Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
There was nothing new in the statement delivered by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) on Monday, but that doesn’t mean the message was without merit or impact.
The significance of the statement, said sources in the BRN movement, was the timing. Similar demands were raised back in early 2013 shortly after the Yingluck Shinawatra government kicked off a peace process. But the intention then was to derail the initiative, which BRN members felt had been forced on them.
The BRN said it knew the Yingluck administration and the Thai Army would make no concessions at talks launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013. Thus the main separatist organisation refused to join the process.
Today, the BRN is suggesting it is ready to talk with Bangkok but adds that it is not under any pressure to do so.
The April 10 statement highlighted the BRN’s terms for talks, which include the participation of foreign governments, and agreement on the terms of reference for negotiations by the two opposing parties – Thailand and the BRN. At present Bangkok prefers negotiating with MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of separatist movements that has been talking to the Thai government for the past two years.
The statement was meant to remind Thailand that the BRN is the organisation that calls the shots on the ground, not MARA Patani.
Tension between the two separatist organisations is high but not beyond repair, said BRN sources, who added that MARA Patani is welcome to join BRN-led talks with the Thais “but only as an individual movement, not an umbrella organisation”.
MARA Patani a ‘Thai creation’
BRN members said they see MARA Patani as a “Thai creation”, pointing to the so-called “Track 1.5” forum that started in 2011. Overseen by the late Jeeraporn Bunnang from the King Prajadhipok’s Institute, the forum brought together exiled leaders from the separatist community to explore peaceful resolutions to this conflict. This quiet initiative would evolve over time and resurfaced in August 2015, when it adopted the name of MARA Patani.
One problem with this forum was that the self-proclaimed BRN members in MARA Patani did not have the endorsement or a mandate from the movement’s ruling council, also known as the Dewan Pimpinan Parti.
Publicly, Thai officials insist they are on the right track and talking to the right people. But lately, some in the Bangkok policy circle are quietly admitting that the so-called “right people”, MARA Patani, do not have command and control over the insurgent combatants.
“It’s a vicious cycle. Whatever we agree with MARA Patani in talks, BRN militants move quickly to discredit it,” said a Thai government source who spoke on condition of anonymity.
But while BRN fighters waste no time discrediting the current peace initiative, the group said it has shut the door to individual MARA Patani members joining it in future talks.
A senior Thai Army officer who has had dealings with Malay separatist leaders since the 1980s said the BRN is reminding Thailand, Malaysia and MARA Patani that it is the one with control over the insurgent militias.
“The BRN wants to show the separatist community that it is fair and open to other possibilities and suggestions from other separatist movements as long as its people are at the head of the table,” said the officer, who also spoke on condition of anonymity.
BRN leaders out of their depth?
But if the Thai government does give in to BRN demands for international mediation of talks, BRN leaders, who have strong religious credentials, “will be in over their heads” because of their lack of understanding of international norms and legal principles, the officer added.
“These babors [elders] know Islam’s holy book. But if and when negotiations between them and Thai officials take off, much of the agenda will be very technical, as it will be based on tangible issues and on secular, humanitarian and legal principles,” said the officer.
“I’m not so sure if these ulema [scholarly Muslims] are ready for it. I’m not even sure if Bangkok is prepared to go that route.”
There is also the question of Malaysia’s role as facilitator if foreign governments are permitted to oversee the talks.
Old methods won’t work
Talking to the separatists is nothing new for the Thai Army. Many like to boast of how their “negotiating skills” brought down the communist insurgency and armed Patani Malay separatist movements. Some think they can repeat that success using the same tactics – tangible incentives in exchange for laying down arms.
But such tactics do nothing to address the historical and cultural narrative that provides the legitimacy for the Malays’ armed struggle. BRN sources said Thailand’s claims of success are exaggerated.
They said the armed struggle waged by various separatist movements went under in the late 1980s because their main backers in the Middle East and North Africa were repositioning themselves for a post-Cold War era.
Today, the BRN’s training and financing is self-sufficient and conducted from within the region.
Combatants are no longer camping out on mountaintops or travelling to Libya for training as happened in the 1980s. Instead they are scattered throughout the region, where villagers provide them with logistical support.
Thailand wrongly assumed that the absence of violence during the 1990s meant peace; in reality the period was merely a lull before another storm. As long as the Thai state rides roughshod over the Patani Malay narrative of cultural and historical difference, a new crop of separatist insurgents will always resurface to take up where the previous generation left off.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based consultant and security analyst. He is also the founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict and insurgency in Thailand’s far South.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/guest_columnist/30312244
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Saturday, 15 April 2017
Wednesday, 12 April 2017
COMMENTARY: Thai Deep South: BRN Takes Aim at Peace Talks
Don Pathan
BenarNews
Bangkok
As if a spike in violence in the Thai Deep South wasn’t enough to rattle the government, the region’s most prominent separatist insurgent group upped the ante this week with a statement dismissing the current peace process and reiterating its demand for negotiating with Bangkok directly.
Rebel group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) reminded the Thais that a meaningful peace process must be in line with international norms, which means an impartial “mediator” should lead the talks.
“Any peace dialogue must be based on the willingness of the two parties involved in the conflict and voluntarily agreed to find a solution,” BRN said in the statement it issued Monday.
Asked to clarify the reference to “two parties,” a BRN operative replied, “the Thai government and the BRN,” not MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups that have been negotiating with the government since 2015 in informal peace talks facilitated by Malaysia.
BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground, the operative said, and the group insisted that Bangkok deal directly with them and that the international community observe the process.
Crossing a red line
The statement followed a spike in insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s Muslim-majority provinces along the southern border that came in retaliation for the recent shooting deaths of two ethnic Malay Muslims, which were largely unreported by the national media.
Separatist militants on the ground were determined to let the government know there was a price to pay for crossing the red line.
Suspected separatist insurgents Isma-ae Hama, 28, and Aseng Useng, 30 were shot and killed on March 29 by paramilitary rangers who said they fired in self-defense during a car chase.
The 15-year-old niece of one of the suspects said the two were not armed. The two stepped out of the vehicle, as instructed by the security officials who led them away, while she waited in the vehicle as instructed. Moments later, she heard gunshots.
Later that day, a photograph of the two dead men about 50 meters from their vehicle along a back road in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, was posted on websites. Beside them were an M16 rifle and a 9-mm handgun.
