A Life of its Own

Don Pathan
The Daily Star

Shan State Army outpost on the Thailand-Myanmar border. 

Eight years ago, then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra came into power and vowed to patch things up with Myanmar's military government, one of the world's most condemned regimes. He tried hard to convince Rangoon of his sincerity, even if it meant going against international sentiment, not to mention the Army, which he accused of "over-reacting" in its dealings with a cross-border clash with Myanmarese forces.

Thaksin, in line with his shoot-from-the-hip nature, said Thailand's armed forces would end their tacit policy of using Myanmarese insurgent groups as buffers. In the same breath, the PM also said aid organisations tending more than 100,000 refugees displaced by fighting in Myanmar would have to scale down their operations. He said they were interfering with his efforts to normalise ties with the junta.

Thaksin believed that his brand of "personal diplomacy," backed with promises of development and economic cooperation, would be sufficient to pave the way for a bigger and better future with the junta. While all that sweet talk about development and assistance was expected, what caught many Myanmar-watchers' attention was the word "buffer."

Apparently loose-lipped Thaksin didn't know that the insurgency along the Thai-Myanmar border had a life of its own. How Thailand positions itself to Myanmar's insurgency is also a factor that defines this relationship.

In 2003, the foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, tried to push through the "Bangkok Process", a multinational forum to steer Myanmar towards reform. He succeeded in getting the late Karen leader, General Bo Mya, and his son, Ner Dah, to visit Rangoon and map out a blueprint for peace talks, but nothing came of it.

Surakiart's "road map" was essentially jinxed from the very beginning because the junta did not see Thailand as an honest broker, for obvious reasons. A tactical retreat was made possible when Myanmarese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced in August 2003 that the junta's seven-step reconciliation plan would include a constitutional drafting assembly and general elections by 2010.

One of the unwritten laws along the Thai-Myanmar border is that if a rebel army is pro-Rangoon, it can be considered a threat to Thai security. The 20,000-strong United Wa State Army automatically comes to mind. Likewise, if the outfit is fighting Rangoon for autonomy or secession, then it is friendly to Thailand. Groups like the Karen National Union, Shan State Army, and Karenni National Progressive Party fall into this category. This law is likely to prevail until security concerns take a back seat to bilateral cooperation. The question is what must be done for both sides to achieve the needed comfort level.

The Thaksin government tried to influence change in Myanmar by keeping the West at bay, but failed. This time around, the Democrat Party, with a track record of being critical of the junta, is suggesting that there is a need to think outside the box. During his recent visit, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya brought up the issue of these so-called proxies along the border. He was asked by the junta to urge the ethnic rebel armies along the border to join Myanmar's seven-step national-reconciliation plan, a process that has been billed a sham by critics.

However, it is not clear what Kasit will do next about this request, which, from a historical perspective, may be way over his head. A bit of wishful thinking, perhaps, if Thailand thinks it can "mediate" peace talks between the rebels and the junta. Facilitation, on the other hand, is more plausible.

From a bird's-eye view, the Thailand-Myanmar border is characterised by its cut-throat politics where rebel leaders, opium warlords, the Thai Army, and Myanmarese generals play for keeps. As long as anyone can remember, armed ethnic groups have always functioned as a buffer between the two nagging neighbours. At the behest of the Thai or Myanmarese military, these ethnic armies do all the dirty work, keeping the hands of their respective overlords clean.

Most of these groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Myanmarese junta in exchange for limited self-rule in so-called "special regions" where they grow opium and churn out methamphetamines. Others have chosen legitimate businesses, granting Thai and Chinese businessmen logging and mining concessions along the border.

Myanmar doesn't mind if these warlords fatten their wallets with the concession money as long as they remain in the junta's "legal fold" and do not pose any security threats. Over the past two years, Myanmar has tried hard to get these groups to hand over their weapons, but success has been very limited.

On the surface, there haven't been any outbursts along the border between the two sides for a fair while now. But military officers on the frontline warn against reaching any premature conclusions. The absence of confrontation does not necessarily mean peace, they say. Mistrust still runs high. It is just that the two sides haven't picked up their guns to display it.

This article was first published in The Nation, Thailand.

The Thai-Burmese border has a life of its own

MARCH 28, 2009

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

EIGHT YEARS ago, then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra came into power and vowed to patch things up with Burma’s military government, one of the world’s most condemned regimes.

