Govt and civic organisations have been quick to condemn separatists over the killing of a family in Narathiwat – but there’s more here than meets the eye
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
The killing of a family of four Thai Buddhists, including an eight-year-old boy, as they made their way to school along a back road in Narathiwat’s Rueso district earlier this month has generated condemnation from all quarters.
Police gathered scores of rounds from M16 and AK47 machineguns and a 9mm handgun at the scene of the attack, which saw the pickup truck carrying the four victims veer off the road and into trees.
Police have not ruled out a personal dispute as the motive. But given the method of attack, all fingers are pointing to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the erstwhile separatist movement that controls virtually all the insurgents in the far South.
Unlike other rebel groups around the world, the BRN does not have an identifiable political wing or spokesman to confirm or deny such allegations. But their refusal to surface is mainly due to the fact that the Thai government is not willing to engage them in a frank manner and on an equal footing.
Information about the identity and thinking of the BRN leadership is scarce but operatives say that, as a policy, their combatants are not supposed to attack innocent civilians. However, mistakes have been made and “collateral damage” is sometimes unavoidable, they add.
Rules of engagement
Efforts have been made to get both state forces and separatists to respect rules of engagement outlined in the Geneva Convention. But for the time being, combatants on both sides decide for themselves what constitute legitimate targets, as well as how their operations are carried out.
Like any militant separatist movement, the BRN identifies “legitimate targets” – which include informants who provide information about their activities to state security forces.
The suspected collaborator, though, is supposed to receive at least one warning before militants step in.
In like fashion, members of pro-government death squads or rogue officers target local residents suspected of being close to separatists. Officially, the government does not have a policy on such “target killing”.
In the eyes of state forces and their militant supporters, a cleric like the late Abdulateh Todir from Yala’s Tambon Patae was considered fair game because of his alleged closeness to a local militant cell. He was gunned down in November 2012 in Yala’s Yaha district. But the insurgents didn’t think he was a “fair” target and responded with a series of vicious bombings and ambushes over the next six weeks.
The deliberate targeting of innocent civilians, such as a group of villagers in a crowded teashop, on the other hand, is understood to be part of the tit-for-tat hostilities between the separatists and state security forces.
One high profile example of deliberate targeting of civilians was the February 2014 killings of three Malay Muslim boys, aged 3, 5 and 9, in Narathiwat’s Bacho district by at least two Army Rangers who, at a press conference announcing their capture, insisted they had acted alone and not on the orders of their superiors.
The Rangers’ surrender was said to be part of a concession deal by the government to get the insurgents to end revenge killings that included the murder of three Buddhist women shot at point-blank range and their bodies set on fire. But when the two suspects appeared in court, they retracted their confession and were immediately released on grounds of insufficient evidence.
Tragic mistake
In the early years of this phase of insurgency, which erupted in January 2004, soft targets such as public schools, monks and teachers were attacked – although not very often. A significant number of local residents deemed sympathetic or too close to the insurgents have been killed as well, including Muslim community leaders and Islamic religious teachers.
While it was pretty clear that the boys in Bacho were deliberately targeted, the same cannot be said for the killing of the family in Rueso two weeks ago. The incident prompted all sorts of condemnation and criticism from Thai officials and rights organisations. Unfortunately, most of it lacked perspective.
Despite the long history of tit-for-tat conflict between state forces and the insurgents, unofficial rules of engagement do exist. The agreement is not in writing, but there is nevertheless an understanding between the two sides that there are red lines you do not cross. Failing to respect them will invite bloody, sometimes overwhelming retaliation.
Meanwhile Malay Muslim locals point out that Islam permits Muslims to take up arms against unjust rulers but forbids the militants from decapitating, castrating or otherwise mutilating dead government soldiers.
Such acts are not in line with Islamic principles, local religious leaders argue. Insurgents have responded by ending their practice of defiling dead government soldiers.
Another example of how combatants have heeded locals’ calls for greater “civility” in the conflict concerns the arson attacks on public schools, which propagate Thailand’s state-construct identity and narrative.
In 2007, a total of 164 schools in the far South came under arson attack. That number dropped to 14 the following year after criticism from local residents and clerics. The Thai government was of course quick to credit their security measures for the drop, deliberately ignoring the wider perspective.
Meanwhile the government dismisses any suggestion that its military sanctions the use of death squads, though locals say it’s hard to think otherwise when they witness armed hooded men jump off a pickup truck and mow down a teashop full of Muslim villagers with machineguns.
More than 6,800 people, mostly Malay Muslims, have died in insurgency-related violence in the Malay-speaking southernmost provinces since January 2004.
For public consumption, Thai authorities blame practically every violent incident on the separatists. But they have not succeeded in influencing the narrative that drives the insurgents and legitimises the armed struggle in the eyes of many ordinary residents.
And the more the authorities blur the line between what constitutes collateral damage and intentional killings, the wider the trust gap between the authorities and the local Malay Muslim population.
Separatist sources say they are disturbed that civil society organisations and community leaders are often quick to take the government’s line before looking at the facts available.
A BRN operative points out that mistakes have been made by the insurgents, but mistakes are not the same as intention. The BRN says collateral damage has been part of its internal debate for a very long time. But too often, militants in the field feel they cannot retreat for fear of retaliation or hot pursuit.
Another built-in protection measure is the requirement that the hitman or hitmen must not come from the local militant cell, to reduce the possibility of facial recognition. With these kinds of restraints, tragic mistakes are bound to occur, BRN members say.
Don Pathan is a security consultant and member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation based in Thailand’s conflict affected far South. The group is dedicated to critical discussion on the nature of the conflict in the historically contested region.
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DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Sunday, 19 March 2017
Saturday, 4 March 2017
Thai Deep South: ‘Bring People Home,’ a PR Exercise or Effective Tool Against Insurgency?
