Seeing things from a different perspective
Published on September 18, 2009
While Bangkokians cry foul over the deaths of political protesters, the daily slaughter in the South continues almost unnoticed
About three years ago a Border Patrol police officer was praying in a village mosque in Panare district in Pattani. Moments after he concluded his prayers, a gunman came from behind and shot him at point-blank range in the head.The killer was presumably a member of a shadowy insurgent cell, part of the new generation of Islamic militants who surfaced about eight years ago but were never taken seriously until January 2004, when scores of them raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat province and made off with nearly 400 weapons.
As hard as it may be for many Thai people to swallow this reality, the word on the streets in the Malay-speaking South was that the killing of the police officer was fair. After all, the victim, regardless of his religion, was a member of the government security forces, caught up in a conflict that few understand.
But there was one small detail to this ground rule. As a Muslim, the victim was not supposed to be touched while he was communicating with his creator. This explained why the shooter had to wait until the victim finished his daily prayers.
This is obviously not part of the Geneva Convention, but it is nevertheless a rule observed by this generation of Malay-Muslim insurgents. Fortifying oneself in a mosque and fighting the Thai security forces to the death – as seen in the April 28, 2004 stand-off at the Krue Se mosque – was deemed heroic and a dignified way to die for one’s cause, in this case the struggle for the recognition of the Malay historical homeland, known as Patani.
Fast-forward to June 8 this year at the Al Furqan Mosque in Narathiwat’s Joh I Rong district, in a village called Ai Bayae. Six gunmen with automatic rifles and shotguns fired indiscriminately into a mosque full of people, killing 11 on the pot and injuring 12 others while they were in the middle of evening prayers.
Local residents who understood the unwritten ground rules immediately dismissed the statements from Thai security officials that blamed the incident on the Malay-Muslim insurgents.
They were correct. Almost two months later, police named Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, as one of the suspects. This incident has become a major embarrassment for the security forces because Sutthirak is a former Ranger who later became part of a government-trained village militia organisation. Whether he and his associates ran amok of their own volition when they fired into the mosque, or whether they acted on someone’s order, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the incident has driven one of the biggest wedges between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai state since the Tak Bai massacre in 2004.
When the idea of outsourcing security duties was floated years ago, no one thought about the possible fallout of handing weapons to villagers and motivating them by showing footage of dead Buddhist monks and civilians.
But when it became clear that some of these Buddhist village militias had taken matters into their own hands, no one wanted to take credit for establishing this exclusively Buddhist network. Moreover, no one can even explain the chain of command that these village militias are supposed to fall under, or whether they are supposed to be accountable to anybody at all.
Since January 2004, more than 3,500 people have been killed in the South. Most of the victims have been Malay-Muslims. It is safe to presume that Malay-Muslim insurgents have killed these fellow-Muslims, and the state would have us believe that the Malay insurgents have indeed carried out most if not all of the killings.
For people who buy into the simple and shallow explanation that the men behind the ongoing violence in the deep South are victims of distorted history who have embraced a false teaching of Islam, it is hard to come to terms with the fact that there is a community living inside the borders of this country that challenges the legitimacy of the state. We conveniently place these insurgents in the simple category of “bad guys” so we can sleep well at night and not think about the complexity of the conflict.
Indeed, we demand unconditional loyalty from the Patani Malays without seeing things from their side, much less looking at our own conduct. And because of their unwillingness to assist our security officials, much less embrace our national identity, we become indifferent to their plight and grievances, such as the massacre at Tak Bai and the killings at the Ai Bayae mosque. More than 80 unarmed Malay-Muslims died at the hands of government officials during the Tak Bai demonstration.
And yet, in Bangkok, we are up in arms over the deaths of two anti-Thaksin demonstrators during the October 2008 seizure of Parliament. One was presumably killed by police officers, who fired teargas canisters into the crowd, injuring hundreds of other anti-government demonstrators. A second person died when a car exploded, apparently because one of the bombs he had kept inside the vehicle exploded prematurely.
If we are unable to see the double standard of our attitude towards the people in the deep South, we cannot move forward as a nation, much less reconcile the differences between the Patani Malays and the Thai state.
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Friday, 18 September 2009
Monday, 31 August 2009
Conflict flare up in Triangle
SOMETHING IS BREWING in the Burmese corner of the Golden Triangle and it's more than just the chemicals boiling in the clandestine heroin and methamphetamine labs.
DON PATHAN
The Nation
Published on August 31, 2009
Bluffing between the military government and one of the cease-fire groups - the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Chinese Kokang - turned into an armed clash last Thursday. Tens of thousands of residents were sent fleeing to China's Yunnan province, Thai and Chinese officials monitoring the border situation said.
With the help of Burmese government troops, Kokang's stronghold Laogai has now come under a splinter group led by the MNDAA's second in command, Bai Souqian, who broke away with about 200 troops, who accounted for 20 per cent of the outfit's total troop strength.
"It's a classical divide-and-conquer tactic. This is not the first time that the Burmese junta has done this," said a senior Thai Army officer on the border who spoke on condition of anonymity.