He tried hard to convince Rangoon of his sincerity even if it meant going against international sentiment, not to mention the Army, which he accused of “over-reacting” in its dealing with a cross-border clash with Burmese forces.

Thaksin, in line with his shoot-from-the-hip nature, said Thailand’s armed forces would end their tacit policy of using Burmese insurgent groups as buffers.

In the same breath, the PM also said aid organisations tending more than 100,000 refugees displaced by fighting in Burma would have to scale down their operations. He said they were interfering with his efforts to normalise ties with the junta.

Thaksin believed that his brand of “personal diplomacy”, backed with promises of development and economic cooperation, would be sufficient to pave the way for a bigger and better future with the junta. And while all that sweet talk about development and assistance was expected, what caught many Burma-watchers’ attention was the word “buffer”.

Apparently loose-lipped Thaksin didn’t know that the insurgency along the Thai-Burmese had a life of its own. How Thailand positions itself in relation to Burma’s insurgency is also a factor that defines this relation.

In 2003, the foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, tried to push through the “Bangkok Process”, a multinational forum to steer Burma towards reform. He succeeded in getting the late Karen leader General Bo Mya and his son Ner Dah to visit Rangoon and map out a blueprint for peace talks, but nothing came of it.

Surakiart’s “road map” was essentially jinxed from the very beginning because the junta did not see Thailand as an honest broker, for obvious reasons.

A tactical retreat was made possible when Burmese prime minister Khin Nyunt announced in August 2003 that the junta’s seven-step reconciliation plan would include a constitutional drafting assembly and general elections by 2010.

One of the unwritten laws along the Thai-Burmese border is that if a rebel army is pro-Rangoon, it can be considered a threat to Thai security. The 20,000-strong United Wa State Army automatically comes to mind.

Likewise, if the outfit is fighting Rangoon for autonomy or secession then it is friendly to Thailand. Groups like the Karen National Union, Shan State Army and Karenni National Progressive Party fall into this category. This law is likely to prevail until security concerns take a back seat to bilateral cooperation. The question is what must be done for both sides to achieve that needed comfort level.

The Thaksin government tried to influence change in Burma by keeping the West at bay but failed. This time around, the Democrat Party, with a track record of being critical of the junta, is suggesting that there is a need to think outside the box.

During his recent visit, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya brought up the issue of these so-called proxies along the border. He was asked by the junta to urge the ethnic rebel armies along the border to join Burma’s seven-step national-reconciliation plan, a process that has been billed a sham by critics.

However, it is not clear what Kasit will do next with regard to this request, which from a historical perspective may be way over his head. A bit of wishful thinking, perhaps, if Thailand thinks it can “mediate” peace talks between the rebels and the junta. Facilitation, on the other hand, is more plausible.

From a bird’s-eye view, the Thai-Burmese border is characterised by its cut-throat politics where rebel leaders, opium warlords, the Thai Army and Burmese generals play for keeps. As long as anyone can remember, armed ethnic groups have always functioned as a buffer between the two nagging neighbours. At the behest of the Thai or Burmese militaries, these ethnic armies do all the dirty work, keeping the hands of their respective overlords clean.

Most of these groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta in exchange for limited self-rule in so-called “special regions” where they grow opium and churn out methamphetamines. Others have chosen legitimate businesses, granting Thai and Chinese businessmen logging and mining concessions along the border.

Burma doesn’t mind if these warlords fatten their wallets with the concession money as long as they remain in the junta’s “legal fold” and do not pose any security threats. Over the past two years, Burma has tried hard to get these groups to hand over their weapons, but success has been very limited.

On the surface, there haven’t been any outbursts along the border between the two sides for a fair while now.

But military officers on the frontline warn against reaching any premature conclusions. The absence of confrontation does not necessarily mean peace, they say. Mistrust still runs high. It is just that the two sides haven’t picked up their guns to display it.

https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/03/28/the-thai-burmese-border-has-a-life-of-its-own/

Peace in the South demands historical recognition

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

Published on August 25, 2009

THE Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been working hard to create understanding in the international community, especially in Islamic countries, that the ongoing violence in the Muslim-majority South is not in any way part of the global war on terror. Since January 2004, the violence has claimed more than 3,500 lives.

Over the past seven months, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has made at least four visits to the restive region, accompanying Thai ambassadors and foreign envoys. Recently, he hosted diplomats from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and journalists from Arab countries.

