Revenge killings perpetuate violent cycle in the deep South

Don Pathan
The Nation

In mid-2005, less than two years after the current insurgency exploded in the Muslim-majority three southernmost provinces, Thai security officials began to reconnect with exiled separatist leaders. They were hoping that these ageing leaders from various long-standing separatist groups could talk sense into the new generation of militants, locally known as juwae, or "fighter", in the Patani Malay dialect.

One issue the exiled leaders always put on the table whenever they meet the Thai side is the target killings of religious leaders by pro-government death squads. Naturally, the government side points to the collateral damage, as well as target killings of innocent people.

Insurgents insist that spies are fair game. Nevertheless, there have been incidents in which innocent civilians were targeted as part of the tit-for-tat between the two sides. An eye for an eye, so they say.

The problem for observers is that, unlike conflicts in other parts of the world, the insurgents in Thailand's deep South do not surface to make claims. This is also very different from the previous generation of Patani Malay separatists, who began to dwindle in the late 1980s.

Today, the theatre of violence is not just in remote areas but in towns and cities, and no one really knows who's behind the attacks, such as Tuesday's drive-by shooting on a teashop in Narathiwat's Rangae district that killed four and injured four.

For the past nine years, one thing has been clear: the juwae, as part of their coordinated campaign, have continuously turned up the heat, inflicting greater psychological damage with their attacks.

Remember how irritated the authorities were at the very first car bomb near a hotel in Sungai Kolok in October 2009? Today, bombs are hidden on motorbikes, in pickup trucks, cars and under the tarmac, waiting for security personnel to pass by.

Often, these attacks are not as discreet. An attack in Pattani's Mayo district last July, when insurgents in three pickup trucks drove up to soldiers on two motorbikes and began firing at close range, was carried out in front of security cameras. It jolted the entire nation and forced the government into a knee-jerk reaction.

While some attacks are easier to predict, such as an ambush of police or soldiers followed by a brief gunfight, roadside car bombs are not.

As in other sub-national conflicts, security officials are pretty much sitting ducks. But insurgents' choices of targets and tactics, on the other hand, change often. In 2007, more than 100 schools came under arson attack. The following year, less than ten.

According to the website of the Regional Education Office No 12 (www.coad3.org/web/), an entity of the Education Ministry that oversees the southernmost provinces, nine teachers were killed in 2004. But from 2005-2007, 65 teachers were killed. The figure dropped by half from 2008-2011, with an average of ten teachers killed each year. And this year, only two teachers had been killed as of October 3.

All that changed on November 14 when gunmen, believed to be part of a pro-government death squad, killed an imam in Yala's Yaha district. Abdullateh Todir, 49, was a member of the Islamic Committee of Yala, as well as chairman of the Imam Association of Yaha. He is a resident of Tambon Patae, an extremely volatile area in this highly contested region of Thailand.

An exiled leader in the BRN-Coordinate accused the government side of killing the imam. The cleric's relatives and friends agreed. There was an attempt on Abdullateh's life about a year ago but a bullet missed him and took his daughter's life instead. Days later, a team of three Special Forces soldiers were providing security for the imam. The team leader, a lieutenant wearing a sarong and traditional Malay shirt, and accompanied by two armed soldiers in fatigues, rode pillion with Abdullateh up and down the Yaha-Bannang Sata backroads. "We're friends," said the smiling lieutenant, pointing to the imam, as he looked at this correspondent, who visited the cleric the day after the failed attempt on his life.

Abdullateh's neighbourhood, Tambon Patae, is one of the reddest areas classified by authorities as a "red zone." Thai official sources said the Special Forces and civilians may have wanted Abdullateh alive because they saw him as a potential go-between for the authorities wanting to set up a line of communication with the insurgents. But others may have found him guilty by association, said the BRN source.

The killing of Abdullateh set off a wave of retaliation including a motorbike bombing of a Paramilitary Ranger unit in downtown Yala, the bombing of a train bogey carrying security personnel in Narathiwat, arson attacks on a school in Pattani, and attacks against three teachers, two of whom were killed.

As part of the damage control, Thawee Sodsong, head of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), ordered an investigation into the killing of Abullateh.

