Don Pathan
Yala, Thailand
Oct. 5, 2016
BenarNews
Troop levels in Thailand’s conflict-ridden Deep South are at their lowest level since peak deployment nine years ago, through a gradual draw-down accompanied by the shifting of security responsibility to local armed groups.
Current troop strength in the southern border region is just over 20,000, slightly more than half the number of military personnel posted there in 2007, according to a spokesman for the military command in charge of Thailand’s south.
Virtually all troops from the country’s north, northeast and central regional commands have already left the Deep South, according to Col. Pramote Prom-in of the Fourth Army Area.
He said only three battalions of non-local troops remain, each made up of about 800 soldiers, remain in the Muslim-majority region where more than 6,000 people have died since 2004 in violence associated with a separatist insurgency.
The downsizing is balanced by the outsourcing of security duties to local armed units such as the Volunteer Defense Corps (Ar Sar - VDC) and the village defense volunteers (Chor Ror Bor - VDV), Pramote told BenarNews.
The total security presence, including those groups and police, is around 50,000, in an area of 1.7 million residents, 80 percent of whom are Malay-speaking Muslims.
“It will not be a complete replacement as the 15th Infantry Division of the Fourth Army Area command will oversee the day-to-day operation in this region,” Pramote said.
The gradual pullout started in 2011, with the largest draw-down being 8,000 military personnel in 2015 alone, he said.
Giving Volunteer Units Bigger Role
The volunteer units operate under the Interior Ministry, not the Defense Ministry.
The Volunteer Defense Corps receive basic military training from army and police. They function as security details for provincial officers and receive a monthly salary from the Interior Ministry.
Village Defense Volunteer units receive 20,000 baht ($578) per month per unit for basic things such as snacks and coffee. Members are given shotguns and trained by local military units. They function more or less as part of neighborhood watch scheme.
Col. Pramote added that about 40 percent of the remaining 20,000-plus soldiers are Rangers, a significant number of whom are local Malay Muslims. These paramilitary forces are not part of the regular armed forces but are locally recruited and trained by the Thai Army.
The rangers form light infantry units and are posted in remote areas where they conduct long-range reconnaissance patrols, as well as search and destroy operations to flush out insurgent units on the army’s behalf.
‘Tired of violence’
The peak of the troop strength in this historically contested region was in 2007 when the total number of armed security personnel stood at about 70,000. Just over half of these personnel were members of the armed forces.
Four years later, in 2011, the military decided to start to downsize and hand out security duties to locally hired militia in the three southernmost provinces – Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat – as well as the four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province.
The same year also saw an additional 1,700 police officers being hired in the region, Pramote said.
He conceded that the current troop strength reflected a sharp drop from 2007, but insisted that locally hired forces were ready and able to take over the security work.
Other factors that added to the confidence of the military include the argument that a growing number of residents are siding with the government.
“The people are tired of the violence,” Pramote said.
Moreover, he added, the overall number of violence incidents has also dropped dramatically.
Military presence remains significant: Security expert
According to Deep South Watch (DSW), a think-tank attached to the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani province, between 2004-2007, the average number of insurgency-related violent incidents per year was 1,926.
From 2009-2014, the annual figure dropped by about half to 1,027 incidents year. The past two years saw a further drop to about 60-70 incidents per months, or 840 annually.
DSW’s director, Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, said outsourcing security work to local militia was part of the military’s long-term strategy to reduce personnel and cut costs.
“The presence and number of the military personnel is still significant and the military operation will remain pretty much the same. The trade off is that the Royal Thai Army will be able to reduce spending significantly because of the withdrawal of troops but efficiency in the on-the-ground operations will inevitably be reduced because local militia will not have the same capability as the regular soldiers,” Srisompob said.
Suhaimee Dulasa, the director of foreign relations for the Patani Institute, a local civil society organization, said, “A professional army, if properly trained, should be in better position to carry out peace-building operation in a conflict such as this one in the Pattani region. Arming local civilians and putting their lives on the line is not the solution.”
“Moreover, meaningful changes can only come about if the Thai Army comes to the understanding that military means will not solve this long-standing conflict. The Thai state will have to open up political space for meaningful discussion to get to the root causes if they want to resolve this conflict,” Suhaimee said.
http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/special-reports/Deep-South-troops-10052016164917.html
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Thursday, 6 October 2016
Wednesday, 5 October 2016
Thailand’s Military Outsourcing Deep South Security to Local Militias
Don Pathan
Yala, Thailand
BernaNews
Troop levels in Thailand’s conflict-ridden Deep South are at their lowest level since peak deployment nine years ago, through a gradual draw-down accompanied by the shifting of security responsibility to local armed groups.
Current troop strength in the southern border region is just over 20,000, slightly more than half the number of military personnel posted there in 2007, according to a spokesman for the military command in charge of Thailand’s south.
Virtually all troops from the country’s north, northeast and central regional commands have already left the Deep South, according to Col. Pramote Prom-in of the Fourth Army Area.
He said only three battalions of non-local troops remain, each made up of about 800 soldiers, remain in the Muslim-majority region where more than 6,000 people have died since 2004 in violence associated with a separatist insurgency.
The downsizing is balanced by the outsourcing of security duties to local armed units such as the Volunteer Defense Corps (Ar Sar - VDC) and the village defense volunteers (Chor Ror Bor - VDV), Pramote told BenarNews.
The total security presence, including those groups and police, is around 50,000, in an area of 1.7 million residents, 80 percent of whom are Malay-speaking Muslims.
“It will not be a complete replacement as the 15th Infantry Division of the Fourth Army Area command will oversee the day-to-day operation in this region,” Pramote said.
The gradual pullout started in 2011, with the largest draw-down being 8,000 military personnel in 2015 alone, he said.
Giving Volunteer Units Bigger Role
The volunteer units operate under the Interior Ministry, not the Defense Ministry.
The Volunteer Defense Corps receive basic military training from army and police. They function as security details for provincial officers and receive a monthly salary from the Interior Ministry.
Village Defense Volunteer units receive 20,000 baht ($578) per month per unit for basic things such as snacks and coffee. Members are given shotguns and trained by local military units. They function more or less as part of neighborhood watch scheme.
Col. Pramote added that about 40 percent of the remaining 20,000-plus soldiers are Rangers, a significant number of whom are local Malay Muslims. These paramilitary forces are not part of the regular armed forces but are locally recruited and trained by the Thai Army.
