Bangkok goes back to the drawing board after platform of separatist groups collapses and bomb attacks continue
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
YALA
For three consecutive days, the city of Yala was in a tailspin.
On Thursday evening last week, 24 small bombs exploded all over the city in the space of two hours.
A security grid was locked in place, but it didn't prevent four more explosions the next morning then the same the morning after.
The three-day bombing spree was a humiliating episode for a Thai security apparatus still reeling from the April 10 car-bomb attack on the tourist island of Koh Samui, where evidence pointed to origins in the southernmost provinces.
Within hours of the Samui attack, spokesmen for the military-installed government, the Defence Ministry and Royal Thai Army publicly claimed the car bomb had nothing to do with the southern insurgency.
Army Region 4 chief Lt-General Prakarn Cholayut defended the security measures put in place on Thursday evening in Yala, saying the subsequent breaches had been the result of explosives placed before the start of the bomb blitz. Moreover, they were set off remotely, possibly by mobile phones.
Speaking to reporters in Bangkok, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan said the bombs were small and the culprits appeared to be more concerned with creating disturbances than claiming lives.
A 'message' from insurgents
Sources close to the separatist movement say the Samui car bomb and the three-day bomb blitz in Yala were carried out by Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) militants as a strong message of their disapproval of Thai troops' conduct, the ill-defined rules of engagement and the culture of impunity among the security forces.
It was also a reminder to Thailand and Malaysia that the BRN, the separatist movement that controls the vast majority of insurgency combatants, does not support the Majlis Amanah Rakyat Patani (MARA Patani), a platform for the various Patani Malay movements to formulate their strategy.
Another component to the MARA Patani is a regional assembly made up of local civil society organisations, whose function is to legitimise the peace initiative.
On April 21, the designated facilitator from Malaysia, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, held a meeting with representatives from six longstanding separatist groups. Representing the BRN was Awang Jabat and his associate, Tok Imam Haleng.
Other participants included representatives of the three separatist factions - the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP). They reiterated their determination to use MARA Patani as a vehicle to unite Patani groups and guide the peace process forward.
But the problem with MARA Patani is that the vast majority of BRN leaders, especially those from its military wing, do not support the initiative.
They said the initiative was cooked up by rogue members who have teamed up with facilitator and, to some extent, Thai officials working on the peace process. Moreover, they do not see Awang Jabat as their representative. Local civic organisations in Thailand's deep South also declined the offer to participate in the 22-strong MARA Patani assembly.
But at a recent meeting of the steering committee for Thailand's southern conflict policy team, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha decided to pour cold water on the MARA Patani idea.
Like the core BRN leaders, Prayut doesn't see MARA Patani as reflecting the desires of the people of this conflict-affected region. He also pointed out that the idea had come from a small group of people.
'Prayut eager to talk'
Nevertheless, Prayut does want to talk to the insurgents, said government sources.
Moreover, the prime minister was concerned that MARA Patani could set the stage for the conflict to be internationalised. With Malaysia chairing Asean this year, some Thai foreign ministry officials fear the issue could easily be pushed onto the regional agenda.
However, there are no indications from Kuala Lumpur that the idea of internationalising the conflict is in their heads. Like Thailand, Malaysia has taken a territorial stand on the conflict and refused to allow foreign government and professional mediators to referee the peace process. With the conflict occurring right on its border, Malaysia sees itself as one of the stakeholders in the process.
But the writing has been on the wall for some time. Awang, who is closely aligned with Dato Zamzamin on this MARA Patani initiative, had recruited a Muslim cleric from Sai Buri - Ustaz Waesumae Sudden, 67 - to help mobilise the support of insurgents and local Malay Muslims at the grassroots level.
Sudden was shot dead on September 28 last year, and MARA Patani has been on a shaky ground ever since. It appears that Prayut has just put the last nail in the coffin.
It is not clear what the future holds for the deep South peace initiative. But political insiders in Bangkok say the junta is interested in talking to the separatists. Coming up with a format that satisfies the Thai generals, it seems, will continue to be a challenge.
Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Friday, 22 May 2015
Tuesday, 7 April 2015
EDITORIAL: Take away the licence to kill
TRIGGER-HAPPY SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE SOUTH NEED TO REASSESS PROCEDURES THAT FUEL THE ANGER ON WHICH INSURGENCY FEEDS
Thai security forces are in hot water again over their actions in the deep South. This time the controversy is over the shooting to death of four young men in Pattani’s Yarang district.
According to the official version, a group of paramilitary rangers were tracking suspected insurgents who had gathered in Pattani’s Tung Yang Daeng District to plan attacks against government security agencies. The scene of the gathering was a construction site at a village in the district.
The rangers’ actions in storming the gathering and shooting dead four young men has drawn fierce criticism from the rector of Fatoni University, where two of the victims had been studying.
Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya has every right to voice his concern, especially now that his students are at the centre of the debate.
Dr Lutfi is proud of his university’s reputation as “cleaner than clean” and not involved in the region’s ongoing separatist conflict.
Academics and researchers who work in this contested region see the insurgency as part of a nationalist movement.
Meanwhile, Lutfi’s brand of Islam places religion above all else, which is why those very same academics and researchers do not talk about his institution in the light of separatism.
Thai authorities, of course, disagree with his claim that none of the students at Fatoni University has embraced separatism as an ideology or has joined the separatist militants.
They claim that just because the university as an institution does not embrace or promote Patani Malay separatism, that doesn’t mean its students – including the two shot dead in Tung Yang Daeng – hadn’t embraced the ideology.
Lutfi and his university staff have in the past been helpful to the state, often making themselves available to receive foreign dignitaries and reporters invited to the South by the government. To show its appreciation, the Yingluck Shinawatra administration added
another academic building to the Fatoni campus.
That appreciation must now be extended by ensuring justice for the two dead students and their families.