But that hasn't changed much on the ground. On Tuesday in Narathiwat's Rangae district, a three-man death squad dressed in black jumped out of a pickup truck and fired on a teashop full of local Malay-Muslim villagers. Four, including an 11-month-old baby, were killed and another four were wounded.

Later in the day, in Tambon Panan in Pattani's Mayo district, five gunmen charged into a schoolyard and shot to death the director and a teacher. As in all other incidents, police said the attackers were insurgents.

Frustrations run high, indeed, especially among agencies that are against the use of death squads to even the score. Many believe target killings have created a reverse effect, such as encouraging people to take up arms to avenge the death of their imam or friends or relatives.

Others, like the SBPAC, believe in establishing dialogue with the separatists. The problem is that their dealings with the old guard have not delivered the desired outcome.

"The government fails to end vigilantism allegedly carried out by rogue security units in revenge for insurgent attacks on Buddhist Thai officials and civilians," said Sunai Phasuk, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch.

"Insurgents may claim that abuses by the security forces justify their attacks, but the government should not allow its troops to adopt the same logic. Any attempt to cover up the misconduct of security forces will further escalate a cycle of reprisal violence. And clearly, this is not an environment to build communal trust, necessary for a peace dialogue," Sunai said.

Judging from the violence that has been unleashed over the past four weeks, it may be a long time before the situation returns to normal, whatever normal means.

The fight over the peace process prolongs conflict

Don Pathan
The Nation

The recent transfer of National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary-General Somkiat Boonchoo to an inactive post in the Prime Minister's Office has raised a lot of eyebrows among those who closely observe the ongoing insurgency in Thailand's deep South.

After all, here was a man who had followed the conflict in the region with a high degree of consistency. Somkiat has been replaced by Lieutenant-General Paradon Pattanathaboot, who returns to a post he once held until he was removed by the previous government.

Technically, it is a swap. But in the Thai political context, if one's name card says you're an "advisor to the Prime Minister's Office", it can mean you were transferred to the post because you are considered deadwood. Or it could be that you are someone with high integrity, thus making you incompatible with the government of the day - especially an administration as insecure as this one. No one doubts Somkiat's integrity, however.

Somkiat has contributed to the recently announced NSC plan that includes recommendations for the government to consider establishing a "safe zone" where dialogue between the authorities and militant separatists could take place.

Besides pushing the idea of dialogue with the separatists into the public sphere, Somkiat's direct participation marked a significant shift that paved the way for more civilian agencies and non-Army personnel, as well as civil society representatives, to get involved in the secret "peace process".

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, this job was exclusively reserved for Army personnel. That changed in late 2005 when the then NSC chief General Winai Pathiyakul, along with the then NSC's director Lieutenant-General Vaipot Srinual, took part in the now-defunct Langkawi Process, a peace initiative launched by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed.

This was during the time when Thaksin Shinwatra was the country's prime minister, although he didn't pay much attention to the recommendations from the process.

After the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin, the NSC was given greater responsibility by the Surayud Chulanont government. In fact, Surayud had opened the door for other agencies and ministries to take part in the process, which included reaching out to neighbouring countries, professional mediators and the international community for help in this daunting task.

The secret peace process drifted off the radar screen during the two pro-Thaksin administrations of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. It came back on the screen again during Abhisit Vejjajiva's tenure as prime minister.

But the NSC was not the only agency talking to the leaders of the long-standing separatist movement. Other agencies got in on the act as well. Everybody, it seemed, wanted to become a peace broker, but nobody wanted to work with anyone else.

When Yingluck Shinawatra came into power and appointed favourite bureaucrat, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong as the new secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the task of talking to the enemy was given to him.

Somkiat saw the writing on the wall and understood full well what this meant for the NSC's secret initiative. But those who know him didn't think the Thaksin camp would go as far as removing him from his post at the NSC.

It is not clear what Paradon's job will be in the NSC, but political insiders believe his main duty is to ensure that the NSC strategy and future plan will be in line with the peace initiative of the Thaksin camp, spearheaded by Thawee.

In fact, Thawee was already acting as the head of Thailand's "peace delegation" almost immediately after this government came to power, and he moved to the SBPAC office about a year ago.

In the months leading up to March, Thawee was sending representatives abroad to meet with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups - the old guard - in the hope that they would convince the new generation of militants on the ground to end their campaign of violence.