Like those before them, the OIC delegation was taken to Army-run projects where they were greeted by smiling Malay-Muslim villagers, flag-waving children, smiling drug addicts and former insurgents who told them how they had been "misled" into taking up arms against the Thai state and how grateful they are to the government for the chance to redeem themselves.

Across the street from the Sirindhorn army camp in Yala, Fourth Army commander Lt General Pichet Wisaichorn showed off military-run community development projects that include the making of organic fertilisers.

"You are here because you wanted to be here, right?" hollered Pichet.

"Yes!" replied the Malay villagers as they huddled in the shade while curiously observing fellow Muslims who came from as far as Egypt and Oman.

Later in the day, speaking at what could be billed as a "town hall meeting" in a packed mosque in Narathiwat's Sueloh village, Kasit told local Muslims of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's determination to solve the conflict in the deep South. He also reminded them that they have the power to help make this happen if they are willing to put their hearts to it.

Outside the mosque entrance, villagers were whispering among themselves about the June 8 massacre by a group of government-trained village militiamen who fired into a mosque in Joh I Rong district, killing 11 Muslims who were praying at the time. The villagers said they didn't want to embarrass Kasit by confronting him with questions on the issue in front of the foreign dignitaries.

So far the police have issued just one arrest warrant. The leading suspect is Sutthirak Kongsuwan, 34, a former paramilitary ranger. Whether he turned rogue and took matters into his own hands or is a product of some security unit operating in the region, remains to be seen.

Not far from the Sueloh mosque were about 100 former insurgents who came to greet the delegation during its brief stopover in this highly contested district of Sungai Padi district. They were part of the "Pracha Ruamjai" project. The project combines religious education with civic responsibility for these former rebels who took up arms against the state about two decades ago. Most, if not all, enrolled in the project to clear their names from any possible "blacklist".

It was obvious that these men were not part of the new generation of militants, whose vast network stretches across the Malay-speaking South, and whose members do not appear to be interested in talking to anyone, much less the government of Thailand.

Wherever he went, Kasit told the audience that the current government is committed to peaceful means to resolve the conflict. Together with development funding and political accountability, it is hoped that the foundation for a lasting peace and reconciliation between the Thai state and the Malay-speaking region will be paved.

Kasit briefly touched on the issue of cultural differences, saying that the authorities assigned to the region will be more sensitive towards the local people.

The idea of bringing foreign diplomats to the deep South was to convince them that the problem in the region is not a religious one and that Muslims in the southernmost provinces, like anywhere else in the country, have all the freedom they need to practice their religion.

But it doesn't take an Islamic expert to see that such freedom is self-evident. As pointed out by Muslim clerics here, Muslims in Thailand probably have more freedom to practice their religion than Muslims in Arab countries.

Speaking to the Arab journalists who accompanied him in the region, Kasit, without singling out ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra or dwelling on the root cause of the problem, said past administrations may have employed questionable security tactics that have made the situation worse.

Given Thaksin's all-or-nothing attitude toward the conflict in the deep South, as well as his decision to dissolve certain institutions such as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) - an organisation viewed favourably by the local population - the former premier has often received much of the blame for what has gone wrong in the region.

But while Thaksin's approach to the conflict may have made things worse and driven a bigger wedge between the Patani Malays and the rest of the country, one can't deny the fact that the new generation of militants had been in the making long before he assumed power in 2001.

Like the generation of militants before them, the young men who have been carrying out roadside bombing and ambushes over the past five years grew up under a cultural narrative that is different from the rest of the Thai people. In this case, it is the century-old occupation of the Malay historical homeland by Siamese invaders.

The state's so-called reconciliation process has never seriously addressed the sticky issue of historical mistrust and the ethnocentric nature of Thailand's nation-state building. And so for the time being, the Malays of the deep South are conveniently dismissed as "Thai Muslims". But "Thai" Muslims don't question the legitimacy of the Thai state. It's the Malays of the southernmost border provinces that do.

Trigger-happy troops not the solution

Abhisit cannot win Malay hearts with more guns pointing at heads in the strife-torn South

Editorial
By The Nation

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said on Thursday that he would send an additional 4,000 troops to the plagued deep South to help quell the ongoing insurgency to which there seems no end in sight. Abhisit said the extra paramilitary rangers would work to improve relations between the authorities and the Malay-speaking South, where historical mistrust runs high.
"They will work towards a better understanding with the residents," Abhisit explained, after meeting with top military officials on Thursday.