The problem of trigger-happy Thai security officials is nothing new in the deep South, but this latest incident adds weight to arguments that their approach and tactics are in urgent need of an overhaul.
In January 2012, soldiers attached to a ranger unit in Pattani’s Nong Chik district, who were reportedly “itching for a fight” after their base had been attacked by militants, gunned down a group of Muslim funeral-goers who happened to be passing, killing four and injuring five.
Expectations that the military would reassess their rules of engagement in response to that debacle came to nothing.
The decade-old emergency decree, coupled with a culture of impunity for security officials, has helped foster a “shoot-to-kill” attitude among security officials. They know that the law – which many locals have dubbed a licence to kill – will protect them. Public indifference in the rest of Thailand towards the plight of Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces also ensures that whatever controversial measures the government takes in the region will be met with little or no criticism elsewhere.
Dr Lutfi has maintained a good working relationship with the Thai state and, thus, the authorities owe it to him to conduct their investigation into the Tung Yang Daeng shootings honestly and accurately.
If the two students were part of the insurgency, the burden is on the state to convince the public of that fact. Meanwhile, Thai security officials’ standard operating procedures in the South must be closely scrutinised and reassessed.
We should not lose sight of the fact that more than 6,000 people – most of them Malay Muslim residents – have been killed in insurgency-related violence in the three southernmost provinces.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/today_editorial/30257529
Thai security forces are in hot water again over their actions in the deep South. This time the controversy is over the shooting to death of four young men in Pattani’s Yarang district.
According to the official version, a group of paramilitary rangers were tracking suspected insurgents who had gathered in Pattani’s Tung Yang Daeng District to plan attacks against government security agencies. The scene of the gathering was a construction site at a village in the district.
The rangers’ actions in storming the gathering and shooting dead four young men has drawn fierce criticism from the rector of Fatoni University, where two of the victims had been studying.
Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya has every right to voice his concern, especially now that his students are at the centre of the debate.
Dr Lutfi is proud of his university’s reputation as “cleaner than clean” and not involved in the region’s ongoing separatist conflict.
Academics and researchers who work in this contested region see the insurgency as part of a nationalist movement.
Meanwhile, Lutfi’s brand of Islam places religion above all else, which is why those very same academics and researchers do not talk about his institution in the light of separatism.
Thai authorities, of course, disagree with his claim that none of the students at Fatoni University has embraced separatism as an ideology or has joined the separatist militants.
They claim that just because the university as an institution does not embrace or promote Patani Malay separatism, that doesn’t mean its students – including the two shot dead in Tung Yang Daeng – hadn’t embraced the ideology.
Lutfi and his university staff have in the past been helpful to the state, often making themselves available to receive foreign dignitaries and reporters invited to the South by the government. To show its appreciation, the Yingluck Shinawatra administration added
another academic building to the Fatoni campus.
That appreciation must now be extended by ensuring justice for the two dead students and their families.
The problem of trigger-happy Thai security officials is nothing new in the deep South, but this latest incident adds weight to arguments that their approach and tactics are in urgent need of an overhaul.
In January 2012, soldiers attached to a ranger unit in Pattani’s Nong Chik district, who were reportedly “itching for a fight” after their base had been attacked by militants, gunned down a group of Muslim funeral-goers who happened to be passing, killing four and injuring five.
Expectations that the military would reassess their rules of engagement in response to that debacle came to nothing.
The decade-old emergency decree, coupled with a culture of impunity for security officials, has helped foster a “shoot-to-kill” attitude among security officials. They know that the law – which many locals have dubbed a licence to kill – will protect them. Public indifference in the rest of Thailand towards the plight of Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces also ensures that whatever controversial measures the government takes in the region will be met with little or no criticism elsewhere.
Dr Lutfi has maintained a good working relationship with the Thai state and, thus, the authorities owe it to him to conduct their investigation into the Tung Yang Daeng shootings honestly and accurately.
If the two students were part of the insurgency, the burden is on the state to convince the public of that fact. Meanwhile, Thai security officials’ standard operating procedures in the South must be closely scrutinised and reassessed.
We should not lose sight of the fact that more than 6,000 people – most of them Malay Muslim residents – have been killed in insurgency-related violence in the three southernmost provinces.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/today_editorial/30257529
Thursday, 2 April 2015
Lost in FOG of conflict, peace talks must go back to basics
Don Pathan
Special to the Nation
To make progress in deep south, negotiations must first focus on verifying separatist groups' credentials
The so-called peace process launched just two years ago by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra is having problems getting back on its feet after languishing for more than a year without progress.
The initiative, launched on February 28, 2013, struggled almost from the very beginning. It hit a snag in late 2013 when the designated liaison with the separatists, Hasan Taib, called it quits. And then came the infamous Bangkok Shutdown that sent the Yingluck government into survival mode, until the May 2014 coup put the final nail in her political coffin.
Our latest junta leadership pledged to continue the peace talks, but on condition that the separatists established a common platform and brought about a "period of peace". For some, this means a ceasefire. For decision-makers in Bangkok, it means assurance that whoever comes to the negotiating table has a significant degree of command-and-control over the separatist combatants.
Observers, stakeholders and separatist leaders themselves agree that the one longstanding group that controls the vast majority of combatants is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).
So far, unlike other groups, the BRN has been camera shy. It frowns on members who have surfaced to take part in any discussion or forum, closed-door or not. Senior BRN members, both in exile and at home, have been kicked out of the movement for violating this ground rule.
Even individual BRN members who have jumped on the bandwagon of the Majlis Amanah Rakyat Patani (MARA Patani), an initiative to create a regional assembly in Thailand's Malay-speaking South to rubber stamp the ongoing peace initiative, have been asked to leave the movement.