In response, MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng has dispatched a small outfit to carry out hit-and-run attacks against a Burmese outpost near the Kokang capital of Laogai and pockets manned by Burmese government troops.
Peng has also reportedly secured the support of other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), Shan State Army-North and Mong La-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), an outfit headed by his son-in-law Lin Mingxian, also known as U Sai Leun. Incidentally, the NDAA, on June 30, celebrated its 20th anniversary of "peace" with the Burmese.
Both Thai and Chinese sources downplayed the so-called military pact between the Kokang and other ethnic armies. Personal connections and common political and security interests aside, mobilising troops to take on the Burmese soldiers is easier said than done.
"It's all about logistics," said the senior Thai Army officer.
"The Burmese have all the holes plugged to prevent any major movement of troops along the border," added a senior officer from Thailand's' Narcotics Control Board.
In spite of the disturbing nature of the development, Chinese officials along the border area say it would not be in the interest of any stakeholder to let the situation escalate out of hand into an all-out war.
Behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts are being taken to minimise the damage before the situation spirals out of control, the Chinese officer said.
But even if the shooting stops, where all sides go from here is anybody's guess. It is undeniable that the two-decades-old cease-fire agreements that were orchestrated by then security chief Lt General Khin Nyunt in 1989 have been effectively shattered.
But for observers of the Golden Triangle, the real aim of this latest development is not to smash the Kokang's hold on Laogai but to send a brutal message to the 20,000-strong UWSA whose members are made up of some very interesting characters. The Wa rank-in-file include opium warlords and head-hunters turned militia. Chinese Red Guards who first entered the areas three decades ago to preach Marxism later discovered that opium was as good as gold, thus the moniker Golden Triangle.
They, too, joined forces with the Wa to seek fortune and glory. Prior to the 1989 cease-fire, Wa foot soldiers formed the largest block within the Communist Party of Burma. And when the CPB broke up in 1989 along ethnic lines, Khin Nyunt quickly neutralised the CPB remnants with a series of cease-fire agreements.
The end of the CPB didn't mean the end of cross-border personal and political ties, however. It means a proxy army has just changed its uniform.
Ever since Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004, the UWSA leadership, as well as other cease-fire groups, have felt that their days were numbered. Almost five years later, their worst fear came true. Their two-decades-old cease-fire has effectively crumbled.
"Picking on the much smaller Kokang reflects the old Thai saying of 'slit the chicken's throat to scare the monkeys'," said a Thai intelligence officer. The monkeys in this case are of course the Wa.
The Burmese junta will continue with its divide-and-conquer tactic, said the Thai Army officer, pointing to the SPDC's relentless drive to split the UWSA. They succeeded in bringing down the Karen National Union in 1994.
The UWSA's geographical foothold in the Golden Triangle resembles that of a dumbbell - with the northern stronghold on the Chinese border, while three regiments are situated near the Thai border. Boa Yuxiang and his brothers control the north while Wei Hsueh-kang and his brothers dominate the south.
The two families can't stand each other but there is an understanding that divided they fall. But that traditional acknowledgement is about to end, said a Chinese official, pointing to the recent mobilising of troops from Wei's Military Region 171 to head to the northern region.
According to the Chinese officer, Wei wants to break away from the UWSA and dispatching troops to Bao's turf is a way of testing the waters. So why can't Wei just announce the breakaway from a distance?
According to Thai and Chinese officials, Wei has been under tremendous pressure from the SPDC to press the UWSA to transform their outfit into a border security guard under the control of the government's army, known as the Tatmadaw. One leverage the SPDC can bring to bear on Wei is that much of his money is invested in Burma while Bao does his banking and money laundering in China.
Since the 1989 cease-fire, Burmese troops were not permitted to enter the territories under the control of these ethnic armies unescorted. In most cases, they had to be disarmed.
Last week's clash was a rude indication that things are about to change. In real terms, this could mean hundreds of thousands of villagers running for their lives to China. Thailand is watching the development closely in case the UWSA's three regiments along its border are drawn into the fight.
For Thailand, it would mean more refugees to look after. For China, it could very well mean the annihilation of an old friendship, namely with the UWSA, whose bonds with the Chinese leadership go all the way back to the days of the communist insurgency.
Loyalty dies hard in the rugged Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps. Some said friendship between the Chinese leaders and their proxies are forever. Apparently, the Burmese junta is saying it's time to part.
DON PATHAN
The Nation
Published on August 31, 2009
Bluffing between the military government and one of the cease-fire groups - the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Chinese Kokang - turned into an armed clash last Thursday. Tens of thousands of residents were sent fleeing to China's Yunnan province, Thai and Chinese officials monitoring the border situation said.
With the help of Burmese government troops, Kokang's stronghold Laogai has now come under a splinter group led by the MNDAA's second in command, Bai Souqian, who broke away with about 200 troops, who accounted for 20 per cent of the outfit's total troop strength.
"It's a classical divide-and-conquer tactic. This is not the first time that the Burmese junta has done this," said a senior Thai Army officer on the border who spoke on condition of anonymity.
In response, MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng has dispatched a small outfit to carry out hit-and-run attacks against a Burmese outpost near the Kokang capital of Laogai and pockets manned by Burmese government troops.