At the end of the day, it’s her word against the authorities. As expected, there was no outpouring of sympathy from the general Thai public outside the Malay-speaking Deep South, especially when police said the two might have been linked to the killing of a Buddhist deputy village chief and three members of his family on March 2.
Historically, Thai people have shown that they can be extremely unkind to people who challenge their narrative.
Patani Malay separatist militants wasted little time in showing their displeasure with what they deemed was the crossing of a red line by the government.
The following day, about five insurgents hopped on back of a pickup truck, drove up to the Narathiwat’s Rangae district police station, and commenced firing at group of officers who were lining up in formation for the start of their day. One officer was killed and five injured.
Four days later, about 30 insurgents stormed a security outpost in the Krong Pinang district of Yala province, injuring at least 12 police officers. And shortly after midnight, April 6, insurgents unleashed dozens of explosions and arson attacks, crippling the power grid and causing widespread blackouts throughout the region.
Deeply rooted in community
Rules of engagement established through negotiated text do not exist between the two warring sides of this conflict. In this respect, how one interprets “violation” or “legitimate killing” has been subjective.
Separatist sources said they could live with the fact that their combatants get killed in a gunfight with government security forces in a normal theater of violence, such as a battlefield or in a setting that constitutes a battle ground. But they will not tolerate targeted killing of suspects.
Although the insurgents justify the targeted killings of people who spy for Thai security agencies, they insist the government cannot use the same rationale and logic to summarily and extra judiciously kill anyone they think is associated with separatist militants.
Just about every Malay Muslim in the Deep South knows somebody in the separatist movement, one senior BRN field operative said.
In this respect, accusing someone of being “associated” with insurgency is the easiest thing to claim and impossible to refute. In other words, if Isma-ae and Aseng could be killed, anybody could be killed.
The BRN network has a strong support base from the grassroots Malay community that provides members with logistical supports and serves as its eyes and ears. Thai officials on the ground know this but are unable to say much because policy-makers in Bangkok dominate the narrative on the Deep South.
As for the combatants and security officials on the ground, the challenge is deciding who constitutes a legitimate target. And without a joint clearing house where both sides could work out a proper rules of engagement, perceived “violations” will inevitably go on.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
BenarNews
Bangkok
 |
A soldier watches as Thai Muslim men offer prayers during a peace gathering at a hospital in the Deep South where suspected separatist militants launched an ambush two days earlier, March 15, 2016. AFP
|
As if a spike in violence in the Thai Deep South wasn’t enough to rattle the government, the region’s most prominent separatist insurgent group upped the ante this week with a statement dismissing the current peace process and reiterating its demand for negotiating with Bangkok directly.
Rebel group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) reminded the Thais that a meaningful peace process must be in line with international norms, which means an impartial “mediator” should lead the talks.
“Any peace dialogue must be based on the willingness of the two parties involved in the conflict and voluntarily agreed to find a solution,” BRN said in the statement it issued Monday.
Asked to clarify the reference to “two parties,” a BRN operative replied, “the Thai government and the BRN,” not MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of long-standing Patani Malay separatist groups that have been negotiating with the government since 2015 in informal peace talks facilitated by Malaysia.
BRN controls virtually all of the militants on the ground, the operative said, and the group insisted that Bangkok deal directly with them and that the international community observe the process.
Crossing a red line
The statement followed a spike in insurgency-related violence in Thailand’s Muslim-majority provinces along the southern border that came in retaliation for the recent shooting deaths of two ethnic Malay Muslims, which were largely unreported by the national media.
Separatist militants on the ground were determined to let the government know there was a price to pay for crossing the red line.
Suspected separatist insurgents Isma-ae Hama, 28, and Aseng Useng, 30 were shot and killed on March 29 by paramilitary rangers who said they fired in self-defense during a car chase.
The 15-year-old niece of one of the suspects said the two were not armed. The two stepped out of the vehicle, as instructed by the security officials who led them away, while she waited in the vehicle as instructed. Moments later, she heard gunshots.
Later that day, a photograph of the two dead men about 50 meters from their vehicle along a back road in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, was posted on websites. Beside them were an M16 rifle and a 9-mm handgun.
At the end of the day, it’s her word against the authorities. As expected, there was no outpouring of sympathy from the general Thai public outside the Malay-speaking Deep South, especially when police said the two might have been linked to the killing of a Buddhist deputy village chief and three members of his family on March 2.
Historically, Thai people have shown that they can be extremely unkind to people who challenge their narrative.
Patani Malay separatist militants wasted little time in showing their displeasure with what they deemed was the crossing of a red line by the government.
The following day, about five insurgents hopped on back of a pickup truck, drove up to the Narathiwat’s Rangae district police station, and commenced firing at group of officers who were lining up in formation for the start of their day. One officer was killed and five injured.
Four days later, about 30 insurgents stormed a security outpost in the Krong Pinang district of Yala province, injuring at least 12 police officers. And shortly after midnight, April 6, insurgents unleashed dozens of explosions and arson attacks, crippling the power grid and causing widespread blackouts throughout the region.
Deeply rooted in community
Rules of engagement established through negotiated text do not exist between the two warring sides of this conflict. In this respect, how one interprets “violation” or “legitimate killing” has been subjective.
Separatist sources said they could live with the fact that their combatants get killed in a gunfight with government security forces in a normal theater of violence, such as a battlefield or in a setting that constitutes a battle ground. But they will not tolerate targeted killing of suspects.
Although the insurgents justify the targeted killings of people who spy for Thai security agencies, they insist the government cannot use the same rationale and logic to summarily and extra judiciously kill anyone they think is associated with separatist militants.
Just about every Malay Muslim in the Deep South knows somebody in the separatist movement, one senior BRN field operative said.
In this respect, accusing someone of being “associated” with insurgency is the easiest thing to claim and impossible to refute. In other words, if Isma-ae and Aseng could be killed, anybody could be killed.
The BRN network has a strong support base from the grassroots Malay community that provides members with logistical supports and serves as its eyes and ears. Thai officials on the ground know this but are unable to say much because policy-makers in Bangkok dominate the narrative on the Deep South.
