Southern militants have scant desire to negotiate

The staged surrender of Suthirak Kongsuwan, one of the suspects behind the massacre at a Narathiwat mosque in June 2009, may not bring needed breathing space for the Abhisit government because, say members of separatist groups, the damage may be irreversible. A secret peace process has been derailed and it will take some time before it gets back on track. 

By DON PATHAN

JUST OVER seven months ago, six gunmen sneaked up on a mosque full of people conducting evening prayer in a village surrounded by military camps. They opened fire, killing ten and injuring 11 others.

The 11th victim died in hospital the following day. In a typical knee-jerk reaction, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Tuegsuband insisted that the June 8, 2009 massacre at Ai Bayae village mosque in Narathiwat was not the work of Thai security forces, although he could not say for sure who the gunmen were.JUST OVER seven months ago, six gunmen sneaked up on a mosque full of people conducting evening prayer in a village surrounded by military camps. They opened fire, killing ten and injuring 11 others.

Local media reported unnamed security officials saying the massacre was the work of Malay Muslim militants bent on driving a bigger wedge between the Malay-speaking region and the state. Other reports quoting unnamed sources said the massacre stemmed from conflict between Muslim missionaries and the Malay villagers, who embrace different schools of thought. While their theological outlook may differ, never in the history of Islamic missionary service in the deep South have such differences turned to violence, much less massacre.

In the past six years of intense violence, there has been only one incident in which suspected insurgents carried out target killing inside a mosque. The place was a village mosque in Panare district of Pattani, and the victim was a Border Patrol Police officer. The gunman waited until he completed his prayers before he shot him at point blank range from behind.

The Ai Bayae massacre should not be compared to the Kru Se Mosque stand-off on April 28, 2004 when insurgents fortified themselves inside the historic mosque as they engaged in a lengthy gunfight with Thai security forces until they were overpowered and killed. Local  Malays  see their act as heroic, as they gave up their lives just to be heard. All were buried as Muslim martyrs. In this respect, a mosque being the main scene enhances their legitimacy as fighting for a just cause. The June 8 massacre didn't fit that bill. And so when the authorities suggested that the killings may have been the work of insurgents, nobody believed them, not even key security and administrative officials in this highly volatile region.

According to military and civilian officials monitoring the situation from the region, the June 8 massacre was a result of an intense tit-for-tat exchange of bombings and shootings between the insurgents and security units, with the help of pro-government death squads.

While murder has been an everyday occurrence since a January 2004 arms heist, the spate of violence that led to the Ai Bayae massacre was sparked by a court decision. The verdict cleared all security officials from any wrongdoing at the Tak Bai massacre in September 2004, when 78 unarmed Malay Muslim demonstrators died from suffocation. Security officials had stacked them one on top of another in the back of military transport trucks.

Immediately after the ruling, soft targets such as schools and restaurants that were off the militants' radar in the previous year, returned to the hit list. For the insurgency in the deep South, a new threshold had been crossed and the insurgents were not about to let the government forget about it.

For PM Abhisit Vejjajiva, the massacre was a setback in more ways than one. Besides driving a deeper wedge between the state and the Malay Muslim community, it threatened to derailed a peace process his government has been carrying out.

The so-called Geneva Process was jump-started by the government of Surayud Chulanont but was not continued by the following administrations of  Samak Sundaravej  and Somchai Wongsawat, who were beset by vicious street protests. Abhisit set up a small steering committee made up of trusted MPs and officials from the National Security Council (NSC) to talk to the long-standing separatist groups in exile. These groups include the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and various branches of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). The idea is to get these old guard to act as brokers between the government and the new generation of militants.

Things were moving along accordingly until the June 8 massacre. According to Pulo and BRN-Coordinate members, the militants on the ground demanded that the Thai authorities arrest the six gunmen in exchange for their endorsement of the peace process.

Essentially, the ball was in the government's court: Arrest the six and bring the peace process back on track. But to get officials to make the arrests wasn't going to be easy, especially when the gunmen were, according to various sources, including Human Rights Watch, members of a pro-government death squad.

Thus began some serious arm-twisting. Mug shots of the suspects were downloaded from the Interior Ministry's ID card databank and distributed around villages. Among the six was a Narathiwat Muslim who had been working as a spy for a local military task force.