Commentary by Don Pathan
Yala, Thailand
March 1, 2017
Surrounded by reporters and television crews, the senior-most military commander tasked with quelling the insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South flew in on his helicopter last week to meet a rebel who, after eight years of on the run, decided to surrender in exchange for leniency from the law.
For a suspect with at least four warrants out for his arrest, Ahama Duere was calm and collected when he met Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanit. Piyawat’s subordinates and press crews treated Ahama kindly and smiled as they walked with him to an awaiting helicopter.
Ahama was not handcuffed. As far as anyone knew, he could have been any of the reporters accompanying the commander of the Fourth Army Area on a field trip.
The targeted audiences were insurgents contemplating whether to give up their armed struggle and surrender and, of course, their parents whom local authorities have urged to talk their sons into turning themselves in through the “Bring People Home Project.”
Separatism as an ideology among the Malay population in the historically contested Deep South runs deep, thus making virtually all Malay Muslim men here suspects or sympathizers in the eyes of authorities.
Often, roadside bombs targeting military and police patrols are buried within the eyesight of residents. This speaks volumes about the relationship between the villagers and the combatants.
Nevertheless, the Thai government calls the project a success but offers no meaningful justification to support that claim. Every now and then, authorities put together a boot-stomping public ceremony where former combatants and authorities get together in a show of force and unity with hugs and handshakes in front of the media and villagers.
But in remote villages, insurgents keep operating freely mainly because villagers continue to support them. They take turns making food for insurgents and sometimes providing them with shelter if their unit has been moved from another area for whatever reason.
Improved government intelligence over the years meant cell members had to relocate, even to another province. Sometimes this meant moving far from their families and loved ones. Such a move has brought hardship for many, as Ahama claimed.
The decision to quit a combatant’s life and return to civilian life is not a difficult one, but requires taking a chance with Thai authorities. Such a decision does not constitute desertion as long as the cell leaders and the individual wanting to leave reach an understanding followed by an oath that they would not reveal the identity of their fellow comrades who are still active.
Possible retaliation
Violating this oath could lead to deadly retaliation.
For the Thai side, the challenge is to strike a balance between cashing in on the publicity around an insurgent’s surrender and squeezing him for more intelligence. For those insurgents who turn themselves in, the aim is not to provide too much, at least not to the point that it could come back and haunt them.
Active combatants, on the other hand, are indifferent to the public relations exercise behind the Bring People Home Project, saying they are fully aware that the Thais are controlling the narrative.
What matters to them is that they continue to capture the imagination and trust of the local Malay Muslim residents whose grievances and mistrust of the Thai state provided them with the legitimacy to carry on with their struggle for a separate homeland.
How the narrative of the conflict evolves will depend on the main rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.
For the time being, combatants said they do not consider the go-between – be it government officials or local civil society organizations working for security forces to persuade the insurgents to surrender – a target or a threat to the movement.
Somebody's blacklist
Locals here think everybody is on somebody’s blacklist, rendering it somewhat meaningless. But from the perspective of a parent, it is an opportunity to remove his or her son from such a list that could very well mean death. Nearly 7,000 have been killed, mostly ethnic Malays, from insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
Moreover, BRN cadres said they are not too worried about combatants wanting to quit because the movement does not need that many people, not at this stage of the struggle anyway. In this kind of “unconventional warfare,” what matters is that the movement can demonstrate that it can still be a threat to the state security apparatus.
Keen observers of the conflict and local Malay Muslim residents of this region don’t buy the official line. So this begs the question: what is the purpose of this ongoing public relations offensive?
Senior policy makers said the idea behind Bring People Home and the so-called peace dialogue with MARA Patani – an umbrella organization of long-standing separatist groups who no longer control combatants on the ground – is all part of a long-term strategy that rests on the hope that villagers will become tired of the violence and turn their backs on the BRN and their combatants.
Like other peace initiatives, the strategy is more like a big leap of faith. Few policy planners take the time to look back into history and ask what went wrong in the relationship between the state and its Malay minority and why, nearly half a century after the region came under direct rule of the state, an armed insurgency erupted and shattered the comfort level between the two sides.
Translations:
http://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-bring-home-03012017181211.html (Thai)
http://www.benarnews.org/malay/komentar/my-don-brn-170303-03032017121642.html (Malay)
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Yala, Thailand
March 1, 2017
 |
AddThai army Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanich takes alleged insurgent Ahama Duere toward an awaiting military helicopter in Yala province, Feb. 24, 2017. Photo: Courtesy of ISOC4
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Surrounded by reporters and television crews, the senior-most military commander tasked with quelling the insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South flew in on his helicopter last week to meet a rebel who, after eight years of on the run, decided to surrender in exchange for leniency from the law.
For a suspect with at least four warrants out for his arrest, Ahama Duere was calm and collected when he met Lt. Gen. Piyawat Nakwanit. Piyawat’s subordinates and press crews treated Ahama kindly and smiled as they walked with him to an awaiting helicopter.
Ahama was not handcuffed. As far as anyone knew, he could have been any of the reporters accompanying the commander of the Fourth Army Area on a field trip.
The targeted audiences were insurgents contemplating whether to give up their armed struggle and surrender and, of course, their parents whom local authorities have urged to talk their sons into turning themselves in through the “Bring People Home Project.”
Separatism as an ideology among the Malay population in the historically contested Deep South runs deep, thus making virtually all Malay Muslim men here suspects or sympathizers in the eyes of authorities.
Often, roadside bombs targeting military and police patrols are buried within the eyesight of residents. This speaks volumes about the relationship between the villagers and the combatants.
Nevertheless, the Thai government calls the project a success but offers no meaningful justification to support that claim. Every now and then, authorities put together a boot-stomping public ceremony where former combatants and authorities get together in a show of force and unity with hugs and handshakes in front of the media and villagers.
But in remote villages, insurgents keep operating freely mainly because villagers continue to support them. They take turns making food for insurgents and sometimes providing them with shelter if their unit has been moved from another area for whatever reason.