Peng has also reportedly secured the support of other cease-fire groups, namely the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), Shan State Army-North and Mong La-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), an outfit headed by his son-in-law Lin Mingxian, also known as U Sai Leun. Incidentally, the NDAA, on June 30, celebrated its 20th anniversary of "peace" with the Burmese.
Both Thai and Chinese sources downplayed the so-called military pact between the Kokang and other ethnic armies. Personal connections and common political and security interests aside, mobilising troops to take on the Burmese soldiers is easier said than done.
"It's all about logistics," said the senior Thai Army officer.
"The Burmese have all the holes plugged to prevent any major movement of troops along the border," added a senior officer from Thailand's' Narcotics Control Board.
In spite of the disturbing nature of the development, Chinese officials along the border area say it would not be in the interest of any stakeholder to let the situation escalate out of hand into an all-out war.
Behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts are being taken to minimise the damage before the situation spirals out of control, the Chinese officer said.
But even if the shooting stops, where all sides go from here is anybody's guess. It is undeniable that the two-decades-old cease-fire agreements that were orchestrated by then security chief Lt General Khin Nyunt in 1989 have been effectively shattered.
But for observers of the Golden Triangle, the real aim of this latest development is not to smash the Kokang's hold on Laogai but to send a brutal message to the 20,000-strong UWSA whose members are made up of some very interesting characters. The Wa rank-in-file include opium warlords and head-hunters turned militia. Chinese Red Guards who first entered the areas three decades ago to preach Marxism later discovered that opium was as good as gold, thus the moniker Golden Triangle.
They, too, joined forces with the Wa to seek fortune and glory. Prior to the 1989 cease-fire, Wa foot soldiers formed the largest block within the Communist Party of Burma. And when the CPB broke up in 1989 along ethnic lines, Khin Nyunt quickly neutralised the CPB remnants with a series of cease-fire agreements.
The end of the CPB didn't mean the end of cross-border personal and political ties, however. It means a proxy army has just changed its uniform.
Ever since Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004, the UWSA leadership, as well as other cease-fire groups, have felt that their days were numbered. Almost five years later, their worst fear came true. Their two-decades-old cease-fire has effectively crumbled.
"Picking on the much smaller Kokang reflects the old Thai saying of 'slit the chicken's throat to scare the monkeys'," said a Thai intelligence officer. The monkeys in this case are of course the Wa.
The Burmese junta will continue with its divide-and-conquer tactic, said the Thai Army officer, pointing to the SPDC's relentless drive to split the UWSA. They succeeded in bringing down the Karen National Union in 1994.
The UWSA's geographical foothold in the Golden Triangle resembles that of a dumbbell - with the northern stronghold on the Chinese border, while three regiments are situated near the Thai border. Boa Yuxiang and his brothers control the north while Wei Hsueh-kang and his brothers dominate the south.
The two families can't stand each other but there is an understanding that divided they fall. But that traditional acknowledgement is about to end, said a Chinese official, pointing to the recent mobilising of troops from Wei's Military Region 171 to head to the northern region.
According to the Chinese officer, Wei wants to break away from the UWSA and dispatching troops to Bao's turf is a way of testing the waters. So why can't Wei just announce the breakaway from a distance?
According to Thai and Chinese officials, Wei has been under tremendous pressure from the SPDC to press the UWSA to transform their outfit into a border security guard under the control of the government's army, known as the Tatmadaw. One leverage the SPDC can bring to bear on Wei is that much of his money is invested in Burma while Bao does his banking and money laundering in China.
Since the 1989 cease-fire, Burmese troops were not permitted to enter the territories under the control of these ethnic armies unescorted. In most cases, they had to be disarmed.
Last week's clash was a rude indication that things are about to change. In real terms, this could mean hundreds of thousands of villagers running for their lives to China. Thailand is watching the development closely in case the UWSA's three regiments along its border are drawn into the fight.
For Thailand, it would mean more refugees to look after. For China, it could very well mean the annihilation of an old friendship, namely with the UWSA, whose bonds with the Chinese leadership go all the way back to the days of the communist insurgency.
Loyalty dies hard in the rugged Golden Triangle where warlords play for keeps. Some said friendship between the Chinese leaders and their proxies are forever. Apparently, the Burmese junta is saying it's time to part.
Thursday, 13 August 2009
Massacre probe must provide answers
If anything, incidents such as the Bang Lang Dam shooting and the Al-Furqan massacre reveal a deep-seated problem of outsourcing security work to local civilians who have little consideration for the political consequences when they decide to fire indiscriminately into a mosque or a teashop full of people.
By DON PATHANThe Nation
The authorities are losing the battle to win hearts and minds in Thailand's deep South
Last Friday, the police in Thailand's deep South announced that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Suttirak Kongsuwan, 34, one of the suspects behind the massacre at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district. It was known for some days that a warrant, or a number of warrants, were going to be issued in connection with the massacre at the Al-Furqan mosque, but the fact that the authorities are releasing bits and pieces of information at a time indicates the extremely sensitive nature of this particular case.
The police accuse Suttirak of being one of the gunmen who fired machineguns into the mosque on the evening of June 8, killing 11 people and injuring more than ten others. The 12th victim has died in hospital. The victims were in the middle of evening prayers.