The PM said the authorities could only maintain the status quo at present. However, he added that this was not enough because there were enough militants around who could still induce a climate of fear in the region.

While it is clear that the insurgents continue to have a capacity to inflict terror among the local population and the authorities, the suggestion that the authorities have succeeded in containing the violence to one geographical area is a bit of a stretch.

It's one thing to say that the militants don't have the capacity, or the desire, to expand their campaign of violence outside the Malay-speaking areas. But it is entirely another to suggest that the troops have been doing such a great job in containing the insurgents to a geographical area.

There are about 60,000 security officials in this highly contested region that was once a Malay homeland before Siam annexed it over a century ago. How will another 4,000 paramilitary rangers help the situation?

If anything, it seems as if Abhisit was just filling the blanks in an unspoken contract created by the Army. A new lease on life has been given to the nearly defunct Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc), and now it is time to make do. The 4,000 rangers, it seems, were just the latest item to go on the dotted line.

Yet how long must we continue this? Didn't Abisit himself once say that the military was not the solution to the trouble in the deep South?

He started off his administration nicely, talking about the return to civilian supremacy by setting up a bureau to administer the Army and the civilians. This bureau was supposed to take its directives from a mini-Cabinet of relevant ministries.

Moreover, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was supposed to be given a legal basis so it didn't have to go through Isoc for funding to carry out projects.

Abhisit also dispatched a high-level delegation that included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and Thai envoys to Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to touch base with clerics, local officials and youth. During the visit, Kasit explained why it was important for the foreign ministry to get involved and become part of the solution. He urged one and all to give this administration a chance and vowed to follow through with more visits to a region that has placed the Kingdom in the spotlight, albeit an unwanted one.

No doubt the first few weeks did indeed bring a breath of fresh air. After listening to the Army's quirky explanation and all sorts of conspiracy theories for the past five years, the initial messages from the new administration were refreshing.

Today, however, some three months into Abhisit's leadership, nobody is talking about a civilian-led bureau, nor has there been an update as to when SBPAC will be let off the Army's leash.

So when we get reports about more troops being sent to the deep South, one can't help but wonder how this is going to win the hearts and minds of the Malays who continue to question the legitimacy of Thai rule in their historical homeland.

Authorities often argue that including more ethnic Malays in these ranger units could ease the tension because they are fluent in the language and culture. Are they expected to feel grateful for this employment opportunity, or is it some kind of sick joke?

Don't our officials know that most of the victims in the deep South are ethnic Malays killed by Malay insurgents who suspect them of spying for Thailand?

As former US president George W Bush once said: "You are either with us or against us." Sadly, this unspoken policy is employed by both the Thai State and the insurgents.

This policy manifested itself in the State employing local Malay Muslims for Bt4,500 a month to serve as their eyes and ears, and then they get told that they should be grateful for what they get? Never mind that 80 per cent of the bureaucrats in the deep South are Buddhists hailing from other parts of the country.

So when the so-called "eyes and ears" get shot in the head, the State is quick to tell the media that so-and-so was killed because he or she was spying for them. See? These Malay Muslim victims are on the side of the State, or so the authorities would like the public to believe.

Are the authorities that desperate for brownie points, or do they just not care about the safety and well being of the victims' families?

The initiatives have not become any more sophisticated, partly because the Thai military personnel and security planners are not the most sophisticated people in the world. Perhaps it's time to bring in people with fresh ideas, not poorly trained rangers with a reputation for being trigger-happy.

It is also time to give the local Malays a real stake in their country, so they too can feel like citizens and not just colonial subjects.

Dear Prime Minister, have you ever heard of social mobility? Try that for a change.

Trigger-happy troops not the solution

Abhisit cannot win Malay hearts with more guns pointing at heads in the strife-torn South

Editorial
By The Nation

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said on Thursday that he would send an additional 4,000 troops to the plagued deep South to help quell the ongoing insurgency to which there seems no end in sight. Abhisit said the extra paramilitary rangers would work to improve relations between the authorities and the Malay-speaking South, where historical mistrust runs high.
"They will work towards a better understanding with the residents," Abhisit explained, after meeting with top military officials on Thursday.

The PM said the authorities could only maintain the status quo at present. However, he added that this was not enough because there were enough militants around who could still induce a climate of fear in the region.