The rangers form light infantry units and are posted in remote areas where they conduct long-range reconnaissance patrols, as well as search and destroy operations to flush out insurgent units on the army’s behalf.
‘Tired of violence’
The peak of the troop strength in this historically contested region was in 2007 when the total number of armed security personnel stood at about 70,000. Just over half of these personnel were members of the armed forces.
Four years later, in 2011, the military decided to start to downsize and hand out security duties to locally hired militia in the three southernmost provinces – Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat – as well as the four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province.
The same year also saw an additional 1,700 police officers being hired in the region, Pramote said.
He conceded that the current troop strength reflected a sharp drop from 2007, but insisted that locally hired forces were ready and able to take over the security work.
Other factors that added to the confidence of the military include the argument that a growing number of residents are siding with the government.
“The people are tired of the violence,” Pramote said.
Moreover, he added, the overall number of violence incidents has also dropped dramatically.
Military presence remains significant: Security expert
According to Deep South Watch (DSW), a think-tank attached to the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani province, between 2004-2007, the average number of insurgency-related violent incidents per year was 1,926.
From 2009-2014, the annual figure dropped by about half to 1,027 incidents year. The past two years saw a further drop to about 60-70 incidents per months, or 840 annually.
DSW’s director, Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, said outsourcing security work to local militia was part of the military’s long-term strategy to reduce personnel and cut costs.
“The presence and number of the military personnel is still significant and the military operation will remain pretty much the same. The trade off is that the Royal Thai Army will be able to reduce spending significantly because of the withdrawal of troops but efficiency in the on-the-ground operations will inevitably be reduced because local militia will not have the same capability as the regular soldiers,” Srisompob said.
Suhaimee Dulasa, the director of foreign relations for the Patani Institute, a local civil society organization, said, “A professional army, if properly trained, should be in better position to carry out peace-building operation in a conflict such as this one in the Pattani region. Arming local civilians and putting their lives on the line is not the solution.”
“Moreover, meaningful changes can only come about if the Thai Army comes to the understanding that military means will not solve this long-standing conflict. The Thai state will have to open up political space for meaningful discussion to get to the root causes if they want to resolve this conflict,” Suhaimee said.
Friday, 9 September 2016
A dangerous waiting game: Thailand's aspirations for peace
Bangkok demands insurgent groups in the south cease militant operations before any agreement is made
Relatives and mourners perform burial rites during a funeral for a father and his four-year-old daughter killed by a bomb blast in front of a school in the Takbai district of Thailand's restive southern province of Narathiwat on Sept. 6. An anonymous source from the separatist militant group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has admitted responsibility for the deadly bombing. (Photo by AFP)
Don Pathan, Pattani
Thailand UCA News
September 8, 2016
UCA News
The peace dialogue between the Thai government and separatist groups under the umbrella of Majlis Syura Patani (MARA Patani) has reached a critical juncture. The main hurdle is that ongoing violence on the ground has placed the government in a very awkward position.
Currently, Bangkok is not letting up with their demands that violence be subsided before they ink any agreement with MARA Patani. The problem is that Thai security officials believe that the group has little or no control over the militants behind a spate of attacks in the country, the most recent being a bombing outside a school in the restive south on Sept. 6. A father and his young daughter were killed in the attack allegedly carried out by insurgents.
A source from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the one group that controls the vast majority of combatants on the ground, admitted that its militants were behind the attack but expressed grave remorse at the death of the father and his child.
The target was the police, which BRN said were "legitimate," and that the bomb exploded half an hour after the school had already started, said the operative who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not permitted to speak to the media.
There were also a recent car bomb attack at a major hotel and a powerful blast targeting a train. Both of these incidents were in the province of Pattani, the capital of the Malays' historical homeland.
About two million people reside in this historically contested region where about 85 percent are ethnically Malays who have a long standing mistrust of the Thai state and its policy of assimilation that they feel come at the expense of their cultural and religious identity. These two attacks were likewise carried out by the BRN.
It was BRN's way of letting both the Thai government and MARA Patani know of their disapproval of the ongoing peace initiative that was first launched by the government of Yingluck Shinwatra in February 2013 and continued by the current military government that ousted her in May 2014.
Even with Yingluck's initiative, which was kicked off by her fugitive brother former premier Thaksin one year before the official launch, BRN wasted no time to let Bangkok know that there is no short cut to peace. Two weeks after Thaksin met with 16 exiled leaders to convince them to come on board of a planned peace talk, BRN in late March 2012 set off a simultaneous triple car bomb in the heart of Yala, killing 14 people and injuring a further 130.
'Safety zone'
This year, the BRN demonstrated their displeasure of the peace initiative in March when scores of its combatants took over a hospital in Narathiwat province's Cho Ai Rong, one of the districts that Thailand wanted to be placed within a "safety zone." The hospital was used to stage a massive attack on a Paramilitary Ranger camp next door.
The safety zone initiative was Bangkok's way of determining whether MARA Patani could actually carry out unilateral ceasefire to demonstrate that it actually has command-and-control over the insurgents on the ground.
BRN wasted little time to demonstrate that MARA Patani doesn't have such control.
But the subject of the safety zones didn't go away and came up again in a Sept. 2 meeting between Thai negotiators and MARA Patani leaders. The heads of the umbrella organization had already suffered a great deal of humiliation last April when Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha refused to give into their demands by signing a negotiated terms of reference that would make their dialogue official and a binding process.
Prayut said he was not able to do so because MARA Patani were associated with "criminals," a term he used in reference to the combatants on the ground. But in actuality, he, like other Thai officials, is waiting to see if MARA Patani could actually influence the course of violence on the ground.
Prayut further described the talk with MARA Patani as a burden that was created by the Yingluck government that was unfairly imposed on him.
And so when the topic of safety zone in the context of the public security came up at the Sept. 2 talks, BRN combatants chose the State Railway of Thailand as their target to discredit the peace initiative.
"You can't really get any more public than hitting a passenger train," said Suhaimee Dulasa, a youth activist from Patani Institute, a local civil society organization critical of the conduct of the state security apparatus.
Like previous attacks, BRN has shown some restraints and went for the carrier that wasn't carrying local passengers. One railway worker died from the blast and two other personnel were wounded.
A Thai military intelligence officer said BRN also employed the same practices when they set off a massive car bomb at a Pattani hotel on Aug. 23. The bomb, about 90 kilograms in weight, was meant to destroy the facility but not to rake up the body count.
