements to voice their disapproval against the military regime.
Some were briefly detained alongside other youth activists and students for their peaceful demonstration.
This development should be welcomed simply because these Malay youths and students from the deep South are teaming up with the rest of the country's student movement and embracing the "Thai narrative", as opposed to the one that focuses exclusively on Pattani.
And while they are calling for the same thing that many of us want to see - democracy, accountability, rule of law, transparency - the fact that they are becoming part of the Thai narrative demonstrates that these Malay Muslim youths also feel that they have a stake and a sense of shared destiny with the rest of the people in this country.
The government, especially the security apparatus, views these Malay Muslim youth activists as spreading their wings beyond the three southernmost provinces that have been hit by an 11-year insurgency that has claimed more than 6,000 lives, with no end in sight - but they predict more trouble, because they see things through a security lens. Problems arise when the lens gets damaged and the authorities become cross-eyed and don't realise it.
The Malay Muslim youths and student activists have over the years earned a great deal of respect and trust from the local population, especially at the grassroots level where abuses by the authorities often occur.
These youths step in and speak out against alleged injustices and abuses. Their activism can be traced back eight years, when many of them occupied the Pattani Central Mosque to protest about the alleged rape against a Muslim woman in Yala province, not to mention the alleged torture and extra-judicial/targeted killings carried out by government officials.
But in recent months, they have been joining the Thai student protests in Bangkok and other parts of the country.
Unfortunately, security officials and intelligence officials see this development as a security challenge against the regime.
If anything, Thai society and government officials, especially those working on the conflict in the deep South, should actually welcome such a development.
This is not to suggest that these Malay Muslim students should be receiving red carpet treatment while in Bangkok.
Up until now, these students and youth activists have been a bunch of uncompromising separatists bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay. Many are still being harassed. And the authorities can get away with it because they have the Emergency Law to shield them from just about anything in terms of legal repercussions. Sadly, a culture of impunity exists in this historically contested region.
And while the Malay Muslim students and youths are promoting the concept of the "right to self-determination", it is still a far cry from separatism or armed insurgency taken up by the thousands of Malay Muslim militants on the ground.
When the red shirts and the yellow shirts were going at it on the streets of Bangkok and elsewhere, these Malay Muslim youths stayed put. Today, they see a common ground with the Thai student activists from other parts of the country.
In his weekly remarks on Friday, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha tried to sound reconciliatory; he said the 14 detained students were pure and innocent and urged them to channel their activities in a constructive manner.
While such a statement suggested that he was extending an olive branch to the student movement, he, nevertheless, could not get away from his old self and suggested that some hidden hands have been guiding these students.
Hasn't it occurred to Prayuth and other security officials that these youth activists have a mind of their own and that they may see things differently from the country's military, whose mandate is still questionable?
If the head honcho can't differentiate between good intention and good policy, there isn't much hope for the folks down the line, is there?
But it does not need to be that way. They just need to broaden their minds, open their hearts and not see every criticism as an attempt to overthrow them.
But the good news is that these guys are here today and gone tomorrow. These youth activists are demanding to know when tomorrow will be and that tomorrow doesn't mean forever.
Saturday, 27 June 2015
Bangkok lacks THE WILL to make peace in deep South
A LONG-STANDING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AMONG SECURITY FORCES IS PREVENTING THE LATEST PUSH FOR PEACE FROM GAINING TRACTION
DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
More than a year after seizing power, our latest crop of junta officials have come face to face with separatist leaders in what are being billed as "pre-talks" - a stepping stone to formal peace negotiations in the far South.
Senior leaders from the self-styled MARA Patani umbrella organisation - which comprises several long-standing separatist groups, including the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP) plus a handful of people who claim to be members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - met with the Thai chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara Kherdphol and his team in Malaysia on June 8. The two sides had met previously for a "pre-talks" session in April.
A young cadre from the BRN, Sukri Hari, was present at the first meeting, but sources said his participation in no way constitutes BRN endorsement for the peace initiative with the Thais.
Sources in the movement said Sukri believes he can help locate common ground between MARA Patani and the BRN, which has so far ruled out any direct talks with the current government. The BRN controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, thus making their participation vital if any peace initiative is to win success.