As for the combatants and security officials on the ground, the challenge is deciding who constitutes a legitimate target. And without a joint clearing house where both sides could work out a proper rules of engagement, perceived “violations” will inevitably go on.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Thursday, 6 April 2017
EDITORIAL Army chiefs forever handcuffed in the South
THE NATION
Lt-General Piyawat finds fresh ways to offend as he tries to ‘do his best’ under such restricted circumstances
Every general assigned to command the Fourth Army jurisdiction tries while overseeing day-to-day operations to make the best of the keen media attention directed that way, knowing his time in the contested southern region will last only until he’s promoted to the inner circle in Bangkok, as has proved inevitable in modern times. Bangkok is the prize and any regional command is a temporary posting, a stepping stone to the ultimate goal. Those handed the far South, as troublesome as it can be for the officials in charge, are under little pressure to find a way to end the conflict. The past 13 years suggest that such an accomplishment is an impossible dream anyway.
Instead, each new commander makes a grand show of introducing a fresh strategy that will achieve the impossible. It is human nature, after all, to wish to seem better than one’s predecessor. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the commanders merely pass along the exact same objective to their successors – to remove as many ethnic Malay insurgents from the field as possible, through kills, capture or coercion. Only the means to complete this mission vary.
Lieutenant General Piyawat Nakwanich, the man in charge since late last year, is no different from his predecessors despite earnest efforts to seem so. His personal touch has been demonstrating the utmost accessibility – when visiting conflict areas, he likes to shout out his phone number and invite any insurgents who might be listening to call him and discuss the terms of their surrender. He guarantees them fair treatment under the law and offers to helicopter into their jungle hideouts to ferry them out. Does it work? A few weeks ago, Piyawat rode a chopper into the middle of field to pick up a young man apparently ready to surrender. But the event was so obviously staged that security officials in Bangkok were shaking their heads in embarrassment.
Another ploy the commander has tried is called “Bring People Back Home”, a campaign that encourages parents (especially dear old mums) to persuade their renegade sons to quit the movement and surrender in exchange for fair treatment. Doing so ensures them that their name will be expunged from a government “black list”, but the local people are all too aware that, once on any of the several varieties of black lists, there’s no getting off.
When one media outlet reported recently that the insurgents are aiming to recruit a million new combatants over the next 15 years, General Piyawat demonstrated arrogance in lieu of professionalism and appalling shallowness in his understanding of the insurrection. He told reporters not to worry, since the deep South 15 years hence will be fully developed, with good roads and high-speed train service. There will no longer be a reason for anyone to take up arms against the state, he said.
Ignoring the insurgents’ fundamental grievance – that the Thai state denies the southern Malay-Muslim majority the basic dignities it is due – Piywat seeks to lecture them and other members of their community that they should swallow their pride, stop biting the hand that feeds them and behave like good citizens. He evidently does not understand why so many young people took up arms in the first place.
To be fair, none of the military men placed in charge of the region has been given a mandate to guide policy based on his own observations, much less set policy. The bloodshed in the South will continue as long as its political, administrative and military management remains centralised. If the situation is ever to improve, the government and Army must give the regional commander far greater authority.
Lt-General Piyawat finds fresh ways to offend as he tries to ‘do his best’ under such restricted circumstances
Every general assigned to command the Fourth Army jurisdiction tries while overseeing day-to-day operations to make the best of the keen media attention directed that way, knowing his time in the contested southern region will last only until he’s promoted to the inner circle in Bangkok, as has proved inevitable in modern times. Bangkok is the prize and any regional command is a temporary posting, a stepping stone to the ultimate goal. Those handed the far South, as troublesome as it can be for the officials in charge, are under little pressure to find a way to end the conflict. The past 13 years suggest that such an accomplishment is an impossible dream anyway.
Instead, each new commander makes a grand show of introducing a fresh strategy that will achieve the impossible. It is human nature, after all, to wish to seem better than one’s predecessor. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the commanders merely pass along the exact same objective to their successors – to remove as many ethnic Malay insurgents from the field as possible, through kills, capture or coercion. Only the means to complete this mission vary.
Lieutenant General Piyawat Nakwanich, the man in charge since late last year, is no different from his predecessors despite earnest efforts to seem so. His personal touch has been demonstrating the utmost accessibility – when visiting conflict areas, he likes to shout out his phone number and invite any insurgents who might be listening to call him and discuss the terms of their surrender. He guarantees them fair treatment under the law and offers to helicopter into their jungle hideouts to ferry them out. Does it work? A few weeks ago, Piyawat rode a chopper into the middle of field to pick up a young man apparently ready to surrender. But the event was so obviously staged that security officials in Bangkok were shaking their heads in embarrassment.
Another ploy the commander has tried is called “Bring People Back Home”, a campaign that encourages parents (especially dear old mums) to persuade their renegade sons to quit the movement and surrender in exchange for fair treatment. Doing so ensures them that their name will be expunged from a government “black list”, but the local people are all too aware that, once on any of the several varieties of black lists, there’s no getting off.
When one media outlet reported recently that the insurgents are aiming to recruit a million new combatants over the next 15 years, General Piyawat demonstrated arrogance in lieu of professionalism and appalling shallowness in his understanding of the insurrection. He told reporters not to worry, since the deep South 15 years hence will be fully developed, with good roads and high-speed train service. There will no longer be a reason for anyone to take up arms against the state, he said.
Ignoring the insurgents’ fundamental grievance – that the Thai state denies the southern Malay-Muslim majority the basic dignities it is due – Piywat seeks to lecture them and other members of their community that they should swallow their pride, stop biting the hand that feeds them and behave like good citizens. He evidently does not understand why so many young people took up arms in the first place.
To be fair, none of the military men placed in charge of the region has been given a mandate to guide policy based on his own observations, much less set policy. The bloodshed in the South will continue as long as its political, administrative and military management remains centralised. If the situation is ever to improve, the government and Army must give the regional commander far greater authority.
Sunday, 19 March 2017
Tragic realities being turned into propaganda in far South
Govt and civic organisations have been quick to condemn separatists over the killing of a family in Narathiwat – but there’s more here than meets the eye
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
The killing of a family of four Thai Buddhists, including an eight-year-old boy, as they made their way to school along a back road in Narathiwat’s Rueso district earlier this month has generated condemnation from all quarters.
Police gathered scores of rounds from M16 and AK47 machineguns and a 9mm handgun at the scene of the attack, which saw the pickup truck carrying the four victims veer off the road and into trees.