Investigators pointed to a much smaller one that was set off 45 minutes earlier, about 100 meters away, which was supposed to be a warning to the people to leave the immediate area.
But while BRN said they do not endorse the ongoing talks between MARA Patani and the Thai government, it doesn't mean that they don't want to negotiate with Thailand.
BRN wants Bangkok to deal with them directly but they will come to the negotiating table only if they are properly prepared. This means the members of their political wing need to be more familiar with capacity building and understanding of international norms. These are basic requirements for them be recognized and accepted by Thailand and the international community.
The train blast occurred three weeks after a series of bombing incidents that killed four and wounded dozens in the seven provinces in the upper south, a region popular among foreign visitors and local tourists.
Unlike previous attacks outside of the conflict-affected region in the far south, BRN has been tight lipped about the attacks in the seven provinces and refrained to relay their message through the normal channel of communication to the policy makers in Bangkok.
BRN sources said the organization tends to react to something they don't like rather than issuing specific demands. Their mode of operation, for the time being, is to make the contested region ungovernable, as much as possible, until they are prepared to come to the negotiating table. This means Bangkok would have to permit the international community to recognize and work with BRN in the area of capacity building. Until then, Thailand can expect to see ongoing violence.
Don Pathan is an associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting, Ltd. and is based in Yala, one of Thailand's three southernmost provinces hit by the current wave of insurgency.
Friday, 26 August 2016
Triple bomb blasts in Pattani leave authorities more confused
DON PATHAN
PATTANI
The Nation
LIKE PREVIOUS attacks by Malay-Muslim separatist militants, the latest three bomb blasts have forced Thai security planners to scramble for answers amid growing fears that the vio‐ lence in the far South may be crossing a new threshold.
On Tuesday night, suspected insurgents packed two 80-kilogram bombs inside a stolen ambulance and parked it at the front door of Pattani’s Southern View Hotel. The driver, who drove to the vicinity with the siren on, jumped out of the vehicle and hopped on to a waiting motorbike before driving off.
A minute later, the bombs went off. The explosion ripped through the hotel’s lobby, shattering windows both in the hotel and surrounding shop houses, shredding vehicles and motorbikes parked nearby and sending shockwaves across the country, which has yet to come to terms with the recent spate of bombings in seven provinces in the upper South.
As expected, policymakers in Bangkok insist that the Tuesday night attacks in Pattani were not related to the ones two weeks earlier.
Suhaimee Dulasa, a senior member of the Patani Institute, a local civil society organisation, said he was perplexed at suggestions that the Tuesday night bombings, were meant to force the Thai government to make concessions at the negotiating table with MARA Patani.
“People in the region and just about everybody monitoring peace initiatives for the Patani region know very well that MARA Patani does not have any command or control over the combatants on the ground,” Suhaimee said.
From the looks of it, the bombs used on Tuesday night were deadly but not meant to come up with a body count.
The first bomb, a very small one, went off at about 10.30pm just outside a discotheque about 100 metres from the hotel. Nobody is really sure what to make of this explosion, be‐ cause it does not match previous attacks.
Previously, the first bomb – usually a small one – is intended to draw security officials to the site of the attack, where they are greeted by a much bigger and more deadly bomb set off by someone within the line of vision. A third bomb detonated harmlessly.
However, the one on Tuesday night was different, as the explosives-packed vehicle was parked more than 100 metres from the first bomb. And a timer was used to explode it. The incident has made political leaders even more confused as they work to quell growing fears that the attacks two weeks ago and the one on Tuesday night are related.
If the attacks in upper South were the work of suspected insurgents as suggested by officials, then it would mean the government’s policy for the restive region has failed, despite authorities claiming they are on the right track. The fact that the insurgents have the audacity to
continue with such attacks despite heightened security across the country suggests that they have no respect for the country’s security apparatus, local officials said.
http://www.pressreader.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/thailand/the-nation/20160825/textview 1/2
9/5/2016 Triple bomb blasts in Pattani leave authorities more confused

PATTANI
The Nation
LIKE PREVIOUS attacks by Malay-Muslim separatist militants, the latest three bomb blasts have forced Thai security planners to scramble for answers amid growing fears that the vio‐ lence in the far South may be crossing a new threshold.
On Tuesday night, suspected insurgents packed two 80-kilogram bombs inside a stolen ambulance and parked it at the front door of Pattani’s Southern View Hotel. The driver, who drove to the vicinity with the siren on, jumped out of the vehicle and hopped on to a waiting motorbike before driving off.
A minute later, the bombs went off. The explosion ripped through the hotel’s lobby, shattering windows both in the hotel and surrounding shop houses, shredding vehicles and motorbikes parked nearby and sending shockwaves across the country, which has yet to come to terms with the recent spate of bombings in seven provinces in the upper South.
As expected, policymakers in Bangkok insist that the Tuesday night attacks in Pattani were not related to the ones two weeks earlier.
Suhaimee Dulasa, a senior member of the Patani Institute, a local civil society organisation, said he was perplexed at suggestions that the Tuesday night bombings, were meant to force the Thai government to make concessions at the negotiating table with MARA Patani.
“People in the region and just about everybody monitoring peace initiatives for the Patani region know very well that MARA Patani does not have any command or control over the combatants on the ground,” Suhaimee said.
From the looks of it, the bombs used on Tuesday night were deadly but not meant to come up with a body count.
The first bomb, a very small one, went off at about 10.30pm just outside a discotheque about 100 metres from the hotel. Nobody is really sure what to make of this explosion, be‐ cause it does not match previous attacks.
Previously, the first bomb – usually a small one – is intended to draw security officials to the site of the attack, where they are greeted by a much bigger and more deadly bomb set off by someone within the line of vision. A third bomb detonated harmlessly.
However, the one on Tuesday night was different, as the explosives-packed vehicle was parked more than 100 metres from the first bomb. And a timer was used to explode it. The incident has made political leaders even more confused as they work to quell growing fears that the attacks two weeks ago and the one on Tuesday night are related.
If the attacks in upper South were the work of suspected insurgents as suggested by officials, then it would mean the government’s policy for the restive region has failed, despite authorities claiming they are on the right track. The fact that the insurgents have the audacity to
continue with such attacks despite heightened security across the country suggests that they have no respect for the country’s security apparatus, local officials said.
http://www.pressreader.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/thailand/the-nation/20160825/textview 1/2
9/5/2016 Triple bomb blasts in Pattani leave authorities more confused

Tuesday, 23 August 2016
Thai bomb probe underlines divide in insurgency groups
Thai investigators believe largest, most heavily armed of deep South rebel groups behind Aug 11-12 spate of attacks
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
A spate of bombings that killed four people and injured around 35 in Thailand’s south are expected to have negative repercussions on ongoing peace talks between the government and Malay Muslim rebels in the far South.
