Thailand Grapples With Deadly Tensions Between Muslims, Buddhists (PBS NewsHour)

PBS NewsHour 

At least 5,000 people have been killed since 2004 in Thailand's three southern provinces amid ongoing mistrust between minority Muslims and majority Buddhists. Kira Kaye reports on efforts to resolve tensions as part of the new Fault Lines of Faith series, produced in partnership with the Bureau for International Reporting.

Click for more: http://to.pbs.org/xcqHfZ 

Rangers behind killings of funeral goers: Nong Chik villagers

Don Pathan

The Nation January 31, 2012 8:51 am

Authorities are debating about admitting that the shooting death of five villagers were "a case of mistaken identity" and pay compensation for the victims.

However complicating the mater is the fact that many senior security leaders have already jumped to the conclusion that the dead were insurgents.

According to informed sources from the Interior ministry, the army and the police, the shooting death of the five funeral goers, along with the three injured, were carried out by a group of paramilitary rangers from Pattani’s Nong Chik district after a heated argument between the two side.

A weapon was planted in their truck to make it seems that they were insurgents, the sources said.

"It was purely emotional that led to this. They were in a shouting match," the sources said. Their accounts matches the villagers’ version, but contradicted a number of senior military and Deputy Prime Minister Yuthasak Sasiprapa who pretty much concluded that the shooting were justified.

According to the sources, the funeral goers’ truck were stopped by a group of paramilitary ranger at one location and were instructed to take a detour because half an hour prior to that a group of insurgents had fired four M79 grenades into their base camp. Only one of the four grenade exploded, said the source.

The funeral goers followed the instruction of the first Paramilitary Ranger unit and took the detour as they were told. But when they ran into another unit of rangers, also on foot patrol to secure the area following the M79 attacks, the villagers were searched and told to get out of their trucks.

A heated debate broke out and couple of the Rangers commence fire at the truck, killing four at the scene and injured four others. The fifth victim died Monday.

District chief of Nong Chik and other non-military officers were not permitted to enter as the victims bleeds in their trucks. The district officers had to sneak into the village from the back, the local villagers and officials said.

"Some lives could have been saved," said Angkhana Neelaphaijit, head of the Justice for Peace Foundation. "There has to be a thorough investigation into this. A simple DNA check would revealed who planted the weapons in the truck. The military have lied to the people in the past about the killings in the deep South," she added.

The sources said there were survivors and possible eyewitness to the scene of the attack and a thorough investigation would prove that the villagers were innocent.

One way out of this, said the source from the army and Interior Ministry, is to admit to the killings but stated that it was a big misunderstanding and provide financial compensation to the families of the dead.

"Even if we clear this with the family of the victims, the damage is irreversible for many people in the community," said the army officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

There have been reports about possible peace process, a dialogue with the separatist movement, from various quarters, including the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC).

"If they are not willing to get to the bottom of this, you can forget about peace dialogue or what have you. This is another moment of truth for Thailand," Angkhana said.

Confusion reigns on 'peace processes' in the deep South

Don Pathan
The Nation 

Insurgents behind the violence in the South have used their attacks to gain attention from international organisations in a bid to draw them into the problem, Army Commander in Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha recently proclaimed to the media.

Prayuth's statement came a day after insurgents launched an attack on a security outpost in Pattani's Sai Buri district, drawing a reinforcement unit into a trap where a roadside bomb and gunfire wounded six soldiers.

The conflict in the Malay-speaking South is Thailand's internal affair and the authorities are making their best effort to deal with the problem, Prayuth said.

Unfortunately, their best is not good enough, and insurgents continue to hit wherever they like.

Billions have been spent to win them over and yet, local Malay Muslims, who account for more than 80 per cent of the local population, continue to turn a blind eye to the activities of the insurgents, as a way of providing tactical support. In some remote communities, armed insurgents walk around freely, strolling in and out of village teashops as if they are the actual law and order. Residents may not agree with the brutality but they certainly share the same sentiment as the militants on the ground.

Prayuth said the presence of international organisations would complicate the problem. But no one really understands what Prayuth's assumption is based upon. After all, if the insurgents wanted to attract international attention, they would not confine the violence to the Muslim-majority South.

It's only a few hours drive from the deep South to a number of high-profile tourist attractions in the upper South. Moreover, an overnight train ride can get them into Bangkok. The materials the insurgents have been using to make explosives can be easily purchased from local hardware stores.