Combatants on the ground and leaders living in exile, as well as Thai intelligence officers, see MARA Patani as a desperate attempt to give the process some credibility after more than a year of stalling. But the plan is not generating any traction, which means key actors in the peace process must now go back to the drawing board and rethink the entire thing.
Latest 'short cut' has failed
The BRN has given MARA Patani the cold shoulder on grounds that it is "artificial and instant", when there is in fact no short cut to peace. The group said they want to talk peace with Thailand but will come to the negotiating table only after a number issues are resolved. These include proper training for their negotiators, official recognition and immunity for members of their political wing.
The BRN said they would like to work with the international community on capacity building but Bangkok is still contemplating the idea of giving the green light to international NGOs or foreign governments to work with the group.
One of the problems, said a Thai political insider, is that the Thai side has never been sure which group is capable of what, or who are the real BRN.
For the past decade or so, just about every potential facilitator and mediator, local and foreign, has claimed to speak for the BRN or to have the group's endorsement. But none has succeeded in generating any traction that leads to meaningful progress towards peace.
No go-between with separatists
Even the credentials of Hasan Taib, the designated BRN liaison for the peace initiative under the Yingluck administration, were misrepresented to the public. Hasan, who did not have the endorsement of the BRN leadership when he surfaced on February 28, 2013, didn't have the audacity to call himself BRN leader. And so the label "liaison" was applied.
The debate over whether Hasan had any influence with the combatants on the ground or support from the BRN leadership nagged the Thai government throughout the process, until November 2013 when he quit in a YouTube video statement. He later went incommunicado for a few weeks.
Now, the participants in the current process are unable to find a replacement to come to the table. Ideally, Bangkok wants a person who is a known figure among the Malays of Patani. Without BRN endorsement, the negotiations will be nothing more than a talking shop. Others believe that a bad process is better than no process at all.
With virtually no leg to stand on, it appears that MARA Patani is about to crumble even before the first meeting begins.
Without calling it "Plan B", Thai officials are saying there has to be a contingency plan or something to keep the talks going if MARA Patan is ditched.
Some officials suggest peace efforts should go back to basics, with confidence-building measures between the two warring sides to repair decades of confusion.
In sub-national conflicts elsewhere, insurgents either give prior warning of an attack through a go-between, such as the media, or leave some sort of signature at the scene as a way of claiming responsibility. This is not the case in southern Thailand, at least not yet anyway, said officials.
Official sources in Bangkok said Thailand might be willing to go down the confidence-building route, as it would help the government obtain a better understanding of the capability of the various Patani movements and factions.
Since recognition is what the movements are after, some sort of a "clearing house" where both sides could get together - directly or through an interlocutor - and compare notes to verify responsibility for attacks could well be the place to begin the much-needed confidence building activities.
DON PATHAN is a freelance security analyst and a consultant based in Yala. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Special to the Nation
To make progress in deep south, negotiations must first focus on verifying separatist groups' credentials
The so-called peace process launched just two years ago by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra is having problems getting back on its feet after languishing for more than a year without progress.
The initiative, launched on February 28, 2013, struggled almost from the very beginning. It hit a snag in late 2013 when the designated liaison with the separatists, Hasan Taib, called it quits. And then came the infamous Bangkok Shutdown that sent the Yingluck government into survival mode, until the May 2014 coup put the final nail in her political coffin.
Our latest junta leadership pledged to continue the peace talks, but on condition that the separatists established a common platform and brought about a "period of peace". For some, this means a ceasefire. For decision-makers in Bangkok, it means assurance that whoever comes to the negotiating table has a significant degree of command-and-control over the separatist combatants.
Observers, stakeholders and separatist leaders themselves agree that the one longstanding group that controls the vast majority of combatants is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).
So far, unlike other groups, the BRN has been camera shy. It frowns on members who have surfaced to take part in any discussion or forum, closed-door or not. Senior BRN members, both in exile and at home, have been kicked out of the movement for violating this ground rule.
Even individual BRN members who have jumped on the bandwagon of the Majlis Amanah Rakyat Patani (MARA Patani), an initiative to create a regional assembly in Thailand's Malay-speaking South to rubber stamp the ongoing peace initiative, have been asked to leave the movement.
Combatants on the ground and leaders living in exile, as well as Thai intelligence officers, see MARA Patani as a desperate attempt to give the process some credibility after more than a year of stalling. But the plan is not generating any traction, which means key actors in the peace process must now go back to the drawing board and rethink the entire thing.
Latest 'short cut' has failed
The BRN has given MARA Patani the cold shoulder on grounds that it is "artificial and instant", when there is in fact no short cut to peace. The group said they want to talk peace with Thailand but will come to the negotiating table only after a number issues are resolved. These include proper training for their negotiators, official recognition and immunity for members of their political wing.
The BRN said they would like to work with the international community on capacity building but Bangkok is still contemplating the idea of giving the green light to international NGOs or foreign governments to work with the group.
One of the problems, said a Thai political insider, is that the Thai side has never been sure which group is capable of what, or who are the real BRN.
For the past decade or so, just about every potential facilitator and mediator, local and foreign, has claimed to speak for the BRN or to have the group's endorsement. But none has succeeded in generating any traction that leads to meaningful progress towards peace.
No go-between with separatists
Even the credentials of Hasan Taib, the designated BRN liaison for the peace initiative under the Yingluck administration, were misrepresented to the public. Hasan, who did not have the endorsement of the BRN leadership when he surfaced on February 28, 2013, didn't have the audacity to call himself BRN leader. And so the label "liaison" was applied.
The debate over whether Hasan had any influence with the combatants on the ground or support from the BRN leadership nagged the Thai government throughout the process, until November 2013 when he quit in a YouTube video statement. He later went incommunicado for a few weeks.
Now, the participants in the current process are unable to find a replacement to come to the table. Ideally, Bangkok wants a person who is a known figure among the Malays of Patani. Without BRN endorsement, the negotiations will be nothing more than a talking shop. Others believe that a bad process is better than no process at all.