In spite of silence from policy makers in Bangkok, Thai investigators believe the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -- the largest and most heavily armed of the deep South rebel groups -- was behind the Aug. 11-12 spate of attacks.
They were hoping members of an umbrella organization, MARA Patani -- which is claiming to represent many rebel units in peace discussions with the government -- could help shed light, or perhaps act as go-between with the BRN, but MARA has decided to give the Thais a cold shoulder.
Thailand's military government has been in discussion with MARA since 2015, but Thai officials said this week that the unofficial “pre-negotiation” talk will now be pushed to the back burner as it is becoming increasingly clear that MARA could not (or would not) provide information on the perpetrators behind the bombing and arson attacks in seven tourist destinations in the upper south.
Talking to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the information, security officials said they were hoping that members of MARA could assist, but were left frustrated -- yet unsurprised -- by their brush off given junta leader-cum-Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha's recent dismissiveness of the group.
Although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombings, officials (despite initially stonewalling) now say they believe that the attacks were linked to the trouble in Thailand's far South, in which more than 7,000 people have been killed since January 2004 when insurgency flared up in the majority Muslim, Malay speaking southernmost border provinces.
All fingers, they say, point to the BRN, the one group that Thai and international observers say controls the vast majority of the combatants on the ground.
Anadolu Agency tried to seek comment from BRN on the attacks earlier this week, but officials declined a response.
MARA Patani surfaced in August 2015 and made three key demands as attempted to negotiate: immunity for all key members, official recognition of the group as the government’s counterpart in the peace talks, and to make the negotiations to find peace in the south a national agenda.
These demands must be met before a formal negotiation process can take place, they said.
From August 2015 to April 2016, representatives from the two sides met on several occasions to nail out the terms of reference (TOR) for a formal process, but when it came to signing the TOR, Thailand balked.
Chan-ocha told reporters in April that he could not recognize MARA because the organization was associated with “criminal” elements.
Thai officials, however, claim that reference to “criminals” -- combatants on the ground -- was just a convenient excuse. The real reason they say has to do with Bangkok’s unwillingness to grant any Patani Malay separatist movement any more legitimacy than they think they deserve.
Moreover, said the source, Chan-ocha does not believe that MARA has any influence over combatants on the ground.
In spite of the ill feeling stemming from Chan-ocha’s statement, the two sides are expected to meet early next month in Kuala Lumpur to continue with the TOR, although Thai officials say any reference agreement will be “very diluted”.
Although MARA Patani does have a handful of self-proclaimed BRN members on its executive board, combatants on the ground have told Anadolu Agency that they do not take orders from the organization or the self-proclaimed representatives.
Since its existence, MARA has consistently tried to make itself relevant. This includes reaching out to the international community, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 57-member world body made up of Muslim countries.
MARA met an OIC delegation in Kuala Lumpur last January in spite of objection from the Bangkok government, but during the OIC Summit in Turkey this year, the Thai government succeeded in convincing OIC not to make any reference to MARA Patani in the final communique.
In the past, such ambiguity over the extent of MARA’s influence over combatants on the ground has played in their favor, as they know that Thailand desperately wants to curb daily violence to show the public that the military is progressing in the right direction.
On its launch, in August 2015, the movement claimed to have some 9,000 fighters on the ground, but over time -- as insurgents continued to carry out attacks while violating humanitarian principles -- MARA decided to recalibrate their position and distance themselves from the old claim.
One example was a March 2016 operation in Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district, when scores of separatist militants used a local hospital to stage an attack on the army’s Paramilitary Ranger unit next door.
BRN said the attacks were meant to discredit the Thai-MARA peace initiative because the very district in which the ranger unit was located was poised to be designated as a cease-fire zone.
As a way to test if MARA has any influence with the combatants on the ground, Thai negotiators had requested that three districts in Thailand’s far South come under a so-called “safety zone”. BRN insurgents on the ground, however, sabotaged the plan to show that they were the ones in control of the situation, according to a source in the movement.
After a barrage of criticism from local residents and human rights organizations, MARA decided to play it safe by denying any involvement and criticizing the use of a hospital as a staging ground.
BRN, which now sees MARA as a rival (as the two compete to win over combatants on the ground), has told Anadolu Agency that in spite of the criticism of the use of the hospital, discrediting the Thailand-MARA peace initiative was well worth it.
And the security sources say the Aug. 11-12 bombings were another moment of truth for MARA.
“MARA Patani has chosen to play it safe by distancing themselves from insurgency violence in the deep South, especially the ones that clearly violate humanitarian norms,” said a Thai security officer monitoring the conflict.
Moreover, it has actively come out against the perpetrators, many of whom it at one time claimed to represent.
“I personally strongly condemn the recent incidents that targeted innocent civilians,” Kasturi Mahkota, a key figure from MARA, said in a statement issued soon after the explosions.
Kasturi is the president of one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) factions, which signed up with MARA last year.
With the gap between the groups and those on the ground increasing, questions are being asked as to how talks can possibly continue, with MARA Patani seemingly having little control over the insurgents.
BRN officials have told Anadolu Agency that they will only talk peace with Thailand if they are given the same training in negotiations and diplomacy by the international community and foreign states afforded to rebel groups in Indonesia’s Aceh and the Philippines’ Mindanao.
As for MARA Patani, Thai security officials said they would almost certainly now evolve into a purely political entity and take up social-political issues.
“They could even liaise between Bangkok and BRN, assuming if this is acceptable to all sides,” one official underlined to Anadolu Agency.
Don Pathan is an associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting, Ltd and is based in Yala, one of Thailand's three southernmost provinces hit by the current wave of insurgency
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
A spate of bombings that killed four people and injured around 35 in Thailand’s south are expected to have negative repercussions on ongoing peace talks between the government and Malay Muslim rebels in the far South.
In spite of silence from policy makers in Bangkok, Thai investigators believe the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -- the largest and most heavily armed of the deep South rebel groups -- was behind the Aug. 11-12 spate of attacks.
They were hoping members of an umbrella organization, MARA Patani -- which is claiming to represent many rebel units in peace discussions with the government -- could help shed light, or perhaps act as go-between with the BRN, but MARA has decided to give the Thais a cold shoulder.