The problem with Prayuth and other conservative Thai bureaucrats is that they do not want to debate the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malay historical homeland. If they did, they would see that the Malays embrace a different cultural and historical narrative from the rest of the country.

One way out of this confrontation, argues Professor Thanet Aphornsuvan in an East-West Centre publication, "Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories", is to acknowledge the differences.

"Without a basic understanding and appreciation of each other's cultures and ethno-religious identities, it will be difficult to have positive political will on both sides to seriously tackle the problems," Thanet said. "Hitherto, Bangkok sees the problem in the South as a separatist threat, while the Malay-Muslims see it as one of cultural and ethnic survival," he added. For a lasting peace to endure, said Thanet, "the Malay-Muslims must be allowed a significant role in bringing peace and prosperity back to the region".

But Bangkok has a tendency to think it knows best. Worse, Prayuth is basically saying things have to be done the Army's way or no way. That's why he immediately came out against the idea of autonomy for the region when it was floated by Yingluck Shinawatra during the last edlection campaign.

Incidentally no Pheu Thai candidate, all campaigning on the autonomy ticket, got a single seat in the region.

As expected, Yingluck and Pheu Thai went back on their word. Being indifferent to the Malays' feelings cost them nothing in political terms because they know the general public is indifferent to the Malays' predicament.

Perhaps autonomy is not the answer. Perhaps it is more about justice and equality, as the Patani Forum's executive director Ekkarin Tuansiri, a speaker at a recent event at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand, pointed out.

The European Union's ambassador to Thailand, David Lipman, in his key keynote speech at the FCCT event, suggested granting the Malays greater cultural space, such as strengthening bilingual education so that the mother tongue is used alongside the official Thai.

Lipman has a point. In 2007, the then military-appointed government of Surayud Chulanont launched a pilot project in which several elementary schools in the region were permitted to teach the local Malay language and Islamic studies. During that year, insurgents torched more than 100 public schools. The following year, less than ten schools came under arson attack.

The key to the success, said the then vice governor of Yala, Grisada Boonrach, was making sure that religious teachers and clerics at the local level have a say in the curriculum. "It's about ownership," said Grisada, currently the governor of Songkhla.

And yet, no one in the security forces or policy-makers cares to seriously look into that particular development. If they had done, they would have lost face because many conservatives had all along played down the idea of Malay being used as a "working language" alongside Thai.

With regard to foreign influence, it is sad that Prayuth did not have the gumption to admit that, during the Surayud administration, the government sought help from the international community, neighbouring countries and foreign mediators to help resolve the conflict. Whether these initiatives produced any meaningful outcome is another matter. But having access to information about these initiatives is not below Prayuth's pay grade. It seems he can't come to terms with a reality he does not like.

Today a number of government agencies - the Army, Police, Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), National Security Council (NSC) - foreign governments, retired and active politicians, local and foreign think tanks, as well as local and international NGOs with mediation experience, are exploring the idea of a peace process. Many are running around looking for separatist leaders to talk to. The fact that there are so many of so-called peace-brokers suggests that there is no single ownership of the process. Some of these peace-brokers have tried to get a buy-in from the local community and religious leaders.

But without a meaningful and identifiable process mandated by the state, the government and "mediators" can forget about getting support from the ground to endorse their noble and ambitious activities.

Along with his public apology for atrocities committed against the people of Patani, Surayud called on various Thai government agencies to work with the international community to seek non-military means to end this conflict once and for all. Most of these tracks fizzled out in the following administrations of (the late) Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. But during the Abhisit administration, a number of "peace processes" surfaced, hoping to get a mandate for mediation.

According to one Cabinet member of the Abhisit government, the NSC issued a statement of intent to explain its ongoing dialogue with one of the long-standing separatist groups through one foreign mediator. The Cabinet did not endorse it, and Abhisit would only acknowledge it informally because, according to the source, the then prime minister needed deniability.

That doesn't mean that Abhisit wasn't aware that various Thai security and intelligence agencies, as well as the international community, were talking to various separatist groups. The PM just couldn't be seen to sanction these initiatives because it was too sensitive politically, the source said.

But the NSC-backed process could very well come to an end now that one of Pheu Thai's favourite bureaucrats is heading SBPAC. Sources in the government say that Thawee Sodsong wants to negotiate with the separatist leaders and end this conflict. His problem is that there are so many people out there who claim to be leader of this or that group.