According to an informed source, the police eventually detained five gunmen - the sixth had committed suicide, possibly out of fear of retribution - and their secret agent. But it was the military that stalled the due process that was supposed to proceed afterwards. Others said the suspects were kept in a "safe house" until all the stakeholders on the government side could figure out what to do.

The staged surrender of Suthirak stemmed from the enormous pressure from various stakeholders, including lawmakers from the region, who feared the inaction of the government could cost them politically. If the "staged" surrender of Suthirak pays off politically, the public could see more suspects being made public, according to a government source.

But the so-called "surrender" of Suthirak last week raised a new set of questions. Officials in the deep South wonder what is to be gained from it.

Pulo and BRN members said they are not hopeful that the surrender of Suthirak, one of the five supposedly detained, will bring the peace process back on track any time soon.

"The Thai authorities knew from the beginning that the longer they waited, the harder it would be to put the dialogue back on track," said a BRN-Coordinate member.

Moreover, said the BRN member, the juwae - a term he used to describe the new generation of militants - are not that interested in talking to the Thais anyway.

"The way they see it, they are winning. They can hit the Thai authorities more or less at will, at any time, in any place. Unless the government is willing to make some serious concessions, one can forget about seeing peace in the region any time soon."

Thailand should just accept that South is different

Only way to bring the violent struggle to an end would be to listen to and acknowledge the Malays of Patani

Don Pathan
The Nation

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak came to Thailand with a clear message: the Malay-speaking region in the country's southernmost provinces was an integral part of the Kingdom.

While respecting Thailand's territorial integrity, Najib also reminded the government that the region had different characteristics that would need special attention. Historical grievances and aspirations of the Malays of Patani must be addressed if the conflicts are to end, he warned.

However, perhaps as a move to show that he is a good sport, Najib backed away from the "autonomy" idea, and instead endorsed Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's "decentralisation" approach.

Amid the spate of bomb attacks against security forces, the two leaders were reminded that where they go from here will not be easy, because behind these bombings was the message: what's acceptable to the two countries may not necessarily be acceptable to the Patani Malays or the separatist movements.

Nevertheless, the cordial atmosphere was an indication that the two countries had moved beyond recent history when Thaksin Shinawatra's arrogance brought bilateral relations to its knee.

Today, that kind of microphone diplomacy is not applied, but that doesn't mean it won't happen again. Thailand's culture of impunity in the restive region could very well have forced Malaysia and other Muslim countries to break their silence.

Apparently, some ill-intentioned people in the restive region don't like the fact that the two countries are moving closer. Posters and banners saying, "Patani is a part of Malaysia" were scattered all over the region, while local residents think some ultra-Thai nationalists looking to distort the significance of the visit might have been behind the incidents.

As pointed out by Senator Warawit Baru, a respected academic from the region, the insurgents don't relate to Malaysia as a nation-state, instead they feel distanced from the Thai state.

It's an open secret that hardliners think Abhisit is giving away too much political capital by allowing Kuala Lumpur to move closer to what they deem as domestic problems. In their mind, a good insurgent is a dead insurgent, so when things such as the banners surfaced, these hardliners in the security community came to mind.

In fact, if one were to go deep enough into the back roads of this restive region, one would see "Patani Merdeka" written all over the place. It means "Free Patani" - free from Thailand and free from Malaysia.

Locals said they were reminded of last year's hoax when a group of ethnic Malays, in fake moustaches and beards, declared an end to insurgency. They called themselves the "Southern Thai Muslims". People with half a brain can figure out who wrote the script. Never in the history of this restive region have the militants called themselves "Southern Thai".

The deep South is undergoing an ethno-nationalistic dispute, one that challenges the Thai state's legitimacy there. Resolving this would require a great deal of sophistication and sensitivity because it centres on national pride, history and the dignity of all the affected parties.

Unfortunately, we never hear the words "human dignity" coming out of either leader's mouth. All we heard were the usual sound bites of how development would cure all. If the past six years are any indication, the billions of baht spent have not really won the state that many hearts. This is not because a big chunk of it is being skimmed off the top, but because handouts do not mean empowerment. They do nothing to enhance one's sense of ownership.