Thailand's military government has been in discussion with MARA since 2015, but Thai officials said this week that the unofficial “pre-negotiation” talk will now be pushed to the back burner as it is becoming increasingly clear that MARA could not (or would not) provide information on the perpetrators behind the bombing and arson attacks in seven tourist destinations in the upper south.
Talking to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the information, security officials said they were hoping that members of MARA could assist, but were left frustrated -- yet unsurprised -- by their brush off given junta leader-cum-Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha's recent dismissiveness of the group.
Although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombings, officials (despite initially stonewalling) now say they believe that the attacks were linked to the trouble in Thailand's far South, in which more than 7,000 people have been killed since January 2004 when insurgency flared up in the majority Muslim, Malay speaking southernmost border provinces.
All fingers, they say, point to the BRN, the one group that Thai and international observers say controls the vast majority of the combatants on the ground.
Anadolu Agency tried to seek comment from BRN on the attacks earlier this week, but officials declined a response.
MARA Patani surfaced in August 2015 and made three key demands as attempted to negotiate: immunity for all key members, official recognition of the group as the government’s counterpart in the peace talks, and to make the negotiations to find peace in the south a national agenda.
These demands must be met before a formal negotiation process can take place, they said.
From August 2015 to April 2016, representatives from the two sides met on several occasions to nail out the terms of reference (TOR) for a formal process, but when it came to signing the TOR, Thailand balked.
Chan-ocha told reporters in April that he could not recognize MARA because the organization was associated with “criminal” elements.
Thai officials, however, claim that reference to “criminals” -- combatants on the ground -- was just a convenient excuse. The real reason they say has to do with Bangkok’s unwillingness to grant any Patani Malay separatist movement any more legitimacy than they think they deserve.
Moreover, said the source, Chan-ocha does not believe that MARA has any influence over combatants on the ground.
In spite of the ill feeling stemming from Chan-ocha’s statement, the two sides are expected to meet early next month in Kuala Lumpur to continue with the TOR, although Thai officials say any reference agreement will be “very diluted”.
Although MARA Patani does have a handful of self-proclaimed BRN members on its executive board, combatants on the ground have told Anadolu Agency that they do not take orders from the organization or the self-proclaimed representatives.
Since its existence, MARA has consistently tried to make itself relevant. This includes reaching out to the international community, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 57-member world body made up of Muslim countries.
MARA met an OIC delegation in Kuala Lumpur last January in spite of objection from the Bangkok government, but during the OIC Summit in Turkey this year, the Thai government succeeded in convincing OIC not to make any reference to MARA Patani in the final communique.
In the past, such ambiguity over the extent of MARA’s influence over combatants on the ground has played in their favor, as they know that Thailand desperately wants to curb daily violence to show the public that the military is progressing in the right direction.
On its launch, in August 2015, the movement claimed to have some 9,000 fighters on the ground, but over time -- as insurgents continued to carry out attacks while violating humanitarian principles -- MARA decided to recalibrate their position and distance themselves from the old claim.
One example was a March 2016 operation in Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district, when scores of separatist militants used a local hospital to stage an attack on the army’s Paramilitary Ranger unit next door.
BRN said the attacks were meant to discredit the Thai-MARA peace initiative because the very district in which the ranger unit was located was poised to be designated as a cease-fire zone.
As a way to test if MARA has any influence with the combatants on the ground, Thai negotiators had requested that three districts in Thailand’s far South come under a so-called “safety zone”. BRN insurgents on the ground, however, sabotaged the plan to show that they were the ones in control of the situation, according to a source in the movement.
After a barrage of criticism from local residents and human rights organizations, MARA decided to play it safe by denying any involvement and criticizing the use of a hospital as a staging ground.
BRN, which now sees MARA as a rival (as the two compete to win over combatants on the ground), has told Anadolu Agency that in spite of the criticism of the use of the hospital, discrediting the Thailand-MARA peace initiative was well worth it.
And the security sources say the Aug. 11-12 bombings were another moment of truth for MARA.
“MARA Patani has chosen to play it safe by distancing themselves from insurgency violence in the deep South, especially the ones that clearly violate humanitarian norms,” said a Thai security officer monitoring the conflict.
Moreover, it has actively come out against the perpetrators, many of whom it at one time claimed to represent.
“I personally strongly condemn the recent incidents that targeted innocent civilians,” Kasturi Mahkota, a key figure from MARA, said in a statement issued soon after the explosions.
Kasturi is the president of one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) factions, which signed up with MARA last year.
With the gap between the groups and those on the ground increasing, questions are being asked as to how talks can possibly continue, with MARA Patani seemingly having little control over the insurgents.
BRN officials have told Anadolu Agency that they will only talk peace with Thailand if they are given the same training in negotiations and diplomacy by the international community and foreign states afforded to rebel groups in Indonesia’s Aceh and the Philippines’ Mindanao.
As for MARA Patani, Thai security officials said they would almost certainly now evolve into a purely political entity and take up social-political issues.
“They could even liaise between Bangkok and BRN, assuming if this is acceptable to all sides,” one official underlined to Anadolu Agency.
Don Pathan is an associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting, Ltd and is based in Yala, one of Thailand's three southernmost provinces hit by the current wave of insurgency
http://aa.com.tr/en/analysis-news/thai-bomb-probe-underlines-divide-in-insurgency-groups/633700
Thai bomb probe underlines divide in insurgency groups
Thai investigators believe largest, most heavily armed of deep South rebel groups behind Aug 11-12 spate of attacks
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
A spate of bombings that killed four people and injured around 35 in Thailand’s south are expected to have negative repercussions on ongoing peace talks between the government and Malay Muslim rebels in the far South.
In spite of silence from policy makers in Bangkok, Thai investigators believe the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -- the largest and most heavily armed of the deep South rebel groups -- was behind the Aug. 11-12 spate of attacks.
They were hoping members of an umbrella organization, MARA Patani -- which is claiming to represent many rebel units in peace discussions with the government -- could help shed light, or perhaps act as go-between with the BRN, but MARA has decided to give the Thais a cold shoulder.
Thailand's military government has been in discussion with MARA since 2015, but Thai officials said this week that the unofficial “pre-negotiation” talk will now be pushed to the back burner as it is becoming increasingly clear that MARA could not (or would not) provide information on the perpetrators behind the bombing and arson attacks in seven tourist destinations in the upper south.