Even if Thawee is barking up the right tree, exiled leaders from long-standing separatist groups say it still won't be easy. Besides the territorial nature of these mediators and so-called peace processes, the separatist leaders are disunited and many are competing among themselves. Worse, they don't seem to have adequate command and control over the militants on the ground.

And for any peace process to have any meaning, the leaders would have to demonstrate to the insurgents that they can come up with deliverables.

The insurgents on the ground are not in a hurry to enter into any peace process or dialogue or whatever the involved parties want to call it. As far as the militants are concerned, they can attack just about any place, any time. The recent ambush in Sai Buri was testimony to that.

Split in Pulo could hurt peace process with Thai government

Don Pathan
The Nation

An ongoing secret peace talk may be facing more obstacles now that one of long standing Malay Muslim separatist groups that have been working the National Security Council (NSC) has split up resulting in more splinter groups.

The NSC has been secretly dealing with the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) since 2006 after the then Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont issued an executive order asking all relevant agencies to look for non-military solutions to the conflict in the deep South where nearly 5,000 people have been died since January 2004 due to insurgency-related violence.

The group was under the leadership of Noor Abdulrahman, also known as Abe Kamae, and vice president, Kasturi Mahkota, who doubled as the group's foreign affairs chief.

As of late October 2011, Abae Kamae and Kasturi went on their own separate way. No explanation was really given as to why the two parted.

In a statement sent to The Nation, Abae Kamae claimed he is still the president of the movement. He was elected at a Pulo Congress held in 2009 in Syria. He named a well-known figure in the exiled Patani Malay community, Lukman Bin Lima, as the deputy president.

Kasturi, on the other hand, accused Abae Kamae and his followers of abuse of power and trying to obstruct a work in progress. Kasturi, a key person behind the dealing with the NSC since 2006, maintained that his legitimacy came from the Pulo Congress, also known as the Majlis Kepimpinan Pulo, or MKP.

He argued that Abae Kamae had decided to abandon the Congress and therefore neither he nor Lukman has the right to the name of the movement. The two factions continue to use the same Pulo logo.

An informed Thai source with working relations with the secret process of the NSC said he was concerned that the split as a set back and could have an adversed affect on the NSC process.

But a source in the Thai Army who has been dealing with Patani Malay separatist movements for decades said the split at this stage should not matter much since the NSC secret process is still in confidence building mode and experimenting on a number of ideas.

Moreover, said the officer, there are other so-called Pulo factions and leaders that the NSC process had overlooked. They include Samsudine Khan, who is also known as Abu Yasir Fikri, who in July 2009 formed an alliance with another separatist group, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) of Jehku Mae Kuteh, also known as Doramae Puteh.

The officer also pointed to Europe-based Rushdie Yi-ngor, also a long-standing leader in the Pulo movement who appeared to have gained some traction after the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) re-entered the scene by organising a talk shop for the long-standing separatist groups in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in October 2010.

OIC urged the leaders to form the United Patani People Council (UPPC) to be an umbrella organisation that could serve as the separatist movement's political wing that would enter into some sort of formal dialogue or peace talks with the Thai state.

The problem with the Thai side, said another military officer, is that there is no unity among all the relevant government agencies on the very idea of talking to the enemies even though there is an understanding that they are willing to settle for something less than independence.

Thai military commanders said they rather deal directly with the insurgents on the ground who are behind the violence rather than the exiled leaders who have no real command and control on the ground.

Thai government continues to employ military approach, coupled with development, to win the hearts and minds of the local residents. The effort has been easy as the armed militants on the ground enjoy a great deal of tremendous support from the local Malay Muslim villagers, not to mention the fact that heavy-handed tactics and culture of impunity among the authorities continue to make it harder for the state to regain its legitimacy among the Malay Muslim residents.

Sources with working knowledge of the militants on the ground said the insurgents would not enter into any direct negotiation with the Thai officials for fear that such effort would be a trap to kill them.

They said the only exit strategy is through the exiled leaders who the armed insurgents said must first unite among themselves before they could enter into formal or informal talks with the Thai state.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Split-in-Pulo-could-hurt-peace-process-with-Thai-g-30170305.html

BURMA: Mekong incident proves that the Golden Triangle is still volatile

Don Pathan
The Nation

In early 2002, when the Chinese authorities were breaking huge boulders to improve the navigational route between China and northern Laos and Thailand on the Mekong River, local residents and environmentalists were half joking when they said they would be

They were opposed to the Chinese-funded project out of concern that it would affect fish stocks and consequently their livelihood. A series of reefs and rapids would be removed, making it possible for 500-tonne cargo vessels to travel further up and down the river.