As for Team Thailand, courting Sukri could pay off in the long run if he can succeed where MARA Patani failed - by convincing the genuine BRN leadership to join the peace process.
In other words, Sukri's participation could be much more important than the participation of self-proclaimed BRN leaders such as Awang Jabat and Tok Imam Haleng, both of whom are prominent members in the MARA Patani forum but were conspicuously absent from the June 8 meeting.
Sukri cannot be allowed to shine too brightly, however. The former teacher is a fugitive facing arrest warrants on charges of treason. He fled Thailand in 2007 along with seven of his colleagues from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala after they were granted bail under the then-government of Surayud Chulanont.
Unless the charges against him are dropped, putting Sukri on a pedestal could prove to be a legal and diplomatic disaster. And there is no guarantee that this young member can change the mindset of the BRN old guard.
Though the June 8 pre-talks were not formal negotiations, and not all of the MARA Patani groups were present, the Thai side did ask the separatist leaders at the meeting if they could get the combatants to curb their activities during the month of Ramadan.
The separatist leaders did not commit themselves, saying it was too early to be making deals, according to a Thai intelligence officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
However, a BRN operative said there would be no escalation of attacks or straying beyond the usual targets of security officials as long as the Thai side did not violate the rules of engagement - by, for example, targeting religious leaders.
The participants at the June 8 meeting couldn't accede to such a request even if they wanted to, because they don't control the combatants, the BRN source added.
Similar discrepancies also exist on the Thai side, between policymakers and the security agencies on the ground.
BRN operatives often point to the target killing of Imam Abdullateh Todir - a member of the Yala Islamic Committee and an imam in Yala's Yaha district - as a prime example of the disunity among the Thai security agencies.
Abdullateh was shot dead by a pro-government death squad in November 2012. An attempt on his life earlier that year failed but cost his daughter her life.
After the failed assassination, Thai Special Forces provided him with a security detail. The Army saw him as a potential go-between for the authorities and the insurgent fighters.
But another agency didn't see it that way, believing instead that he was too close to the insurgents. And when the Special Forces became complacent, a couple of gunmen pounced.
Abdullateh lived in Tambon Patae, an extremely "red" area in Yaha district. His killing triggered an unprecedented spike in violence that lasted six weeks.
A few months later the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) failed to get the provincial Islamic committees to endorse peace negotiations launched on February 28, 2013. Clerics refused to endorse the initiative, having witnessed one of their own gunned down by what they said was a pro-government death squad.
The BRN says Thai security agencies' old attitudes and standard operating procedures haven't changed. The culture of impunity among the officials makes it difficult for them to take anything from Bangkok seriously, they say.
Nevertheless, the BRN has not ruled out talking to the Thai side, but will do so only on its own terms and when it is ready.
For the time being, it doesn't see any real commitment or seriousness from the current Bangkok government and believes that "peace process" is an empty phrase designed for domestic and international consumption.
The culture of impunity aside, the current structure of the Thai negotiating and policy team for the South is also problematic.
On the surface, many ministries and agencies are represented at the policy level and on the dialogue panel.
Top officials from the Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry, Internal Security Operation Command, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Army sit on the policy forum, and their subordinates are represented on the dialogue panel, which is headed by chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara.
But judging from the meeting in mid-May between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and top bureaucrats from these ministries and agencies, it appears that these representatives are more interested in protecting their constituencies than in exploring creative ideas to support peace and negotiations.
Prayut is averse to the idea of MARA Patani because, in the view of the Foreign Ministry, it could lead to an internationalising of the deep South conflict.
Thai officials are often reminded how the now-defunct separatist umbrella group Bersatu helped garner political and financial support from Muslim countries in the Middle East.
Besides the worry over "internationalising" the conflict, there are concerns that the draft constitution doesn't permit the Kingdom to be divided.
PM Prayut may not like the idea of MARA Patani, but the real issue is whether this separatist forum can evolve into something meaningful that attracts support and legitimacy from the Malays of Patani and the international community.
Moreover, no government wants to debate with a foreign entity on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays' historical homeland, much less the culture of impunity and the human rights violations committed against local Muslims over the past few decades.
When the previous wave of separatist militants went under in the 1990s, Bangkok governments stepped up their diplomacy to cut off their support from Arab and Muslim countries.