With virtually no leg to stand on, it appears that MARA Patani is about to crumble even before the first meeting begins.
Without calling it "Plan B", Thai officials are saying there has to be a contingency plan or something to keep the talks going if MARA Patan is ditched.
Some officials suggest peace efforts should go back to basics, with confidence-building measures between the two warring sides to repair decades of confusion.
In sub-national conflicts elsewhere, insurgents either give prior warning of an attack through a go-between, such as the media, or leave some sort of signature at the scene as a way of claiming responsibility. This is not the case in southern Thailand, at least not yet anyway, said officials.
Official sources in Bangkok said Thailand might be willing to go down the confidence-building route, as it would help the government obtain a better understanding of the capability of the various Patani movements and factions.
Since recognition is what the movements are after, some sort of a "clearing house" where both sides could get together - directly or through an interlocutor - and compare notes to verify responsibility for attacks could well be the place to begin the much-needed confidence building activities.
DON PATHAN is a freelance security analyst and a consultant based in Yala. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Saturday, 7 March 2015
EDITORIAL: Good Muslims, bad Muslims and the lies the govt tells you
The Nation
State misinformation about the southern insurgency has fostered an undercurrent of religious bigotry across the country
The dispute over the planned construction of a mosque in the northern province of Nan has reached an unprecedented level. But the anger being voiced by a growing number of Buddhists there is fuelled by falsehood.
Many have cited the insurgency in the Malay-speaking, Muslim-majority South as the reason they don't want a mosque in town. More than 6,000 people in the southernmost provinces have died since violence erupted in January 2004.
There is general agreement among academics, researchers and historians that the conflict in the far South stems from Thailand's policy of forced assimilation at the expense of the separate cultural and religious identity of the Patani Malays.
When the region came under Bangkok's direct rule at the beginning of the 20th century, its Muslims did not challenge Siam's sovereignty. The rebellion only came into play in the 1960s, when heavy-handed rule triggered an armed insurgency.
When the fighting died down in the late 1980s and early '90s, there was an assumption that it had gone for good. But the absence of violence did not equate to peace.
With the Patani historical narrative still alive, it was only a matter of time before a new generation of Malay Muslims resurfaced to take up arms against the state. When it did, Bangkok was quick to dismiss the insurgency as the work of misguided, drug-crazed youths who had embraced a distorted brand of Islam. Placing the blame on religious fanatics offered a convenient way of hiding the truth: Their policy of assimilation had failed.
Though shallow and misleading, this official state line has been accepted by Thais almost without challenge. Many citizens, perhaps, thought it would be unpatriotic to question it.
Inevitably, the decision to play the religious card in the South has come back to haunt the state.
The anti-Muslim sentiment of protesters in Nan is just the latest example. Elsewhere, monks are demanding that Buddhism be recognised as the state religion. Both these groups have cited the conflict in the South to support their arguments.
Never mind that Thai Muslims outside the deep South are just as patriotic as their Buddhist neighbours and accept the legitimacy of the state. Never mind that the conflict in the Muslim-majority South is ethno-nationalist in nature and has nothing to do with Muslims in the rest of the country.
Instead, people find it easier to accept the official explanation at face value, because it avoids questioning a past failed policy. When the majority in the country shares this same attitude towards the conflict in the South, people don't mind being seen as bigots.
Who cares if scores of Malay Muslims suffocate to death in the back of military transport trucks, or if an imam in Narathiwat, Yapa Kaseng, is beaten to death in front of his son? And so what if no Thai security official has ever been punished for crimes like these?
Such popular sentiments are evidence the state has been successful in burying the Malay Muslims' historical grievances beneath a "good khaek versus bad khaek" narrative.
Bangkok let the genie of religious bigotry out of the bottle. Now authorities in Nan are having trouble convincing Buddhist protesters that their Muslim neighbours are the "good khaek" and should be left alone.
They should know that the anti-Muslim mindset is a product of their government's doing. But they should also know that it's never too late to tell the truth and set the record straight.
Many have cited the insurgency in the Malay-speaking, Muslim-majority South as the reason they don't want a mosque in town. More than 6,000 people in the southernmost provinces have died since violence erupted in January 2004.
There is general agreement among academics, researchers and historians that the conflict in the far South stems from Thailand's policy of forced assimilation at the expense of the separate cultural and religious identity of the Patani Malays.
When the region came under Bangkok's direct rule at the beginning of the 20th century, its Muslims did not challenge Siam's sovereignty. The rebellion only came into play in the 1960s, when heavy-handed rule triggered an armed insurgency.
When the fighting died down in the late 1980s and early '90s, there was an assumption that it had gone for good. But the absence of violence did not equate to peace.
With the Patani historical narrative still alive, it was only a matter of time before a new generation of Malay Muslims resurfaced to take up arms against the state. When it did, Bangkok was quick to dismiss the insurgency as the work of misguided, drug-crazed youths who had embraced a distorted brand of Islam. Placing the blame on religious fanatics offered a convenient way of hiding the truth: Their policy of assimilation had failed.
Though shallow and misleading, this official state line has been accepted by Thais almost without challenge. Many citizens, perhaps, thought it would be unpatriotic to question it.
Inevitably, the decision to play the religious card in the South has come back to haunt the state.
The anti-Muslim sentiment of protesters in Nan is just the latest example. Elsewhere, monks are demanding that Buddhism be recognised as the state religion. Both these groups have cited the conflict in the South to support their arguments.
Never mind that Thai Muslims outside the deep South are just as patriotic as their Buddhist neighbours and accept the legitimacy of the state. Never mind that the conflict in the Muslim-majority South is ethno-nationalist in nature and has nothing to do with Muslims in the rest of the country.
