Showing posts with label NSC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NSC. Show all posts

Tuesday, 18 November 2025

New Government, New Team

The National Security Council (NSC) of Thailand organized a seminar in Bangkok on 29 October 2025, bringing together the chief negotiators for the southern peace process to share their experiences. Credit: Don Pathan

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Resumed Talks

After nearly two years of stagnation, peace negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) are getting back on track. Leaders from both sides met recently to acquaint themselves and prepare for a high-level official meeting next month, facilitated by Malaysia.

Thailand’s newly appointed chief negotiator for the conflict, Gen (rtd) Somsak Rungsita, along with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Chatchai Bangchuad, met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrohman in Kuala Lumpur on 11 November 2025.

According to a press statement from the Office of the Malaysian Government Facilitator, the meeting was “cordial and constructive”, with both parties committing to resume official and technical dialogues in December 2025. The meeting was facilitated by retired Malaysian NSC chief Mohd Rabin Bashir.

A BRN officer from the negotiation team said the organisation acknowledges the short time the current government of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has in office but pledged the movement would do its utmost to ensure continuity.

The last high-level talks with the BRN – the longstanding separatist group that controls combatants in Thailand’s far south – were held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 February 2024.

Past Setbacks

As for the meeting next month, the two sides will pick up where they left off—discussing the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This framework identifies three key items: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict, which has claimed over 7,700 lives since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004. The region is the historical Malay homeland known as Patani.

Initially, they had planned to delve deeper into these three items. However, fierce criticism from insiders of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, particularly Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, sidelined the negotiators and effectively put formal talks on hold for nearly two years.

Surachart was upset that the Thai team had not made the reduction of violence a binding commitment and lashed out at international donors for not pressuring the BRN to end its violent tactics; he said their role in the peace process has helped to legitimise BRN.

Still, quiet discussions between BRN and Thai representatives continued outside the formal track. During a meeting at the beginning of this year, the Thai side requested a temporary ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadhan, which ran from 1 to 30 March 2025.

BRN agreed on the condition that international observers be permitted on the ground and an unspecified number of detainees be released. The then-defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected the proposal, insisting the government would only negotiate if BRN ended its campaign of violence and that they would only talk with those who have command-and-control over militants on the ground.

When political discussions hit a brick wall, BRN’s military wing took charge to map out the next move. On 9 March, a 10-strong BRN unit attacked the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for the Ministry of Interior officials) and wounding eight others.

The combatants left behind a car packed with explosives that detonated during their retreat. The car bomb ripped through the district office compound, sending a stern message to Bangkok that it does not get to decide who represents BRN at the negotiating table.

Differing Definitions of “Peace”

Today, with Pheu Thai and Surachart out, NSC has returned to the fold. A public event was organised by NSC on 29 October where all former chief negotiators were invited to share their experiences. They largely echoed the same points: that there is continuity despite political instability, a commitment to peace and that Thailand’s territorial integrity remains paramount.

But academic and peace expert Mark Tamthai, who led the negotiation team under former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, said Thailand has yet to understand the nature of the conflict in the far south and therefore has not developed the necessary tools to extinguish it.

“At first, there is the simplistic view that people take up arms because they are upset with the state. But the reality is more complicated than that,” said Mark, a retired professor of peace studies at Chiang Mai’s Payap University.

Mark believes there must be a better way to involve the public because their participation could help strengthen the peace process and generate traction.

“My other question is why the peace process doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. We take a step forward and then take a step back. Why is that?” he asked.

One reason the process seems circular is that both sides define peace differently.

“For the government, peace is the absence of violence, as well as the people of Patani living within the framework set by the government. They are not allowed to make too many demands, such as self-determination rights, and there can also be no seminar on a public referendum,” Mark said. “If these demands continue to surface, in the state’s view, then the fire in the south has yet to be put out.”

Mark said BRN and local civil society agree with the state on the first point—that regional violence must end. But the second point involves opening a political space where no issue is off-limits. This is where the two sides differ greatly, as demonstrated by the ongoing court case against political activists in the far south.

“I’m glad that the new chief negotiator (Gen [rtd] Somsak) wants to hear what the local people are saying. But you must be serious about wanting to listen; you can’t let them speak and then turn around and charge them with whatever law is at hand.”

Mark also pointed to JCPP as an example of progress that can only go so far. “But when the issue of public consultation comes up, some people retreat. Why? Because public consultation doesn’t fit their definition of what is politically permissible,” he said.