The Chuan Leekpai government even secured permanent observer status for Thailand at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in order to block these separatist movements from obtaining a seat in the forum and consequently diplomatic support.
Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - friendly Muslim countries in Southeast Asia - endorsed Thailand's quest, which Bangkok took as a stamp of approval for how Thailand treats its Muslim minority.
Today, a stamp of approval seems the last thing on Thai authorities' mind, with anti-Muslim sentiment in and around the country continuing unabated, especially in Nan province where residents are campaigning against a plan to build a local mosque. They claim that an Islamic place of worship could turn their community into another conflict zone like the Patani region.
But separatist movements, particularly the BRN, say it's a different kind of fight nowadays. Combatants on the ground no longer depend on foreign donors since local villagers now provide intelligence, logistical support and supplies to sustain militant cells.
Thai officials often pay lip service to the idea of winning hearts and minds in deep-South communities but seem to have little insight on how to achieve this task.
If anybody has sway over the combatants' rules of engagement, said one BRN operative, it is the local villagers.
He said the militants' decision to end the practice of mutilating Thai soldiers' corpses, as well as ceasing attacks on public schools, was influenced by the villagers.
For the time being, the immediate challenge for the self-proclaimed MARA Patani is convincing the BRN that there is merit in coming to the table to talk, Thai officials said.
But like everything else in this conflict, that's easier said than done, especially when Bangkok is not willing to make any concessions.
DON PATHAN is a security analyst and development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
More than a year after seizing power, our latest crop of junta officials have come face to face with separatist leaders in what are being billed as "pre-talks" - a stepping stone to formal peace negotiations in the far South.
Senior leaders from the self-styled MARA Patani umbrella organisation - which comprises several long-standing separatist groups, including the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP) plus a handful of people who claim to be members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - met with the Thai chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara Kherdphol and his team in Malaysia on June 8. The two sides had met previously for a "pre-talks" session in April.
A young cadre from the BRN, Sukri Hari, was present at the first meeting, but sources said his participation in no way constitutes BRN endorsement for the peace initiative with the Thais.
Sources in the movement said Sukri believes he can help locate common ground between MARA Patani and the BRN, which has so far ruled out any direct talks with the current government. The BRN controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, thus making their participation vital if any peace initiative is to win success.
As for Team Thailand, courting Sukri could pay off in the long run if he can succeed where MARA Patani failed - by convincing the genuine BRN leadership to join the peace process.
In other words, Sukri's participation could be much more important than the participation of self-proclaimed BRN leaders such as Awang Jabat and Tok Imam Haleng, both of whom are prominent members in the MARA Patani forum but were conspicuously absent from the June 8 meeting.
Sukri cannot be allowed to shine too brightly, however. The former teacher is a fugitive facing arrest warrants on charges of treason. He fled Thailand in 2007 along with seven of his colleagues from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala after they were granted bail under the then-government of Surayud Chulanont.
Unless the charges against him are dropped, putting Sukri on a pedestal could prove to be a legal and diplomatic disaster. And there is no guarantee that this young member can change the mindset of the BRN old guard.
Though the June 8 pre-talks were not formal negotiations, and not all of the MARA Patani groups were present, the Thai side did ask the separatist leaders at the meeting if they could get the combatants to curb their activities during the month of Ramadan.
The separatist leaders did not commit themselves, saying it was too early to be making deals, according to a Thai intelligence officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
However, a BRN operative said there would be no escalation of attacks or straying beyond the usual targets of security officials as long as the Thai side did not violate the rules of engagement - by, for example, targeting religious leaders.
The participants at the June 8 meeting couldn't accede to such a request even if they wanted to, because they don't control the combatants, the BRN source added.
Similar discrepancies also exist on the Thai side, between policymakers and the security agencies on the ground.
BRN operatives often point to the target killing of Imam Abdullateh Todir - a member of the Yala Islamic Committee and an imam in Yala's Yaha district - as a prime example of the disunity among the Thai security agencies.
Abdullateh was shot dead by a pro-government death squad in November 2012. An attempt on his life earlier that year failed but cost his daughter her life.
After the failed assassination, Thai Special Forces provided him with a security detail. The Army saw him as a potential go-between for the authorities and the insurgent fighters.
But another agency didn't see it that way, believing instead that he was too close to the insurgents. And when the Special Forces became complacent, a couple of gunmen pounced.