Commissioner of the Southern Border Provinces Police Bureau, Pol Lt General Peera Poompichet, said more warrants would be issued soon and added that authorities are committed to ensuring justice for all the victims in this case. Narathiwat police chief Pol Maj General Surachai Suebsuk said the number of suspects should be about ten in all.
Surachai said the gunmen at the Al-Furqan mosque might have used the same weapons that were fired on a group of Muslim villagers at a teashop in Rangae district on November 17 last year. Besides linking him to various attacks, the police are suggesting Suttirak may have been involved in drugs and other illicit business activities.
Needless to say, the massacre has driven a bigger wedge between the Malay-speaking community and the Thai State. This has been aggravated by the sloppy manner in which the case has been handled. From the start, no one believed the massacre at Al-Furqan was the work of Islamic insurgents, as suggested by top government officials.
What turned off the local community was the knee-jerk reaction from both Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Army chief General Anupong Paochinda that the authorities were not involved, when no investigation whatsoever had been conducted.
But as time passed and pressure mounted on the government to come clean, it was discovered the gunmen were Thai Buddhists. Some of the suspects were members of the Aor Ror Bor, or the Township Defence Volunteers, a network of government-trained militia organisations whose members are exclusively Buddhists.
The strategy now, it seems, is for the authorities to distance themselves as much as possible from these suspects, as more names will be made public in the coming days.
Like the April 2007 shooting incident in Narathiwat's Bang Lang Dam district - when similar, government-trained village militias fired into a group of Muslim funeral-goers, killing four and injuring six others - the Army initially tried to blame the mosque incident on insurgents. And when that didn't work, they tried to justify the attack by saying the Malay Muslims were armed with sticks and stones. Never mind that a unit of Border Patrol Police was just metres away from the scene of the 2007 clash, which started off with verbal abuse but ended in the death of the funeral mourners.
Authorities have not taken any action against the suspects and the incidents, like other similar cases, will probably fade from people's memories. They say that time heals all wounds. But for the Malays in the deep South, the opposite appears to be the truth. This is because such injustices are fed into the historical narrative that questions the legitimacy of the Thai State in the Malay historical homeland. In other words, it helps them justify the armed insurgency against the state and reinforces the notion that the deep South is an occupied territory.
If anything, incidents such as the Bang Lang Dam shooting and the Al-Furqan massacre reveal a deep-seated problem of outsourcing security work to local civilians who have little consideration for the political consequences when they decide to fire indiscriminately into a mosque or a teashop full of people. It also raises the question of training and motivation techniques for the village militias - like showing video footage of innocent Buddhist civilians and monks, to motivate them to sign up for jobs as village scouts or defence volunteers. This is the kind of thing that international terrorists do in the course of indoctrination and recruitment processes.
Senior security officials in the South say that relations between the authorities and the local Malay Muslim residents are at a low point, and any effort to get things back on track will depend heavily on how the authorities handle the investigation into the massacre at the mosque.
Wednesday, 1 July 2009
SPECIAL REPORT: MINORITY CONFLICTS – TOWARDS AN ASEM FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
6th ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE
10-12 June 2009
The 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable “Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management “ was held on 10-12 June 2009 in Derry and Letterkenny in both jurisdictions in Ireland. It was the sixth in a series of meetings on conflict management, bringing together participants from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) member countries.
Go to: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07198.pdf
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE 6TH ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE
By Don Pathan
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Building on the findings from the previous gatherings, the recently concluded 6th Asia-Europe Round Table (AER) examined different types of minority conflicts with a particular focus on “frozen conflicts” in which cessation of open hostility offers a chance for the regional and international community to explore possible solutions and frameworks for transforming the conflict into sustainable peace. While the 5th AER explored the various potential pitfalls of managing a peace process, the 6th AER facilitated discussion of relevant case studies to illustrate how conflicts developed and provided different perspectives on various possible solutions or framework for managing conflict. While keeping in mind that each conflict is unique in its character because of different underlying causes, contours and trajectories, participants at the 6th AER succeeded in teasing out some common threads on why these conflicts evolved along certain patterns and how they might be addressed. More than 40 Asian and European experts in conflict and peace studies and research, academics, specialised journalists, human rights activists, practitioners, and diplomats came together in Derry and Letterkenny in both jurisdictions in Ireland from June 10-12, 2009 to work towards a framework for conflict management. The following is a summary of some of the recommendations that the experts came up with.
For full report: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/07198.pdf (see page 11 for the Special Report by Don Pathan)
Special Report of the 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable page 11
Mr. Don Pathan
Journalist
The Nation
Executive Summary: Key Messages and Recommendations
Report on Proceedings
1. Setting the Scene: An Informal Briefing on Northern Ireland page 13
2. Two Case Studies: Asia and Europe page 14
3. “When, Who and How” of Conflict Management:
The Success of ASEAN-EU Aceh Monitoring Mission page 20
4. Cafe Conversations and Open Space page 21
5. Dialogue with Local Community Leaders page 22
Wednesday, 17 June 2009
Anupong's remarks may add fuel to the fire in the South
By DON PATHAN
THE NATION
Published on June 17, 2009
For a man who is known for choosing his words carefully, Army chief General Anupong Paochinda has over this past week sounded more like a buck private who couldn't bribe his way out of an army draft.