While it is clear that the insurgents continue to have a capacity to inflict terror among the local population and the authorities, the suggestion that the authorities have succeeded in containing the violence to one geographical area is a bit of a stretch.

It's one thing to say that the militants don't have the capacity, or the desire, to expand their campaign of violence outside the Malay-speaking areas. But it is entirely another to suggest that the troops have been doing such a great job in containing the insurgents to a geographical area.

There are about 60,000 security officials in this highly contested region that was once a Malay homeland before Siam annexed it over a century ago. How will another 4,000 paramilitary rangers help the situation?

If anything, it seems as if Abhisit was just filling the blanks in an unspoken contract created by the Army. A new lease on life has been given to the nearly defunct Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc), and now it is time to make do. The 4,000 rangers, it seems, were just the latest item to go on the dotted line.

Yet how long must we continue this? Didn't Abisit himself once say that the military was not the solution to the trouble in the deep South?

He started off his administration nicely, talking about the return to civilian supremacy by setting up a bureau to administer the Army and the civilians. This bureau was supposed to take its directives from a mini-Cabinet of relevant ministries.

Moreover, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was supposed to be given a legal basis so it didn't have to go through Isoc for funding to carry out projects.

Abhisit also dispatched a high-level delegation that included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and Thai envoys to Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to touch base with clerics, local officials and youth. During the visit, Kasit explained why it was important for the foreign ministry to get involved and become part of the solution. He urged one and all to give this administration a chance and vowed to follow through with more visits to a region that has placed the Kingdom in the spotlight, albeit an unwanted one.

No doubt the first few weeks did indeed bring a breath of fresh air. After listening to the Army's quirky explanation and all sorts of conspiracy theories for the past five years, the initial messages from the new administration were refreshing.

Today, however, some three months into Abhisit's leadership, nobody is talking about a civilian-led bureau, nor has there been an update as to when SBPAC will be let off the Army's leash.

So when we get reports about more troops being sent to the deep South, one can't help but wonder how this is going to win the hearts and minds of the Malays who continue to question the legitimacy of Thai rule in their historical homeland.

Authorities often argue that including more ethnic Malays in these ranger units could ease the tension because they are fluent in the language and culture. Are they expected to feel grateful for this employment opportunity, or is it some kind of sick joke?

Don't our officials know that most of the victims in the deep South are ethnic Malays killed by Malay insurgents who suspect them of spying for Thailand?

As former US president George W Bush once said: "You are either with us or against us." Sadly, this unspoken policy is employed by both the Thai State and the insurgents.

This policy manifested itself in the State employing local Malay Muslims for Bt4,500 a month to serve as their eyes and ears, and then they get told that they should be grateful for what they get? Never mind that 80 per cent of the bureaucrats in the deep South are Buddhists hailing from other parts of the country.

So when the so-called "eyes and ears" get shot in the head, the State is quick to tell the media that so-and-so was killed because he or she was spying for them. See? These Malay Muslim victims are on the side of the State, or so the authorities would like the public to believe.

Are the authorities that desperate for brownie points, or do they just not care about the safety and well being of the victims' families?

The initiatives have not become any more sophisticated, partly because the Thai military personnel and security planners are not the most sophisticated people in the world. Perhaps it's time to bring in people with fresh ideas, not poorly trained rangers with a reputation for being trigger-happy.

It is also time to give the local Malays a real stake in their country, so they too can feel like citizens and not just colonial subjects.

Dear Prime Minister, have you ever heard of social mobility? Try that for a change.

No one wants to live under colonial rule

Editorial

Malay Muslims in the South are content to be part of the Thai state, but with their own identity

The Foreign Ministry should be commended for making the problems in the deep South one of its top priorities. Earlier this week, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya led a high-level delegation of Thai ambassadors, and envoys from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, to Pattani, the heart of the Malay-speaking South, where he held meetings with a wide range of people. Participants included students who receive grants and scholarships from the government, Islamic religious leaders, governors of the southernmost provinces and military top brass. Kasit gave each group time to make its case, as well as letting them know the ministry's concerns. Kasit reminded the officials assigned to the restive region that the entire world is watching, and stressed the need to be more sensitive with regards to cultural differences. The international community has good intentions and the issue of human rights is one of its biggest concerns, he said.