Bangkok will have to let go of its "I know better" attitude and give the Patani Malays enough political space to talk about their grievances, resentments and aspirations.

We may not like the fact that the Thai-Patani history is full of blood, but acknowledging history for what it is can help all sides come to terms with the past and move forward as a united country. Surely the two leaders understand how disturbing an ethno-nationalist struggle can be. After all, they both studied in Britain.

Sadly though, both Abhisit and Najib have been unable to go beyond their narrow mindset of a nation-state. Patani should not be reduced to a footnote in Thailand's nationhood. It has its own myths, legends and tales that are not related to Thailand's history. And if this point is not taken into consideration, any political model, a development scheme or a peace process put forward is doomed to fail.

Fireworks set to go off in the Golden Triangle

THE SHOOTING has stopped and the refugees have returned to their homes on the Burmese side of the border. But it would be a grave mistake to think the fighting and bloodshed on the Sino-Burmese border is over and done with.

By DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Immediately after the mid-August attack on ethnic Chinese Kokang rebels by the Burmese army, politics in the Golden Triangle went into a tailspin. Jolted by the attack against the Kokang, Chinese authorities moved quickly to ensure that the Burmese junta would not make further advances against other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA).

The junta, on the other hand, justified its attack on the Kokang, after two decades of cease-fire, saying the group was illegally producing arms. Perhaps accusing them of trafficking illicit drugs would be too easy given the fact that just about every ethnic army in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle is growing opium and making heroin and methamphetamine.

In fact, almost immediately after they came into being, these splinter groups of the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, have flooded the world with heroin and, over the past few decades, methamphetamine. But that was fine as long as some of that money helped build roads, other infrastructure and trickled down into the pockets of Burmese army commanders. This arrangement, however, has effectively come to an end. In the aftermath of the August attack, horse-trading between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's junta, and the UWSA has been going on. It won't be the same, but the Wa are trying to hold on to whatever they believe is rightfully theirs. So far, neither side appears to be giving in.

The end of October is reportedly the deadline for the Wa to surrender their arms and come under direct command of the junta. But similar ultimatums have been issued before, and the two sides have always wiggled their way out of such tight spots. In 1996, for example, after joining up with the Wa to defeat the then Shan opium warlord, Khun Sa, and his Mong Tai Army, Rangoon ordered the Wa back to the so-called Special Region 2 on the Sino-Burmese border. But the way the Wa see it, they fought and died for those patches of land along the Thai border. Not long after that, nearly 200,000 villagers along the northern Wa region were relocated to UWSA-controlled areas along the Thai border. With the help of heroin money, temporary outposts became permanent Wa villages.

To begin with, the ceasefire agreements between the junta and the cease-fire groups were never really built on solid ground. The absence of clashes didn't mean peace. It just meant they had agreed to stop shooting at each other for a while. Prior to his ouster in 2004, the then Burmese security chief, General Khin Nyunt, would make annual visits to the Wa stronghold of Panghsang, where UWSA chairman Bao Yuxiang would greet him with a bundle of sugar cane - a symbol of strong friendship. But since Khin Nyunt's fall from grace, a new reality has kicked in. Burmese army commander, Deputy Snr-General Maung Aye, and junta chief Snr-General Than Shwe, have repeatedly made efforts to redefine Rangoon's relationship with the ethnic armies.

The SPDC has, over the years, made overtures to smaller rebel groups and succeeded in getting several of them to surrender their weapons. These outfits would police their own districts, but conventional security would be up to the national army, the Tadmadaw. One such model is Huamuang, a former stronghold of the late Khun Sa, the Shan opium warlord who surrendered in 1997 in exchange for amnesty. In Huamuang, Maha Ja now operates more like a mayor rather than the fearsome warlord he once was. To make certain that he toes the line, Huamuang is surrounded by two Burmese army battalions. But by ousting the Kokang Chinese, the junta effectively shredded the two-decade-old cease-fire agreements. It was also a slap in the face to the Chinese government, which sees these ethnic armies as more or less their proxies even after direct and open support ended in 1989 when the Communist Party of Burma, the umbrella that held these groups together, fell apart. Khin Nyunt then orchestrated a series of cease-fires with these groups.