Police have not ruled out a personal dispute as the motive. But given the method of attack, all fingers are pointing to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the erstwhile separatist movement that controls virtually all the insurgents in the far South.
Unlike other rebel groups around the world, the BRN does not have an identifiable political wing or spokesman to confirm or deny such allegations. But their refusal to surface is mainly due to the fact that the Thai government is not willing to engage them in a frank manner and on an equal footing.
Information about the identity and thinking of the BRN leadership is scarce but operatives say that, as a policy, their combatants are not supposed to attack innocent civilians. However, mistakes have been made and “collateral damage” is sometimes unavoidable, they add.
Rules of engagement
Efforts have been made to get both state forces and separatists to respect rules of engagement outlined in the Geneva Convention. But for the time being, combatants on both sides decide for themselves what constitute legitimate targets, as well as how their operations are carried out.
Like any militant separatist movement, the BRN identifies “legitimate targets” – which include informants who provide information about their activities to state security forces.
The suspected collaborator, though, is supposed to receive at least one warning before militants step in.
In like fashion, members of pro-government death squads or rogue officers target local residents suspected of being close to separatists. Officially, the government does not have a policy on such “target killing”.
In the eyes of state forces and their militant supporters, a cleric like the late Abdulateh Todir from Yala’s Tambon Patae was considered fair game because of his alleged closeness to a local militant cell. He was gunned down in November 2012 in Yala’s Yaha district. But the insurgents didn’t think he was a “fair” target and responded with a series of vicious bombings and ambushes over the next six weeks.
The deliberate targeting of innocent civilians, such as a group of villagers in a crowded teashop, on the other hand, is understood to be part of the tit-for-tat hostilities between the separatists and state security forces.
One high profile example of deliberate targeting of civilians was the February 2014 killings of three Malay Muslim boys, aged 3, 5 and 9, in Narathiwat’s Bacho district by at least two Army Rangers who, at a press conference announcing their capture, insisted they had acted alone and not on the orders of their superiors.
The Rangers’ surrender was said to be part of a concession deal by the government to get the insurgents to end revenge killings that included the murder of three Buddhist women shot at point-blank range and their bodies set on fire. But when the two suspects appeared in court, they retracted their confession and were immediately released on grounds of insufficient evidence.
Tragic mistake
In the early years of this phase of insurgency, which erupted in January 2004, soft targets such as public schools, monks and teachers were attacked – although not very often. A significant number of local residents deemed sympathetic or too close to the insurgents have been killed as well, including Muslim community leaders and Islamic religious teachers.
While it was pretty clear that the boys in Bacho were deliberately targeted, the same cannot be said for the killing of the family in Rueso two weeks ago. The incident prompted all sorts of condemnation and criticism from Thai officials and rights organisations. Unfortunately, most of it lacked perspective.
Despite the long history of tit-for-tat conflict between state forces and the insurgents, unofficial rules of engagement do exist. The agreement is not in writing, but there is nevertheless an understanding between the two sides that there are red lines you do not cross. Failing to respect them will invite bloody, sometimes overwhelming retaliation.
Meanwhile Malay Muslim locals point out that Islam permits Muslims to take up arms against unjust rulers but forbids the militants from decapitating, castrating or otherwise mutilating dead government soldiers.
Such acts are not in line with Islamic principles, local religious leaders argue. Insurgents have responded by ending their practice of defiling dead government soldiers.
Another example of how combatants have heeded locals’ calls for greater “civility” in the conflict concerns the arson attacks on public schools, which propagate Thailand’s state-construct identity and narrative.
In 2007, a total of 164 schools in the far South came under arson attack. That number dropped to 14 the following year after criticism from local residents and clerics. The Thai government was of course quick to credit their security measures for the drop, deliberately ignoring the wider perspective.
Meanwhile the government dismisses any suggestion that its military sanctions the use of death squads, though locals say it’s hard to think otherwise when they witness armed hooded men jump off a pickup truck and mow down a teashop full of Muslim villagers with machineguns.
More than 6,800 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died in insurgency-related violence in the Malay-speaking southernmost provinces since January 2004.
For public consumption, Thai authorities blame practically every violent incident on the separatists. But they have not succeeded in influencing the narrative that drives the insurgents and legitimises the armed struggle in the eyes of many ordinary residents.
And the more the authorities blur the line between what constitutes collateral damage and intentional killings, the wider the trust gap between the authorities and the local Malay Muslim population.
Separatist sources say they are disturbed that civil society organisations and community leaders are often quick to take the government’s line before looking at the facts available.
A BRN operative points out that mistakes have been made by the insurgents, but mistakes are not the same as intention. The BRN says collateral damage has been part of its internal debate for a very long time. But too often, militants in the field feel they cannot retreat for fear of retaliation or hot pursuit.
Another built-in protection measure is the requirement that the hitman or hitmen must not come from the local militant cell, to reduce the possibility of facial recognition. With these kinds of restraints, tragic mistakes are bound to occur, BRN members say.
Don Pathan is a security consultant and member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation based in Thailand’s conflict affected far South. The group is dedicated to critical discussion on the nature of the conflict in the historically contested region.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/30309478#.WMyBkH0z7lg.facebook
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
The killing of a family of four Thai Buddhists, including an eight-year-old boy, as they made their way to school along a back road in Narathiwat’s Rueso district earlier this month has generated condemnation from all quarters.
Police gathered scores of rounds from M16 and AK47 machineguns and a 9mm handgun at the scene of the attack, which saw the pickup truck carrying the four victims veer off the road and into trees.
Police have not ruled out a personal dispute as the motive. But given the method of attack, all fingers are pointing to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the erstwhile separatist movement that controls virtually all the insurgents in the far South.
Unlike other rebel groups around the world, the BRN does not have an identifiable political wing or spokesman to confirm or deny such allegations. But their refusal to surface is mainly due to the fact that the Thai government is not willing to engage them in a frank manner and on an equal footing.
Information about the identity and thinking of the BRN leadership is scarce but operatives say that, as a policy, their combatants are not supposed to attack innocent civilians. However, mistakes have been made and “collateral damage” is sometimes unavoidable, they add.
Rules of engagement
Efforts have been made to get both state forces and separatists to respect rules of engagement outlined in the Geneva Convention. But for the time being, combatants on both sides decide for themselves what constitute legitimate targets, as well as how their operations are carried out.