Knowing that tension would be high in the aftermath of the massacre of 11 Muslims attending an evening prayer at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district, Anupong concluded prematurely that it was the work of insurgents.
He, along with deputy premier Suthep Thaugsuban, the so-called security tzar, was dispatched to the deep South immediately after the massacre at the Al Pukon mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district.
Instead of buying more time and looking for ways to ease the tension, the two security bigwigs made things worse. They prematurely dismissed any suggestion that the attackers could be anybody else other than Malay Muslim insurgents.
For local Muslims, their position drove in a bigger wedge between their community and the rest of the country. Few thought the mistrust could go any lower after a controversial court ruling on May 29 that cleared security officials of the Tak Bai massacre of 2004.
Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch noted a worrying trend over the past five years that has seen rogue elements in the volunteer and regular security units attacking mosque, Islamic schools and teashops in retaliation for the killings of Buddhist officials and civilians.
"This is a worrying trend that has fuelled communal tension and worsened the conflict in the South over the past five years," Sunai said. "The widespread suspicion in the Muslim community after the Al Pukon mosque massacre shows how the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable has led to deep distrust of the government," Sunai added.
While it may have crossed their minds that the massacre could have been the work of some rogue outfit, retaliating for a week-long mayhem that included brutal killings, beheadings, car bombs and an attack on a passenger bus full of Buddhists, Suthep and Anupong just did not want to confront other possibilities. Embracing old habits could be comforting.
If anything, the position taken by the two men became a much-needed comfort zone for officials who did not want to debate why a group of Malay Muslim insurgents would want to indiscriminately gun down people from an area where they probably received the most support.
In spite of a track record of abuses and extra-judicial killings, it is still unthinkable for the country's top political leaders to come to terms with the notion that one of their own may have committed such a thing.
Some of the security spin-doctors reiterated this half-baked but long-standing explanation that blamed the insurgents for all the atrocities because they want to raise the profile of the issue and draw the attention of the international community, such as the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Killing their own people was supposed to be the best way of attracting international sympathy.
In Bangkok, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva saw the deep South drifting further away from the kingdom, and tried to do some damage control.
He warned against reaching premature conclusions and added that "an attack on a mosque is unusual and not the style of separatists".
For the militants, it was payback time. Assoc Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani said the clock could be turned back to the scale of the violence in 2007 when collateral damage was also high - 164 public schools came under arson attack, a big jump from 43 in 2006.
Naturally, the security agencies take credit for the significant drop in 2008 that saw only 14 public schools coming under arson attacks.
But local residents say the real reason has more to do with the fact that the insurgents are losing support at the grass-roots level. In spite of the historical mistrust and dislike of state institutions, such as public school, essentially, a Siamese education for their children is better than no education at all, they said.
In spite of the unprecedented nature of these past two weeks, few want to make the connection between the spike in violence and the court verdict on May 29 that cleared soldiers, police and paramilitary rangers involved in dealing with the Tak Bai protest. The incident ended in the death of 85 Malay Muslims protesters, 78 from suffocation when they were stacked one on top of another, up to four, on the back of military trucks.
What complicated the situation further was that local media only picked up on Anupong's statement about not negotiating with the separatists. Few noted that the statement contradicted Abhisit who did not rule out the idea of talking to separatists.
What Abhisit said was that at the policy level the government does not have such a position but added that at the operational level a channel of communication with separatist groups is already in place.
But keeping the dialogue at the operation level may not be enough as security and intelligence personnel don't have the political will to go further than collect data and go after insurgents and kill them.
A number of professional mediators, including retired military top brass familiar with insurgency in the deep South and neighbouring countries, have been knocking on Abhisit's door asking him for permission to do the mediating job.
So far, Abhisit has not given anybody the much-sought-after mandate. Given the uncertain nature of the current political situation, as well as the fact that such a move will be costly in political terms, it may be a very long time before Abhisit puts all his eggs in anybody's basket.
THE NATION
Published on June 17, 2009
For a man who is known for choosing his words carefully, Army chief General Anupong Paochinda has over this past week sounded more like a buck private who couldn't bribe his way out of an army draft.
Knowing that tension would be high in the aftermath of the massacre of 11 Muslims attending an evening prayer at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district, Anupong concluded prematurely that it was the work of insurgents.
He, along with deputy premier Suthep Thaugsuban, the so-called security tzar, was dispatched to the deep South immediately after the massacre at the Al Pukon mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district.
Instead of buying more time and looking for ways to ease the tension, the two security bigwigs made things worse. They prematurely dismissed any suggestion that the attackers could be anybody else other than Malay Muslim insurgents.
For local Muslims, their position drove in a bigger wedge between their community and the rest of the country. Few thought the mistrust could go any lower after a controversial court ruling on May 29 that cleared security officials of the Tak Bai massacre of 2004.
Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch noted a worrying trend over the past five years that has seen rogue elements in the volunteer and regular security units attacking mosque, Islamic schools and teashops in retaliation for the killings of Buddhist officials and civilians.