These leaders claimed to have dialogue and working relations with the militants, locally referred to as juwae, but few observers and officials were convinced that the link was strong enough to constitute a shared command, or command-and-control in military language.

Moreover, Thawee thought that by bringing Thaksin into the picture, the separatist leaders would be convinced that the Thai side was sincere about its commitment. And so a secret meeting between Thaksin and a group of 17 separatist leaders was held in mid-March. Nothing major came out of it, as expected, as the encounter was more symbolic than anything else.

The interesting part was not so much which separatist groups showed up but which one didn't. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relationship with the juwae, boycotted the meeting because it couldn't forgive Thaksin for his heavy-handed and abusive tactics when he was in power.

For the BRN-C to surface and come to the table at this point in time, there would have to be great demands and expectations - the kind of expectations and demands that neither side will be able to deliver.

According to BRN-C and other separatist sources, although the BRN-C may have the best working relationship with the juwae, this link does not constitute a shared command.

To add insult to the boycott, the juwae on March 31 carried out massive car-bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala. With more than a dozen killed and over 100 injured in the two incidents, the insurgent violence in Thailand's deep South reached a new threshold. It was a slap in the face for Thaksin and his cronies.

The Army and the opposition Democrat Party didn't waste time in ridiculing the government about Thaksin's participation in the secret talks, despite the fact that all parties have at one time or another talked to the representatives of the separatists.

Thaksin, of course, denied meeting the separatists. So much for the so-called commitment. As the government retreats to the drawing board, it has decided to ditch Somkiat, the one man who knows a great deal about the conflict in the region.

But Somkiat's absence doesn't mean Thawee's job will be easier. Somkiat would have been a good resource person for Thawee but the manner in which he was sidelined suggests that the Thaksin camp wants to have complete control of the process even though their effort so far has not produced any meaningful result.

Moreover, the Army's ridiculing the government for "talking to the enemy" should not be equated to an uncompromising stance because the Army, too, talks to the separatists. Essentially the spitting contest among these power cliques is all about having full control of the peace process.

One way out of this quagmire, according to several observers and insiders, is to have the government designate an agency that has full control over peace processes, similar to the one in the Philippines. With a full political mandate, the military and other agencies would have no choice but to get in line or miss the boat.

Wishful thinking perhaps. For the time being, the government's hopes are still pinned on Thawee, hoping that he can come up with something bold and creative. But where he goes from here is anybody's guess.

No easy way to start a peace process in the deep South

With the backing of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the premier's older brother Thaksin, the secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), Thawee Sodsong, thinks he is on a roll.

Don Pathan
The Nation

Over the past few months, Thawee has been working hard to kick-start a peace process in the three southernmost provinces, where the ongoing insurgency has claimed more than 5,000 lives since January 2004.

Thawee has been sending representatives to neighbouring countries to ask for their assistance in facilitating secret talks with leaders of long-standing separatist movements in southern Thailand.
One of the things Thawee will be offering is that the future SBPAC chief be locally elected. The ruling Pheu Thai Party is also exploring, again, the idea of granting the Muslim-majority South special administrative status.

On the surface, Thawee’s idea of permitting the future SBPAC chief to be locally elected may sound like a good idea, as the Malay Muslims – who constitute over 80 per cent of the residents in the deep South – would be given an opportunity to elect one of their own people to a top post. But some exiled separatist leaders, as well as members of the Barisan Revolusi National-Coordinate (BRN-C), think Thawee and the Thaksin camp are trying to wash their hands of the deep South. Autonomy and decentralisation could mean political and administrative power in the deep South falling into the hands of the few Malay elites, who could very well be Bangkok’s lackeys, they say.

And while a locally elected SBPAC chief would take the heat for things that go wrong, the locally hired paramilitary Rangers would inevitably become the target for insurgents’ bullets and bombs, as the regular Army command pulled soldiers back to their respective regions.

Many observers warn that without a meaningful decentralisation process in place, or structural reform in such a way that would give the SBPAC real power over administrative and security matters, a locally appointed secretary-general would amount to a paper tiger.