Like any militant separatist movement, the BRN identifies “legitimate targets” – which include informants who provide information about their activities to state security forces.
The suspected collaborator, though, is supposed to receive at least one warning before militants step in.
In like fashion, members of pro-government death squads or rogue officers target local residents suspected of being close to separatists. Officially, the government does not have a policy on such “target killing”.
In the eyes of state forces and their militant supporters, a cleric like the late Abdulateh Todir from Yala’s Tambon Patae was considered fair game because of his alleged closeness to a local militant cell. He was gunned down in November 2012 in Yala’s Yaha district. But the insurgents didn’t think he was a “fair” target and responded with a series of vicious bombings and ambushes over the next six weeks.
The deliberate targeting of innocent civilians, such as a group of villagers in a crowded teashop, on the other hand, is understood to be part of the tit-for-tat hostilities between the separatists and state security forces.
One high profile example of deliberate targeting of civilians was the February 2014 killings of three Malay Muslim boys, aged 3, 5 and 9, in Narathiwat’s Bacho district by at least two Army Rangers who, at a press conference announcing their capture, insisted they had acted alone and not on the orders of their superiors.
The Rangers’ surrender was said to be part of a concession deal by the government to get the insurgents to end revenge killings that included the murder of three Buddhist women shot at point-blank range and their bodies set on fire. But when the two suspects appeared in court, they retracted their confession and were immediately released on grounds of insufficient evidence.
Tragic mistake
In the early years of this phase of insurgency, which erupted in January 2004, soft targets such as public schools, monks and teachers were attacked – although not very often. A significant number of local residents deemed sympathetic or too close to the insurgents have been killed as well, including Muslim community leaders and Islamic religious teachers.
While it was pretty clear that the boys in Bacho were deliberately targeted, the same cannot be said for the killing of the family in Rueso two weeks ago. The incident prompted all sorts of condemnation and criticism from Thai officials and rights organisations. Unfortunately, most of it lacked perspective.
Despite the long history of tit-for-tat conflict between state forces and the insurgents, unofficial rules of engagement do exist. The agreement is not in writing, but there is nevertheless an understanding between the two sides that there are red lines you do not cross. Failing to respect them will invite bloody, sometimes overwhelming retaliation.
Meanwhile Malay Muslim locals point out that Islam permits Muslims to take up arms against unjust rulers but forbids the militants from decapitating, castrating or otherwise mutilating dead government soldiers.
Such acts are not in line with Islamic principles, local religious leaders argue. Insurgents have responded by ending their practice of defiling dead government soldiers.
Another example of how combatants have heeded locals’ calls for greater “civility” in the conflict concerns the arson attacks on public schools, which propagate Thailand’s state-construct identity and narrative.
In 2007, a total of 164 schools in the far South came under arson attack. That number dropped to 14 the following year after criticism from local residents and clerics. The Thai government was of course quick to credit their security measures for the drop, deliberately ignoring the wider perspective.
Meanwhile the government dismisses any suggestion that its military sanctions the use of death squads, though locals say it’s hard to think otherwise when they witness armed hooded men jump off a pickup truck and mow down a teashop full of Muslim villagers with machineguns.
More than 6,800 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died in insurgency-related violence in the Malay-speaking southernmost provinces since January 2004.
For public consumption, Thai authorities blame practically every violent incident on the separatists. But they have not succeeded in influencing the narrative that drives the insurgents and legitimises the armed struggle in the eyes of many ordinary residents.
And the more the authorities blur the line between what constitutes collateral damage and intentional killings, the wider the trust gap between the authorities and the local Malay Muslim population.
Separatist sources say they are disturbed that civil society organisations and community leaders are often quick to take the government’s line before looking at the facts available.
A BRN operative points out that mistakes have been made by the insurgents, but mistakes are not the same as intention. The BRN says collateral damage has been part of its internal debate for a very long time. But too often, militants in the field feel they cannot retreat for fear of retaliation or hot pursuit.
Another built-in protection measure is the requirement that the hitman or hitmen must not come from the local militant cell, to reduce the possibility of facial recognition. With these kinds of restraints, tragic mistakes are bound to occur, BRN members say.
Don Pathan is a security consultant and member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation based in Thailand’s conflict affected far South. The group is dedicated to critical discussion on the nature of the conflict in the historically contested region.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/30309478#.WMyBkH0z7lg.facebook
Saturday, 4 March 2017
Thai Deep South: ‘Bring People Home,’ a PR Exercise or Effective Tool Against Insurgency?
Commentary by Don Pathan
Yala, Thailand
March 1, 2017
Surrounded by reporters and television crews, the senior-most military commander tasked with quelling the insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South flew in on his helicopter last week to meet a rebel who, after eight years of on the run, decided to surrender in exchange for leniency from the law.
For a suspect with at least four warrants out for his arrest, Ahama Duere was calm and collected when he met Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanit. Piyawat’s subordinates and press crews treated Ahama kindly and smiled as they walked with him to an awaiting helicopter.
Ahama was not handcuffed. As far as anyone knew, he could have been any of the reporters accompanying the commander of the Fourth Army Area on a field trip.
The targeted audiences were insurgents contemplating whether to give up their armed struggle and surrender and, of course, their parents whom local authorities have urged to talk their sons into turning themselves in through the “Bring People Home Project.”
Separatism as an ideology among the Malay population in the historically contested Deep South runs deep, thus making virtually all Malay Muslim men here suspects or sympathizers in the eyes of authorities.
Often, roadside bombs targeting military and police patrols are buried within the eyesight of residents. This speaks volumes about the relationship between the villagers and the combatants.
Nevertheless, the Thai government calls the project a success but offers no meaningful justification to support that claim. Every now and then, authorities put together a boot-stomping public ceremony where former combatants and authorities get together in a show of force and unity with hugs and handshakes in front of the media and villagers.
But in remote villages, insurgents keep operating freely mainly because villagers continue to support them. They take turns making food for insurgents and sometimes providing them with shelter if their unit has been moved from another area for whatever reason.
Improved government intelligence over the years meant cell members had to relocate, even to another province. Sometimes this meant moving far from their families and loved ones. Such a move has brought hardship for many, as Ahama claimed.