He was correct to say that Thailand has an obligation to explain to the Thai people, as well as the international community, the progress the government has made in this trouble-plagued region, where more than 3,200 people have been killed since January 2004.

As a way to strengthen ties between the local community and the state, Kasit said budget allocations should be spread out to include local NGOs working at the community level. While it might not take a rocket scientist to figure out that that these ideas are good, Kasit and the ministry should not get caught up in a false sense of confidence. Good intentions are not policy. Tough decisions will have to be made if the problem in the deep South is to be resolved.

Like other ministries, Foreign Affairs will have to get the rest of the country to prepare for what could be a rough journey. As it stands, any move to accommodate the deep South will be costly in political terms. The rest of the country will look at it as favouritism when, in fact, meaningful effort to improve the livelihood of the region is long overdue.

For too long the Muslim-majority region has been neglected in more ways than one. We know about the historical mistrust and we know that the Patani Malays have always questioned the legitimacy of Thai rule. But instead of trying to come to terms with the past and working towards improving the social mobility of the local Malays so they felt they had a stake in this country, the state repeatedly tampered with the issue of identity. It was believed that, eventually, the Patani Malays would become "Thais" like the Chinese in Yaowarat or the Lao in Isaan. They were wrong. No matter how we look at this, tension in the South always comes back to the question of identity, the question of human dignity.

Like it or not, the Patani Malays have their own history, myths, heroes and legends, and these happen to be a completely different set of narratives from those of the Thai state. In spite of the fact that armed separatist movements surface every generation or so, there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that the local Muslims want to break away from Thailand. If anything, we believe that they want to be part of Thailand, but on their own terms.

Like others, Kasit needs to know that any move to accommodate the Patani Malays will not be easy. It is, indeed, hard for any Thai to swallow the notion that there are actually Thai citizens out there who refuse to come to terms with the ideologies that define what this nation-state is and should be.

For too long, the state has worked hard to mould the Patani Malays into something they are not and do not wish to be - at least to the point where they don't challenge the authority or question the legitimacy of the state. But for the Patani Malays, this has been something they cannot compromise on, as Malay identity and Islam are inseparable. An attack on one is an attack on the other.

Historically, state officials, including aristocrats sent to the region over the past century, see themselves as benevolent rulers. A century after the region came under the direct rule of Bangkok, we continue to believe that sending good and honest officials to administer over the Malay-speaking region will help improve the situation.

Today, with a new generation of insurgents forming a web of cells in the region, we are still scratching our heads over what to do. For five years, the military-led initiatives have tried everything under the sun - both carrot and stick have been employed and yet the Patani Malays just won't get in line. We don't seem to understand that, from the Malays' perspective, a benevolent Siamese colonial master is still a Siamese colonial master.

This may be a bit hard for us to swallow, but many people in the three southernmost provinces actually see Thai officials and residents as foreign occupiers - which naturally makes the local people colonial subjects. This is probably why extremely few local people have stepped forward to point the finger at suspected insurgents. They may not agree wit the brutal methods employed by the insurgents but we can't deny the fact that they share the same overall sentiment.

Perhaps it's time to think outside the box. Perhaps we should start to look for ways to change the equation so that the Patani Malays feel they have a stake in this country, a shared destiny. Our initiative has to go beyond giving local Malay Muslims free trips to Bangkok and Chiang Mai to show them grand temples and whisper in their ears, "This is yours, too".

Funny how none of these trips ever include a visit to the Praya Tani cannons in front of the Defence Ministry. What would we say? "This used to be yours, but not anymore. Learn to live with it buddy; you are a defeated people"?

POLITICAL WILL LACKING TO DEAL WITH SOUTH PROBLEM

Don Pathan
The Nation

Kuala Lumpur

For the past three decades, old man Fadel has met and talked with Thai
security officials about what seems to be a never ending dispute
between the Malay historical homeland of Patani and the Thai state.

Not much has changed over the years. If anything, the situation seems
to be getting worse if one takes into consideration the level of
violence in the southernmost border provinces where more than 3,200
have died since January 2004.

Fadel (not his real name) is a key leader from one of the longstanding
separatist groups that emerged in the late 1960s to carve out a
separate homeland for Malays in Thailand's southernmost border
provinces. Like many Patani exiles, Fadel lives a quiet life in
Malaysia under the watchful eyes of the state security and
intelligence agencies.