Instead, people find it easier to accept the official explanation at face value, because it avoids questioning a past failed policy. When the majority in the country shares this same attitude towards the conflict in the South, people don't mind being seen as bigots.
Who cares if scores of Malay Muslims suffocate to death in the back of military transport trucks, or if an imam in Narathiwat, Yapa Kaseng, is beaten to death in front of his son? And so what if no Thai security official has ever been punished for crimes like these?
Such popular sentiments are evidence the state has been successful in burying the Malay Muslims' historical grievances beneath a "good khaek versus bad khaek" narrative.
Bangkok let the genie of religious bigotry out of the bottle. Now authorities in Nan are having trouble convincing Buddhist protesters that their Muslim neighbours are the "good khaek" and should be left alone.
They should know that the anti-Muslim mindset is a product of their government's doing. But they should also know that it's never too late to tell the truth and set the record straight.
Sunday, 22 February 2015
Car-bomb in Narathiwat: A wake-up call for Bangkok
EDITORIAL
The Nation
The Nation
Drama shows that govt claims of progress and a drop in violence are not soundly based
The huge car-bomb that rocked Narathiwat on Friday has cast a cloud over the supposed progress that authorities say they have made over recent months in their fight against insurgency in the far South.
More than 10 people were injured and about 20 shophouses and food stalls damaged by the blast.
For some months now, the government has pointed to the fact that the overall number of violent incidents has dropped by more than 40 per cent compared to the previous year.
But if anything, the Narathiwat car-bomb was a reminder that the number of violent incidents alone is not enough to justify a claim of success or progress.
For the past decade or so the central government has been sounding like a broken record: The insurgents hit us because we are on the right track; the insurgents don't hit us because we are on the right track.
With Thai society largely indifferent to the plight and grievances of ethnic Malays in the southernmost provinces, the government could just about say anything and get away with it.
Over recent months, the authorities have been telling the general public and the world that the number of "green zone" areas is up while the number of troubled "red" zones has dropped.
Superficial attempts to quantify progress are straight out of a warfare textbook. But the conflict in the far South is anything but conventional.
Insurgents, at this point in time, are not out to win geographical space, but mental space. This is a war of hearts and minds - at least at this stage anyway.
And if the current crop of Thai security planners can't understand this point, they should step aside and let people with better understanding of sub-national conflict take over.
It's amazing how the authorities can blindly believe their own propaganda - about how they have won over the hearts and minds of the local people.
Yes, intelligence has improved as more and more moles are being placed in various pockets and communities throughout the region. And they do, every once in a long while, provide information leading to the arrest of suspects.
And of course, forensic science has been stepped up tremendously to help secure convictions. In the past, most suspects would confess to whatever allegations the police made against them - then retract their statement when the case gets to court.
And without concrete evidence, the court has no choice but to let them go. This explained why, until just over a year ago, more than 80 per cent of such cases were thrown out by the courts. People will say anything, it seems, if they are being tortured.
But it would take a lot more than just forensic science and an improved judicial system to secure peace in this highly and historically contested region.
Understanding the root cause is a good start. From that our policy makers could see the difference between the Thai state-constructed narrative and the narrative embraced by the Malays of Patani. Perhaps our leaders could understand why the Malays in Patani refer to them as colonial masters and call themselves colonial subjects.
If we get this far, then we can start talking about what kind of concessions the state is willing to give to the Malays of Patani. But sadly, our attitude to the Malays of Patani has not been that different from the longstanding notion of the "white man's burden" - the duty of colonisers to civilise indigenous people.
The locals may take our freebies and we immediately think they are on our side because they wouldn't bite the hands that feed them.
Well, it has been more than 10 years now - this wave of insurgency - and more than 6,000 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died. It's high time to rethink the whole thing. It is up to us to find a better way to resolve this problem.
More than 10 people were injured and about 20 shophouses and food stalls damaged by the blast.
For some months now, the government has pointed to the fact that the overall number of violent incidents has dropped by more than 40 per cent compared to the previous year.
But if anything, the Narathiwat car-bomb was a reminder that the number of violent incidents alone is not enough to justify a claim of success or progress.
For the past decade or so the central government has been sounding like a broken record: The insurgents hit us because we are on the right track; the insurgents don't hit us because we are on the right track.
With Thai society largely indifferent to the plight and grievances of ethnic Malays in the southernmost provinces, the government could just about say anything and get away with it.
Over recent months, the authorities have been telling the general public and the world that the number of "green zone" areas is up while the number of troubled "red" zones has dropped.
Superficial attempts to quantify progress are straight out of a warfare textbook. But the conflict in the far South is anything but conventional.
Insurgents, at this point in time, are not out to win geographical space, but mental space. This is a war of hearts and minds - at least at this stage anyway.
And if the current crop of Thai security planners can't understand this point, they should step aside and let people with better understanding of sub-national conflict take over.
It's amazing how the authorities can blindly believe their own propaganda - about how they have won over the hearts and minds of the local people.
Yes, intelligence has improved as more and more moles are being placed in various pockets and communities throughout the region. And they do, every once in a long while, provide information leading to the arrest of suspects.
And of course, forensic science has been stepped up tremendously to help secure convictions. In the past, most suspects would confess to whatever allegations the police made against them - then retract their statement when the case gets to court.
And without concrete evidence, the court has no choice but to let them go. This explained why, until just over a year ago, more than 80 per cent of such cases were thrown out by the courts. People will say anything, it seems, if they are being tortured.
But it would take a lot more than just forensic science and an improved judicial system to secure peace in this highly and historically contested region.
Understanding the root cause is a good start. From that our policy makers could see the difference between the Thai state-constructed narrative and the narrative embraced by the Malays of Patani. Perhaps our leaders could understand why the Malays in Patani refer to them as colonial masters and call themselves colonial subjects.