Improved government intelligence over the years meant cell members had to relocate, even to another province. Sometimes this meant moving far from their families and loved ones. Such a move has brought hardship for many, as Ahama claimed.
The decision to quit a combatant’s life and return to civilian life is not a difficult one, but requires taking a chance with Thai authorities. Such a decision does not constitute desertion as long as the cell leaders and the individual wanting to leave reach an understanding followed by an oath that they would not reveal the identity of their fellow comrades who are still active.
Possible retaliation
Violating this oath could lead to deadly retaliation.
For the Thai side, the challenge is to strike a balance between cashing in on the publicity around an insurgent’s surrender and squeezing him for more intelligence. For those insurgents who turn themselves in, the aim is not to provide too much, at least not to the point that it could come back and haunt them.
Active combatants, on the other hand, are indifferent to the public relations exercise behind the Bring People Home Project, saying they are fully aware that the Thais are controlling the narrative.
What matters to them is that they continue to capture the imagination and trust of the local Malay Muslim residents whose grievances and mistrust of the Thai state provided them with the legitimacy to carry on with their struggle for a separate homeland.
How the narrative of the conflict evolves will depend on the main rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.
For the time being, combatants said they do not consider the go-between – be it government officials or local civil society organizations working for security forces to persuade the insurgents to surrender – a target or a threat to the movement.
Somebody's blacklist
Locals here think everybody is on somebody’s blacklist, rendering it somewhat meaningless. But from the perspective of a parent, it is an opportunity to remove his or her son from such a list that could very well mean death. Nearly 7,000 have been killed, mostly ethnic Malays, from insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
Moreover, BRN cadres said they are not too worried about combatants wanting to quit because the movement does not need that many people, not at this stage of the struggle anyway. In this kind of “unconventional warfare,” what matters is that the movement can demonstrate that it can still be a threat to the state security apparatus.
Keen observers of the conflict and local Malay Muslim residents of this region don’t buy the official line. So this begs the question: what is the purpose of this ongoing public relations offensive?
Senior policy makers said the idea behind Bring People Home and the so-called peace dialogue with MARA Patani – an umbrella organization of long-standing separatist groups who no longer control combatants on the ground – is all part of a long-term strategy that rests on the hope that villagers will become tired of the violence and turn their backs on the BRN and their combatants.
Like other peace initiatives, the strategy is more like a big leap of faith. Few policy planners take the time to look back into history and ask what went wrong in the relationship between the state and its Malay minority and why, nearly half a century after the region came under direct rule of the state, an armed insurgency erupted and shattered the comfort level between the two sides.
Translations:
http://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/TH-bring-home-03012017181211.html (Thai)
http://www.benarnews.org/malay/komentar/my-don-brn-170303-03032017121642.html (Malay)
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Friday, 3 March 2017
‘Safety zone’ in South only a pipe dream without BRN agreement
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
YALA, Thailand
Special to The Nation
IT WAS billed as a significant step – some even called it a breakthrough – but the announcement on Tuesday that the Thai government and Malay Muslim separatists from the far South has agreed on a “safety zone” is still a pipe dream because the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the group that controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground, is not onboard.
If the recent past is any lesson, the BRN stands ready to discredit any so-called progress made by the two sides – Thai government negotiators and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation made up of long-standing separatist movements besides the BRN.
For example, just a year ago, when a Thai official leaked to the local press that the two sides had agreed to designate Narathiwat’s Joh I Rong district as a “safety zone”, BRN combatants dispatched about 40 combatants to take over the district hospital and launched an assault on the Paramilitary Ranger camp next door. CCTV cameras captured the group’s movements, which was exactly what it wanted – to send a stern warning to the government and MARA Patani of its capabilities.
Government and MARA Patani lead negotiators came together this past Tuesday to rubber stamp the work of senior officials from both sides who had been working on various technical issues such as the scope, definition, mechanism and framework for formal talks.
The task at this point is to set the stage for formal negotiations that will take place if and when the two sides decide the time is right. For now, they have agreed in principle to bring five districts – one in Pattani, two in Yala and two in Narathiwat – under a “safety zone”. But they have yet to designate the specific districts.
It’s a small step forward and it was done in a way that MARA Patani would not suffer humiliation in the same manner as after the Joh I Rong retaliation.
But the right time to elevate this ongoing dialogue into formal negotiations may not depend on the preparations of the technical team. It has more to do with the BRN’s willingness to come to the table.
Discussion on how to bring the real BRN to the table has been carried out in back channels. But, so far, the BRN has not budged. One of the factions within the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) led by Samsudine Khan, who is based in Sweden, is taking the same wait-and-see approach.
One month after the Joh I Rong operation, MARA Patani was forced to swallow its pride in April 2016 when Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said he could not formally recognise the umbrella organisation because it was associated with “criminals”.
Some officials say it was Prayut’s way of keeping MARA Patani at bay until the real BRN comes to the table. Others think Prayut realised that it is virtually impossible to reach any sort of formal agreement with the rebels during his time in office and he was not willing to make any meaningful concession because he was concerned about his legacy. He did not want to be remembered as the leader who gave away Patani, they said.
MARA Patani wants the dialogue process it conducts to be official and binding, as well as assurances that its negotiators and technicians will be granted legal immunity. Such demands are understandable in any conflict resolution process.
The rejection only reinforces the belief among BRN leaders that the Thai government side is not willing to make concessions and that coming to the table at this juncture would be a waste of time.
Tuesday, 28 February 2017
Thai Deep South: An Elusive Leader, an Enduring Narrative
Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
For weeks, Thai security and intelligence agencies debated how the death of Sapae-ing Baso would affect the separatist movement he was accused of leading in Thailand’s Muslim-majority Deep South.
One answer: very little. Violence in the restive region has resumed now that the rainy season has ended.
“BRN is a revolutionary organization that is run by a group of elders, not by one individual. Of course, there is a sense of loss because of what Sapae-ing meant to his people,” said an operative from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing Patani Malay separatist group.