Abdullateh lived in Tambon Patae, an extremely "red" area in Yaha district. His killing triggered an unprecedented spike in violence that lasted six weeks.
A few months later the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) failed to get the provincial Islamic committees to endorse peace negotiations launched on February 28, 2013. Clerics refused to endorse the initiative, having witnessed one of their own gunned down by what they said was a pro-government death squad.
The BRN says Thai security agencies' old attitudes and standard operating procedures haven't changed. The culture of impunity among the officials makes it difficult for them to take anything from Bangkok seriously, they say.
Nevertheless, the BRN has not ruled out talking to the Thai side, but will do so only on its own terms and when it is ready.
For the time being, it doesn't see any real commitment or seriousness from the current Bangkok government and believes that "peace process" is an empty phrase designed for domestic and international consumption.
The culture of impunity aside, the current structure of the Thai negotiating and policy team for the South is also problematic.
On the surface, many ministries and agencies are represented at the policy level and on the dialogue panel.
Top officials from the Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry, Internal Security Operation Command, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Army sit on the policy forum, and their subordinates are represented on the dialogue panel, which is headed by chief negotiator Lt-General Aksara.
But judging from the meeting in mid-May between Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and top bureaucrats from these ministries and agencies, it appears that these representatives are more interested in protecting their constituencies than in exploring creative ideas to support peace and negotiations.
Prayut is averse to the idea of MARA Patani because, in the view of the Foreign Ministry, it could lead to an internationalising of the deep South conflict.
Thai officials are often reminded how the now-defunct separatist umbrella group Bersatu helped garner political and financial support from Muslim countries in the Middle East.
Besides the worry over "internationalising" the conflict, there are concerns that the draft constitution doesn't permit the Kingdom to be divided.
PM Prayut may not like the idea of MARA Patani, but the real issue is whether this separatist forum can evolve into something meaningful that attracts support and legitimacy from the Malays of Patani and the international community.
Moreover, no government wants to debate with a foreign entity on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays' historical homeland, much less the culture of impunity and the human rights violations committed against local Muslims over the past few decades.
When the previous wave of separatist militants went under in the 1990s, Bangkok governments stepped up their diplomacy to cut off their support from Arab and Muslim countries.
The Chuan Leekpai government even secured permanent observer status for Thailand at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in order to block these separatist movements from obtaining a seat in the forum and consequently diplomatic support.
Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - friendly Muslim countries in Southeast Asia - endorsed Thailand's quest, which Bangkok took as a stamp of approval for how Thailand treats its Muslim minority.
Today, a stamp of approval seems the last thing on Thai authorities' mind, with anti-Muslim sentiment in and around the country continuing unabated, especially in Nan province where residents are campaigning against a plan to build a local mosque. They claim that an Islamic place of worship could turn their community into another conflict zone like the Patani region.
But separatist movements, particularly the BRN, say it's a different kind of fight nowadays. Combatants on the ground no longer depend on foreign donors since local villagers now provide intelligence, logistical support and supplies to sustain militant cells.
Thai officials often pay lip service to the idea of winning hearts and minds in deep-South communities but seem to have little insight on how to achieve this task.
If anybody has sway over the combatants' rules of engagement, said one BRN operative, it is the local villagers.
He said the militants' decision to end the practice of mutilating Thai soldiers' corpses, as well as ceasing attacks on public schools, was influenced by the villagers.
For the time being, the immediate challenge for the self-proclaimed MARA Patani is convincing the BRN that there is merit in coming to the table to talk, Thai officials said.
But like everything else in this conflict, that's easier said than done, especially when Bangkok is not willing to make any concessions.
DON PATHAN is a security analyst and development consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Tuesday, 2 June 2015
Deep South: Under the wreckage of lies, a complicated truth
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Yala, Thailand
The killing of two Buddhist monks on Visakha Bucha day four years ago shed light on the nature of the conflict in this historically contested region
Just before dawn four years ago on Visakha Bucha Day, one of the most important days on the Buddhist calendar, two young men were hiding inside the tree-line keeping a look out for an oncoming Army patrol.
Approaching the point where the bomb was buried was a patrol of four soldiers riding pillion on two motorbikes. Behind them was a pickup truck with two soldiers on the back. Behind the truck were four soldiers on two motorbikes.