If we get this far, then we can start talking about what kind of concessions the state is willing to give to the Malays of Patani. But sadly, our attitude to the Malays of Patani has not been that different from the longstanding notion of the "white man's burden" - the duty of colonisers to civilise indigenous people.
The locals may take our freebies and we immediately think they are on our side because they wouldn't bite the hands that feed them.
Well, it has been more than 10 years now - this wave of insurgency - and more than 6,000 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died. It's high time to rethink the whole thing. It is up to us to find a better way to resolve this problem.
Friday, 20 February 2015
Chickens come home to roost in Myanmar
The Nation
The government is blaming ethnic rebels for instigating battles on the Chinese border, but its own murky role in this longstanding conflict cannot be ignored
Fighting between Myanmar troops and rebels on the northern border with China has yet to subside and a political solution is nowhere in sight after the central government placed the region under army control for the next three months.
The fighting erupted 11 days ago in Kokang region and has so far claimed the lives of about 50 Myanmar army soldiers and 30 rebels.
Meanwhile a Red Cross convoy on a mission to help civilians displaced by the fighting came under attack, resulting in injuries to several of its personnel. As expected, each side is blaming the other for the attack on the aid workers.
As is often the case with conflict, it's easier to point fingers than to address the underlying causes.
The central government is blaming the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) for instigating the latest round of fighting.
But the roots of the conflict lie in the previous round, five years ago, when the Myanmar military launched an all-out offensive against the ethnic-Chinese MNDAA and ousted its leader, Peng Jiasheng. The motivations for that action remain murky and certainly contradict any claim that the government side is an "innocent victim".
The MNDAA is among the several ethnic rebel armies that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government of Myanmar, also known as Burma, since 1989.
In exchange, the MNDAA and fellow rebel groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) were granted a degree of autonomy to run affairs in their respective regions. Like the Wa, the MNDAA were part of the Communist Party of Burma insurgency network, an outfit that fell apart in 1989.
But in 2009, after two decades of ceasefires, it became clear that none of these groups was willing to disband its army and submit to the authority of the government's Border Guard Forces. So the central government decided to teach them all a lesson by focusing its ire on the Kokang's MNDAA. The group is much smaller and doesn't have the firepower of rebel armies like the 30,000-strong UWSA.
And so, in August 2009, Myanmar reneged on its two-decade-old ceasefire agreement and sent troops into the semi-autonomous Kokang, ousting its leader Peng and replacing him with its own proxy. Now, six years later, Peng has made good on his promise to return to retake the territory from government troops.
For Myanmar - and especially for current army chief Min Aung Hlaing, who led the assault that ousted Peng in 2009 - this is a case of chickens coming home to roost. And, in the rugged hills of the Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps, the payback can be brutal.
For the past five years Peng has sought dialogue with Myanmar top brass in a bid to return to power, but they weren't interested in listening to what he had to say. He certainly has their attention now, but it's still not clear whether they are willing to sit down with him, given they were the ones who violated the 1989 ceasefire.
The government claims it ousted Peng because his army traded in drugs. That claim seems hollow when you consider that the state has neglected to tackle the many other drug-dealing groups in the Golden Triangle.
Naturally, Beijing is concerned that the conflict raging on its border might affect its relations with Myanmar, which extend to huge investments and strategic interest. Many of the Golden Triangle's warlords are former Communist Party of China proxies and maintain links with their old masters. But there is no solid evidence to support rumours that China is supporting Peng in this latest conflict.
While the warlords retain personal ties with the Chinese leadership, to suggest they have the power to shape bilateral relations is far-fetched.
The fighting erupted 11 days ago in Kokang region and has so far claimed the lives of about 50 Myanmar army soldiers and 30 rebels.
Meanwhile a Red Cross convoy on a mission to help civilians displaced by the fighting came under attack, resulting in injuries to several of its personnel. As expected, each side is blaming the other for the attack on the aid workers.
As is often the case with conflict, it's easier to point fingers than to address the underlying causes.
The central government is blaming the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) for instigating the latest round of fighting.
But the roots of the conflict lie in the previous round, five years ago, when the Myanmar military launched an all-out offensive against the ethnic-Chinese MNDAA and ousted its leader, Peng Jiasheng. The motivations for that action remain murky and certainly contradict any claim that the government side is an "innocent victim".
The MNDAA is among the several ethnic rebel armies that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government of Myanmar, also known as Burma, since 1989.
In exchange, the MNDAA and fellow rebel groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) were granted a degree of autonomy to run affairs in their respective regions. Like the Wa, the MNDAA were part of the Communist Party of Burma insurgency network, an outfit that fell apart in 1989.
But in 2009, after two decades of ceasefires, it became clear that none of these groups was willing to disband its army and submit to the authority of the government's Border Guard Forces. So the central government decided to teach them all a lesson by focusing its ire on the Kokang's MNDAA. The group is much smaller and doesn't have the firepower of rebel armies like the 30,000-strong UWSA.
And so, in August 2009, Myanmar reneged on its two-decade-old ceasefire agreement and sent troops into the semi-autonomous Kokang, ousting its leader Peng and replacing him with its own proxy. Now, six years later, Peng has made good on his promise to return to retake the territory from government troops.
For Myanmar - and especially for current army chief Min Aung Hlaing, who led the assault that ousted Peng in 2009 - this is a case of chickens coming home to roost. And, in the rugged hills of the Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps, the payback can be brutal.
For the past five years Peng has sought dialogue with Myanmar top brass in a bid to return to power, but they weren't interested in listening to what he had to say. He certainly has their attention now, but it's still not clear whether they are willing to sit down with him, given they were the ones who violated the 1989 ceasefire.
The government claims it ousted Peng because his army traded in drugs. That claim seems hollow when you consider that the state has neglected to tackle the many other drug-dealing groups in the Golden Triangle.