Two decades later, with the attack on the Kokang, the agreements are more or less in pieces. For the Burmese, there is no turning back. Where the region goes from now is anybody's guess. But for the time being, the Thai authorities are scrambling for any scrap of information - just to get an indication as to what the UWSA, the Chinese government, and the SPDC have up their sleeves. Like Thailand, all these actors are stakeholders.

Whatever happens in this rugged region affects them all - thus the eagerness to know, especially when, in the coming weeks, the Wa leaders and the Burmese junta will get together for what a senior Thai military intelligence officer called the "final showdown". The Burmese are expected to issue another ultimatum to the UWSA this month that basically calls on it to transform into some sort of border patrol police unit under the directive of the Burmese army.

"All are convinced that the Wa will reject this, but no one knows for sure what kind of measures the junta will take up after the rejection," said a Thai officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

For the Thai government, an all-out war between the Wa and the Burmese could mean hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. For the Chinese, watching the Kokang force crumble has not been easy. Their influence in and access to the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, not to mention their access to the Indian Ocean, was put into question.

All are certain that the UWSA, another of China's long-time friends, is next on the Burmese hit list. Taking out the UWSA may create a new set of ground rules for the Burmese and the remaining cease-fire groups. It won't shut the door on China's entry into Burma, however.

It just means that the Chinese will have one less proxy in Burma. Cross-border friendship is common in this part of the world, where opium warlords and drug armies play for keeps. But by eliminating the Kokang, the Burmese are telling their Chinese neighbour that such friendship will no longer come at the expense of national security.

EDITORIAL: The double standard of our attitude towards the people in the deep South

Seeing things from a different perspective

Published on September 18, 2009

While Bangkokians cry foul over the deaths of political protesters, the daily slaughter in the South continues almost unnoticed
About three years ago a Border Patrol police officer was praying in a village mosque in Panare district in Pattani. Moments after he concluded his prayers, a gunman came from behind and shot him at point-blank range in the head.The killer was presumably a member of a shadowy insurgent cell, part of the new generation of Islamic militants who surfaced about eight years ago but were never taken seriously until January 2004, when scores of them raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat province and made off with nearly 400 weapons.

As hard as it may be for many Thai people to swallow this reality, the word on the streets in the Malay-speaking South was that the killing of the police officer was fair. After all, the victim, regardless of his religion, was a member of the government security forces, caught up in a conflict that few understand.

But there was one small detail to this ground rule. As a Muslim, the victim was not supposed to be touched while he was communicating with his creator. This explained why the shooter had to wait until the victim finished his daily prayers.
This is obviously not part of the Geneva Convention, but it is nevertheless a rule observed by this generation of Malay-Muslim insurgents. Fortifying oneself in a mosque and fighting the Thai security forces to the death – as seen in the April 28, 2004 stand-off at the Krue Se mosque – was deemed heroic and a dignified way to die for one’s cause, in this case the struggle for the recognition of the Malay historical homeland, known as Patani.
Fast-forward to June 8 this year at the Al Furqan Mosque in Narathiwat’s Joh I Rong district, in a village called Ai Bayae. Six gunmen with automatic rifles and shotguns fired indiscriminately into a mosque full of people, killing 11 on the pot and injuring 12 others while they were in the middle of evening prayers.
Local residents who understood the unwritten ground rules immediately dismissed the statements from Thai security officials that blamed the incident on the Malay-Muslim insurgents.
They were correct. Almost two months later, police named Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, as one of the suspects. This incident has become a major embarrassment for the security forces because Sutthirak is a former Ranger who later became part of a government-trained village militia organisation. Whether he and his associates ran amok of their own volition when they fired into the mosque, or whether they acted on someone’s order, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the incident has driven one of the biggest wedges between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai state since the Tak Bai massacre in 2004.
When the idea of outsourcing security duties was floated years ago, no one thought about the possible fallout of handing weapons to villagers and motivating them by showing footage of dead Buddhist monks and civilians.
But when it became clear that some of these Buddhist village militias had taken matters into their own hands, no one wanted to take credit for establishing this exclusively Buddhist network. Moreover, no one can even explain the chain of command that these village militias are supposed to fall under, or whether they are supposed to be accountable to anybody at all.
Since January 2004, more than 3,500 people have been killed in the South. Most of the victims have been Malay-Muslims. It is safe to presume that Malay-Muslim insurgents have killed these fellow-Muslims, and the state would have us believe that the Malay insurgents have indeed carried out most if not all of the killings.
For people who buy into the simple and shallow explanation that the men behind the ongoing violence in the deep South are victims of distorted history who have embraced a false teaching of Islam, it is hard to come to terms with the fact that there is a community living inside the borders of this country that challenges the legitimacy of the state. We conveniently place these insurgents in the simple category of “bad guys” so we can sleep well at night and not think about the complexity of the conflict.
Indeed, we demand unconditional loyalty from the Patani Malays without seeing things from their side, much less looking at our own conduct. And because of their unwillingness to assist our security officials, much less embrace our national identity, we become indifferent to their plight and grievances, such as the massacre at Tak Bai and the killings at the Ai Bayae mosque. More than 80 unarmed Malay-Muslims died at the hands of government officials during the Tak Bai demonstration.
And yet, in Bangkok, we are up in arms over the deaths of two anti-Thaksin demonstrators during the October 2008 seizure of Parliament. One was presumably killed by police officers, who fired teargas canisters into the crowd, injuring hundreds of other anti-government demonstrators. A second person died when a car exploded, apparently because one of the bombs he had kept inside the vehicle exploded prematurely.
If we are unable to see the double standard of our attitude towards the people in the deep South, we cannot move forward as a nation, much less reconcile the differences between the Patani Malays and the Thai state.