"This is a worrying trend that has fuelled communal tension and worsened the conflict in the South over the past five years," Sunai said. "The widespread suspicion in the Muslim community after the Al Pukon mosque massacre shows how the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable has led to deep distrust of the government," Sunai added.
While it may have crossed their minds that the massacre could have been the work of some rogue outfit, retaliating for a week-long mayhem that included brutal killings, beheadings, car bombs and an attack on a passenger bus full of Buddhists, Suthep and Anupong just did not want to confront other possibilities. Embracing old habits could be comforting.
If anything, the position taken by the two men became a much-needed comfort zone for officials who did not want to debate why a group of Malay Muslim insurgents would want to indiscriminately gun down people from an area where they probably received the most support.
In spite of a track record of abuses and extra-judicial killings, it is still unthinkable for the country's top political leaders to come to terms with the notion that one of their own may have committed such a thing.
Some of the security spin-doctors reiterated this half-baked but long-standing explanation that blamed the insurgents for all the atrocities because they want to raise the profile of the issue and draw the attention of the international community, such as the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Killing their own people was supposed to be the best way of attracting international sympathy.
In Bangkok, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva saw the deep South drifting further away from the kingdom, and tried to do some damage control.
He warned against reaching premature conclusions and added that "an attack on a mosque is unusual and not the style of separatists".
For the militants, it was payback time. Assoc Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani said the clock could be turned back to the scale of the violence in 2007 when collateral damage was also high - 164 public schools came under arson attack, a big jump from 43 in 2006.
Naturally, the security agencies take credit for the significant drop in 2008 that saw only 14 public schools coming under arson attacks.
But local residents say the real reason has more to do with the fact that the insurgents are losing support at the grass-roots level. In spite of the historical mistrust and dislike of state institutions, such as public school, essentially, a Siamese education for their children is better than no education at all, they said.
In spite of the unprecedented nature of these past two weeks, few want to make the connection between the spike in violence and the court verdict on May 29 that cleared soldiers, police and paramilitary rangers involved in dealing with the Tak Bai protest. The incident ended in the death of 85 Malay Muslims protesters, 78 from suffocation when they were stacked one on top of another, up to four, on the back of military trucks.
What complicated the situation further was that local media only picked up on Anupong's statement about not negotiating with the separatists. Few noted that the statement contradicted Abhisit who did not rule out the idea of talking to separatists.
What Abhisit said was that at the policy level the government does not have such a position but added that at the operational level a channel of communication with separatist groups is already in place.
But keeping the dialogue at the operation level may not be enough as security and intelligence personnel don't have the political will to go further than collect data and go after insurgents and kill them.
A number of professional mediators, including retired military top brass familiar with insurgency in the deep South and neighbouring countries, have been knocking on Abhisit's door asking him for permission to do the mediating job.
So far, Abhisit has not given anybody the much-sought-after mandate. Given the uncertain nature of the current political situation, as well as the fact that such a move will be costly in political terms, it may be a very long time before Abhisit puts all his eggs in anybody's basket.
Anupong's remarks may add fuel to the fire in the South
By DON PATHAN
For a man who is known for choosing his words carefully, Army chief General Anupong Paochinda has over this past week sounded more like a buck private who couldn't bribe his way out of an army draft.
Knowing that tension would be high in the aftermath of the massacre of 11 Muslims attending an evening prayer at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district, Anupong concluded prematurely that it was the work of insurgents.
He, along with deputy premier Suthep Thaugsuban, the so-called security tzar, was dispatched to the deep South immediately after the massacre at the Al Pukon mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district.
Instead of buying more time and looking for ways to ease the tension, the two security bigwigs made things worse. They prematurely dismissed any suggestion that the attackers could be anybody else other than Malay Muslim insurgents.
For local Muslims, their position drove in a bigger wedge between their community and the rest of the country. Few thought the mistrust could go any lower after a controversial court ruling on May 29 that cleared security officials of the Tak Bai massacre of 2004.
Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch noted a worrying trend over the past five years that has seen rogue elements in the volunteer and regular security units attacking mosque, Islamic schools and teashops in retaliation for the killings of Buddhist officials and civilians.
"This is a worrying trend that has fuelled communal tension and worsened the conflict in the South over the past five years," Sunai said. "The widespread suspicion in the Muslim community after the Al Pukon mosque massacre shows how the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable has led to deep distrust of the government," Sunai added.
While it may have crossed their minds that the massacre could have been the work of some rogue outfit, retaliating for a week-long mayhem that included brutal killings, beheadings, car bombs and an attack on a passenger bus full of Buddhists, Suthep and Anupong just did not want to confront other possibilities. Embracing old habits could be comforting.
If anything, the position taken by the two men became a much-needed comfort zone for officials who did not want to debate why a group of Malay Muslim insurgents would want to indiscriminately gun down people from an area where they probably received the most support.
In spite of a track record of abuses and extra-judicial killings, it is still unthinkable for the country's top political leaders to come to terms with the notion that one of their own may have committed such a thing.