But while the Chinese engineers were busy dynamiting the rocks and reefs, the authorities conveniently overlooked one glaring security concern – that the stretch of river between the Chinese border and Thailand’s territorial waters is also the domain of opium warlords and drug armies operating out of the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle.

Prior to the coming of the Chinese cargo ships, the notorious United Wa State Army (UWSA) – dubbed the world’s largest armed drug-trafficking outfit by the US State Department – at one time even set up a small port of its own in the northern Burmese border region. Embarrassed by the Wa’s flag flying high, the Burmese government asked its Wa allies to close the port down, or at least not make it so obvious.

There is always a sense of nervousness – whenever passing through this no man’s land – among those who observe the Golden Triangle’s opium trade and its related ethnic insurgents. But regional integration cannot wait for Burma’s internal conflict to subside, thus, the decision by China to improve the trade link through this area.

Over the years, the authorities and stakeholders have tolerated the banditry and armed robberies that often take place along this route. But earlier this month their worst fears were realised when a group of bandits hijacked two Chinese-flagged cargo vessels and killed 12 people. A 13th person is still missing.

According to the Thai police, a gang run by Nor Kham, a Shan warlord, is thought to be behind the simultaneous hijack attempt that appears to have gone wrong. The incident took place about 20 kilometres from Thai territory.

Most of the victims had been handcuffed, tied and blindfolded. Nearly one million methamphetamine tablets were found on the two cargo ships.

Major General Prakarn Chonlayuth, commander of the Pa Muang Task Force, reportedly said that authorities believe the gang demands protection money. But if any vessels refuse to pay, they will hijack them and use them to transport drugs into Thailand.

Somehow the Task Force was alerted to this incident and sent its men to go after the two ships after they had entered Thai territory in the Chiang Saen district of Chiang Rai province.

The official explanation as to what had taken place, and why so many drugs were on board, has raised more questions than answers.

The drug gangs in the Golden Triangle produce millions of methamphetamine tablets on a weekly basis and tonnes of opium and heroin on a seasonal basis annually. These illicit drugs are usually smuggled into Thailand via the land route. So why would a drug gang that knows the Thai-Burma border area like the back of its hand opt to use this particular strategy and entry point – a security bottleneck – to enter Thailand with hijacked ships with a massive amount of drugs on board.

Were the drugs already on the ships when they left the Chinese port? This wouldn’t make much sense, since the drug armies and warlords in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle operate somewhat freely without interference from the Burmese authorities.

In 1989 the Burmese junta granted the UWSA autonomous status in an area called Special Region 2. Trying to go “legitimate”, the UWSA announced in October 2005 that it would ban opium cultivation in Wa-controlled areas. But the world, with the exception of a hopeful handful of Chinese intelligence and security officials along the Sino-Burma border, paid them no mind because methamphetamines continue to flood out of the region.

Thailand’s Yong Kha Development Project, a crop substitution scheme, launched in Wa-controlled areas near the Thai border in December 2003, was another laughing stock, as no one fell for it. Shortly after that, the US announced more arrest warrants for Wa leaders. It was a big embarrassment for the then Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who permitted himself to be duped by his Burmese counterpart, General Khin Nyunt. The Yong Kha Project did more to whitewash the UWSA – and strengthen Thai-Burmese relations than address the plight and suffering of Wa peasants, or long-term peace and stability.

In the end, none of the piecemeal projects and initiatives worked.

Today, a cloud of uncertainty continues to hang over Burma’s sector of the Golden Triangle, and the river that runs by it, as warlords and drug armies continue to roam freely. If anything, the murder of the 12 Chinese crew members is a reminder of how things can go awfully wrong when officials overlook obvious security concerns.

Like opium and insurgency, development and stability in this rugged part of the world, where warlords and drug armies play for keeps, go hand in hand. Development and regional integration will always hit a snag if the security issue is not addressed in a comprehensive and meaningful way.

Sapae-ing Basor and the Peace Process

Don Pathan
The Nation

Thai policy-makers have never been fond of the idea of talking to the Malay Muslim separatists in the deep South, unless these encounters are kept off the public radar screen.

The long-standing argument has been that they should not give the enemy much sought-after legitimacy and political capital.