Kuala Lumpur has been working quietly with
Bangkok to facilitate some of these meetings that Fadel said hasn't
made much progress. He blamed the lack of sincerity and the absence of
mandate on his Thai counterparts.

Since his last interview to The Nation, early last year, Fadel has
lost a tooth and his hair has greyed more. But his stance remains
unchanged.

Like other leaders of long standing groups – Patani United Liberation
Organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional, Gerekan Mujahidin
Islam Patani (GMIP), Barisan Islam Pembangunan Patani (BIPP) – Fadel
has dropped the demand for an independent Patani.

Echoing other old guards from these long standing groups, Fadel
maintained that before true and lasting peace can be achieved,
Thailand must first recognise the historical fact that the
Malay-speaking region was once an independent sultanate. Moreover, the
use of Malay must be permitted as a "working language" alongside the
"official" Thai.

"This is not about separating Patani from Thailand. It's about the
dignity of the Malays of Patani," explained Fadel.

Thai security officials have said rewriting history and having all
sides come to terms with the past will not go well with conservative
elements who see the current nationstate boundary as something next to
divine revelation. But the demands from the old guards can be met as
long as the will is there from the political leaders, they said.

Like everything else, it seems, the devil is in the details.

In recent months, Fadel has been watching with some discomfort the
various initiatives by key Thai political and regional leaders to
broker a peace deal with groups who claimed to be representing the
people of Patani.

These key Thai political leaders include Chavalit Yongchaiyudh,
Chettha Thanajaro, Surayud Chulanont and last but not the least,
Indonesian Vice President Yusuf Kalla. Malaysian opposition leader
Anwar Ibrahim has also expressed concern and interest in working
towards peace as well.

But good intentions are not necessarily good policy. Many stakeholders
have questioned the true intention of these socalled mediators and the
merit of their action. In fact, some of these recent initiatives were
billed as, at best, bad planning, and at worst, a hoax.

Two months ago Chavalit publicly said an everlasting peace would be
achieved by December 5 this year. He has less than two weeks left.
Before that Chettha announced an end to the century-old resistance.
Kalla, on the other hand, was left high and dry when the Thai
government said it was not aware of his initiative.

While these dialogue tracks continue to attract the attention of the
exiled leaders, there is a growing consensus among concerned parties
that in spite of these talks, Thailand and Patani separatist groups
are as far apart as ever.

"I have got to the point that these discussions, dialogue or
negotiations have become pointless. This is because the Thai side has
always sent men, usually soldiers, who have no real mandate," said
another exiled leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Malaysian officials who helped facilitate some of these meetings
echoed the same sentiment, saying there is no continuity from the Thai
side and the participants see these meetings as an intelligence
gathering exercise rather than as part of an effort to come up with a
sound policy.

This is not to say that the Thai government has never been in
constructive dialogue before. In December 2007, then prime minister
Surayud met secretly with a top PULO official during a stopover in
Bahrain.

But the foundation that Surayud laid was not built on. "Everything at
the official level is more or less at a standstill at the moment,"
said the Malaysian officer.

Well, not exactly. Surayud's effort was replaced by individual
initiatives from various camps, namely Kalla, Chetta and Chavalit. All
reached out to the old guards but so far, nothing meaningful has come
out of their efforts.

While no one doubted the historical role of these old guards, the
biggest question that is eating up the Thai side is what kind of
influence the exiled leaders have over the new generation of militants
operating on the ground.

Old guards said they have regular dialogue with the new generation and
maintain that they can bring them to the negotiating table if and when
a formal negotiation is kicked off.

Others in the exiled community are quietly singling out the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional – Coordinate as the one long standing group that has
any real influence on the new generation operating on the ground.
Locally, the new generation of militants is referred to as the juwae,
which means fighter in local Malay dialect.

For the time being, Bangkok's official position is to deny any
involvement with these "private initiatives" in spite of financing
some of them. The Thai government is also keeping the international
community away from what they have consistently billed as a domestic
issue.

Observers and frustrated officials on the ground say Thai security
agencies have too much to hide – the torture, a culture of impunity,
corruption and the use of government death squad. Certainly, they can
do without the headache from the international community, much less
the debate on the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malays'
historical homeland.

Unless there is political will from Bangkok to push for real change in
the deep South, said old man Fadel, violence will continue unabated.

"We don't mind being part of Thailand," Fadel said. "But it has to be
on our own terms."