Sapae-ing, a former head master of Thammawittaya Foundation School in Yala province, died at age 86 of complications from diabetes in Malaysia on Jan. 10.
BRN cadres say Sapae-ing’s passing will have no impact on their campaign of violence, which, for the time being, aims to make the region as ungovernable as possible.
A hero of the Patani narrative
Armed insurgency in the region known among locals as Patani flared up in the early 1960s – 50 years after then-Siam and British Malaya drew their common border – in response to a government assimilation policy, which, local Malay Muslims thought, came at the expense of their cultural-religious identity.
That wave of violence subsided in the early 1990s as backers in the Middle East and North Africa repositioned themselves for a post-Cold War world.
But a narrative painting the Thai state as invaders in the historical homeland of the Malays never went away. That narrative also made heroes out of men like Sapae-ing, a high school educator who promoted local Malay identity to resist a state-constructed identity and narrative.
Separatist violence returned in late 2001 but was not officially recognized until Jan. 4, 2004, when scores of combatants raided an army battalion and made off with more than 400 rifles. The then-government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could no longer deny the return of Malay separatist movement in the historically contested region.
Thailand’s counter-insurgency approach has never moved beyond carrot-and-stick proposals, including a blanket amnesty and a small plot of land for former combatants. Government policy has centered on development aimed at winning hearts and minds of the local Malay Muslims, who account for more than 80 percent of the 2 million residents in the area.
Nor has a military approach ended the problem. Soldiers in the Deep South are sitting ducks, as troops can’t distinguish between ordinary citizens and combatants. Today, the insurgents are in towns, cities, villages and municipalities across the region.
As long as the Patani narrative remains intact, separatism as an ideology will never go away, exiled separatist leaders say.
As for Sapae-ing, the fact that a significant number of students from his school took up arms against the Thai state made him an easy target for then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Thaksin needed to put a face on the conflict, and Sapae-ing became that face. Thaksin stated in one of his weekly radio addresses that the fugitive cleric, who fled southern Thailand in December 2004, was poised to be the leader of a liberated Patani.
The arrest warrant that forced Sapae-ing to flee was signed by then-Police Col. Thawee Sodsong, a man who would later become a key person the government’s peace initiatives for the far South for Thaksin and his sister, Yingluck.
Thai officials who examined the warrants said evidence against Sapae-ing was extremely flimsy and that he would have beaten the charges easily had he decided to fight it in court.
In the two years immediately after Sapae-ing fled southern Thailand, nine teachers from his school were shot dead, one-by-one, all at close range, presumably by members of a government or pro-government death squad.
Intervention from high-ups in Bangkok put an end to the killing of Sapae-ing’s teachers, according to a senior government source. But what successive administrations failed to grasp was the resilience of the cultural-historical narrative that Sapae-ing represented.
Successive governments tried to lure him to the table with the promise of leniency. It didn’t work. He was not about to sell his soul to the Thais, one associate said.
And since Thailand was not even willing to talk about the historical grievances and root cause of the conflict that claimed nearly 7,000 lives since January 2004, Sapae-ing didn’t see any point in talking to Thai officials.
Yoda-like
Artef Sohko, a youth leader from the far South, described Sapae-ing, his late principal, as a strict, polite and simple man who led by example.
The principal would go around pick up trash around the school like an ordinary janitor. After school, he would go around town to check to see if any of his students were getting into trouble.
Young people saw in him a role-model of the man they wanted to grow up to be. Parents admired his moral authority with students. Clerics in the region admired his leadership.
Foreign observers who closely monitor the conflict jokingly compared Sapae-ing to Yoda, the wise and powerful Jedi master from Star Wars. Some separatist combatants speculated that Sapae-ing was blessed with the power to go invisible and thus evade arrest.
After more than a decade of living secretly in exile and up until his death, the mystique around Sapae-ing never seemed to fade.
Upon learning of his death, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha expressed his sorrow to Sapae-ing’s family, while Thawee, the man who sent him and many other suspects on the run, also dropped by his family home to pay respects.
Today, weeks after his death, observers are asking who, if anyone, can replace him. One thing is clear: the end to the current wave of insurgency is nowhere in sight.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
For weeks, Thai security and intelligence agencies debated how the death of Sapae-ing Baso would affect the separatist movement he was accused of leading in Thailand’s Muslim-majority Deep South.
One answer: very little. Violence in the restive region has resumed now that the rainy season has ended.
“BRN is a revolutionary organization that is run by a group of elders, not by one individual. Of course, there is a sense of loss because of what Sapae-ing meant to his people,” said an operative from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing Patani Malay separatist group.
Sapae-ing, a former head master of Thammawittaya Foundation School in Yala province, died at age 86 of complications from diabetes in Malaysia on Jan. 10.
BRN cadres say Sapae-ing’s passing will have no impact on their campaign of violence, which, for the time being, aims to make the region as ungovernable as possible.
A hero of the Patani narrative
Armed insurgency in the region known among locals as Patani flared up in the early 1960s – 50 years after then-Siam and British Malaya drew their common border – in response to a government assimilation policy, which, local Malay Muslims thought, came at the expense of their cultural-religious identity.
That wave of violence subsided in the early 1990s as backers in the Middle East and North Africa repositioned themselves for a post-Cold War world.
But a narrative painting the Thai state as invaders in the historical homeland of the Malays never went away. That narrative also made heroes out of men like Sapae-ing, a high school educator who promoted local Malay identity to resist a state-constructed identity and narrative.
Separatist violence returned in late 2001 but was not officially recognized until Jan. 4, 2004, when scores of combatants raided an army battalion and made off with more than 400 rifles. The then-government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could no longer deny the return of Malay separatist movement in the historically contested region.
Thailand’s counter-insurgency approach has never moved beyond carrot-and-stick proposals, including a blanket amnesty and a small plot of land for former combatants. Government policy has centered on development aimed at winning hearts and minds of the local Malay Muslims, who account for more than 80 percent of the 2 million residents in the area.