Naturally, Beijing is concerned that the conflict raging on its border might affect its relations with Myanmar, which extend to huge investments and strategic interest. Many of the Golden Triangle's warlords are former Communist Party of China proxies and maintain links with their old masters. But there is no solid evidence to support rumours that China is supporting Peng in this latest conflict.
While the warlords retain personal ties with the Chinese leadership, to suggest they have the power to shape bilateral relations is far-fetched.
Wednesday, 18 February 2015
Educating the BRN for the sake of peace in deep South
Don Pathan
With talks set to begin again, the separatists need help forging a political wing
A new Thai negotiating team for the latest round of talks with Patani Malay separatist movements is taking shape as top policymakers enter the final selection stage for the daunting task ahead.
The selection should be finalised by the end of this month, furnishing a team made up of mid-ranking government officials from various agencies and ministries. They include the National Intelligence Agency, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, the ministries of Justice and of Foreign Affairs, the Internal Security Operation Command, and representatives from the Fourth Army Area and the Royal Thai Army.
Former Army chief-of-staff General Aksara Kherdphol was appointed chief negotiator by Prime MinisterPrayuth Chan-o-cha some months ago. Thailand will continue to use Malaysia as the designated facilitator.
There is also a hidden component to the talks - a backdoor channel by which Thai security officials meet face to face with representatives from individual separatist groups without Malaysia's participation. But it is not yet clear how this covert track will complement the official process.
The secret track is expected to address operational issues, such as rules of engagement, while politically charged issues will be confined to the official track.
According to both Thai officials and insurgency sources, the official and the backdoor channel must complement one another, or it would defeat the purpose of having a two-track process. While the official talks will take place in public, negotiations on military matters will be clandestine, they said.
There have already been two such face-to-face backdoor meetings, between senior officers of the Fourth Army Area command and leaders from two long-standing separatist movements. Both were held in December in Indonesia.
But military insiders say the meetings were conducted without the endorsement of Aksara and that any agreement reached could not be honoured. Thailand's dealings with Patani Malay separatist organisations over this past half century have been shaped by mistrust and the inability to honour promises made. No one is certain whether things will be any different this time around.
It is not yet clear who will be leading the secret talks. Sources say the junta might give the job to retired General Akanit Maunsawat, a close personal friend of Premier Prayut.
Akanit was initially tipped to lead the Thai negotiating team but was removed from the line-up because Bangkok did not want to upset Malaysia by appointing him to this high-profile position.
Akanit has in the past made critical statements about Malaysia, accusing the Kuala Lumpur government of being half-hearted towards Thailand's peace initiative in the South.
He said Thailand had worked hard to help Malaysia bring an end to its communist insurgency and was hoping Kuala Lumpur would reciprocate over the Thai insurgency.
Observers said his return to the process - nominally as an "adviser to the government negotiating team" - has not only sent a wrong message to Kuala Lumpur but could very well undermine Aksara's role.
One concern relates to the line of command: It's not clear if Akanit will be accountable to Aksara or report directly to PM Prayuth - or be completely independent and free to speak his mind.
Akanit was the Army's point man in various talks with leaders of the longstanding separatist movements in the 1980s and '90s. Those encounters were treated as information-gathering exercises rather than formal negotiations or meaningful efforts at finding how the Malays of Patani could coexist peacefully with the Thai state. The main separatist group back then was the Patani United Liberation Organisation, or Pulo.
Today, the vast majority of insurgent combatants come under the network of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a secretive group of elders with strong religious credentials.
BRN operatives said the elders are not involved in combat operations but do intervene once in a while when they feel the fighters have strayed too far away from their loosely defined rules of engagement.
Between the elders and the combatants is the political wing, a group of mid-ranking figures, also with considerable religious credentials, who one day hope to be the public face of the BRN.
BRN representatives say the organisation is not interested in joining any peace process because the group gives priority to establishing a recognisable political wing that could represent the movement. There are also other related issues, such as immunity for insurgents and recognition of the group's political wing and negotiators. The group said it is willing to work with members of the international community to achieve this goal.
And if it does work with outsiders in whatever capacity, it would prefer that they be state entities, not local or international NGOs.
BRN leaders have looked at other separatist organisations, such as the Free Aceh Movement and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and been impressed by their respective political wings.
Observers of the conflict say a political wing is necessary to serve as a buffer for the government in Bangkok. The government needs to be able to say it is dealing not with armed men but with a political group. Moreover, the two sides need to be able to communicate on the same wavelength.
But doing away with the zero-sum-game mentality will not be easy for the Thai military. Thailand's top brass have shown no willingness to make concessions. Observers said the junta just wants the number of violent incidents to drop so it can show the public that it is making headway.
In other words, educating the BRN so the movement can be on a par with its Thai counterpart if and when it enters peace talks is not exactly high on the agenda of the Bangkok administration.
BRN sources say they are well aware that, historically, the Thai Army has never been too thrilled about a formal peace process. They are also aware that the military had no role in the formulation of peace talks launched by the Yingluck government in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013.
The fact that the Army is running the show now has not changed that long-standing attitude. The BRN sees the rebooting of peace talks by the junta as a public relations stunt designed for both domestic and international consumption.
That view is shared by many in the international community, who have observed the developments with keen interest but are still wondering what kind of concessions Thailand is willing to make to the BRN or the Malay-speaking people of the deep South.
One positive for Bangkok is that the number of violent incidents has dropped by about 40 per cent compared to last year. But BRN sources dismiss that statistic, saying their group has succeeded in expanding to new ground - Yala's Betong and Songkhla's Sadao districts - and that they are attacking more meaningful targets and with greater intensity.
The BRN's military capability and activities make it relevant, its representatives said. But whether that capability is enough to convince Thai authorities to relinquish their zero-sum mentality remains to be seen.