The decision to quit a combatant’s life and return to civilian life is not a difficult one, but requires taking a chance with Thai authorities. Such a decision does not constitute desertion as long as the cell leaders and the individual wanting to leave reach an understanding followed by an oath that they would not reveal the identity of their fellow comrades who are still active.
Possible retaliation
Violating this oath could lead to deadly retaliation.
For the Thai side, the challenge is to strike a balance between cashing in on the publicity around an insurgent’s surrender and squeezing him for more intelligence. For those insurgents who turn themselves in, the aim is not to provide too much, at least not to the point that it could come back and haunt them.
Active combatants, on the other hand, are indifferent to the public relations exercise behind the Bring People Home Project, saying they are fully aware that the Thais are controlling the narrative.
What matters to them is that they continue to capture the imagination and trust of the local Malay Muslim residents whose grievances and mistrust of the Thai state provided them with the legitimacy to carry on with their struggle for a separate homeland.
How the narrative of the conflict evolves will depend on the main rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.
For the time being, combatants said they do not consider the go-between – be it government officials or local civil society organizations working for security forces to persuade the insurgents to surrender – a target or a threat to the movement.
Somebody's blacklist
Locals here think everybody is on somebody’s blacklist, rendering it somewhat meaningless. But from the perspective of a parent, it is an opportunity to remove his or her son from such a list that could very well mean death. Nearly 7,000 have been killed, mostly ethnic Malays, from insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
Moreover, BRN cadres said they are not too worried about combatants wanting to quit because the movement does not need that many people, not at this stage of the struggle anyway. In this kind of “unconventional warfare,” what matters is that the movement can demonstrate that it can still be a threat to the state security apparatus.
Keen observers of the conflict and local Malay Muslim residents of this region don’t buy the official line. So this begs the question: what is the purpose of this ongoing public relations offensive?
Senior policy makers said the idea behind Bring People Home and the so-called peace dialogue with MARA Patani – an umbrella organization of long-standing separatist groups who no longer control combatants on the ground – is all part of a long-term strategy that rests on the hope that villagers will become tired of the violence and turn their backs on the BRN and their combatants.
Like other peace initiatives, the strategy is more like a big leap of faith. Few policy planners take the time to look back into history and ask what went wrong in the relationship between the state and its Malay minority and why, nearly half a century after the region came under direct rule of the state, an armed insurgency erupted and shattered the comfort level between the two sides.
Translations:
http://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-bring-home-03012017181211.html (Thai)
http://www.benarnews.org/malay/komentar/my-don-brn-170303-03032017121642.html (Malay)
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Yala, Thailand
March 1, 2017
 |
AddThai army Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanich takes alleged insurgent Ahama Duere toward an awaiting military helicopter in Yala province, Feb. 24, 2017. Photo: Courtesy of ISOC4
|
Surrounded by reporters and television crews, the senior-most military commander tasked with quelling the insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South flew in on his helicopter last week to meet a rebel who, after eight years of on the run, decided to surrender in exchange for leniency from the law.
For a suspect with at least four warrants out for his arrest, Ahama Duere was calm and collected when he met Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanit. Piyawat’s subordinates and press crews treated Ahama kindly and smiled as they walked with him to an awaiting helicopter.
Ahama was not handcuffed. As far as anyone knew, he could have been any of the reporters accompanying the commander of the Fourth Army Area on a field trip.
The targeted audiences were insurgents contemplating whether to give up their armed struggle and surrender and, of course, their parents whom local authorities have urged to talk their sons into turning themselves in through the “Bring People Home Project.”
Separatism as an ideology among the Malay population in the historically contested Deep South runs deep, thus making virtually all Malay Muslim men here suspects or sympathizers in the eyes of authorities.
Often, roadside bombs targeting military and police patrols are buried within the eyesight of residents. This speaks volumes about the relationship between the villagers and the combatants.
Nevertheless, the Thai government calls the project a success but offers no meaningful justification to support that claim. Every now and then, authorities put together a boot-stomping public ceremony where former combatants and authorities get together in a show of force and unity with hugs and handshakes in front of the media and villagers.
But in remote villages, insurgents keep operating freely mainly because villagers continue to support them. They take turns making food for insurgents and sometimes providing them with shelter if their unit has been moved from another area for whatever reason.
Improved government intelligence over the years meant cell members had to relocate, even to another province. Sometimes this meant moving far from their families and loved ones. Such a move has brought hardship for many, as Ahama claimed.
The decision to quit a combatant’s life and return to civilian life is not a difficult one, but requires taking a chance with Thai authorities. Such a decision does not constitute desertion as long as the cell leaders and the individual wanting to leave reach an understanding followed by an oath that they would not reveal the identity of their fellow comrades who are still active.
Possible retaliation
Violating this oath could lead to deadly retaliation.
For the Thai side, the challenge is to strike a balance between cashing in on the publicity around an insurgent’s surrender and squeezing him for more intelligence. For those insurgents who turn themselves in, the aim is not to provide too much, at least not to the point that it could come back and haunt them.
Active combatants, on the other hand, are indifferent to the public relations exercise behind the Bring People Home Project, saying they are fully aware that the Thais are controlling the narrative.
What matters to them is that they continue to capture the imagination and trust of the local Malay Muslim residents whose grievances and mistrust of the Thai state provided them with the legitimacy to carry on with their struggle for a separate homeland.
How the narrative of the conflict evolves will depend on the main rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.
For the time being, combatants said they do not consider the go-between – be it government officials or local civil society organizations working for security forces to persuade the insurgents to surrender – a target or a threat to the movement.
Somebody's blacklist
Locals here think everybody is on somebody’s blacklist, rendering it somewhat meaningless. But from the perspective of a parent, it is an opportunity to remove his or her son from such a list that could very well mean death. Nearly 7,000 have been killed, mostly ethnic Malays, from insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
Moreover, BRN cadres said they are not too worried about combatants wanting to quit because the movement does not need that many people, not at this stage of the struggle anyway. In this kind of “unconventional warfare,” what matters is that the movement can demonstrate that it can still be a threat to the state security apparatus.
Keen observers of the conflict and local Malay Muslim residents of this region don’t buy the official line. So this begs the question: what is the purpose of this ongoing public relations offensive?