Talking to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the information, security officials said they were hoping that members of MARA could assist, but were left frustrated -- yet unsurprised -- by their brush off given junta leader-cum-Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha's recent dismissiveness of the group.
Although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombings, officials (despite initially stonewalling) now say they believe that the attacks were linked to the trouble in Thailand's far South, in which more than 7,000 people have been killed since January 2004 when insurgency flared up in the majority Muslim, Malay speaking southernmost border provinces.
All fingers, they say, point to the BRN, the one group that Thai and international observers say controls the vast majority of the combatants on the ground.
Anadolu Agency tried to seek comment from BRN on the attacks earlier this week, but officials declined a response.
MARA Patani surfaced in August 2015 and made three key demands as attempted to negotiate: immunity for all key members, official recognition of the group as the government’s counterpart in the peace talks, and to make the negotiations to find peace in the south a national agenda.
These demands must be met before a formal negotiation process can take place, they said.
From August 2015 to April 2016, representatives from the two sides met on several occasions to nail out the terms of reference (TOR) for a formal process, but when it came to signing the TOR, Thailand balked.
Chan-ocha told reporters in April that he could not recognize MARA because the organization was associated with “criminal” elements.
Thai officials, however, claim that reference to “criminals” -- combatants on the ground -- was just a convenient excuse. The real reason they say has to do with Bangkok’s unwillingness to grant any Patani Malay separatist movement any more legitimacy than they think they deserve.
Moreover, said the source, Chan-ocha does not believe that MARA has any influence over combatants on the ground.
In spite of the ill feeling stemming from Chan-ocha’s statement, the two sides are expected to meet early next month in Kuala Lumpur to continue with the TOR, although Thai officials say any reference agreement will be “very diluted”.
Although MARA Patani does have a handful of self-proclaimed BRN members on its executive board, combatants on the ground have told Anadolu Agency that they do not take orders from the organization or the self-proclaimed representatives.
Since its existence, MARA has consistently tried to make itself relevant. This includes reaching out to the international community, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 57-member world body made up of Muslim countries.
MARA met an OIC delegation in Kuala Lumpur last January in spite of objection from the Bangkok government, but during the OIC Summit in Turkey this year, the Thai government succeeded in convincing OIC not to make any reference to MARA Patani in the final communique.
In the past, such ambiguity over the extent of MARA’s influence over combatants on the ground has played in their favor, as they know that Thailand desperately wants to curb daily violence to show the public that the military is progressing in the right direction.
On its launch, in August 2015, the movement claimed to have some 9,000 fighters on the ground, but over time -- as insurgents continued to carry out attacks while violating humanitarian principles -- MARA decided to recalibrate their position and distance themselves from the old claim.
One example was a March 2016 operation in Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district, when scores of separatist militants used a local hospital to stage an attack on the army’s Paramilitary Ranger unit next door.
BRN said the attacks were meant to discredit the Thai-MARA peace initiative because the very district in which the ranger unit was located was poised to be designated as a cease-fire zone.
As a way to test if MARA has any influence with the combatants on the ground, Thai negotiators had requested that three districts in Thailand’s far South come under a so-called “safety zone”. BRN insurgents on the ground, however, sabotaged the plan to show that they were the ones in control of the situation, according to a source in the movement.
After a barrage of criticism from local residents and human rights organizations, MARA decided to play it safe by denying any involvement and criticizing the use of a hospital as a staging ground.
BRN, which now sees MARA as a rival (as the two compete to win over combatants on the ground), has told Anadolu Agency that in spite of the criticism of the use of the hospital, discrediting the Thailand-MARA peace initiative was well worth it.
And the security sources say the Aug. 11-12 bombings were another moment of truth for MARA.
“MARA Patani has chosen to play it safe by distancing themselves from insurgency violence in the deep South, especially the ones that clearly violate humanitarian norms,” said a Thai security officer monitoring the conflict.
Moreover, it has actively come out against the perpetrators, many of whom it at one time claimed to represent.
“I personally strongly condemn the recent incidents that targeted innocent civilians,” Kasturi Mahkota, a key figure from MARA, said in a statement issued soon after the explosions.
Kasturi is the president of one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) factions, which signed up with MARA last year.
With the gap between the groups and those on the ground increasing, questions are being asked as to how talks can possibly continue, with MARA Patani seemingly having little control over the insurgents.
BRN officials have told Anadolu Agency that they will only talk peace with Thailand if they are given the same training in negotiations and diplomacy by the international community and foreign states afforded to rebel groups in Indonesia’s Aceh and the Philippines’ Mindanao.
As for MARA Patani, Thai security officials said they would almost certainly now evolve into a purely political entity and take up social-political issues.
“They could even liaise between Bangkok and BRN, assuming if this is acceptable to all sides,” one official underlined to Anadolu Agency.
Don Pathan is an associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting, Ltd and is based in Yala, one of Thailand's three southernmost provinces hit by the current wave of insurgency
Don Pathan
YALA, Thailand
A spate of bombings that killed four people and injured around 35 in Thailand’s south are expected to have negative repercussions on ongoing peace talks between the government and Malay Muslim rebels in the far South.
In spite of silence from policy makers in Bangkok, Thai investigators believe the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -- the largest and most heavily armed of the deep South rebel groups -- was behind the Aug. 11-12 spate of attacks.
They were hoping members of an umbrella organization, MARA Patani -- which is claiming to represent many rebel units in peace discussions with the government -- could help shed light, or perhaps act as go-between with the BRN, but MARA has decided to give the Thais a cold shoulder.
Thailand's military government has been in discussion with MARA since 2015, but Thai officials said this week that the unofficial “pre-negotiation” talk will now be pushed to the back burner as it is becoming increasingly clear that MARA could not (or would not) provide information on the perpetrators behind the bombing and arson attacks in seven tourist destinations in the upper south.
Talking to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the information, security officials said they were hoping that members of MARA could assist, but were left frustrated -- yet unsurprised -- by their brush off given junta leader-cum-Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha's recent dismissiveness of the group.
Although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombings, officials (despite initially stonewalling) now say they believe that the attacks were linked to the trouble in Thailand's far South, in which more than 7,000 people have been killed since January 2004 when insurgency flared up in the majority Muslim, Malay speaking southernmost border provinces.
All fingers, they say, point to the BRN, the one group that Thai and international observers say controls the vast majority of the combatants on the ground.
Anadolu Agency tried to seek comment from BRN on the attacks earlier this week, but officials declined a response.