Nor has a military approach ended the problem. Soldiers in the Deep South are sitting ducks, as troops can’t distinguish between ordinary citizens and combatants. Today, the insurgents are in towns, cities, villages and municipalities across the region.
As long as the Patani narrative remains intact, separatism as an ideology will never go away, exiled separatist leaders say.
As for Sapae-ing, the fact that a significant number of students from his school took up arms against the Thai state made him an easy target for then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Thaksin needed to put a face on the conflict, and Sapae-ing became that face. Thaksin stated in one of his weekly radio addresses that the fugitive cleric, who fled southern Thailand in December 2004, was poised to be the leader of a liberated Patani.
The arrest warrant that forced Sapae-ing to flee was signed by then-Police Col. Thawee Sodsong, a man who would later become a key person the government’s peace initiatives for the far South for Thaksin and his sister, Yingluck.
Thai officials who examined the warrants said evidence against Sapae-ing was extremely flimsy and that he would have beaten the charges easily had he decided to fight it in court.
In the two years immediately after Sapae-ing fled southern Thailand, nine teachers from his school were shot dead, one-by-one, all at close range, presumably by members of a government or pro-government death squad.
Intervention from high-ups in Bangkok put an end to the killing of Sapae-ing’s teachers, according to a senior government source. But what successive administrations failed to grasp was the resilience of the cultural-historical narrative that Sapae-ing represented.
Successive governments tried to lure him to the table with the promise of leniency. It didn’t work. He was not about to sell his soul to the Thais, one associate said.
And since Thailand was not even willing to talk about the historical grievances and root cause of the conflict that claimed nearly 7,000 lives since January 2004, Sapae-ing didn’t see any point in talking to Thai officials.
Yoda-like
Artef Sohko, a youth leader from the far South, described Sapae-ing, his late principal, as a strict, polite and simple man who led by example.
The principal would go around pick up trash around the school like an ordinary janitor. After school, he would go around town to check to see if any of his students were getting into trouble.
Young people saw in him a role-model of the man they wanted to grow up to be. Parents admired his moral authority with students. Clerics in the region admired his leadership.
Foreign observers who closely monitor the conflict jokingly compared Sapae-ing to Yoda, the wise and powerful Jedi master from Star Wars. Some separatist combatants speculated that Sapae-ing was blessed with the power to go invisible and thus evade arrest.
After more than a decade of living secretly in exile and up until his death, the mystique around Sapae-ing never seemed to fade.
Upon learning of his death, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha expressed his sorrow to Sapae-ing’s family, while Thawee, the man who sent him and many other suspects on the run, also dropped by his family home to pay respects.
Today, weeks after his death, observers are asking who, if anyone, can replace him. One thing is clear: the end to the current wave of insurgency is nowhere in sight.
Don Pathan is a consultant and security analyst based in Thailand. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
Sunday, 26 February 2017
EDITORIAL: An exercise in futility?
Without involving the BRN in peace talks on the South, the government might be wasting its time
The Nation
In the ongoing peace dialogue between representatives of the Thai government and the MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of longstanding Patani Malay separatist organisations – all except the one that controls insurgents on the ground – it is clear that what the two sides are seeking, and what they are being offered are two different things.
The two sides desperately want a designated safety zone. They have been talking about it for almost two years now so the two sides can implement a ceasefire. They will talk about it again on Tuesday in Malaysia.
The problem here is not difficult to understand. Neither side (Thai or MARA Patani groups) controls the insurgents on the ground. It is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) that has control over the insurgents, the one long-standing group that has refused to join the peace initiative.
The BRN refuses to join the talks because, according to reports, they do not believe the Thai side is committed to any meaningful peace settlement for Malays in the Patani region. Successive Thai governments only wanted to use money to buy out these so-called rebel leaders and if that didn’t work, the state has the troops ready to kill them.
But such an attitude has not produced the desired outcome. About 7,000 people – mostly Malay Muslims – have died from insurgency-related violence since January 2004 and Bangkok continues to turn a blind eye to the historical root cause of the conflict and the injustice that provided legitimacy to rebel groups to take up arms.
The BRN will not come to the negotiating table until its political wing is recognised and properly trained by members of international organisations – more or less in the same manner as fel?low rebels from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from Indonesia.
Thailand refuses to entertain the idea of permitting members of the international community to get directly involved in the peace process – at least not publicly, anyway – for fear that it would “internationalise” the conflict.
By using the term “internationalised”, Bangkok is saying in other words it does not want to debate the legitimacy of Thailand controlling the Malays’ historic homeland. No government wants such a headache. But this headache is necessary if we are to move the peace process forward.
The concept of a safe zone is a euphemism for “ceasefire”, and has been on the agenda ever since MARA Patani and the government of this current junta decided to talk to one another. The Thai side wanted to be certain that they are at least talking the people who have some control of combatants on the ground.
In May 2016, it was leaked to the press by Thai negotiators that Narathiwat’s Joh Ai Rong district would be designated a safety zone. It didn’t take BRN com?batants long to launch a massive operation in that district to discredit the so-called “breakthrough ” claimed by the Thai and MARA Patani sides.
The writing was already on the wall because from the very first meeting with the so-called Dialogue Panel (negotia?tors) and the Policy Panel for the far South, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha had stated that his government would not recognise MARA Patani.
Members of the Policy Panel, which include the Foreign Ministry, Internal Security Operations Command, Defence Ministry, head of the Dialogue Panel, National Security Council, argued that recognition would lead to institutionalisation and the outcome of that would be internationalisation.
The government, besides not being willing to recognise MARA Patani, who they referred to as “Party B”, would not even entertain the idea of granting legal immunity to their negotiators, much less the BRN who really control the insurgents.