Senior policy makers said the idea behind Bring People Home and the so-called peace dialogue with MARA Patani – an umbrella organization of long-standing separatist groups who no longer control combatants on the ground – is all part of a long-term strategy that rests on the hope that villagers will become tired of the violence and turn their backs on the BRN and their combatants.
Like other peace initiatives, the strategy is more like a big leap of faith. Few policy planners take the time to look back into history and ask what went wrong in the relationship between the state and its Malay minority and why, nearly half a century after the region came under direct rule of the state, an armed insurgency erupted and shattered the comfort level between the two sides.
Translations:
http://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-bring-home-03012017181211.html (Thai)
http://www.benarnews.org/malay/komentar/my-don-brn-170303-03032017121642.html (Malay)
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Friday, 3 March 2017
‘Safety zone’ in South only a pipe dream without BRN agreement
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
YALA, Thailand
Special to The Nation
IT WAS billed as a significant step – some even called it a breakthrough – but the announcement on Tuesday that the Thai government and Malay Muslim separatists from the far South has agreed on a “safety zone” is still a pipe dream because the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the group that controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground, is not onboard.
If the recent past is any lesson, the BRN stands ready to discredit any so-called progress made by the two sides – Thai government negotiators and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation made up of long-standing separatist movements besides the BRN.
For example, just a year ago, when a Thai official leaked to the local press that the two sides had agreed to designate Narathiwat’s Joh I Rong district as a “safety zone”, BRN combatants dispatched about 40 combatants to take over the district hospital and launched an assault on the Paramilitary Ranger camp next door. CCTV cameras captured the group’s movements, which was exactly what it wanted – to send a stern warning to the government and MARA Patani of its capabilities.
Government and MARA Patani lead negotiators came together this past Tuesday to rubber stamp the work of senior officials from both sides who had been working on various technical issues such as the scope, definition, mechanism and framework for formal talks.
The task at this point is to set the stage for formal negotiations that will take place if and when the two sides decide the time is right. For now, they have agreed in principle to bring five districts – one in Pattani, two in Yala and two in Narathiwat – under a “safety zone”. But they have yet to designate the specific districts.
It’s a small step forward and it was done in a way that MARA Patani would not suffer humiliation in the same manner as after the Joh I Rong retaliation.
But the right time to elevate this ongoing dialogue into formal negotiations may not depend on the preparations of the technical team. It has more to do with the BRN’s willingness to come to the table.
Discussion on how to bring the real BRN to the table has been carried out in back channels. But, so far, the BRN has not budged. One of the factions within the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) led by Samsudine Khan, who is based in Sweden, is taking the same wait-and-see approach.
One month after the Joh I Rong operation, MARA Patani was forced to swallow its pride in April 2016 when Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said he could not formally recognise the umbrella organisation because it was associated with “criminals”.
Some officials say it was Prayut’s way of keeping MARA Patani at bay until the real BRN comes to the table. Others think Prayut realised that it is virtually impossible to reach any sort of formal agreement with the rebels during his time in office and he was not willing to make any meaningful concession because he was concerned about his legacy. He did not want to be remembered as the leader who gave away Patani, they said.
MARA Patani wants the dialogue process it conducts to be official and binding, as well as assurances that its negotiators and technicians will be granted legal immunity. Such demands are understandable in any conflict resolution process.
The rejection only reinforces the belief among BRN leaders that the Thai government side is not willing to make concessions and that coming to the table at this juncture would be a waste of time.
Tuesday, 28 February 2017
Thai Deep South: An Elusive Leader, an Enduring Narrative
Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
For weeks, Thai security and intelligence agencies debated how the death of Sapae-ing Baso would affect the separatist movement he was accused of leading in Thailand’s Muslim-majority Deep South.
One answer: very little. Violence in the restive region has resumed now that the rainy season has ended.
“BRN is a revolutionary organization that is run by a group of elders, not by one individual. Of course, there is a sense of loss because of what Sapae-ing meant to his people,” said an operative from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing Patani Malay separatist group.
Sapae-ing, a former head master of Thammawittaya Foundation School in Yala province, died at age 86 of complications from diabetes in Malaysia on Jan. 10.
BRN cadres say Sapae-ing’s passing will have no impact on their campaign of violence, which, for the time being, aims to make the region as ungovernable as possible.
A hero of the Patani narrative
Armed insurgency in the region known among locals as Patani flared up in the early 1960s – 50 years after then-Siam and British Malaya drew their common border – in response to a government assimilation policy, which, local Malay Muslims thought, came at the expense of their cultural-religious identity.
That wave of violence subsided in the early 1990s as backers in the Middle East and North Africa repositioned themselves for a post-Cold War world.
But a narrative painting the Thai state as invaders in the historical homeland of the Malays never went away. That narrative also made heroes out of men like Sapae-ing, a high school educator who promoted local Malay identity to resist a state-constructed identity and narrative.
Separatist violence returned in late 2001 but was not officially recognized until Jan. 4, 2004, when scores of combatants raided an army battalion and made off with more than 400 rifles. The then-government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could no longer deny the return of Malay separatist movement in the historically contested region.
Thailand’s counter-insurgency approach has never moved beyond carrot-and-stick proposals, including a blanket amnesty and a small plot of land for former combatants. Government policy has centered on development aimed at winning hearts and minds of the local Malay Muslims, who account for more than 80 percent of the 2 million residents in the area.
Nor has a military approach ended the problem. Soldiers in the Deep South are sitting ducks, as troops can’t distinguish between ordinary citizens and combatants. Today, the insurgents are in towns, cities, villages and municipalities across the region.
As long as the Patani narrative remains intact, separatism as an ideology will never go away, exiled separatist leaders say.
As for Sapae-ing, the fact that a significant number of students from his school took up arms against the Thai state made him an easy target for then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Thaksin needed to put a face on the conflict, and Sapae-ing became that face. Thaksin stated in one of his weekly radio addresses that the fugitive cleric, who fled southern Thailand in December 2004, was poised to be the leader of a liberated Patani.
The arrest warrant that forced Sapae-ing to flee was signed by then-Police Col. Thawee Sodsong, a man who would later become a key person the government’s peace initiatives for the far South for Thaksin and his sister, Yingluck.
Thai officials who examined the warrants said evidence against Sapae-ing was extremely flimsy and that he would have beaten the charges easily had he decided to fight it in court.