Hurdles

The upcoming high-level meeting will not be a walk in the park. It comes at a time when flimsy charges are being levied against five civic actors, scheduled to appear in the Pattani Criminal Court on 20 November 2025, to face charges of advocating separatism during a 2023 seminar that they had participated in.

From left to right: Artef Sohko – President of The Patani; Hussen Bue-nae – Former President, Student Organization of Yala Rajabhat University (YRUSO); Irfan Umar – Member of The Patani; Sareef Salaeman – Patani–Malay cultural youth activist, Student at PSU Pattani, Member of The Patani; and Hakim Pongtigor – Deputy Secretary-General, Fair Party at the time of the seminar, currently senior member of The Patani. Photo taken in front of the Office of the Attorney  General in Pattani. (Photo Credit: The Patani)

What got on the nerves of the region’s military command was the mock referendum, which asked participants a hypothetical question on whether they would support the idea of a referendum on rights to self-determination if Thai law permitted it. They did not advocate independence or encourage political mobilisation to call for separatism. But a hypothetical question was enough for the military to push for legal action against the activists.

Moreover, old issues like public consultation under the framework of JCPP remain far from resolved. BRN has informed Thailand that its representatives should be permitted to enter the far south to conduct in-person public consultations.

This request was rejected by the Thai army, whose leaders feared a public relations nightmare. One military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, asked to imagine an outpouring of public support for BRN delegates; such a scene would not only embarrass the Thai side but also shatter its long-standing claim that the Malays of Patani side with them.

Making the Most of Limited Time

After nearly two years of a halted formal process, BRN considered the setting up of a negotiating team as somewhat pretentious, considering the government has only less than four months in office before a general election is called. Yet, it could set a precedent for the incoming administration, especially if the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is part of the coalition and tasked with conflict resolution in the far south.

“We are looking to make the most of it given the limited time in office of this government,” one BRN operative said.

BRN has already stated it is willing to settle for something less than full independence. The ball now seems to be in Thailand’s court to reciprocate.

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani – a political action group that often acts as an interlocutor between BRN and Thai government agencies – the clock is ticking. The next wave of BRN leaders might not be as accommodating as the current ones.

If the Thai government continues to kick the can down the road, the next generation of BRN leaders could retreat from their commitment to work within the Thai Constitution. Artef is one of the five civic actors being charged with advocating separatism for participating in a mock referendum.

The challenge for the current and incoming government is enormous. It is unclear if Bhumjaithai has the appetite or the mindset for a challenge that demands creative policy and serious thought about what aspects of Thailand’s nation-state construct must be revised for the sake of peace and peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, violence in this historically contested region has been on the rise, with combatants (who are operating quite freely) straying outside the normal theatre of conflict. Last month’s gold heist in Narathiwat, where over 36.5 million baht worth of gold was stolen, as well as a botched bombing operation in major tourist spots on the Andaman coast in June 2025, are examples of how the absence of a political platform has allowed violence to morph and spread. BRN made no public statement about the 11 bombs unearthed in Krabi and Phuket provinces, but it did say that without a formal peace process, increased violence and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

  • Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Friday, 27 October 2023

Thai peace talks: Expect new PM to appoint civilian as chief negotiator

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews

Peace talks between Thailand and Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels came to a complete stop in early 2023 when BRN said they would not return to the table until a new government took power following the May general election.

Prime Minister Srettha Tavisin and his cabinet were inducted on Sept. 5 after political wrangling and a post-polls impasse that lasted 3½ months. But nearly two months into office, Srettha’s government still has not announced who he has appointed to serve as the chief negotiator representing Thailand in the Malaysia-brokered talks. 

It’s also unclear whether Srettha has removed Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, the incumbent, from that post. The delay is not so much a tactic but a reflection of how this administration prioritizes its policies.

Srettha has other urgent matters to attend to such as restoring the faith of his Pheu Thai Party’s support base, who felt betrayed by deals it made in forming a ruling coalition with the help of ex-military rivals who had toppled another Pheu Thai prime minister through a 2014 coup.

And so it’s important to give the impression of civilian supremacy. 

The prime minister is poised to appoint the first non-military person in years to lead the negotiating team. The past three chief negotiators for the southern peace process were retired army generals. A non-military person is expected to lead the National Security Council (NSC) as well.

Official sources said the negotiating team would report directly to Srettha, who would incorporate his own key personnel into the outfit. The NSC will not take the lead on that team but will join representatives from other government agencies and ministries in the secretariat.

While the negotiations team will come directly under the prime minister, the Prachachat Party, a local party made up of mostly ageing Malay Muslims who were members of the now-defunct Wadah Faction, will take the lead in overseeing policy for the far south. They will receive a wide mandate, from development to national reconciliation.