Conflict flare up in Triangle

SOMETHING IS BREWING in the Burmese corner of the Golden Triangle and it's more than just the chemicals boiling in the clandestine heroin and methamphetamine labs.

DON PATHAN
The Nation
Published on August 31, 2009

Bluffing between the military government and one of the cease-fire groups - the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Chinese Kokang - turned into an armed clash last Thursday. Tens of thousands of residents were sent fleeing to China's Yunnan province, Thai and Chinese officials monitoring the border situation said.

With the help of Burmese government troops, Kokang's stronghold Laogai has now come under a splinter group led by the MNDAA's second in command, Bai Souqian, who broke away with about 200 troops, who accounted for 20 per cent of the outfit's total troop strength.

"It's a classical divide-and-conquer tactic. This is not the first time that the Burmese junta has done this," said a senior Thai Army officer on the border who spoke on condition of anonymity.

In response, MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng has dispatched a small outfit to carry out hit-and-run attacks against a Burmese outpost near the Kokang capital of Laogai and pockets manned by Burmese government troops.

Peng has also reportedly secured the support of other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), Shan State Army-North and Mong La-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), an outfit headed by his son-in-law Lin Mingxian, also known as U Sai Leun. Incidentally, the NDAA, on June 30, celebrated its 20th anniversary of "peace" with the Burmese.

Both Thai and Chinese sources downplayed the so-called military pact between the Kokang and other ethnic armies. Personal connections and common political and security interests aside, mobilising troops to take on the Burmese soldiers is easier said than done.

"It's all about logistics," said the senior Thai Army officer.

"The Burmese have all the holes plugged to prevent any major movement of troops along the border," added a senior officer from Thailand's' Narcotics Control Board.

In spite of the disturbing nature of the development, Chinese officials along the border area say it would not be in the interest of any stakeholder to let the situation escalate out of hand into an all-out war.

Behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts are being taken to minimise the damage before the situation spirals out of control, the Chinese officer said.

But even if the shooting stops, where all sides go from here is anybody's guess. It is undeniable that the two-decades-old cease-fire agreements that were orchestrated by then security chief Lt General Khin Nyunt in 1989 have been effectively shattered.

But for observers of the Golden Triangle, the real aim of this latest development is not to smash the Kokang's hold on Laogai but to send a brutal message to the 20,000-strong UWSA whose members are made up of some very interesting characters. The Wa rank-in-file include opium warlords and head-hunters turned militia. Chinese Red Guards who first entered the areas three decades ago to preach Marxism later discovered that opium was as good as gold, thus the moniker Golden Triangle.

They, too, joined forces with the Wa to seek fortune and glory. Prior to the 1989 cease-fire, Wa foot soldiers formed the largest block within the Communist Party of Burma. And when the CPB broke up in 1989 along ethnic lines, Khin Nyunt quickly neutralised the CPB remnants with a series of cease-fire agreements.