Nevertheless, Thawee is going ahead with his plan and is preparing to take this message of peace and reconciliation to the leaders of the long-standing separatist movements living in exile.
However, a number of Thai officials who have observed the conflict for years, as well as the exiled separatist leaders, think Thawee’s textbook-like approach will not work because there are too many factors that he has yet to overcome.

“Thawee thinks he can bring exiled separatist leaders to the table and cut a deal to end this conflict once and for all. It won’t work because the grievances are deep-rooted in the hearts and minds of just about every single Malay Muslim of Patani,” said a BRN Coordinate cadre.

Even if Thawee succeeded in getting the current crop of separatists to come on board, a new generation of militants will eventually surface to continue the armed struggle, as this past eight years have shown.

Another problem for Thawee, said another exiled leader, is that there is no unity among leaders of these separatist groups he plans to meet. Personal rivalries aside, the views of these leaders vary from wanting complete independence to willingness to settle for some form of autonomy.
Perhaps the most important factor that would hamper Thawee’s peace process is the fact that none of these groups seem to have adequate control over the new generation of insurgents, locally known as juwae, operating on the ground.

Members of the BRN Coordinate, who are said to have the best working relationship with the juwae, admit that the chain of command is too fluid, and more time will be needed to consolidate command-and-control with the juwae. And without the ability to effectively influence the juwae or curb the ongoing violence, Thawee negotiating with the old guard could prove meaningless.

One of the biggest concerns for the BRN, said one of its cadre, is that some of the juwae, or young men who call themselves juwae, have been selling their services to crime syndicates and smugglers. This has made consolidation much more difficult.

For the time being, there is a truce between the Army and the Thaksin camp. No one is certain how long this truce will last, but Thawee’s quest for a quick peace deal has rubbed many of the country’s top brass up the wrong way. The Army chief is against autonomy, and the top brass does not like the idea of talking to the enemy unless they are the ones doing the talking.

And in spite of the fact that the Army sent one of its generals to observe the nearly defunct National Security Council’s secret peace talks two years ago, the idea of backing another government agency’s peace initiative is not something the top brass is willing to entertain in any meaningful way.
But with support from Thaksin and Yingluck, Thawee thinks there is nothing that is going to stop him. Separatist leaders, on the other hand, see things differently. There are just too many unresolved issues that Thawee will have to overcome, they say.

Besides the fact that Thawee is surrounded by people they don’t really trust, exiled Patani Malay leaders say he is still haunted by his past deeds. Indeed, many locals still recall how, back in 2004, Thawee hunted down suspected insurgents and Islamic teachers, including a Malay-Muslim spiritual leader, Sapae-ing Basor. Thaksin had accused Sapaeing of wanting to be president of a liberated Patani.

Today, many Thai government officials are quietly saying what the local Malays have believed all along – that the charges against Sapae-ing were fabricated. Incidentally, many of the peace-brokers are looking for the man, hoping that he could help bridge the trust gap between the state and the Malays of Patani.

The talk of autonomy or permitting a locally elected SBPAC chief may appeal to some local Malay elites but certainly not the vast majority of the voters, who, at the last general election, did not grant even one parliamentary seat to the Pheu Thai Party, which was promising special status for the region. Locals say policy-makers should concern themselves with issues like justice, equality and social mobility for the Malays, not structural reforms aimed at changing an agency’s head but not much else.

Assuming that Thawee and Thaksin’s camp can cut a deal with the separatist movements, there is no guarantee that the Patani Malay’s historical narrative will just disappear. The emergence of a new generation of insurgents after a relatively quiet decade in the deep South is a testimony to this very point.

Police insiders say Thawee has asked Malaysia to facilitate talks with the separatist leaders. It is not the first time that top Thai officials have tried to arrange talks with the separatist leaders in a collective manner. In 2005, former Malaysian PM Dr Mahathir Mohammed facilitated a series of talks between top Thai security officials, and the outcome did not have any real impact on the conflict or Thai policy in the deep South. Separatist leaders who took part in the Langkawi peace talks say they didn’t like the fact that they were being dictated to, and warn that future dealings with Thawee could very well be repetition of the so-called Langawi initiative – a peace process that didn’t get anywhere.

“You can’t just impose peace. Thailand has to work for it in a meaningful way,” said one exiled leader.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/aec/30177950