The junta in Bangkok thinks it can have the cake and eat it too. The BRN combatants on the ground, on the other hand, are telling Bangkok – not so fast.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/today_editorial/30307268#.WLJYC9DQLU8.facebook
The Nation
In the ongoing peace dialogue between representatives of the Thai government and the MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of longstanding Patani Malay separatist organisations – all except the one that controls insurgents on the ground – it is clear that what the two sides are seeking, and what they are being offered are two different things.
The two sides desperately want a designated safety zone. They have been talking about it for almost two years now so the two sides can implement a ceasefire. They will talk about it again on Tuesday in Malaysia.
The problem here is not difficult to understand. Neither side (Thai or MARA Patani groups) controls the insurgents on the ground. It is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) that has control over the insurgents, the one long-standing group that has refused to join the peace initiative.
The BRN refuses to join the talks because, according to reports, they do not believe the Thai side is committed to any meaningful peace settlement for Malays in the Patani region. Successive Thai governments only wanted to use money to buy out these so-called rebel leaders and if that didn’t work, the state has the troops ready to kill them.
But such an attitude has not produced the desired outcome. About 7,000 people – mostly Malay Muslims – have died from insurgency-related violence since January 2004 and Bangkok continues to turn a blind eye to the historical root cause of the conflict and the injustice that provided legitimacy to rebel groups to take up arms.
The BRN will not come to the negotiating table until its political wing is recognised and properly trained by members of international organisations – more or less in the same manner as fel?low rebels from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from Indonesia.
Thailand refuses to entertain the idea of permitting members of the international community to get directly involved in the peace process – at least not publicly, anyway – for fear that it would “internationalise” the conflict.
By using the term “internationalised”, Bangkok is saying in other words it does not want to debate the legitimacy of Thailand controlling the Malays’ historic homeland. No government wants such a headache. But this headache is necessary if we are to move the peace process forward.
The concept of a safe zone is a euphemism for “ceasefire”, and has been on the agenda ever since MARA Patani and the government of this current junta decided to talk to one another. The Thai side wanted to be certain that they are at least talking the people who have some control of combatants on the ground.
In May 2016, it was leaked to the press by Thai negotiators that Narathiwat’s Joh Ai Rong district would be designated a safety zone. It didn’t take BRN com?batants long to launch a massive operation in that district to discredit the so-called “breakthrough ” claimed by the Thai and MARA Patani sides.
The writing was already on the wall because from the very first meeting with the so-called Dialogue Panel (negotia?tors) and the Policy Panel for the far South, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha had stated that his government would not recognise MARA Patani.
Members of the Policy Panel, which include the Foreign Ministry, Internal Security Operations Command, Defence Ministry, head of the Dialogue Panel, National Security Council, argued that recognition would lead to institutionalisation and the outcome of that would be internationalisation.
The government, besides not being willing to recognise MARA Patani, who they referred to as “Party B”, would not even entertain the idea of granting legal immunity to their negotiators, much less the BRN who really control the insurgents.
The junta in Bangkok thinks it can have the cake and eat it too. The BRN combatants on the ground, on the other hand, are telling Bangkok – not so fast.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/today_editorial/30307268#.WLJYC9DQLU8.facebook
Wednesday, 18 January 2017
Beacon for peace in far South is extinguished
The condolences from Premier Prayut Chan-o-cha over Sapae-ing Basor’s death carry tragic echoes of missed opportunities
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
Just a decade ago, in 2006, when Interior Ministry Permanent Secretary Grisada Boonrach was assigned vice governor of Yala, he would stop by and check on security officers manning the checkpoints in and around his restive province.
One late afternoon he came across a young man, a Muslim, who appeared to be slightly intoxicated.
“Are you Malayu [ethnic Malay]?” Grisada asked, to which the young man replied, “yes” without hesitation.
“Then why are you drunk?” barked Grisada.
The young man snapped back, asking the then-vice governor, “Who are you, Sapae-ing Basor?”
Grisada would learn soon learn more about the moral authority of one of Thailand’s most-wanted men, who at one time had a Bt10 million police bounty on his head.
Sapae-ing was perceived by many as the spiritual leader of Muslims in this Malay-speaking region. He was accused by the Thai police of being the leader of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a longstanding separatist movement that surfaced in the early 1960s and today commands well over 90 per cent of insurgents operating in the South.
Sapae-ing fled his Yala home in December 2004 to escape arrest. Then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, in one of his weekly radio address, claimed Sapae-ing was poised to become overall leader of a liberated Patani.
Thaksin accused this Thamvithya School principal of leading an army bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces, a region historically known as Patani.
The arrest warrant for Sapae-ing was signed off by Thaksin’s point-man for the far South, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, on December 14, 2004. A decade later, Thawee would become the key figure in a peace initiative launched by the Yingluck government on February 28, 2013, during which another concerted effort was made to reach out to Sapae-ing for help.
Last week, upon learning news about Sapae-ing’s death, Thawee showed up in Pattani’s Yarang district to personally express condolences to the late principal’s family.
Senior government officials who examined the warrant said the evidence against Sapae-ing was extremely flimsy and suspected it was motivated by Thaksin and his cronies’ agenda. They saw him as an easy target to get at the movement because students from his school had joined the insurgent movement.
It would be some time before the government in Bangkok realised that they weren’t just fighting young men with guns. They were up against an entirely different cultural and historical narrative that was breeding a new wave of separatist militants bent on forging a separate homeland.
Thai security planners eventually learned about Sapae-ing’s integrity, together with his strong religious credentials, and sought his help to end the conflict. Through him, they saw an opportunity to communicate with the Malays of Patani. But Bangkok was never clear as to what message it wanted to send or what kind of compromises it was willing to make with the Malays.
It took the Thais some time to realise that they weren’t fighting against “sparrow bandits” – young men who had embraced distorted Islam and history – as Thaksin and many Thai officials would describe them. They were actually battling a competing history and a narrative that Sapae-ing exemplified.