Back in the 1970s and 1980s, such encounters were carried out by the military, in various cities in the Middle East like Cairo, Damascus and so on. No formal mediation was needed. It was not the Thai Army's style to have outsiders sitting in on these discussions.

One senior Malaysian police officer who met these handful Thai military officers joked about how “Every time they come over, they always said they are representative for the Thai government. But when they go back, nothing happens.”

Needless to say, the outcome of these meetings didn't have any impact on policy because they were treated as news and information gathering exercises. The Thai military just wanted to fighting to stop but never really wanted to understand the grievances that motivated these separatists.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the armed wings of these long-standing separatist groups (Pulo, BRN, BIPP, GMIP, etc...) that first surfaced in the late 1960s had gone under. Foot soldiers put down their weapons, returned to their villages and picked up where they had left off. Many of their leaders remained abroad, taking up citizenship of the respective countries where they had been residing at the time of the insurgency downturn.

But since 2004, at a time when a new generation of Malay Muslim separatist groups went into full swing, the leaders of these long-standing separatist groups decided that it was time to reinvent themselves. Some went through foreign NGOs specialised in mediation, while others turned to neighbouring governments and foreign institutions like the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), seeking help in facilitating meetings with the Thai side. A proliferation of "peace processes" emerged and each and everyone of them were territorial.

From the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) to retired and active senior Army officers, the National Security Council (NSC), the police, academic institutions, foreign and local NGOs, as well as former Malaysian PM Dr. Mahathir Mohammed and the then Indonesia Vice President Jusuf Kalla, all were looking for separatist groups to talk to. The Patani Malay leaders who came forward put on a brave face, insisting that they can convince the new generation of fighters -- locally referred to as juwae or perjuang in standard Malay -- to the negotiating table as long as the Thais would give them the mandate to do so.

Rivalries among the long-standing groups also emerged as they tried to convince the Thai side to give them the mandate to speak on behalf of the Malays of Patani in spite of the fact that few people in the deep South know the identity of these so-called leaders.

Former foot soldiers who came down from the hills and returned to their villages have decided to stay out of the ongoing insurgency, saying while they still dream about a free Patani, they also acknowledged that there is a generation gap between them and the juwae.

Some admitted that they were concern with the level of violence and the collateral damages stemming from it. But while they are concern with the attack on soft targets, they are equally disapprove of the use of pro-government death squads or vigilante. The tit-for-tat violence often spills into the civilian side, with both Muslims and Buddhists becoming victims as one side tries to teach the other a nasty lesson.

The one key question that everybody is asking is whether these self-proclaimed leaders of Patani liberation movements can influence the juwae on the ground. Most, if not all, insist they can, pointing to their regular dialogue with cell leaders.

But the Thai side is not convinced. In other words, these exiled leaders may have dialogue with the juwae but they don't have shared command (like a military chain of command). In other words, they don't control and can not instruct the juwae as to what to attack or when to carry out attack.

If and when the Thai side is convinced that there is a shared command - assuming that the old guard can unite with one voice - it is very like that the Thai side will start to take them more seriously.

For the time being, "negotiation" is out of the question. Academics and think tanks working secretly with some of these initiatives have come up with the term "peace dialogue" to broaden the participation to include civil society and key community leaders - Buddhists and Muslims - from the three southernmost provinces.

In one peace process that involved the National Security Council (NSC) and a group of Pulo under the leadership of Noor Abulrahman and Kasturi Mahkota, invitees include a woman activist leader to a mayor of a southern city, to a former student activist to village imams.

The idea here is to strengthen the legitimacy and acceptance of the process. How much of a buy-in there is from local leaders, on the other hand, remains to be seen. Some members of the civil society say they are willing to help. Others question the sincerity of the Thai side, saying the stakes are too high to be sticking their necks out. Good intention is not enough. There has to be a guarantee that their participation will not be exploited by one side or the other. Another concern is how the militants will perceive this participation.

But this particular NSC-led process is operating on a shaky ground. Sources in the military said the Army feel they are in better position to lead any peace process. Another problem is that Kasturi and Noor Abdulrahman have split up. Observers of the conflict said the two leaders are likely to remain active looking for ways to remain relevant in working towards peace for the south although they may no longer work together. Beside these two individuals, there are other self-proclaimed Pulo leaders. They include Samsudin Khan and Rushdie Yi-ngor, both of whom also claimed to be the true leader of Pulo.