Anas Abdulrahman (center), the head of the panel representing Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels in peace talks with Thailand, and fellow BRN delegates take part in a post-meetings press conference at a hotel in Petaling Jaya, near Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3, 2022. [S. Mahfuz/BenarNews]

However, identifying the terms for peaceful coexistence between the ethnic Malays in the troubled border region and the rest of the predominantly Buddhist country will not be easy. 

Wadah politicians were given the same mandate by the then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who, almost immediately after coming to power in 2001, dissolved the multiagency Southern Border Provinces Administration Center so that his people could have a freer hand to deal with the region. 

But the government of Thaksin, Pheu Thai’s patriarch, was caught off guard with the emergence of the new generation of Patani Malay separatist fighters after nearly a decade of relatively calm.

At first, Thaksin labeled them “sparrow bandits,” insisting that Patani Malay separatist ideology was a thing of the past. But his government could no longer deny the political underpinnings of their operations when, on Jan. 4, 2004, scores of BRN insurgents raided an army battalion and made off with hundreds of military weapons from an arms depot on base.

Since then more than 7,300 people have been killed from insurgency-related violence.

Peace initiatives have come and gone but none generated enough traction to push the talks beyond confidence-building measures, or CBM – not even after the BRN, the group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the field, came to the table, in early 2020.

As long as anyone could remember, Prachachat members like to blame the military for just about everything, from abuse of power and heavy-handedness in counter-insurgency operations, to obstructing progress and development in this historically contested region.

But it was their refusal to stand up for their own people against the then government of Thaksin and the army during two bloody incidents – the Tak Bai massacre and the Krue Se Mosque standoff in April and October 2004, respectively – that undermined their popularity with voters.  

According to Daungyewa Utarasint, an assistant professor at the New York University campus in Abu Dhabi, the so-called Wadah politicians were shunned by their constituency for nearly 15 years. They were able to make a comeback in 2018 with the help of Police Col. Tawee Sodsong, a close political ally of Thaksin. Together, these so-called Wadah politicians formed the Prachachart Party.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group advocating rights to self-determination for the people in the far south, said memories of the Tak Bai and the Krue Se incidents are still vivid in the minds of the locals who have yet to come to terms with these atrocities.

“Blaming the Army for all the region’s problems is Wadah’s way of excluding themselves from any responsibilities. They were more concerned about staying in power than bringing justice to their people,” Artef said.

“Justice to them is mainly about economic development. They forgot it’s also about human dignity,” Artef added.

Negotiation can be a thankless job because the Thai team was hampered by national politics that would not permit them to make any meaningful concessions to the rebels or to the Patani Malays, a people who embrace an entirely different set of historical and cultural narratives from that of the Thai State.

For the young men taking up arms against the state, said local writer Asmadee Bueheng, their political objective is non-negotiable.

“People have put their lives on the line for it and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Thailand has to learn how to deal with this sacred value that cannot be compromised,” Asmadee said.

Today, with a civilian government in place, it is tempting to believe that changes is inevitable. It is hoped that meaningful topics would reach the negotiating table and generate greater social-political space for the Malays in the far south that could lead to reconciliation.

But this blind optimism rests on the assumption that the civilian leaders understand the nature of the conflict better than the military who had dominated the country’s national politics for much of the past two decades.

Civilian leaders may have a better rapport with civil society organizations (CSO). But if the past two decades tell us anything is that neither the political leaders nor the country’s top brass has the political will to push for real changes.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/thailand-srettha-thavisin-southern-peace-talks-don-pathan-10272023104732.html 


Wednesday, 4 July 2012

The fight over the peace process prolongs conflict

Don Pathan
The Nation

The recent transfer of National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary-General Somkiat Boonchoo to an inactive post in the Prime Minister's Office has raised a lot of eyebrows among those who closely observe the ongoing insurgency in Thailand's deep South.

After all, here was a man who had followed the conflict in the region with a high degree of consistency. Somkiat has been replaced by Lieutenant-General Paradon Pattanathaboot, who returns to a post he once held until he was removed by the previous government.

Technically, it is a swap. But in the Thai political context, if one's name card says you're an "advisor to the Prime Minister's Office", it can mean you were transferred to the post because you are considered deadwood. Or it could be that you are someone with high integrity, thus making you incompatible with the government of the day - especially an administration as insecure as this one. No one doubts Somkiat's integrity, however.