Some of the security spin-doctors reiterated this half-baked but long-standing explanation that blamed the insurgents for all the atrocities because they want to raise the profile of the issue and draw the attention of the international community, such as the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Killing their own people was supposed to be the best way of attracting international sympathy.
In Bangkok, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva saw the deep South drifting further away from the kingdom, and tried to do some damage control.
He warned against reaching premature conclusions and added that "an attack on a mosque is unusual and not the style of separatists".
For the militants, it was payback time. Assoc Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani said the clock could be turned back to the scale of the violence in 2007 when collateral damage was also high - 164 public schools came under arson attack, a big jump from 43 in 2006.
Naturally, the security agencies take credit for the significant drop in 2008 that saw only 14 public schools coming under arson attacks.
But local residents say the real reason has more to do with the fact that the insurgents are losing support at the grass-roots level. In spite of the historical mistrust and dislike of state institutions, such as public school, essentially, a Siamese education for their children is better than no education at all, they said.
In spite of the unprecedented nature of these past two weeks, few want to make the connection between the spike in violence and the court verdict on May 29 that cleared soldiers, police and paramilitary rangers involved in dealing with the Tak Bai protest. The incident ended in the death of 85 Malay Muslims protesters, 78 from suffocation when they were stacked one on top of another, up to four, on the back of military trucks.
What complicated the situation further was that local media only picked up on Anupong's statement about not negotiating with the separatists. Few noted that the statement contradicted Abhisit who did not rule out the idea of talking to separatists.
What Abhisit said was that at the policy level the government does not have such a position but added that at the operational level a channel of communication with separatist groups is already in place.
But keeping the dialogue at the operation level may not be enough as security and intelligence personnel don't have the political will to go further than collect data and go after insurgents and kill them.
A number of professional mediators, including retired military top brass familiar with insurgency in the deep South and neighbouring countries, have been knocking on Abhisit's door asking him for permission to do the mediating job.
So far, Abhisit has not given anybody the much-sought-after mandate. Given the uncertain nature of the current political situation, as well as the fact that such a move will be costly in political terms, it may be a very long time before Abhisit puts all his eggs in anybody's basket.
For a man who is known for choosing his words carefully, Army chief General Anupong Paochinda has over this past week sounded more like a buck private who couldn't bribe his way out of an army draft.
Knowing that tension would be high in the aftermath of the massacre of 11 Muslims attending an evening prayer at a village mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district, Anupong concluded prematurely that it was the work of insurgents.
He, along with deputy premier Suthep Thaugsuban, the so-called security tzar, was dispatched to the deep South immediately after the massacre at the Al Pukon mosque in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong district.
Instead of buying more time and looking for ways to ease the tension, the two security bigwigs made things worse. They prematurely dismissed any suggestion that the attackers could be anybody else other than Malay Muslim insurgents.
For local Muslims, their position drove in a bigger wedge between their community and the rest of the country. Few thought the mistrust could go any lower after a controversial court ruling on May 29 that cleared security officials of the Tak Bai massacre of 2004.
Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch noted a worrying trend over the past five years that has seen rogue elements in the volunteer and regular security units attacking mosque, Islamic schools and teashops in retaliation for the killings of Buddhist officials and civilians.
"This is a worrying trend that has fuelled communal tension and worsened the conflict in the South over the past five years," Sunai said. "The widespread suspicion in the Muslim community after the Al Pukon mosque massacre shows how the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable has led to deep distrust of the government," Sunai added.
While it may have crossed their minds that the massacre could have been the work of some rogue outfit, retaliating for a week-long mayhem that included brutal killings, beheadings, car bombs and an attack on a passenger bus full of Buddhists, Suthep and Anupong just did not want to confront other possibilities. Embracing old habits could be comforting.
If anything, the position taken by the two men became a much-needed comfort zone for officials who did not want to debate why a group of Malay Muslim insurgents would want to indiscriminately gun down people from an area where they probably received the most support.
In spite of a track record of abuses and extra-judicial killings, it is still unthinkable for the country's top political leaders to come to terms with the notion that one of their own may have committed such a thing.
Some of the security spin-doctors reiterated this half-baked but long-standing explanation that blamed the insurgents for all the atrocities because they want to raise the profile of the issue and draw the attention of the international community, such as the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Killing their own people was supposed to be the best way of attracting international sympathy.
In Bangkok, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva saw the deep South drifting further away from the kingdom, and tried to do some damage control.
He warned against reaching premature conclusions and added that "an attack on a mosque is unusual and not the style of separatists".
For the militants, it was payback time. Assoc Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani said the clock could be turned back to the scale of the violence in 2007 when collateral damage was also high - 164 public schools came under arson attack, a big jump from 43 in 2006.
Naturally, the security agencies take credit for the significant drop in 2008 that saw only 14 public schools coming under arson attacks.
But local residents say the real reason has more to do with the fact that the insurgents are losing support at the grass-roots level. In spite of the historical mistrust and dislike of state institutions, such as public school, essentially, a Siamese education for their children is better than no education at all, they said.
In spite of the unprecedented nature of these past two weeks, few want to make the connection between the spike in violence and the court verdict on May 29 that cleared soldiers, police and paramilitary rangers involved in dealing with the Tak Bai protest. The incident ended in the death of 85 Malay Muslims protesters, 78 from suffocation when they were stacked one on top of another, up to four, on the back of military trucks.