Another peace process that was being overseen by a senior officer at the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) involved a former mid-ranking Pulo officer (not under the same faction as Kasturi, Samsudin Khan or Rushdie Yi-ngor). This process was working to put together a “staged ceremony” that would show some 170 former Patani Malayu separatist combatants “surrendering” to the Thai State. Sources in the Army and the Police pointed to the “staged” nature of the act, saying the plan does not involve any of the law enforcement agency. It's just a show.

Today, a new government is in place and the SBPAC has got a new chief, Thawee Sodsong, who is not exactly a new face to the region. Thawee was a key person who went after Sapae-ing and other ustaz back in 2005. He was also given the task of tracking down the militants behind the January 4, 2004 arms heists in Narathiwat, an incident that ended in the lives of four soldiers and more than 350 pieces of military weapons being taken from the camp. Thawee rubbed many local Malay Muslims the wrong way as he hunt down ustaz and suspected insurgents in the deep South.

Perhaps the biggest irony here is that for the past four years, all these "peace-makers" and Thai authorities have been looking for one man, Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of a private Islamic school, Thamvithya  Foundation, who was accused by the Thaksin administration of being the overall leader of the new generation of militants. The fact that a number of juwae had graduated from the Thamvitya network private Islamic school that oversees more than 10,000 students made Sapae-ing an easy target.

But today, they want his help.

Exiled separatist leaders, academics, local residents, religious and community leaders said Spae-ing is looked upon as sort of a spiritual leader of the Malays in the deep South. The mystique around him is a topic of much debate. Those who know him say his integrity earned him respect from his people. Because of that respect, they see him as a sort of spiritual leader for the Malays of Patani.

Achieving such status come with a price, as well as enemies, especially when one is a symbol of an identity and historical and cultural narrative that is different from the one constructed by the state.

As of late, more and more government officials are coming to admit that the December 2004 charges against Sapae-ing will not hold water in the court of law. These officers said if he was to stand trial today, he would beat the charges easily.

But after hiding for six years, it is very unlikely that the aging principle will give the Thai legal system the benefit of the doubt. This explains why the former school principle has stayed outside any peace process.

“Sapae-ing sees these peace process as somewhat of a joke,” said a member of an exiled group who has been trying to start up a peace process.

There is little evidence that separatism or radicalism is taught in the school, however. In fact,

The historical and cultural narrative that challenges the legitimacy of the Thai state is widespread and there is nothing to support the claim that private Islamic schools are used to indoctrinate the juwae. Security officials said about 90 per cent of villages in this restive region have a militant cell. And from the look of it, the juwae enjoy a great deal of sympathy and support from villagers.

Because the Patani Malay historical and cultural narrative is so widespread, the movement doesn't have to rely on Islamic schools to tell them that the Thai security forces are illegitimate occupier. The presence of some 60,000 armed security personnel - half of whom have been dispatched to the region since 2004 - reinforces such notion and perception that the deep South is an occupied territory.

Sapae-ing's support is deemed important because these peace initiatives need a person who the Malays of Patani can relate to.

“We don't know any of these exiled leaders that you mentioned,” said a group of young men at a  teashop in a remote village Narathiwat's Rusoh district.

There have been suggestions among government officials that the charges against Sapae-ing be pushed through the due process so that his legal status can be concluded once and for all. But there is no guarantee that he is going to stick his neck and help any one of these peace process, however.

There is a growing understanding among senior Thai officials that the conflict in the deep South is ethnic-nationalist in nature. Therefore, it makes sense to talk to a spiritual leader such as Sapae-ing.

However, the mode of operation for the time being is a combination of search-and-destroy and winning hearts and minds through development runs by military and government officials. But after nearly eight years of this strategy, many officers are saying a new approach for the south is needed.

Asking Sapae-ing for help is one way. But the fact that the Thai state had ruined his life and forced him to go on the run, don't be surprise if he decided to sit out these peace process that often appeared to be more about the people who are behind it rather then the people of Patani.

OFFICIAL INTRANSIGENCE LEADS TO STALEMATE IN DEEP SOUTH

DON PATHAN
THE NATION

SOLDIERS and police inspect the scence of a roadside bomb attack on a passing police vehicle in Pattani's Yarang district.