The young man had a split second to decide, and he went for the pickup. When it was all over, two monks inside the cab of the pickup lay dead. They were from nearby Suan Kaew Temple in Yala's Yaha district. The two soldiers on the back of the pickup were severely wounded. The vehicle they were travelling in was destroyed.
Thai national media went haywire for days, concluding that the Malay Muslim separatists in the southernmost provinces were out to drive a bigger wedge between Buddhists and Muslims. That the incident took place on an important day for Buddhists just reinforced that claim.
Separatist sources from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), on the other hand, maintained that the two brothers behind the attack did not know there were monks inside the truck. They saw a legitimate target and went with it.
Soldiers from the targeted unit, who were using the temple as a base camp, reiterated the same point - there was no line of vision, so the person who detonated the bomb could not have seen the monks.
Given the fact that monks hadn't been attacked for years, government officials didn't know what to make of the Yaha incident. But over time it became clear that this was a one-off incident.
Nevertheless, the damage had been done and now it was time for payback. Within a week or so, word got out that authorities were looking for two young brothers from a nearby village in the district.
No one was sure how the authorities were able to identify the two suspects so quickly. It could have been through informants - the dozens of so-called "Bt4,500 local security guards" who take their orders from the local Army unit. Or it could have been the moles that the authorities had put in place.
But less than two weeks after the incident, one of the suspects was shot dead in front of his wife's house. The other decided to leave Yaha for Narathiwat, where he would lay low for the next four years.
A BRN source would neither confirm nor deny that the two brothers were behind the Yaha attack. But he did say they were members of local cell and that the surviving brother, Saudi Setopa, had been relocated to Narathiwat shortly after the incident.
But Saudi's name would come up again in another major case. This time it was the massive July 2014 car bomb in Betong, a border town few thought would ever come under this theatre of violence given its remoteness and the logistics nightmare of carrying out such an operation here and getting away with it.
Though the BRN seldom publicises strategy specifics - at least nothing that could incriminate its members - the source maintained that Saudi was not involved in the Betong car bomb.
But from the perspective of the Thai security agencies, justice caught up with Saudi on January 30 this year, when 50 police officers surrounded him at a house in Kabang district, just east of Yaha.
Investigation by a BRN operative suggested that Saudi was spotted in Yaha district, most likely by an informant. He made a dash for nearby Kabang district but was foiled by the security grid that was already in place.
He took refuge in a nearby house and positioned himself for a two-hour gunfight. One officer was hit in the leg. Saudi refused to surrender and was eventually killed in the lopsided shoot-out.
It wasn't clear why Saudi had returned to his village earlier this year or surfaced in Yaha district on January 30.
Sitting on the patio in front of his one-storey home, Saudi's father didn't seem to be in the mood for a lengthy discussion about his son's life. He had buried Saudi's body the night before.
Hanging in the living room was a picture of Saudi with fellow soldiers after graduating from Army basic training in 1999. It wasn't clear if the father was trying to suggest that his son, at least at one point in his life, was patriotic, or whether it was merely the only picture he had left of Saudi.
Nevertheless, Saudi's case and chase did shed light on the nature of the conflict in this historically contested region, where more than 6,000 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died in insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
From the network of separatist militants that stretches across the Malay-speaking provinces, to the police informants - not to mention the locally hired security details that the Thai soldiers don't trust to look after the Buddhist temples - there is an endless struggle for survival in every corner of this restive region.
Government soldiers in Yaha don't believe that their "Bt4,500 security details" will put their lives on the line for the unit that commands them. Instead, there is widespread acknowledgement that these village-based security guards often share the separatists' sentiment and historical mistrust of the Thai state.
The incident also revealed how eager the Thai media and wider society are to jump to assumptions about the conflict without looking at the finer details and circumstances surrounding the attacks.
The world will never know why Saudi decided to fight to his death. But for the Thai security forces, it was mission accomplished, even though his death did little to advance either peace or "victory" for the state.
Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)
Special to The Nation
Yala, Thailand
The killing of two Buddhist monks on Visakha Bucha day four years ago shed light on the nature of the conflict in this historically contested region
Just before dawn four years ago on Visakha Bucha Day, one of the most important days on the Buddhist calendar, two young men were hiding inside the tree-line keeping a look out for an oncoming Army patrol.