The end of the CPB didn't mean the end of cross-border personal and political ties, however. It means a proxy army has just changed its uniform.

Ever since Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004, the UWSA leadership, as well as other cease-fire groups, have felt that their days were numbered. Almost five years later, their worst fear came true. Their two-decades-old cease-fire has effectively crumbled.

"Picking on the much smaller Kokang reflects the old Thai saying of 'slit the chicken's throat to scare the monkeys'," said a Thai intelligence officer. The monkeys in this case are of course the Wa.

The Burmese junta will continue with its divide-and-conquer tactic, said the Thai Army officer, pointing to the SPDC's relentless drive to split the UWSA. They succeeded in bringing down the Karen National Union in 1994.

The UWSA's geographical foothold in the Golden Triangle resembles that of a dumbbell - with the northern stronghold on the Chinese border, while three regiments are situated near the Thai border. Boa Yuxiang and his brothers control the north while Wei Hsueh-kang and his brothers dominate the south.

The two families can't stand each other but there is an understanding that divided they fall. But that traditional acknowledgement is about to end, said a Chinese official, pointing to the recent mobilising of troops from Wei's Military Region 171 to head to the northern region.

According to the Chinese officer, Wei wants to break away from the UWSA and dispatching troops to Bao's turf is a way of testing the waters. So why can't Wei just announce the breakaway from a distance?

According to Thai and Chinese officials, Wei has been under tremendous pressure from the SPDC to press the UWSA to transform their outfit into a border security guard under the control of the government's army, known as the Tatmadaw. One leverage the SPDC can bring to bear on Wei is that much of his money is invested in Burma while Bao does his banking and money laundering in China.

Since the 1989 cease-fire, Burmese troops were not permitted to enter the territories under the control of these ethnic armies unescorted. In most cases, they had to be disarmed.

Last week's clash was a rude indication that things are about to change. In real terms, this could mean hundreds of thousands of villagers running for their lives to China. Thailand is watching the development closely in case the UWSA's three regiments along its border are drawn into the fight.

For Thailand, it would mean more refugees to look after. For China, it could very well mean the annihilation of an old friendship, namely with the UWSA, whose bonds with the Chinese leadership go all the way back to the days of the communist insurgency.

Loyalty dies hard in the rugged Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps. Some said friendship between the Chinese leaders and their proxies are forever. Apparently, the Burmese junta is saying it's time to part.

Massacre probe must provide answers

If anything, incidents such as the Bang Lang Dam shooting and the Al-Furqan massacre reveal a deep-seated problem of outsourcing security work to local civilians who have little consideration for the political consequences when they decide to fire indiscriminately into a mosque or a teashop full of people.

By DON PATHAN
 The Nation

The authorities are losing the battle to win hearts and minds in Thailand's deep South
Last Friday, the police in Thailand's deep South announced that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Suttirak Kongsuwan, 34, one of the suspects behind the massacre at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district. It was known for some days that a warrant, or a number of warrants, were going to be issued in connection with the massacre at the Al-Furqan mosque, but the fact that the authorities are releasing bits and pieces of information at a time indicates the extremely sensitive nature of this particular case.

The police accuse Suttirak of being one of the gunmen who fired machineguns into the mosque on the evening of June 8, killing 11 people and injuring more than ten others. The 12th victim has died in hospital. The victims were in the middle of evening prayers.

Commissioner of the Southern Border Provinces Police Bureau, Pol Lt General Peera Poompichet, said more warrants would be issued soon and added that authorities are committed to ensuring justice for all the victims in this case. Narathiwat police chief Pol Maj General Surachai Suebsuk said the number of suspects should be about ten in all.

Surachai said the gunmen at the Al-Furqan mosque might have used the same weapons that were fired on a group of Muslim villagers at a teashop in Rangae district on November 17 last year. Besides linking him to various attacks, the police are suggesting Suttirak may have been involved in drugs and other illicit business activities.

Needless to say, the massacre has driven a bigger wedge between the Malay-speaking community and the Thai State. This has been aggravated by the sloppy manner in which the case has been handled. From the start, no one believed the massacre at Al-Furqan was the work of Islamic insurgents, as suggested by top government officials.