BESIDES the criminalisation of the MalayMuslim insurgent movement in Thailand’s deep South, there is also the problem of ongoing brutality by both sides that undermines mediation efforts by the old guard of Malay separatists. It’s not easy claiming to have command and control of the new generation of militants and then have to face up to the kind of violence that takes place on the ground, exiled leaders say.
With regard to the lack of unity among the long-standing separatist groups, the same can be said of the Thai side. No official agency can really claim a sole mandate to carry out a peace process, not even the Army, because a significant number of hardliners in the military do not like the idea of talking to the enemy.
During the Surayud administration, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, as well as European countries were asked to help. They were seen as credible partners and were asked to take a direct role in facilitating meetings with the separatists. Surayud thought it made sense to work with the international community, especially countries where many of the old guard were exiled.
The Abhisit government retreated from Surayud’s hands-on approach and told the rest of the world that the deep South was an internal matter. The idea of negotiating peace was just too controversial and the government needed what one officer at the PM’s Office called “deniability”.
That doesn’t mean that Abhisit Vejjajiva wasn’t aware that various security and intelligence agencies were talking to the separatist groups. The PM just couldn’t be seen as sanctioning these initiatives because it was too sensitive politically.
Surayud, on the other hand, headed a military-appointed government that didn’t have opposition in Parliament to contend with. Unfortunately, the vision Surayud put forth never materialised as mediators and the exiled groups became territorial. Then the following administrations – from Samak Sundaravej to Abhisit – pushed foreign governments and international bodies away.
Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya may have publicly thanked Kuala Lumpur for supposedly informing Thailand about the Organisation of Islamic Conference’s (OIC) initiatives on Thailand’s deep South, after news about their meeting with the old guard went public late last year. But no one who followed the issue closely believed what he said. They saw his statement as a face-saving measure. This is because the Thai government does not want outsiders to get involved in the deep South.
Like others, Kuala Lumpur is concerned that the violence could either spill over to its side of the border or lure Malaysian citizens into the conflict. After all, the Thai-Malaysian border is as artificial as any other. Today, what concerns the international community is the idea that the political context of the conflict will change – from a Patani Malay nationalist cause to a global jihadist cause where the fight becomes one for Islam.
There is nothing to suggest that the conflict is moving in that direction, however. One of the reasons is that the new militants, locally referred to as juwae, or “fighters” in the local Malay dialect, see themselves as winning, as they are able to attack anyone, any place, at any time. The juwae share the same resentment toward the Thai state as local Malay villagers. This explains why so few people help Thai security officials with their investigations.
Thailand will be hard pressed by the OIC members to explain the culture of impunity among its officials in the deep South. Thailand’s unwillingness to crack down on pro-government death squads or its own people accused of torturing suspects continues to drive a deeper wedge between the Malays in the deep South and the state. The June 2009 Ai Bayae massacre in Narathiwat and a May 2011 shooting spree in Bannang Sata in Yala are just two incidents that come to mind. Both incidents were carried out by former paramilitary rangers with an axe to grind with local insurgents but decided to take it out on ordinary villagers. And the fact that the Bannang Sata shooting took place just 200 metres from an Army outpost, and that none of the soldiers bothered to come to check the five locations that gunmen hit, reinforced the perception that the Army turns a blind eye or that soldiers had colluded with Buddhist gunmen. Warrants were issued and the suspects sent home after turning themselves in. If the Ai Bayae massacre is any indication, the suspects are likely to walk free.
Still, the Army is convinced it is the most suitable negotiator and determined to be at the head of any negotiations with the insurgents. The Army believes that with help from Indonesia and Malaysia, the old guard will come to the table – assuming they can get over their grudges – and that will serve as an entry point to the new militants. It is not clear what kind of concession the Army could make to the old guard to gain the attention of the insurgents who, seeing themselves as winning, don’t seem to be interested in talking.
Another thing that is unclear is why the Army is assured that it has the right to engineer any peace process given the fact that it talked to the old guard in the 1970s and 80s but failed to achieve any breakthrough. A retired senior officer in the Malaysian government who helped facilitate some of the meetings in the 1980s said the Thai Army was never serious about moving talks beyond an informal setting.
In the coming months, it is likely that Thai soldiers and the Patani Malay old guard will come face to face again for a round of talks. Meanwhile violence continues and there doesn’t seem to be much anybody can do to stop it. Some people believe that sooner or later the militants will get tired of fighting and look for a way out. But this end game the old guard hope for might not materialise.
The problem with the new generation of militants is that there will always be a new crop of young fighters to replace them. Judging from the recent past, especially the conduct of the post-Tak Bai generation, the replacements will be just as vicious and brutal, if not more so.