Attempts to get this spiritual leader to the negotiating table were fruitless because, according to people who knew him, Sapae-ing didn’t see the conflict as being about him but about the people of Patani. Furthermore, he sensed the Thais were unwilling to make any concessions to his people and had failed to understand the root causes and grievances of the people in this region.
It was said he could have cut a deal for himself but he chose not to do so. Too much was riding on his shoulder and he wasn’t about to sell out, said exiled separatist leaders.
Artef Sohko, a youth activist and graduate of Thamvithya, said there was no leader in the Patani region who could match the level of respect and admiration that Sapae-ing commanded.
“There was nothing beneath him. He practices what he preaches. That kind of moral authority is hard to find nowadays,” said Artef, recalling how Sapae-ing would often tour the school grounds picking up trash to set a good example for students.
The historical Patani sultanate, once known for its ports and commerce and business dealings with Western merchants, has been subsumed into four provinces of Thailand. Most Thais do not care to learn about this region’s glorious past, preferring to swallow a state-constructed narrative that encompasses the Malays but fails to recognise their difference.
But the mystique continues to shape the cultural and historical narrative for the people of this region and the end result is a series of separatist movements.
Sapae-ing was very much a part of that narrative – an example of how the state fails to people who embrace a different narrative and cultural identity with respect and understanding.
Those who knew Sapae-ing said he was the most selfless person they ever encountered. They said he always placed the needs and dignity of his community before his own, and that’s why he refused to deal with the Thais during his years in exile.
His students loved him dearly. Many even considered a whooping from him a blessing that helped set them on the right path in life. Parents adored his strict discipline as a protection against their young ones being led astray by rapid social change which is compromising the longstanding traditional values of this conservative community.
According teachers at Thamvithya School, Sapae-ing liked to patrol beer joints and hangouts after school to see if any of his students were there. Any that he caught could be sure of swift and painful justice.
Even after he disappeared from public sight, locals continued to talk about him. The mystique surrounding this righteous man of religion never seemed to fade. Some of those who observed his role in the regional conflict referred to Sapae-ing as “Yoda”, the wise and powerful Jedi master from George Lucas’ “Star Wars”.
Some young militants even believed he was blessed with the power of invisibility or omniscience. They spoke as if he had never left them. As far as many of them were concerned, he never did; he was always in their hearts and minds.
But after he was demonised and dismissed by Thaksin and his ilk as a power-hungry individual eager to be ruler of a liberated Patani, it was hard for any political or security official to take a softer or more subtle line. Pressure to end the conflict was too high and the Thai leaders couldn’t afford to look weak.
But when news about Sapae-ing’s death reached Bangkok, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha promptly expressed condolences to his family. A gesture of goodwill is never too late, it seems.
“It could be that he [Prayut] wanted to make the Thais, the state and the government look less guilty because they were the ones who forced him to go out [into exile],” said Nualnoi Thammasathein, a veteran documentary producer and former London-based BBC reporter, who has done much work on the far-South conflict.
“They [the Thai government] look vulnerable, not sensible. I doubt that he [Prayut] did it for the family, but rather for himself and his government – maybe even to lift himself a little bit higher in the eyes of the Malays,” she added.
Prayut even instructed the Army to help his family transport Sapae-ing’s body back to Yala from Malaysia’s Terengganu state. Similar treatment was extended to the family of Romli Uttarasin, considered a founding father of the BRN, when he died in Malaysia in February 2010.
Thai security officials, on the other hand, said resolving the conflicts in this region will be harder without Sapae-ing, who could have played a crucial role in implementing any deal between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani.
Sources in the BRN said Sapae-ing would be greatly missed but their fight against the Thai security forces would continue until they achieved their aims. Independence remains one of those aims, but sources add that they were willing to negotiate with the Thais if the conditions are right. This means foreign governments observing the talk to ensure international best practice governs negotiations.
Bangkok will likely give the BRN the cold shoulder, demanding that the group join up with the separatist umbrella organisation MARA Patani for the ongoing peace initiative with the Thai government.
The Nation
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security consultant and a member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict in the far South.
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
Just a decade ago, in 2006, when Interior Ministry Permanent Secretary Grisada Boonrach was assigned vice governor of Yala, he would stop by and check on security officers manning the checkpoints in and around his restive province.
One late afternoon he came across a young man, a Muslim, who appeared to be slightly intoxicated.
“Are you Malayu [ethnic Malay]?” Grisada asked, to which the young man replied, “yes” without hesitation.
“Then why are you drunk?” barked Grisada.
The young man snapped back, asking the then-vice governor, “Who are you, Sapae-ing Basor?”
Grisada would learn soon learn more about the moral authority of one of Thailand’s most-wanted men, who at one time had a Bt10 million police bounty on his head.
Sapae-ing was perceived by many as the spiritual leader of Muslims in this Malay-speaking region. He was accused by the Thai police of being the leader of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a longstanding separatist movement that surfaced in the early 1960s and today commands well over 90 per cent of insurgents operating in the South.
 |
| About 2,500 local residents and students gather at the Thamvithya Mulnithi School on Monday, Jan 16, 2017, to bid farewell to former principal Sapae-ing Basor, the spiritual leader for the Malay Muslims in the region accused by the Thai police of being a separatist leader. Photo by: IBROHEM MASOH |
Thaksin accused this Thamvithya School principal of leading an army bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces, a region historically known as Patani.
The arrest warrant for Sapae-ing was signed off by Thaksin’s point-man for the far South, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, on December 14, 2004. A decade later, Thawee would become the key figure in a peace initiative launched by the Yingluck government on February 28, 2013, during which another concerted effort was made to reach out to Sapae-ing for help.
Last week, upon learning news about Sapae-ing’s death, Thawee showed up in Pattani’s Yarang district to personally express condolences to the late principal’s family.
Senior government officials who examined the warrant said the evidence against Sapae-ing was extremely flimsy and suspected it was motivated by Thaksin and his cronies’ agenda. They saw him as an easy target to get at the movement because students from his school had joined the insurgent movement.