MARA Patani surfaced in August 2015 and made three key demands as attempted to negotiate: immunity for all key members, official recognition of the group as the government’s counterpart in the peace talks, and to make the negotiations to find peace in the south a national agenda.
These demands must be met before a formal negotiation process can take place, they said.
From August 2015 to April 2016, representatives from the two sides met on several occasions to nail out the terms of reference (TOR) for a formal process, but when it came to signing the TOR, Thailand balked.
Chan-ocha told reporters in April that he could not recognize MARA because the organization was associated with “criminal” elements.
Thai officials, however, claim that reference to “criminals” -- combatants on the ground -- was just a convenient excuse. The real reason they say has to do with Bangkok’s unwillingness to grant any Patani Malay separatist movement any more legitimacy than they think they deserve.
Moreover, said the source, Chan-ocha does not believe that MARA has any influence over combatants on the ground.
In spite of the ill feeling stemming from Chan-ocha’s statement, the two sides are expected to meet early next month in Kuala Lumpur to continue with the TOR, although Thai officials say any reference agreement will be “very diluted”.
Although MARA Patani does have a handful of self-proclaimed BRN members on its executive board, combatants on the ground have told Anadolu Agency that they do not take orders from the organization or the self-proclaimed representatives.
Since its existence, MARA has consistently tried to make itself relevant. This includes reaching out to the international community, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 57-member world body made up of Muslim countries.
MARA met an OIC delegation in Kuala Lumpur last January in spite of objection from the Bangkok government, but during the OIC Summit in Turkey this year, the Thai government succeeded in convincing OIC not to make any reference to MARA Patani in the final communique.
In the past, such ambiguity over the extent of MARA’s influence over combatants on the ground has played in their favor, as they know that Thailand desperately wants to curb daily violence to show the public that the military is progressing in the right direction.
On its launch, in August 2015, the movement claimed to have some 9,000 fighters on the ground, but over time -- as insurgents continued to carry out attacks while violating humanitarian principles -- MARA decided to recalibrate their position and distance themselves from the old claim.
One example was a March 2016 operation in Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district, when scores of separatist militants used a local hospital to stage an attack on the army’s Paramilitary Ranger unit next door.
BRN said the attacks were meant to discredit the Thai-MARA peace initiative because the very district in which the ranger unit was located was poised to be designated as a cease-fire zone.
As a way to test if MARA has any influence with the combatants on the ground, Thai negotiators had requested that three districts in Thailand’s far South come under a so-called “safety zone”. BRN insurgents on the ground, however, sabotaged the plan to show that they were the ones in control of the situation, according to a source in the movement.
After a barrage of criticism from local residents and human rights organizations, MARA decided to play it safe by denying any involvement and criticizing the use of a hospital as a staging ground.
BRN, which now sees MARA as a rival (as the two compete to win over combatants on the ground), has told Anadolu Agency that in spite of the criticism of the use of the hospital, discrediting the Thailand-MARA peace initiative was well worth it.
And the security sources say the Aug. 11-12 bombings were another moment of truth for MARA.
“MARA Patani has chosen to play it safe by distancing themselves from insurgency violence in the deep South, especially the ones that clearly violate humanitarian norms,” said a Thai security officer monitoring the conflict.
Moreover, it has actively come out against the perpetrators, many of whom it at one time claimed to represent.
“I personally strongly condemn the recent incidents that targeted innocent civilians,” Kasturi Mahkota, a key figure from MARA, said in a statement issued soon after the explosions.
Kasturi is the president of one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) factions, which signed up with MARA last year.
With the gap between the groups and those on the ground increasing, questions are being asked as to how talks can possibly continue, with MARA Patani seemingly having little control over the insurgents.
BRN officials have told Anadolu Agency that they will only talk peace with Thailand if they are given the same training in negotiations and diplomacy by the international community and foreign states afforded to rebel groups in Indonesia’s Aceh and the Philippines’ Mindanao.
As for MARA Patani, Thai security officials said they would almost certainly now evolve into a purely political entity and take up social-political issues.
“They could even liaise between Bangkok and BRN, assuming if this is acceptable to all sides,” one official underlined to Anadolu Agency.
Don Pathan is an associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting, Ltd and is based in Yala, one of Thailand's three southernmost provinces hit by the current wave of insurgency
http://aa.com.tr/en/analysis-news/thai-bomb-probe-underlines-divide-in-insurgency-groups/633700
Monday, 15 August 2016
NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW: Thai military and insurgents change tack in southern provinces
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Thai-military-and-insurgents-change-tack-in-southern-provinces
August 15, 2016 12:30 am JST
Thai military and insurgents change tack in southern provinces
DON PATHAN, Contributing writer
A lightly armored pickup truck transporting five Defense Volunteers and two local officials was hit by a roadside bomb on Aug. 3 in Southern Thailand, after the group met with local villagers to encourage them to vote "yes" in the Aug. 7 referendum on the constitution. © Wartani News
SI SAKHON, NARATHIWAT, Thailand -- Even as fingers are pointed at southern separatists as among possible suspects behind a string of bombing and arson attacks on Aug. 11 and 12 in southern Thailand, the Thai military is shifting strategy on countering the 12-year old insurgency. By October, the Thai army will reduce its presence in the historically contested southernmost provinces, in favor of outsourcing security responsibilities to volunteers and officials at the village level.
Village chiefs, provincial governors, district chiefs and paramilitary Defense Volunteers, who normally take their orders from the Thai interior ministry, are being assigned more onerous security duties. These include patrolling violence-prone areas alongside regular army soldiers and paramilitary Rangers. The concept -- known as the Tung Yang Daeng model, after a district in Pattani province where it was introduced -- is to put the volunteers rather than regular soldiers in the line of fire of insurgents. In the past, the rebels have shown that they prefer to leave local people alone.
Thai army and police officials said that these village volunteers are often relatives of the insurgents in this restive region, where 90% of the 2 million population see themselves as ethnic Malay Muslims.
Up to now, village chiefs, their deputies and the Defense Volunteers have been largely unchallenged by the insurgents as long as they do not engage in intelligence-gathering activities for the government forces.
The Fourth Army Area command, which is responsible for security in the region, has also taken a more hands-off stance toward village officials, allowing them to carry out routine administrative tasks such as registering births and deaths. The officials are lightly armed and are not expected to do much more than defend themselves if required.