Somkiat has contributed to the recently announced NSC plan that includes recommendations for the government to consider establishing a "safe zone" where dialogue between the authorities and militant separatists could take place.

Besides pushing the idea of dialogue with the separatists into the public sphere, Somkiat's direct participation marked a significant shift that paved the way for more civilian agencies and non-Army personnel, as well as civil society representatives, to get involved in the secret "peace process".

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, this job was exclusively reserved for Army personnel. That changed in late 2005 when the then NSC chief General Winai Pathiyakul, along with the then NSC's director Lieutenant-General Vaipot Srinual, took part in the now-defunct Langkawi Process, a peace initiative launched by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed.

This was during the time when Thaksin Shinwatra was the country's prime minister, although he didn't pay much attention to the recommendations from the process.

After the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin, the NSC was given greater responsibility by the Surayud Chulanont government. In fact, Surayud had opened the door for other agencies and ministries to take part in the process, which included reaching out to neighbouring countries, professional mediators and the international community for help in this daunting task.

The secret peace process drifted off the radar screen during the two pro-Thaksin administrations of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. It came back on the screen again during Abhisit Vejjajiva's tenure as prime minister.

But the NSC was not the only agency talking to the leaders of the long-standing separatist movement. Other agencies got in on the act as well. Everybody, it seemed, wanted to become a peace broker, but nobody wanted to work with anyone else.

When Yingluck Shinawatra came into power and appointed favourite bureaucrat, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong as the new secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the task of talking to the enemy was given to him.

Somkiat saw the writing on the wall and understood full well what this meant for the NSC's secret initiative. But those who know him didn't think the Thaksin camp would go as far as removing him from his post at the NSC.

It is not clear what Paradon's job will be in the NSC, but political insiders believe his main duty is to ensure that the NSC strategy and future plan will be in line with the peace initiative of the Thaksin camp, spearheaded by Thawee.

In fact, Thawee was already acting as the head of Thailand's "peace delegation" almost immediately after this government came to power, and he moved to the SBPAC office about a year ago.

In the months leading up to March, Thawee was sending representatives abroad to meet with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups - the old guard - in the hope that they would convince the new generation of militants on the ground to end their campaign of violence.

These leaders claimed to have dialogue and working relations with the militants, locally referred to as juwae, but few observers and officials were convinced that the link was strong enough to constitute a shared command, or command-and-control in military language.

Moreover, Thawee thought that by bringing Thaksin into the picture, the separatist leaders would be convinced that the Thai side was sincere about its commitment. And so a secret meeting between Thaksin and a group of 17 separatist leaders was held in mid-March. Nothing major came out of it, as expected, as the encounter was more symbolic than anything else.

The interesting part was not so much which separatist groups showed up but which one didn't. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relationship with the juwae, boycotted the meeting because it couldn't forgive Thaksin for his heavy-handed and abusive tactics when he was in power.

For the BRN-C to surface and come to the table at this point in time, there would have to be great demands and expectations - the kind of expectations and demands that neither side will be able to deliver.

According to BRN-C and other separatist sources, although the BRN-C may have the best working relationship with the juwae, this link does not constitute a shared command.

To add insult to the boycott, the juwae on March 31 carried out massive car-bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala. With more than a dozen killed and over 100 injured in the two incidents, the insurgent violence in Thailand's deep South reached a new threshold. It was a slap in the face for Thaksin and his cronies.

The Army and the opposition Democrat Party didn't waste time in ridiculing the government about Thaksin's participation in the secret talks, despite the fact that all parties have at one time or another talked to the representatives of the separatists.

Thaksin, of course, denied meeting the separatists. So much for the so-called commitment. As the government retreats to the drawing board, it has decided to ditch Somkiat, the one man who knows a great deal about the conflict in the region.

But Somkiat's absence doesn't mean Thawee's job will be easier. Somkiat would have been a good resource person for Thawee but the manner in which he was sidelined suggests that the Thaksin camp wants to have complete control of the process even though their effort so far has not produced any meaningful result.

Moreover, the Army's ridiculing the government for "talking to the enemy" should not be equated to an uncompromising stance because the Army, too, talks to the separatists. Essentially the spitting contest among these power cliques is all about having full control of the peace process.

One way out of this quagmire, according to several observers and insiders, is to have the government designate an agency that has full control over peace processes, similar to the one in the Philippines. With a full political mandate, the military and other agencies would have no choice but to get in line or miss the boat.

Wishful thinking perhaps. For the time being, the government's hopes are still pinned on Thawee, hoping that he can come up with something bold and creative. But where he goes from here is anybody's guess.