But the "great game" has already begun, it seems, as international mediators look to gain entry to the process and secure a seat at the table. With the exception of the BRN, leaders of the longstanding separatist organisations are publishing photos and video of themselves in the public domain, apparently to create an impression that they are part of this contest.
BRN sources say they remain camera shy because they have too much to lose by surfacing at this juncture.
Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance consultant based in Yala, Thailand.
The selection should be finalised by the end of this month, furnishing a team made up of mid-ranking government officials from various agencies and ministries. They include the National Intelligence Agency, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, the ministries of Justice and of Foreign Affairs, the Internal Security Operation Command, and representatives from the Fourth Army Area and the Royal Thai Army.
Former Army chief-of-staff General Aksara Kherdphol was appointed chief negotiator by Prime MinisterPrayuth Chan-o-cha some months ago. Thailand will continue to use Malaysia as the designated facilitator.
There is also a hidden component to the talks - a backdoor channel by which Thai security officials meet face to face with representatives from individual separatist groups without Malaysia's participation. But it is not yet clear how this covert track will complement the official process.
The secret track is expected to address operational issues, such as rules of engagement, while politically charged issues will be confined to the official track.
According to both Thai officials and insurgency sources, the official and the backdoor channel must complement one another, or it would defeat the purpose of having a two-track process. While the official talks will take place in public, negotiations on military matters will be clandestine, they said.
There have already been two such face-to-face backdoor meetings, between senior officers of the Fourth Army Area command and leaders from two long-standing separatist movements. Both were held in December in Indonesia.
But military insiders say the meetings were conducted without the endorsement of Aksara and that any agreement reached could not be honoured. Thailand's dealings with Patani Malay separatist organisations over this past half century have been shaped by mistrust and the inability to honour promises made. No one is certain whether things will be any different this time around.
It is not yet clear who will be leading the secret talks. Sources say the junta might give the job to retired General Akanit Maunsawat, a close personal friend of Premier Prayut.
Akanit was initially tipped to lead the Thai negotiating team but was removed from the line-up because Bangkok did not want to upset Malaysia by appointing him to this high-profile position.
Akanit has in the past made critical statements about Malaysia, accusing the Kuala Lumpur government of being half-hearted towards Thailand's peace initiative in the South.
He said Thailand had worked hard to help Malaysia bring an end to its communist insurgency and was hoping Kuala Lumpur would reciprocate over the Thai insurgency.
Observers said his return to the process - nominally as an "adviser to the government negotiating team" - has not only sent a wrong message to Kuala Lumpur but could very well undermine Aksara's role.
One concern relates to the line of command: It's not clear if Akanit will be accountable to Aksara or report directly to PM Prayuth - or be completely independent and free to speak his mind.
Akanit was the Army's point man in various talks with leaders of the longstanding separatist movements in the 1980s and '90s. Those encounters were treated as information-gathering exercises rather than formal negotiations or meaningful efforts at finding how the Malays of Patani could coexist peacefully with the Thai state. The main separatist group back then was the Patani United Liberation Organisation, or Pulo.
Today, the vast majority of insurgent combatants come under the network of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a secretive group of elders with strong religious credentials.
BRN operatives said the elders are not involved in combat operations but do intervene once in a while when they feel the fighters have strayed too far away from their loosely defined rules of engagement.
Between the elders and the combatants is the political wing, a group of mid-ranking figures, also with considerable religious credentials, who one day hope to be the public face of the BRN.
BRN representatives say the organisation is not interested in joining any peace process because the group gives priority to establishing a recognisable political wing that could represent the movement. There are also other related issues, such as immunity for insurgents and recognition of the group's political wing and negotiators. The group said it is willing to work with members of the international community to achieve this goal.
And if it does work with outsiders in whatever capacity, it would prefer that they be state entities, not local or international NGOs.
BRN leaders have looked at other separatist organisations, such as the Free Aceh Movement and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and been impressed by their respective political wings.
Observers of the conflict say a political wing is necessary to serve as a buffer for the government in Bangkok. The government needs to be able to say it is dealing not with armed men but with a political group. Moreover, the two sides need to be able to communicate on the same wavelength.
But doing away with the zero-sum-game mentality will not be easy for the Thai military. Thailand's top brass have shown no willingness to make concessions. Observers said the junta just wants the number of violent incidents to drop so it can show the public that it is making headway.
In other words, educating the BRN so the movement can be on a par with its Thai counterpart if and when it enters peace talks is not exactly high on the agenda of the Bangkok administration.
BRN sources say they are well aware that, historically, the Thai Army has never been too thrilled about a formal peace process. They are also aware that the military had no role in the formulation of peace talks launched by the Yingluck government in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013.
The fact that the Army is running the show now has not changed that long-standing attitude. The BRN sees the rebooting of peace talks by the junta as a public relations stunt designed for both domestic and international consumption.
That view is shared by many in the international community, who have observed the developments with keen interest but are still wondering what kind of concessions Thailand is willing to make to the BRN or the Malay-speaking people of the deep South.
One positive for Bangkok is that the number of violent incidents has dropped by about 40 per cent compared to last year. But BRN sources dismiss that statistic, saying their group has succeeded in expanding to new ground - Yala's Betong and Songkhla's Sadao districts - and that they are attacking more meaningful targets and with greater intensity.
The BRN's military capability and activities make it relevant, its representatives said. But whether that capability is enough to convince Thai authorities to relinquish their zero-sum mentality remains to be seen.
But the "great game" has already begun, it seems, as international mediators look to gain entry to the process and secure a seat at the table. With the exception of the BRN, leaders of the longstanding separatist organisations are publishing photos and video of themselves in the public domain, apparently to create an impression that they are part of this contest.
BRN sources say they remain camera shy because they have too much to lose by surfacing at this juncture.
Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance consultant based in Yala, Thailand.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)