Approaching the point where the bomb was buried was a patrol of four soldiers riding pillion on two motorbikes. Behind them was a pickup truck with two soldiers on the back. Behind the truck were four soldiers on two motorbikes.
The young man had a split second to decide, and he went for the pickup. When it was all over, two monks inside the cab of the pickup lay dead. They were from nearby Suan Kaew Temple in Yala's Yaha district. The two soldiers on the back of the pickup were severely wounded. The vehicle they were travelling in was destroyed.Thai national media went haywire for days, concluding that the Malay Muslim separatists in the southernmost provinces were out to drive a bigger wedge between Buddhists and Muslims. That the incident took place on an important day for Buddhists just reinforced that claim.
Separatist sources from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), on the other hand, maintained that the two brothers behind the attack did not know there were monks inside the truck. They saw a legitimate target and went with it.
Soldiers from the targeted unit, who were using the temple as a base camp, reiterated the same point - there was no line of vision, so the person who detonated the bomb could not have seen the monks.
Given the fact that monks hadn't been attacked for years, government officials didn't know what to make of the Yaha incident. But over time it became clear that this was a one-off incident.
Nevertheless, the damage had been done and now it was time for payback. Within a week or so, word got out that authorities were looking for two young brothers from a nearby village in the district.
No one was sure how the authorities were able to identify the two suspects so quickly. It could have been through informants - the dozens of so-called "Bt4,500 local security guards" who take their orders from the local Army unit. Or it could have been the moles that the authorities had put in place.
But less than two weeks after the incident, one of the suspects was shot dead in front of his wife's house. The other decided to leave Yaha for Narathiwat, where he would lay low for the next four years.
A BRN source would neither confirm nor deny that the two brothers were behind the Yaha attack. But he did say they were members of local cell and that the surviving brother, Saudi Setopa, had been relocated to Narathiwat shortly after the incident.
But Saudi's name would come up again in another major case. This time it was the massive July 2014 car bomb in Betong, a border town few thought would ever come under this theatre of violence given its remoteness and the logistics nightmare of carrying out such an operation here and getting away with it.
Though the BRN seldom publicises strategy specifics - at least nothing that could incriminate its members - the source maintained that Saudi was not involved in the Betong car bomb.
But from the perspective of the Thai security agencies, justice caught up with Saudi on January 30 this year, when 50 police officers surrounded him at a house in Kabang district, just east of Yaha.
Investigation by a BRN operative suggested that Saudi was spotted in Yaha district, most likely by an informant. He made a dash for nearby Kabang district but was foiled by the security grid that was already in place.
He took refuge in a nearby house and positioned himself for a two-hour gunfight. One officer was hit in the leg. Saudi refused to surrender and was eventually killed in the lopsided shoot-out.
It wasn't clear why Saudi had returned to his village earlier this year or surfaced in Yaha district on January 30.
Sitting on the patio in front of his one-storey home, Saudi's father didn't seem to be in the mood for a lengthy discussion about his son's life. He had buried Saudi's body the night before.
Hanging in the living room was a picture of Saudi with fellow soldiers after graduating from Army basic training in 1999. It wasn't clear if the father was trying to suggest that his son, at least at one point in his life, was patriotic, or whether it was merely the only picture he had left of Saudi.
Nevertheless, Saudi's case and chase did shed light on the nature of the conflict in this historically contested region, where more than 6,000 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died in insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
From the network of separatist militants that stretches across the Malay-speaking provinces, to the police informants - not to mention the locally hired security details that the Thai soldiers don't trust to look after the Buddhist temples - there is an endless struggle for survival in every corner of this restive region.
Government soldiers in Yaha don't believe that their "Bt4,500 security details" will put their lives on the line for the unit that commands them. Instead, there is widespread acknowledgement that these village-based security guards often share the separatists' sentiment and historical mistrust of the Thai state.
The incident also revealed how eager the Thai media and wider society are to jump to assumptions about the conflict without looking at the finer details and circumstances surrounding the attacks.
The world will never know why Saudi decided to fight to his death. But for the Thai security forces, it was mission accomplished, even though his death did little to advance either peace or "victory" for the state.
Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in Yala, Thailand. He is also the founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)
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