What complicated the situation further was that local media only picked up on Anupong's statement about not negotiating with the separatists. Few noted that the statement contradicted Abhisit who did not rule out the idea of talking to separatists.
What Abhisit said was that at the policy level the government does not have such a position but added that at the operational level a channel of communication with separatist groups is already in place.
But keeping the dialogue at the operation level may not be enough as security and intelligence personnel don't have the political will to go further than collect data and go after insurgents and kill them.
A number of professional mediators, including retired military top brass familiar with insurgency in the deep South and neighbouring countries, have been knocking on Abhisit's door asking him for permission to do the mediating job.
So far, Abhisit has not given anybody the much-sought-after mandate. Given the uncertain nature of the current political situation, as well as the fact that such a move will be costly in political terms, it may be a very long time before Abhisit puts all his eggs in anybody's basket.
Friday, 3 April 2009
A Life of its Own
Don Pathan
The Daily Star
 |
| Shan State Army outpost on the Thailand-Myanmar border. |
| Eight years ago, then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra came into power and vowed to patch things up with Myanmar's military government, one of the world's most condemned regimes. He tried hard to convince Rangoon of his sincerity, even if it meant going against international sentiment, not to mention the Army, which he accused of "over-reacting" in its dealings with a cross-border clash with Myanmarese forces. |
Thaksin, in line with his shoot-from-the-hip nature, said Thailand's armed forces would end their tacit policy of using Myanmarese insurgent groups as buffers. In the same breath, the PM also said aid organisations tending more than 100,000 refugees displaced by fighting in Myanmar would have to scale down their operations. He said they were interfering with his efforts to normalise ties with the junta.
Thaksin believed that his brand of "personal diplomacy," backed with promises of development and economic cooperation, would be sufficient to pave the way for a bigger and better future with the junta. While all that sweet talk about development and assistance was expected, what caught many Myanmar-watchers' attention was the word "buffer."
Apparently loose-lipped Thaksin didn't know that the insurgency along the Thai-Myanmar border had a life of its own. How Thailand positions itself to Myanmar's insurgency is also a factor that defines this relationship.
In 2003, the foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, tried to push through the "Bangkok Process", a multinational forum to steer Myanmar towards reform. He succeeded in getting the late Karen leader, General Bo Mya, and his son, Ner Dah, to visit Rangoon and map out a blueprint for peace talks, but nothing came of it.
Surakiart's "road map" was essentially jinxed from the very beginning because the junta did not see Thailand as an honest broker, for obvious reasons. A tactical retreat was made possible when Myanmarese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced in August 2003 that the junta's seven-step reconciliation plan would include a constitutional drafting assembly and general elections by 2010.
One of the unwritten laws along the Thai-Myanmar border is that if a rebel army is pro-Rangoon, it can be considered a threat to Thai security. The 20,000-strong United Wa State Army automatically comes to mind. Likewise, if the outfit is fighting Rangoon for autonomy or secession, then it is friendly to Thailand. Groups like the Karen National Union, Shan State Army, and Karenni National Progressive Party fall into this category. This law is likely to prevail until security concerns take a back seat to bilateral cooperation. The question is what must be done for both sides to achieve the needed comfort level.
The Thaksin government tried to influence change in Myanmar by keeping the West at bay, but failed. This time around, the Democrat Party, with a track record of being critical of the junta, is suggesting that there is a need to think outside the box. During his recent visit, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya brought up the issue of these so-called proxies along the border. He was asked by the junta to urge the ethnic rebel armies along the border to join Myanmar's seven-step national-reconciliation plan, a process that has been billed a sham by critics.
However, it is not clear what Kasit will do next about this request, which, from a historical perspective, may be way over his head. A bit of wishful thinking, perhaps, if Thailand thinks it can "mediate" peace talks between the rebels and the junta. Facilitation, on the other hand, is more plausible.
From a bird's-eye view, the Thailand-Myanmar border is characterised by its cut-throat politics where rebel leaders, opium warlords, the Thai Army, and Myanmarese generals play for keeps. As long as anyone can remember, armed ethnic groups have always functioned as a buffer between the two nagging neighbours. At the behest of the Thai or Myanmarese military, these ethnic armies do all the dirty work, keeping the hands of their respective overlords clean.
Most of these groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Myanmarese junta in exchange for limited self-rule in so-called "special regions" where they grow opium and churn out methamphetamines. Others have chosen legitimate businesses, granting Thai and Chinese businessmen logging and mining concessions along the border.
Myanmar doesn't mind if these warlords fatten their wallets with the concession money as long as they remain in the junta's "legal fold" and do not pose any security threats. Over the past two years, Myanmar has tried hard to get these groups to hand over their weapons, but success has been very limited.
On the surface, there haven't been any outbursts along the border between the two sides for a fair while now. But military officers on the frontline warn against reaching any premature conclusions. The absence of confrontation does not necessarily mean peace, they say. Mistrust still runs high. It is just that the two sides haven't picked up their guns to display it.
This article was first published in The Nation, Thailand.
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