What turned off the local community was the knee-jerk reaction from both Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Army chief General Anupong Paochinda that the authorities were not involved, when no investigation whatsoever had been conducted.

But as time passed and pressure mounted on the government to come clean, it was discovered the gunmen were Thai Buddhists. Some of the suspects were members of the Aor Ror Bor, or the Township Defence Volunteers, a network of government-trained militia organisations whose members are exclusively Buddhists.

The strategy now, it seems, is for the authorities to distance themselves as much as possible from these suspects, as more names will be made public in the coming days.

Like the April 2007 shooting incident in Narathiwat's Bang Lang Dam district - when similar, government-trained village militias fired into a group of Muslim funeral-goers, killing four and injuring six others - the Army initially tried to blame the mosque incident on insurgents. And when that didn't work, they tried to justify the attack by saying the Malay Muslims were armed with sticks and stones. Never mind that a unit of Border Patrol Police was just metres away from the scene of the 2007 clash, which started off with verbal abuse but ended in the death of the funeral mourners.

Authorities have not taken any action against the suspects and the incidents, like other similar cases, will probably fade from people's memories. They say that time heals all wounds. But for the Malays in the deep South, the opposite appears to be the truth. This is because such injustices are fed into the historical narrative that questions the legitimacy of the Thai State in the Malay historical homeland. In other words, it helps them justify the armed insurgency against the state and reinforces the notion that the deep South is an occupied territory.

If anything, incidents such as the Bang Lang Dam shooting and the Al-Furqan massacre reveal a deep-seated problem of outsourcing security work to local civilians who have little consideration for the political consequences when they decide to fire indiscriminately into a mosque or a teashop full of people. It also raises the question of training and motivation techniques for the village militias - like showing video footage of innocent Buddhist civilians and monks, to motivate them to sign up for jobs as village scouts or defence volunteers. This is the kind of thing that international terrorists do in the course of indoctrination and recruitment processes.

Senior security officials in the South say that relations between the authorities and the local Malay Muslim residents are at a low point, and any effort to get things back on track will depend heavily on how the authorities handle the investigation into the massacre at the mosque.

SPECIAL REPORT: MINORITY CONFLICTS – TOWARDS AN ASEM FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

6th ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE
10-12 June 2009 

The 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable “Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management “ was held on 10-12 June 2009 in Derry and Letterkenny in both jurisdictions in Ireland. It was the sixth in a series of meetings on conflict management, bringing together participants from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) member countries.

Go to: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07198.pdf

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE 6TH ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE

By Don Pathan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Building on the findings from the previous gatherings, the recently concluded 6th Asia-Europe Round Table (AER) examined different types of minority conflicts with a particular focus on “frozen conflicts” in which cessation of open hostility offers a chance for the regional and international community to explore possible solutions and frameworks for transforming the conflict into sustainable peace. While the 5th AER explored the various potential pitfalls of managing a peace process, the 6th AER facilitated discussion of relevant case studies to illustrate how conflicts developed and provided different perspectives on various possible solutions or framework for managing conflict. While keeping in mind that each conflict is unique in its character because of different underlying causes, contours and trajectories, participants at the 6th AER succeeded in teasing out some common threads on why these conflicts evolved along certain patterns and how they might be addressed. More than 40 Asian and European experts in conflict and peace studies and research, academics, specialised journalists, human rights activists, practitioners, and diplomats came together in Derry and Letterkenny in both jurisdictions in Ireland from June 10-12, 2009 to work towards a framework for conflict management. The following is a summary of some of the recommendations that the experts came up with. 

For full report: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07198.pdf (see page 11 for the Special Report by Don Pathan)

Special Report of the 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable                                                                         page 11 

Mr. Don Pathan
Journalist
The Nation

Executive Summary: Key Messages and Recommendations
Report on Proceedings

1. Setting the Scene: An Informal Briefing on Northern Ireland page 13
2. Two Case Studies: Asia and Europe page 14
3. “When, Who and How” of Conflict Management: The Success of ASEAN-EU Aceh Monitoring Mission page 20
4. Cafe Conversations and Open Space page 21
5. Dialogue with Local Community Leaders page 22