In the two years immediately after Sapae-ing fled southern Thailand, nine teachers from his school were shot dead, one-by-one, all at close range, presumably by members of a government or pro-government death squad.
Intervention from high-ups in Bangkok put an end to the killing of Sapae-ing’s teachers, according to a senior government source. But what successive administrations failed to grasp was the resilience of the cultural-historical narrative that Sapae-ing represented.
Successive governments tried to lure him to the table with the promise of leniency. It didn’t work. He was not about to sell his soul to the Thais, one associate said.
And since Thailand was not even willing to talk about the historical grievances and root cause of the conflict that claimed nearly 7,000 lives since January 2004, Sapae-ing didn’t see any point in talking to Thai officials.
Yoda-like
Artef Sohko, a youth leader from the far South, described Sapae-ing, his late principal, as a strict, polite and simple man who led by example.
The principal would go around pick up trash around the school like an ordinary janitor. After school, he would go around town to check to see if any of his students were getting into trouble.
Young people saw in him a role-model of the man they wanted to grow up to be. Parents admired his moral authority with students. Clerics in the region admired his leadership.
Foreign observers who closely monitor the conflict jokingly compared Sapae-ing to Yoda, the wise and powerful Jedi master from Star Wars. Some separatist combatants speculated that Sapae-ing was blessed with the power to go invisible and thus evade arrest.
After more than a decade of living secretly in exile and up until his death, the mystique around Sapae-ing never seemed to fade.
Upon learning of his death, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha expressed his sorrow to Sapae-ing’s family, while Thawee, the man who sent him and many other suspects on the run, also dropped by his family home to pay respects.
Today, weeks after his death, observers are asking who, if anyone, can replace him. One thing is clear: the end to the current wave of insurgency is nowhere in sight.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
For weeks, Thai security and intelligence agencies debated how the death of Sapae-ing Baso would affect the separatist movement he was accused of leading in Thailand’s Muslim-majority Deep South.
One answer: very little. Violence in the restive region has resumed now that the rainy season has ended.
“BRN is a revolutionary organization that is run by a group of elders, not by one individual. Of course, there is a sense of loss because of what Sapae-ing meant to his people,” said an operative from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing Patani Malay separatist group.
Sapae-ing, a former head master of Thammawittaya Foundation School in Yala province, died at age 86 of complications from diabetes in Malaysia on Jan. 10.
BRN cadres say Sapae-ing’s passing will have no impact on their campaign of violence, which, for the time being, aims to make the region as ungovernable as possible.
A hero of the Patani narrative
Armed insurgency in the region known among locals as Patani flared up in the early 1960s – 50 years after then-Siam and British Malaya drew their common border – in response to a government assimilation policy, which, local Malay Muslims thought, came at the expense of their cultural-religious identity.
That wave of violence subsided in the early 1990s as backers in the Middle East and North Africa repositioned themselves for a post-Cold War world.
But a narrative painting the Thai state as invaders in the historical homeland of the Malays never went away. That narrative also made heroes out of men like Sapae-ing, a high school educator who promoted local Malay identity to resist a state-constructed identity and narrative.
Separatist violence returned in late 2001 but was not officially recognized until Jan. 4, 2004, when scores of combatants raided an army battalion and made off with more than 400 rifles. The then-government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could no longer deny the return of Malay separatist movement in the historically contested region.
Thailand’s counter-insurgency approach has never moved beyond carrot-and-stick proposals, including a blanket amnesty and a small plot of land for former combatants. Government policy has centered on development aimed at winning hearts and minds of the local Malay Muslims, who account for more than 80 percent of the 2 million residents in the area.
Nor has a military approach ended the problem. Soldiers in the Deep South are sitting ducks, as troops can’t distinguish between ordinary citizens and combatants. Today, the insurgents are in towns, cities, villages and municipalities across the region.
As long as the Patani narrative remains intact, separatism as an ideology will never go away, exiled separatist leaders say.
As for Sapae-ing, the fact that a significant number of students from his school took up arms against the Thai state made him an easy target for then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Thaksin needed to put a face on the conflict, and Sapae-ing became that face. Thaksin stated in one of his weekly radio addresses that the fugitive cleric, who fled southern Thailand in December 2004, was poised to be the leader of a liberated Patani.
The arrest warrant that forced Sapae-ing to flee was signed by then-Police Col. Thawee Sodsong, a man who would later become a key person the government’s peace initiatives for the far South for Thaksin and his sister, Yingluck.
Thai officials who examined the warrants said evidence against Sapae-ing was extremely flimsy and that he would have beaten the charges easily had he decided to fight it in court.
In the two years immediately after Sapae-ing fled southern Thailand, nine teachers from his school were shot dead, one-by-one, all at close range, presumably by members of a government or pro-government death squad.
Intervention from high-ups in Bangkok put an end to the killing of Sapae-ing’s teachers, according to a senior government source. But what successive administrations failed to grasp was the resilience of the cultural-historical narrative that Sapae-ing represented.
Successive governments tried to lure him to the table with the promise of leniency. It didn’t work. He was not about to sell his soul to the Thais, one associate said.
And since Thailand was not even willing to talk about the historical grievances and root cause of the conflict that claimed nearly 7,000 lives since January 2004, Sapae-ing didn’t see any point in talking to Thai officials.
Yoda-like
Artef Sohko, a youth leader from the far South, described Sapae-ing, his late principal, as a strict, polite and simple man who led by example.
The principal would go around pick up trash around the school like an ordinary janitor. After school, he would go around town to check to see if any of his students were getting into trouble.
Young people saw in him a role-model of the man they wanted to grow up to be. Parents admired his moral authority with students. Clerics in the region admired his leadership.
Foreign observers who closely monitor the conflict jokingly compared Sapae-ing to Yoda, the wise and powerful Jedi master from Star Wars. Some separatist combatants speculated that Sapae-ing was blessed with the power to go invisible and thus evade arrest.
After more than a decade of living secretly in exile and up until his death, the mystique around Sapae-ing never seemed to fade.
Upon learning of his death, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha expressed his sorrow to Sapae-ing’s family, while Thawee, the man who sent him and many other suspects on the run, also dropped by his family home to pay respects.
Today, weeks after his death, observers are asking who, if anyone, can replace him. One thing is clear: the end to the current wave of insurgency is nowhere in sight.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)