But all that could change with the shift of local volunteer forces to the frontline. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha recently set a deadline for troops from Thailand's central, north, and northeast commands to withdraw from the region by October after being posted there since 2007. The withdrawal of non-local troops has been considered for some years, but a decision was finally reached in November 2014, six months after the coup that brought Prayuth to power.
At the time, Lt. General Prakarn Chonlayut, then commander of the Fourth Army Area, announced that local militia would replace the outgoing conscript troops. Citing the drop in insurgency incidents, Prakarn said the situation was improving and that it was time to scale back the central government's military presence. He explained that "locals are the ones who know the area best."
Some experts doubt that the region -- and the local volunteers -- are ready to shoulder the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. "The government's assertion that they can do this now because violence is down is a misnomer. If you look at the monthly rate of violence, the insurgents can ratchet it up at will," said Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington D.C., who has been monitoring the situation.
"There is a lot of concern about human rights violations by the Rangers. They are less disciplined and poorly trained; they think more about short-term tactical gains, than the long-term consequences of their actions," he added.
Bombings raise suspicion
Complicating the picture, the spate of 11 bombings and arson attacks in several Thai tourist resorts and southern towns on Aug. 11 and 12 has raised questions about whether the southern Thai insurgents are behind the attacks, for which no one has officially claimed responsibility.
The military-backed government has blamed the bombings on supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, the populist former prime minister who was ousted by the army in 2006. The pro-Thaksin forces opposed the new constitution proposed by the government, which was approved in an Aug. 7 national referendum.
Thai security officials told the Nikkei Asian Review it was too early to rule out the Malay separatists. They explained that the pro-Thaksin camp has virtually no presence in southern Thailand, where most of the recent bombings occurred, and the bombs used in the attacks "looked too much like the ones used by the insurgents in the far south." On Aug. 13, a Buddhist man from Chiang Mai was arrested and questioned about a possible connection to the bombings, adding to suspicions of a possible connection to the pro-Thaksin "red shirt" movement. A Buddhist suspect would conveniently support the government's narrative, while if a Malay Muslim was implicated, it would highlight the military's failure in the southern provinces.
An officer from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the dominant separatist group in the south, told the NAR that the drop in insurgency activity was mostly due to a change in the movement's strategy. The BRN controls more than 90% of the rebel combatants, according to Thai military intelligence officers. The BRN officer denied that the expansion of the army's security network, using ranger units, was the prime reason for the change. The officer added that he had no knowledge whether his movement was involved in the Aug. 11 and 12 terrorist attacks.
The conflict in recent months has fallen into a pattern of strikes and retaliatory attacks between the insurgents and security forces. "There are costs to employing violence -- getting caught, limited manpower, limited resources, loss of local support. But [the BRN insurgents] have proven they can still strike at will. For example, the military stepped up security across the south in the week ahead of the [constitutional] referendum. Violence surged nonetheless," Abuza said.
For example, a powerful homemade bomb attached to a parked motorcycle ripped through a lightly armored pickup truck carrying five Defense Volunteers and two senior provincial officials on Aug. 3. All seven survived, although a bystander was injured by shrapnel.
The group had just left a Volunteer camp where the members had met local villagers in efforts to convince them to vote in favor of the new constitution. An overwhelming majority in the region voted against the proposed charter on Aug. 7.
Among other small bomb attacks in the lead up to the referendum, on the night before the vote, telephone poles in nearby districts were bombed, causing temporary power outages across Narathiwat province.
BRN officials told the NAR that these attacks were a way of rejecting Thai sovereignty over the southern provinces. "Besides undermining Thailand's security apparatus, it was also an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities," said one BRN operative. But the local population has indicated growing opposition to the violence and has pressed the armed groups to change their tactics.
In particular, many Muslims have spoken out against attacks on soft targets, including religious sites, schools, teachers and Buddhist monks.
Violence peaked in 2007 when there were 1,850 insurgency-related violent incidents, according to the researchers at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani. That year also saw 164 schools targeted in arson attacks.
Since then, as an apparent result of public pressure, the number of incidents fell to 821 in 2008, with only 10 schools subjected to fire-bombings. The BRN officer admitted in an interview with the NAR that public pressure was one reason for the reduction in attacks, particularly against "soft" targets such as schools and markets. Even so, a string of bombings in May 2015 saw nearly 40 small bombs detonated in Yala, although no one was killed. The aim, according to another BRN member, was to demonstrate the group's capabilities and discredit the military.
Earlier in the long-running insurgency, the rebels resorted to beheading and castrating dead soldiers to "demoralize the local commanders and their units, especially those who had just been assigned to the region," said a BRN officer. But Muslim clerics have since ruled that this practice is out of line with Sharia law.
"Islam gives Muslims the right to fight their enemies but the juwae (fighter) has no right to mutilate their bodies after killing them," said one village imam, or religious leader.
Acknowledging the ability of local people to influence the insurgents, the government has attempted to find ways to use them to counter the separatists. In the first decade of the conflict, many local residents were employed as government clerks and assistants for the 60,000-strong security force in the region.
Outsourcing conflict
The big question behind the army's new thinking is whether the switch to outsource security responsibilities to villagers will work.
The army has encouraged local Muslims to join the Rangers, hoping they will serve as links between the security forces and the local community. The idea makes strategic sense for the Thai state but looks much less effective on the ground. Similar government thinking lies behind the creation of the Defense Volunteers Corps, which initially seemed to be a successful tactic, reducing the level of conflict.
But there are costs for social cohesion in local communities in this strategy. A Muslim Ranger manning an M60 machinegun in Si Sakhon district told the NAR that his decision to join the Rangers has turned him into a marked man who must take security precautions whenever he leaves the military camp. People from his village said he had "crossed the line" by joining the Rangers.
Indeed, the insurgents have shown their willingness to attack the local volunteer units if necessary, with 12 village headmen and 10 Defense Volunteers, most of them Muslims, killed in 2015, according to Abuza. So far this year, another seven headmen and seven Defense Volunteers have been killed. "So the cost of collaborating with the Thai government is not academic," he added.
Last July, the BRN attacked a Defense Volunteer camp for the first time. The assault, on a camp in Yala Province, was carried out by about 30 militants using machine guns and M79 grenades. BRN representatives told the NAR that no one was killed because the aim was to send a "stern warning" to local people who might take up arms against the insurgents. That warning was ignored by the Volunteers, a key factor no doubt in the Aug. 3 attack on their pickup truck.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting.
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Thai-military-and-insurgents-change-tack-in-southern-provinces
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