It would be some time before the government in Bangkok realised that they weren’t just fighting young men with guns. They were up against an entirely different cultural and historical narrative that was breeding a new wave of separatist militants bent on forging a separate homeland.
Thai security planners eventually learned about Sapae-ing’s integrity, together with his strong religious credentials, and sought his help to end the conflict. Through him, they saw an opportunity to communicate with the Malays of Patani. But Bangkok was never clear as to what message it wanted to send or what kind of compromises it was willing to make with the Malays.
It took the Thais some time to realise that they weren’t fighting against “sparrow bandits” – young men who had embraced distorted Islam and history – as Thaksin and many Thai officials would describe them. They were actually battling a competing history and a narrative that Sapae-ing exemplified.
Attempts to get this spiritual leader to the negotiating table were fruitless because, according to people who knew him, Sapae-ing didn’t see the conflict as being about him but about the people of Patani. Furthermore, he sensed the Thais were unwilling to make any concessions to his people and had failed to understand the root causes and grievances of the people in this region.
It was said he could have cut a deal for himself but he chose not to do so. Too much was riding on his shoulder and he wasn’t about to sell out, said exiled separatist leaders.
Artef Sohko, a youth activist and graduate of Thamvithya, said there was no leader in the Patani region who could match the level of respect and admiration that Sapae-ing commanded.
“There was nothing beneath him. He practices what he preaches. That kind of moral authority is hard to find nowadays,” said Artef, recalling how Sapae-ing would often tour the school grounds picking up trash to set a good example for students.
The historical Patani sultanate, once known for its ports and commerce and business dealings with Western merchants, has been subsumed into four provinces of Thailand. Most Thais do not care to learn about this region’s glorious past, preferring to swallow a state-constructed narrative that encompasses the Malays but fails to recognise their difference.
But the mystique continues to shape the cultural and historical narrative for the people of this region and the end result is a series of separatist movements.
Sapae-ing was very much a part of that narrative – an example of how the state fails to people who embrace a different narrative and cultural identity with respect and understanding.
Those who knew Sapae-ing said he was the most selfless person they ever encountered. They said he always placed the needs and dignity of his community before his own, and that’s why he refused to deal with the Thais during his years in exile.
His students loved him dearly. Many even considered a whooping from him a blessing that helped set them on the right path in life. Parents adored his strict discipline as a protection against their young ones being led astray by rapid social change which is compromising the longstanding traditional values of this conservative community.
According teachers at Thamvithya School, Sapae-ing liked to patrol beer joints and hangouts after school to see if any of his students were there. Any that he caught could be sure of swift and painful justice.
Even after he disappeared from public sight, locals continued to talk about him. The mystique surrounding this righteous man of religion never seemed to fade. Some of those who observed his role in the regional conflict referred to Sapae-ing as “Yoda”, the wise and powerful Jedi master from George Lucas’ “Star Wars”.
Some young militants even believed he was blessed with the power of invisibility or omniscience. They spoke as if he had never left them. As far as many of them were concerned, he never did; he was always in their hearts and minds.
But after he was demonised and dismissed by Thaksin and his ilk as a power-hungry individual eager to be ruler of a liberated Patani, it was hard for any political or security official to take a softer or more subtle line. Pressure to end the conflict was too high and the Thai leaders couldn’t afford to look weak.
But when news about Sapae-ing’s death reached Bangkok, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha promptly expressed condolences to his family. A gesture of goodwill is never too late, it seems.
“It could be that he [Prayut] wanted to make the Thais, the state and the government look less guilty because they were the ones who forced him to go out [into exile],” said Nualnoi Thammasathein, a veteran documentary producer and former London-based BBC reporter, who has done much work on the far-South conflict.
“They [the Thai government] look vulnerable, not sensible. I doubt that he [Prayut] did it for the family, but rather for himself and his government – maybe even to lift himself a little bit higher in the eyes of the Malays,” she added.
Prayut even instructed the Army to help his family transport Sapae-ing’s body back to Yala from Malaysia’s Terengganu state. Similar treatment was extended to the family of Romli Uttarasin, considered a founding father of the BRN, when he died in Malaysia in February 2010.
Thai security officials, on the other hand, said resolving the conflicts in this region will be harder without Sapae-ing, who could have played a crucial role in implementing any deal between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani.
Sources in the BRN said Sapae-ing would be greatly missed but their fight against the Thai security forces would continue until they achieved their aims. Independence remains one of those aims, but sources add that they were willing to negotiate with the Thais if the conditions are right. This means foreign governments observing the talk to ensure international best practice governs negotiations.
Bangkok will likely give the BRN the cold shoulder, demanding that the group join up with the separatist umbrella organisation MARA Patani for the ongoing peace initiative with the Thai government.
The Nation
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security consultant and a member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict in the far South.
Thursday, 12 January 2017
Thailand's Muslims mourn death of spiritual leader
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Thailand-s-Muslims-mourn-death-of-spiritual-leader
Nikkei Asian Review
 |
| Sapae-ing Basor escort then PM Chuan Leekapi through school ground during a visit in early 1990s. Between them is Haji Harun Sulong, the rector of the school and Sapae-ing's father-in-lasw. (Courtesy of the Basor family). |
YALA, Thailand -- Muslims in Thailand's southernmost provinces are bidding farewell to a prominent spiritual leader accused by Thai police of leading a separatist movement intent on carving out a homeland for ethnic Malays in the region.
Wartani News, a local media outlet, quoted family members of Sapae-ing Basor as saying he had passed away on Jan. 10 while living in exile in Malaysia. He died of a lung infection after being treated for diabetes and heart disease. He was 81.
About 2,500 people congregated on Monday morning at Thamvithya Mulnithi, a high school in southern Yala province where Sapae-ing served as principal until he fled the country in December 2004. Sapae-ing had been charged with treason by police over his alleged involvement in a series of attacks on police and military facilities in the region.
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